People v. Brownfield and the Refined Test for Michigan Offense Variable 7:
“Similarly Egregious” Conduct Coupled with Intent to Heighten Fear

Introduction

The Michigan Supreme Court’s order in People of MI v. Dacoda Steven Brownfield (SC 168386, July 3 2025) formally denied leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ April 1 2025 decision. While the denial itself carries no precedential weight, Justice Welch’s lengthy dissent—joined by Justice Thomas—squarely confronts a recurring and consequential sentencing problem: how to properly score Offense Variable 7 (OV 7) under the post-2015 version of MCL 777.37.

At stake is fifty guideline points—an “all-or-nothing” addition that can dramatically increase the recommended minimum sentence for crimes against a person. The dissent faults lower courts for applying pre-amendment tests, flagging the inconsistency as antithetical to the predictability and fairness that the legislative guidelines are meant to foster.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court denied the defendant’s application for leave; consequently, the Court of Appeals’ judgment (upholding the 50-point OV 7 score) stands.
• Justice Welch’s dissent argues the Court should have granted leave to clarify the post-2015 standard, warning that continued misapplication of People v. Hardy (2013) undermines uniform sentencing.
• No majority opinion was issued; the only substantive discussion comes from the dissent, which analyzes statutory amendments, lower-court confusion, and the defendant’s case record.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• People v. Hardy, 494 Mich 430 (2013) – established a two-part test for the OV 7 “catch-all” when the statute required merely “conduct designed to substantially increase fear.”
• 2015 PA 137 – amended MCL 777.37(1)(a) to add the phrase “similarly egregious conduct,” partially abrogating Hardy.
• People v. Rodriguez, 327 Mich App 573 (2019) – first Court of Appeals case recognizing the amendment’s narrowing effect.
• People v. Lydic, 335 Mich App 486 (2021) – articulated a new multi-step test but omitted the statutory word “designed,” effectively skipping the intent requirement.
• People v. Walker, 330 Mich App 378 (2019) – interpreted explicit categories (sadism, torture, excessive brutality) as not requiring intent to increase fear.
• People v. Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015) – rendered the guidelines advisory, heightening the importance of accurate variable scoring.
• People v. Dixon, 509 Mich 170 (2022) – reiterated that offense variables aim to individualize sentencing.

Legal Reasoning of the Dissent

1. Statutory Text Controls. The dissent underscores that “similarly egregious” added by 2015 PA 137 signals legislative intent to narrow OV 7’s reach. A court must therefore compare the defendant’s conduct to sadism, torture, or excessive brutality.
2. Intent Element. Because the statute retains “conduct designed to substantially increase…fear,” courts must find that the defendant intended the heightened fear, not merely that fear in fact increased.
3. Analytical Missteps Below. The trial court recited Hardy but never decided (a) whether the conduct was “similarly egregious,” or (b) whether Brownfield intended to amplify fear. The Court of Appeals’ opinions likewise relied on effect, not design, and analogical reasoning rather than explicit statutory comparison.
4. Need for Consistency. Given OV 7’s dramatic sentencing effect, uniform application is indispensable to the equal-protection and proportionality values underpinning Michigan’s sentencing scheme.

Impact on Future Cases

Although no binding precedent emerged, the dissent functions as a roadmap for defense attorneys, prosecutors, and trial courts:

• Defense counsel should preserve objections where the sentencing court fails to make both findings—“similarly egregious” and “intent-to-increase-fear.”
• Prosecutors must marshal record evidence of deliberate psychological escalation, not merely brutal acts.
• Trial courts are on notice that reliance on the pre-2015 Hardy test alone is error.
• The Legislature may clarify or further amend MCL 777.37 if inconsistent outcomes persist.
• The Michigan Supreme Court is likely to grant leave in a future, well-preserved case that squarely presents the statutory-interpretation question.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Offense Variable (OV)

Michigan’s sentencing guidelines require courts to score various OVs, each assessing a specific aspect of criminal conduct; OV 7 addresses aggravated physical abuse and psychological terror.

OV 7’s “All-or-Nothing” Nature

Unlike other variables with multiple tiers, OV 7 is scored at either 0 or 50 points—no middle ground—magnifying its effect on a defendant’s minimum sentence range.

“Sadism, Torture, or Excessive Brutality”

These explicit categories automatically trigger 50 points regardless of intent to increase fear—e.g., prolonged beatings, live dismemberment, or extreme physical cruelty.

Catch-All Provision (Post-2015)

Conduct “similarly egregious” to the above categories and designed to substantially increase fear—e.g., threatening a victim with slow burning, staging mock executions, or using restraints in a psychologically tormenting manner.

Abrogation

When a legislature amends a statute to override part of a judicial decision; here, 2015 PA 137 partially overturned Hardy by requiring “similarly egregious” conduct.

Guidelines “Advisory” After Lockridge

Courts must consider—but are not strictly bound by—the sentencing grid; nonetheless, accurate scoring remains essential to informed discretion and appellate review.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s refusal to grant leave in People v. Brownfield technically leaves Michigan’s post-2015 OV 7 jurisprudence untouched, yet Justice Welch’s dissent shines a spotlight on widespread doctrinal drift. The dissent articulates a two-pronged, post-amendment test:

(1) Determine whether the defendant’s conduct is “similarly egregious” to sadism, torture, or excessive brutality; and
(2) Decide whether the conduct was intended (“designed”) to substantially increase the victim’s fear and anxiety.

Until the high court speaks decisively—or the Legislature intervenes—Michigan practitioners should treat these two findings as indispensable to any 50-point OV 7 score under the catch-all clause. The Brownfield dissent, though not binding, offers the most persuasive and structured framework yet for achieving the clarity and consistency that Michigan’s sentencing guidelines demand.