People v. Caselnova: Grand Jury Justification Instructions, Group Self‑Defense, Kidnapping, and Duty to Retreat

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in People v. Caselnova, 2025 NY Slip Op 06560 (Nov. 26, 2025), is a significant clarification of the prosecutor’s obligations when charging a grand jury on justification (self‑defense) in violent street‑encounter cases, particularly those involving multiple aggressors and competing narratives of threat.

The case arises from a chaotic late‑night confrontation in downtown Saratoga Springs between the defendant, Vito E. Caselnova, his then‑girlfriend, Alex Colon, and a group accompanying Colon. A verbal exchange escalated into a physical assault on the defendant, followed by an exchange of gunfire between defendant and Colon, with multiple people – including defendant, Colon, and the girlfriend – ultimately shot, in part due to police response.

A grand jury indicted Caselnova on a range of charges, including:

• Attempted murder in the second degree,
• Assault in the first degree,
• Menacing in the second degree,
• Reckless endangerment in the second degree,
• Possession of a firearm in a sensitive location,
• Possession of a large capacity ammunition feeding device (two counts), and
• Harassment in the second degree.

After receiving an anonymous letter from a grand juror expressing concerns about the proceeding, the Saratoga County Court (Murphy, J.) conducted a sua sponte inquiry, disclosed grand jury minutes to the defense, and ultimately dismissed the indictment under CPL 210.35(5), finding that the integrity of the grand jury proceeding had been impaired by defective and biased instructions, especially regarding justification.

The People appealed pursuant to CPL 450.20(1). The Third Department affirmed the dismissal, though on narrower grounds than the County Court: it held that the indictment must be dismissed because the prosecution failed to adequately instruct the grand jury on key aspects of justification, including:

• That the defendant could be justified in using deadly force not only against Colon but against the entire attacking group;
• That, viewing the evidence most favorably to the defendant, he had no duty to retreat because he could not do so with complete safety; and
• That his use of deadly force could be justified by a reasonable belief that a kidnapping was in progress, not merely a robbery.

At the same time, the court rejected the County Court’s view that the prosecutor needed to instruct the grand jury on “withdrawal” from the role of initial aggressor, given the specific fact pattern after the defendant brandished his firearm.

This opinion shapes the law in three connected areas:

1. The scope of justification instructions required at the grand jury stage under CPL 210.35(5);
2. The analysis of initial aggressor status, withdrawal, and duty to retreat in fast‑moving, multi‑party violent encounters; and
3. The reach of Penal Law § 35.15(2)(b) (former) justification where a defendant reasonably believes a kidnapping (as opposed to just a robbery) is occurring.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

After the indictment, the County Court received an anonymous letter from a grand juror raising unspecified “concerns” about the grand jury proceedings. The court:

• Commenced a sua sponte investigation into those concerns;
• Disclosed grand jury minutes to the defense; and
• Entertained a defense motion to dismiss the indictment under CPL 210.35(5).

County Court granted dismissal without prejudice, allowing the People to re‑present to a different grand jury, based on:

• Incomplete and misleading instructions on justification (self‑defense), and
• Additional non‑instructional errors the court characterized as evidencing bias against the defendant.

On appeal, the Third Department:

• Affirmed the dismissal of the indictment;
• Did so solely on the ground that the People failed to properly instruct on justification; and
• Declared the County Court’s broader bias findings “academic” and did not address them.

B. Key Holdings

The Third Department’s principal rulings are:

1. No requirement to charge “withdrawal” after brandishing a gun.
   Once the defendant brandished his firearm during the beating, there was no reasonable view of the evidence under which he attempted to withdraw from the use or threatened use of deadly force. Therefore, the prosecution was not required to charge the grand jury on “withdrawal” under the initial aggressor rule.
2. Obligation to charge justification as extending to the entire attacking group.
   The grand jury should have been instructed that the defendant’s use of deadly force in self‑defense could be directed not only at Colon but at all members of the attacking group, given the evidence that:
   • Multiple individuals were simultaneously assaulting the defendant; and
   • He reasonably believed someone in the group was armed and posed a deadly threat.
3. No duty to retreat when safe retreat is impossible.
   Viewing the evidence most favorably to the defendant, there was no reasonable view under which he had a duty to retreat before employing deadly force, assuming he was not the initial aggressor. The circumstances – traffic on a four‑lane road, simultaneous attacks from multiple directions, and the girlfriend’s proximity – showed he could not retreat with “complete safety” to himself and others.
4. Justification based on perceived kidnapping must be charged when supported.
   Evidence that someone in the group shouted “run his pockets and grab the girl,” combined with the rapid escalation and positioning of vehicles and people, provided a reasonable basis for the defendant to believe a kidnapping was underway. Thus, the grand jury should have been instructed on justification under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(former)(b) in relation to kidnapping, not only to robbery (for which the People did give a justification instruction).
5. Failure to give these justification instructions impaired the integrity of the proceeding.
   Under CPL 210.35(5), the combined instructional failures “impaired the integrity of the proceeding and prejudiced defendant,” warranting dismissal of the indictment, even though the dismissal was without prejudice and the case could be re‑presented to a new grand jury.

III. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Grand Jury Instruction Standards and Justification Defenses

The opinion begins from well‑established principles regarding the level of detail necessary in grand jury instructions:

• The prosecutor’s instructions to a grand jury “need not be instructed with the same degree of precision” required for a petit (trial) jury.
  – People v. Waddell, 78 AD3d 1325, 1326 (3d Dept 2010), lv denied 16 NY3d 837 (2011).
• It is sufficient if the grand jury receives “enough information for it to intelligently decide whether a crime has been committed and whether legally sufficient evidence exists to establish the material elements of that crime.”
• However, “while there is no requirement that the grand jury be charged with every potential defense suggested by the evidence, the People must charge those defenses that the evidence will reasonably support.”
  – People v. Gallo, 135 AD3d 982, 984 (3d Dept 2016).
  – See also Waddell, supra; People v. Calafell, 211 AD3d 1114, 1118 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 1077 (2023).
• Where the evidence suggests a “complete defense such as justification may be present, the prosecutor must also charge the grand jurors on that defense, providing enough information to enable them to determine whether the defense, in light of the evidence, should preclude the criminal prosecution.”
  – Waddell, 78 AD3d at 1326.

Caselnova does not alter these principles but applies them rigorously to a complex set of facts, clarifying how far the prosecutor must go in presenting justification theories that the evidence reasonably supports, especially in a multi‑assailant, fast‑moving confrontation.

B. Initial Aggressor and Withdrawal: No Additional Instruction Required After Brandishing

A central issue was whether the prosecutor needed to instruct on “withdrawal” from initial aggressor status under Penal Law § 35.15(1)(b).

The Court of Appeals in People v. Brown, 33 NY3d 316 (2019), clarified the initial aggressor rule in the context of escalation from physical to deadly force:

• Being the “initial aggressor” must be analyzed separately for mere physical force and deadly physical force.
• If a confrontation starts with non‑deadly physical force and one party escalates by using or threatening deadly force, that party may become the “initial aggressor” with respect to deadly force.
• “Both the sequence of the attacks (or imminently threatened attacks) and the nature of those attacks matter.”

Caselnova applies this framework:

• When Colon’s group first approached, the defendant had his hand on his gun; this made him the first to threaten deadly force and a possible initial aggressor as to deadly force.
• He then removed his hand from his weapon, stepped between Colon and the girlfriend, extended his left hand toward Colon’s chest, and ushered the girlfriend behind him. The altercation shifted at that point to a punching assault by Colon’s group, culminating in the defendant being forced onto the hood of a rideshare vehicle.
• This interim conduct – hand off the gun, hands used in a non‑deadly, protective manner – could be interpreted as an attempted withdrawal from deadly force aggression. The court acknowledges this, citing Penal Law § 35.15(1)(b) and People v. Petty, 7 NY3d 277, 285 n 4 (2006).
• However, the critical moment for the current charges is later: while the defendant was being beaten against the car hood and then after the car backed up, he again reached for and brandished his gun.

From that point on, the appellate court holds:

• The question of who was the initial aggressor in terms of deadly force from that moment forward was for the grand jury, given evidence that the defendant was being beaten and simultaneously became aware someone in the group had a gun.
• If the grand jury determined the defendant was the initial aggressor at that point, then justification would require a later withdrawal from the use or threatened use of deadly force – something that, on this record, never occurred.
• Therefore, “there is no reasonable view of the evidence that defendant attempted to withdraw at any point once he threatened deadly force by brandishing his weapon,” and so “the need for the withdrawal charge is negated.”

In short, the Third Department narrows, rather than expands, grand jury charging obligations on this point: no withdrawal instruction is necessary where, once the gun is brandished, there is no evidence that the defendant later abandons the use or threat of deadly force.

C. Justification Against a Group of Aggressors

The decisive instructional error, in the court’s view, concerned the scope of the defendant’s purported self‑defense: was it limited to Colon alone, or did it extend to the entire attacking group?

The general rule, drawn from People v. Young, 33 AD3d 1120 (3d Dept 2006), lv denied 8 NY3d 929 (2007), and Court of Appeals cases such as People v. Wesley, 76 NY2d 555 (1990), and People v. Goetz, 68 NY2d 96 (1986), is that:

• A jury (or, at the charging level, a grand jury) considering justification must look beyond the immediate motions of the named “victim.”
• It should consider:
  • Evidence of prior acts by the victim known to the defendant,
  • Physical characteristics of all persons involved, and
  • “The behavior of third‑party aggressors acting in concert with the victim.”

Applying that principle, the Third Department notes:

• The evidence showed the defendant was punched and beaten by several members of Colon’s group from multiple directions.
• He reasonably understood that someone in that group – though not necessarily Colon – had a gun, based in part on his girlfriend’s warning.
• Video showed a coordinated, group‑based attack rather than a one‑on‑one duel.

In this context:

• The defendant could “reasonably have believed that deadly force was necessary to protect himself against the entire group.”
• Therefore, the justification charge for the attempted murder and assault counts should have been framed to allow the grand jury to consider whether his use of deadly force was justified as against “Colon and others,” not solely Colon.
• Notably, the People did use “Colon and others” in their justification instruction for the menacing count (count 3) but did not extend that same broader framing to the attempted murder and assault charges. The appellate court implicitly treats this inconsistency as significant.

This aspect of Caselnova is an important refinement: it instructs that when a defendant is attacked by a group and evidence suggests he reasonably perceived a group threat, the grand jury must be told that justification can encompass self‑defense against all of the attackers, not only the one named complainant or the one who is ultimately shot.

D. Duty to Retreat and the “Complete Safety” Standard

New York’s justification statute (Penal Law § 35.15) traditionally required, in many circumstances, that a person retreat if he or she can do so with “complete safety” before using deadly force, unless in one of several statutorily recognized exceptions (e.g., in a dwelling against certain felonies).

The Third Department, relying on cases such as:

• Matter of Y.K., 87 NY2d 430 (1996),
• People v. Mercer, 221 AD3d 1259 (3d Dept 2023), lv denied 41 NY3d 1003 (2024),
• People v. DeCamp, 211 AD3d 1121 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 1077 (2023), and
• People v. Black, 33 AD3d 338 (1st Dept 2006),

holds that “there was no reasonable view of the evidence that defendant had a duty to retreat” if he was not the initial aggressor.

The court emphasizes the specific, seconds‑long sequence:

• The defendant was backing onto Broadway (a four‑lane road with observed vehicular traffic) while being approached and assaulted by members of the group.
• He was punched multiple times and forced onto the hood of a parked rideshare vehicle.
• When the rideshare abruptly reversed, he regained his balance and raised his firearm, only to be attacked almost immediately from his left by the driver of a newly arrived white SUV.
• He circled to the sidewalk with his gun drawn, and approximately seven seconds later, after Colon raised his firearm, gunfire was exchanged.
• The girlfriend was physically close to the fray, and she had already shouted a warning that someone in the group was armed.

Given these facts, the court finds that the defendant:

• Could not safely retreat – stepping into traffic, leaving his girlfriend behind, or attempting to outrun multiple aggressors in close quarters would not reasonably promise “complete safety.”
• Thus, if he was not the initial aggressor with respect to deadly force, the law did not impose a duty to retreat before he used deadly physical force.

Although the opinion does not spell out the exact defect in the People’s actual instructions, the court characterizes this as part of the missing “justification charges.” The clear implication is that the grand jury was not properly told that, based on the evidence, defendant might have had no duty to retreat, and that omission risked leading the grand jury to reject justification on an incorrect legal premise.

E. Justification Based on Preventing Kidnapping Under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(former)(b)

The opinion’s most notable doctrinal extension concerns Penal Law § 35.15(2)(former)(b), which, at the time of the incident, authorized deadly force where the defendant reasonably believes another person is:

• “committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery.”

(As the court notes, the Legislature has since amended this subdivision to add “forcible aggravated sexual abuse.” See L 2024, ch 23, § 4; L 2023, ch 777, § 8.)

The People did instruct the grand jury on justification based on a perceived robbery. But the County Court – and the Third Department, now affirming – concluded that the evidence also reasonably supported a justification theory premised on attempted kidnapping of the girlfriend, requiring a separate instruction.

Key facts relied upon by the appellate court:

• Video from a rideshare dashboard camera and city cameras showed:
  • The white SUV arriving hastily while two members of the group attacked the defendant on the hood of the rideshare vehicle; and
  • An overall scene of rapid, coordinated movement of cars and people.
• Both the defendant and the girlfriend testified they heard someone in the group yell “run his pockets and grab the girl.”
• Colon had tried to punch the defendant, stumbled on the curb, and dropped his firearm; the girlfriend saw the gun and shouted a warning.
• The rideshare vehicle suddenly reversed, freeing the defendant from the hood and enabling him to gain his balance, draw his firearm, and “scan the scene.”
• According to the defendant, he moved back to the sidewalk specifically to position himself between the group and the girlfriend.
• Only seconds later, Colon raised his firearm and the gunfire exchange began; approximately 15 seconds elapsed from the first punch to the first shot.

The Third Department applies the familiar standard for when a justification charge must be given:

• “A justification charge is appropriate where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, a jury, based upon any reasonable view of the evidence, could decide that the defendant’s actions were justified.”
  – People v. Reinfurt, 241 AD3d 1015, 1024 (3d Dept 2025).
  – See also People v. Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 144–145 (1983); People v. Thomas, 166 AD3d 1499, 1503 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied 32 NY3d 1178 (2019).

On that standard, the court holds:

• When viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, the shouted phrase “run his pockets and grab the girl,” the SUV’s arrival, the ongoing assault, and the positioning of the girlfriend justified an inference that the group might be attempting to abduct her.
• Thus, a reasonable person in defendant’s position could believe that a kidnapping was “taking place in the seconds after the violence began.”
• Therefore, the grand jury should have been charged on justification premised on preventing a kidnapping, not solely a robbery.
• The People’s argument that the defendant’s version was not credible misses the point – credibility disputes must be left to the grand jury; the prosecutor’s charging obligation is triggered by whether “any reasonable view of the evidence” supports the defense theory, assuming the jury believes it.

This portion of the opinion underscores that:

• The enumerated‑felony justification in § 35.15(2)(b) is not purely academic at the grand jury stage; it has real effect in street‑crime scenarios.
• When a victim’s words or coordinated group behavior reasonably suggest an intent to seize or drag away a companion, a kidnapping‑based justification must be considered.

F. Impaired Integrity of the Grand Jury Proceeding – CPL 210.35(5)

Under CPL 210.35(5), an indictment may be dismissed when:

• “the integrity of the grand jury proceeding is impaired and prejudice to the defendant may result.”

This standard, interpreted in cases such as People v. Huston, 88 NY2d 400 (1996), and People v. Ball, 175 AD3d 987 (4th Dept 2019), affd 35 NY3d 1009 (2020), is not satisfied by every instructional error. The defect must be fundamental enough that it:

• Undermines the grand jury’s ability to make an informed, lawful charging decision; and
• Is likely to have prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights.

In Caselnova, the Third Department emphasizes that:

• Justification is a complete defense; if accepted, it precludes criminal liability.
• Here, multiple independent justification theories were reasonably supported by the evidence:
  • Self‑defense against a deadly threat posed by a group,
  • No duty to retreat given the inability to retreat with complete safety, and
  • Deadly force to prevent a kidnapping.
• The People either failed to charge these theories or charged them in an unduly narrow way (e.g., only as to Colon, or only for robbery).
• Under Batashure and Huston, credibility is for the grand jury, but here the grand jury was not given the correct legal framework within which to exercise that judgment.

The court concludes:

“Collectively, we find that the failure to provide the foregoing justification charges impaired the integrity of the proceeding and prejudiced defendant, thus supporting dismissal of the indictment (see CPL 210.35[5]; see e.g. People v. Ball, 175 AD3d 987, 989 [4th Dept 2019], affd 35 NY3d 1009 [2020]).”

Crucially, the dismissal is without prejudice and with leave to re‑present to a new grand jury. The People are not barred from prosecution; they are required to redo the grand jury process under proper legal instructions.

G. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion weaves together a number of important precedents. The most significant and how they are used:

• People v. Goetz, 68 NY2d 96 (1986).
  Foundation of New York’s modern justification law. It clarifies that a defendant’s belief in the need for deadly force must both:
  • Reflect the defendant’s actual, subjective belief; and
  • Be objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
  Caselnova relies on this dual standard, especially in assessing defendant’s perception of a deadly group threat and potential kidnapping.
• People v. Brown, 33 NY3d 316 (2019).
  Key authority on the “initial aggressor” concept as applied separately to physical and deadly force. The Third Department adopts Brown’s sequencing and nature‑of‑force analysis in deciding that, once the defendant brandished his gun, there was no later withdrawal that would require a “withdrawal” instruction.
• People v. Valentin, 29 NY3d 57 (2017).
  Reaffirms that a defendant need not wait to be struck or wounded if he reasonably believes deadly force is about to be used against him. Caselnova uses this principle to support the view that the defendant could draw and use his firearm based on an imminent threat from an armed group.
• Matter of Y.K., 87 NY2d 430 (1996).
  Addresses duty to retreat and the necessity to retreat only when one can do so with “complete safety.” The Third Department applies this standard in concluding the defendant had no such safe avenue of retreat.
• People v. Young, 33 AD3d 1120 (3d Dept 2006).
  Emphasizes that justification analysis must focus on a broad set of circumstances, including third‑party aggressors acting in concert. This case is the main support for expanding the self‑defense instruction to cover the entire group, not just Colon.
• People v. Wesley, 76 NY2d 555 (1990).
  Supports considering prior acts of the victim known to the defendant and the broader context in assessing reasonableness of fear. Caselnova cites it when discussing how the grand jury must consider the totality of the circumstances.
• People v. Waddell, 78 AD3d 1325 (3d Dept 2010); People v. Gallo, 135 AD3d 982 (3d Dept 2016); People v. Calafell, 211 AD3d 1114 (3d Dept 2022).
  These cases collectively establish:
  • Grand jury instructions can be less detailed than petit jury charges; but
  • Where evidence reasonably supports a complete defense such as justification, that defense must be charged.
  Caselnova is a direct, fact‑rich application and elaboration of this line.
• People v. Padgett, 60 NY2d 142 (1983); People v. Thomas, 166 AD3d 1499 (4th Dept 2018); People v. Reinfurt, 241 AD3d 1015 (3d Dept 2025).
  These cases articulate the standard for when a justification charge is required: if, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant,” a jury could reasonably find his acts justified. Caselnova extends that analysis to kidnapping‑based justification.
• People v. Huston, 88 NY2d 400 (1996); People v. Batashure, 75 NY2d 306 (1990).
  These decisions address the grand jury’s role as fact‑finder and stress that issues of credibility are for the grand jury, not the court, and that indictments should not be dismissed based on credibility assessments. Caselnova uses them to explain why the People’s skepticism about the defendant’s testimony is irrelevant to whether a justification charge was required.
• People v. Ball, 175 AD3d 987 (4th Dept 2019), affd 35 NY3d 1009 (2020).
  Demonstrates that significant charging errors can impair the integrity of a grand jury proceeding under CPL 210.35(5). Caselnova relies on Ball to support dismissal based on defective justification instructions.

The opinion also cites more recent Appellate Division cases such as People v. Swanton, People v. Singh, People v. Mercer, People v. DeCamp, People v. Cutting, and others to illustrate applications of initial aggressor, duty‑to‑retreat, and group assault concepts, but it does not detail their facts; they serve primarily as doctrinal support rather than independent holdings.

IV. Simplifying Complex Legal Concepts

1. Grand Jury vs. Petit Jury Instructions

A grand jury decides whether there is enough evidence to charge someone with a crime (probable cause), not whether the person is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A petit jury (trial jury) decides guilt or innocence.

Because of that difference:

• Grand jury instructions can be shorter and less detailed than trial instructions.
• However, they must still provide a legally accurate framework, especially where a complete defense (like justification) may entirely negate criminal liability.

2. Justification (Self‑Defense) as a Complete Defense

“Justification” in New York is essentially the codified concept of self‑defense (and defense of others). If a person’s use of force is justified under Penal Law § 35.15, that force is not a crime.

Key elements include:

• The defendant must actually believe that force is necessary to defend against another’s use or imminent use of unlawful force.
• That belief must be objectively reasonable under the facts as the defendant reasonably perceived them.
• For deadly force, special conditions apply (e.g., threat of deadly force or certain serious felonies, plus the duty to retreat where applicable).

3. Initial Aggressor and Withdrawal

The “initial aggressor” is the person who first uses or threatens unlawful physical or deadly force. An initial aggressor generally may not claim justification unless:

• He or she withdraws from the encounter and clearly communicates that withdrawal; and
• The other person nevertheless persists in or resumes the use of force.

Brown refined this concept by recognizing:

• A person can be an initial aggressor with respect to deadly force even if the other person started the physical altercation with mere punches.
• Thus, the analysis must look carefully at the timing and nature of escalations from fists to firearms.

4. Duty to Retreat

Under prior versions of § 35.15 (and still relevant concepts), a person using deadly physical force has a duty to retreat, if:

• He can do so “with complete safety” to himself and others; and
• No statutory exception (like certain home‑defense scenarios) applies.

“Complete safety” is a demanding standard. If retreat would leave a companion at risk, force someone into significant danger (e.g., into moving traffic), or is practically impossible in the few seconds available, the law does not require retreat.

5. Enumerated Felony Justification – § 35.15(2)(b)

Separate from the usual “defense of self or others” provision (§ 35.15(2)(a)), subdivision (2)(b) allows the use of deadly force where a person reasonably believes another is “committing or attempting to commit” especially serious violent felonies, including:

• Kidnapping,
• Forcible rape,
• Forcible criminal sexual act,
• Robbery, and now also
• Forcible aggravated sexual abuse (post‑amendment).

Caselnova demonstrates that this provision can apply not only to obvious abductions but to rapidly unfolding situations where attackers indicate an intent to seize or drag away a companion (“grab the girl”), particularly in the context of an ongoing group assault.

6. CPL 210.35(5) – Impaired Integrity of Grand Jury Proceedings

CPL 210.35(5) permits a court to dismiss an indictment where:

• There has been some fundamental error in how the grand jury was instructed or how evidence was presented; and
• That error is serious enough to impair the integrity of the process and threaten prejudice to the defendant.

Not every technical mistake qualifies. But when the prosecutor fails to provide the grand jury with the legal tools necessary to consider a complete defense that the evidence reasonably supports, that typically crosses the line into “impaired integrity.”

V. Impact and Future Implications

A. For Prosecutors

People v. Caselnova sends a clear signal to prosecutors, at least within the Third Department:

• When evidence of justification is present – particularly in dynamic, multi‑assailant encounters – prosecutors must:
  • Identify all reasonably supported justification theories;
  • Charge the grand jury on those theories, not just the narrowest or most favorable to the prosecution; and
  • Frame justification in a way that accounts for group aggression where warranted.
• Skipping or unduly narrowing justification charges risks dismissal of the indictment under CPL 210.35(5), even in serious violent‑crime cases.
• Prosecutors must carefully consider:
  • Whether a defendant had a realistic opportunity to retreat with complete safety;
  • Whether the threat reasonably appeared to be coming from a group rather than a single aggressor; and
  • Whether any enumerated felony under § 35.15(2)(b), such as kidnapping, is reasonably suggested by the evidence.

B. For Defense Counsel

Defense attorneys gain a powerful template from Caselnova for challenging indictments where:

• The incident involves multiple attackers or a chaotic group fight;
• There is evidence – even disputed or partially based on defendant’s testimony – of:
  • Self‑defense against group threats,
  • Inability to retreat safely, or
  • An attempted kidnapping or robbery of a companion.
• The prosecutor gave justification instructions that:
  • Focused only on a single named victim, ignoring group threats;
  • Assumed or implied a duty to retreat when safe retreat was arguably impossible; or
  • Addressed some, but not all, relevant enumerated‑felony justifications under § 35.15(2)(b).

Defense motions to dismiss under CPL 210.35(5) can now directly analogize to Caselnova and Ball, arguing that omitted or distorted justification instructions impaired the grand jury’s ability to fairly evaluate whether prosecution should proceed at all.

C. For Courts and the Development of Justification Law

Within the Third Department, Caselnova is likely to be:

• A leading case on the breadth of grand jury justification instructions;
• A practical guide for judges reviewing grand jury minutes in cases involving:
  • Concealed or licensed firearms in public places,
  • Group brawls or “pack” assaults, and
  • Alleged kidnapping or attempted abduction in the course of a fight or robbery.
• A case that may be cited by other Departments or by the Court of Appeals in future self‑defense and grand jury integrity disputes.

Doctrinally, it reinforces that:

• Self‑defense is not to be atomized into artificially narrow victim‑by‑victim analyses when a group acts in concert;
• The reality of modern, rapidly escalating street confrontations must inform how courts assess the availability of safe retreat; and
• Enumerated‑felony justification (especially kidnapping) has real, not merely theoretical, application in such contexts.

VI. Conclusion

People v. Caselnova stands as a comprehensive and nuanced application of New York’s justification law to the grand jury stage. The Third Department:

• Affirms that prosecutors must charge justification defenses that are reasonably supported by the evidence, including:
  • Self‑defense against an entire attacking group,
  • Lack of duty to retreat where safe retreat is impossible, and
  • Use of deadly force to prevent an apparent kidnapping.
• Clarifies that a “withdrawal” instruction under the initial aggressor rule is not required absent evidence that the defendant withdrew after threatening or using deadly force.
• Holds that failures in these justification instructions can “impair the integrity” of a grand jury proceeding under CPL 210.35(5), warranting dismissal of even serious indictments, albeit without prejudice.

For practitioners, Caselnova underscores that the grand jury is not merely a formality: it is a constitutional checkpoint where the law of self‑defense must be fairly and accurately presented whenever the facts reasonably support such a defense. In an era of heightened scrutiny of firearm use, public violence, and group confrontations in urban settings, this decision provides an important doctrinal anchor and procedural safeguard in New York criminal practice.