People v. Bjork: Narrow Grounds to Reopen Suppression Hearings, Limits on “Homicide” Opinions, and What Counts as a Meaningful Jury-Note Response

Introduction

In People v Bjork (Appellate Division, Third Department, Jan. 8, 2026), the defendant appealed a St. Lawrence County judgment of conviction for murder in the second degree, arising from a fatal beating discovered inside defendant’s residence in Massena. Police found one man (the “injured person”) unconscious outside the residence and another (the “victim”) naked, bloodied, and unresponsive in an upstairs bathroom near a wooden baseball bat; the victim later died.

On appeal, defendant challenged (1) the denial of his motion to reopen a prior Huntley suppression hearing based on an alleged discrepancy between audio recordings, (2) the admission of expert testimony concerning the victim’s “manner”/cause of death, (3) the scope of the People’s cross-examination of a defense witness concerning when alleged third-party admissions were reported to police, and (4) County Court’s response to a jury note requesting readbacks.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department affirmed. It held that County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening of the suppression hearing because defendant failed to show “additional pertinent facts” that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence; additionally, no prejudice resulted because the People stipulated that defendant’s interview statements were not introduced at trial. The Court also upheld admission of the medical examiner’s testimony because the expert did not label the death a “homicide” or opine on culpability. It rejected the claim that cross-examination about whether/when the alleged admissions were reported was improper collateral impeachment, reasoning it was relevant to defendant’s affirmative third-party culpability theory. Finally, the Court found no preserved error (and no mode-of-proceedings error) in the trial court’s handling of a jury note and readbacks.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited

A. Reopening a suppression hearing (CPL 710.40 [4])

People v Rivera, 239 AD3d 1045 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1058 (2025): cited for the CPL 710.40 (4) standard—renewal/reopening requires a showing of “additional pertinent facts” discovered that could not have been found earlier with reasonable diligence.
People v Rivera, 124 AD3d 1070 (3d Dept 2015), lv denied 26 NY3d 971 (2015): cited both for the diligence requirement and as support that denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
People v Thompson, 118 AD3d 822 (2d Dept 2014), revd 26 NY3d 678 (2016): cited as an additional example supporting the discretionary nature of reopening (noting it was reversed on unrelated grounds).
People v Kirton, 36 AD3d 1011 (3d Dept 2007), lv denied 8 NY3d 947 (2007): used for the prejudice analysis—where the challenged statements are not introduced at trial, the defendant cannot show harm from suppression rulings.

Together, these authorities frame reopening as an exceptional remedy: it is not enough to assert that different media existed; a defendant must explain why the allegedly “new” facts were not discoverable earlier through reasonable diligence and must show actual prejudice if the evidence never reached the jury.

B. Expert testimony on the victim’s death

People v Every, 146 AD3d 1157 (3d Dept 2017), affd 29 NY3d 1103 (2017): stands for the rule that it is error for an expert to characterize the death as a “homicide,” because that invades the jury’s province.
People v Ramsaran, 154 AD3d 1051 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 30 NY3d 1063 (2017): supplies the “guiding principle” that expert opinion is admissible if it assists the jury on matters beyond ordinary knowledge, even if it touches the ultimate issue.
Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 119 AD3d 1052 (3d Dept 2014): cited consistently with Ramsaran for the expert-assistance framework.
People v Odell, 26 AD3d 527 (3d Dept 2006), lv denied 7 NY3d 760 (2006): used to support the line between admissible medical conclusions (cause of death and exclusion of alternatives) and impermissible conclusions on culpability.
People v Morgan, 230 AD3d 864 (3d Dept 2024), affd ___ NY3d ___ (Oct. 16, 2025), and People v Pascuzzi, 173 AD3d 1367 (3d Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 953 (2019): cited as recent Third Department applications approving similar expert testimony.

The Court treated “homicide” as a legally loaded characterization, but permitted a medical examiner to explain the medical cause of death and why natural/accidental/suicidal explanations were excluded—so long as the expert did not cross into the legal conclusion that a crime was committed or who committed it.

C. Cross-examination, impeachment, and “collateral” matters

People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452 (2002), and People v Morehouse, 202 AD3d 1370 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1073 (2022): cited for the principle that rebuttal evidence may contradict a witness or disprove an affirmative fact advanced in response to the People’s case.
People v Wise, 46 NY2d 321 (1978): quoted for the collateral-evidence test—evidence is not collateral if relevant to an issue other than credibility.
People v Bellamy, 26 AD3d 638 (3d Dept 2006): cited as consistent with Wise.
Matter of Blaize F., 50 AD3d 1182 (3d Dept 2008): used as a contrast point in the collateral-issue discussion.
People v Morin, 146 AD3d 901 (2d Dept 2017), lv denied 29 NY3d 950 (2017), and People v Knight, 173 AD2d 736 (2d Dept 1991), affd 80 NY2d 845 (1992): support the conclusion that questioning about reporting alleged admissions was permissible where it bore directly on the defense theory and its plausibility.

Applying these cases, the Court characterized the “when/how did you report it?” line of questioning as tied to the defendant’s affirmative third-party-culpability narrative, not mere side impeachment.

D. Jury notes, preservation, and “mode of proceedings”

People v Ashcroft, 233 AD3d 1080 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 961 (2025), and People v Fleegle, 20 AD3d 684 (3d Dept 2005), lv denied 5 NY3d 828 (2005), cert denied 547 US 1152 (2006): cited for preservation—without an appropriate objection, claims about the adequacy of a response to a jury note are generally unpreserved.
People v Johnson, 183 AD3d 77 (3d Dept 2020): cited for the mode-of-proceedings framework—certain fundamental errors require reversal even absent objection, but the record here did not establish such an error.
People v Aguilar, 41 NY3d 335 (2024), People v Salas, ___ NY3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op 03603 (2025), and People v McRae, 237 AD3d 543 (1st Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1057 (2025): used to support inferring that the court adequately addressed the request where the record reflects a reasonable, complete response and the jury did not seek further clarification.
People v O'Rama, 78 NY2d 270 (1991): cited as the governing authority requiring meaningful notice to counsel and meaningful response to jury communications.
Footnote comparison: People v Johnson, 175 AD3d 14 (3d Dept 2019): contrasted on reconstruction; the Court declined to remit for reconstruction in Bjork.

These precedents anchor the opinion’s approach: appellate intervention is limited where counsel had notice and opportunities to object, and the record indicates the court gave the jury the information it requested.

2) Legal Reasoning

A. Reopening the Huntley hearing: diligence and prejudice

The Court emphasized CPL 710.40 (4)’s twin requirements: (1) “additional pertinent facts” and (2) a showing that the defendant could not have discovered those facts earlier with reasonable diligence. It found the record inconsistent with that standard because defendant was already “aware and in possession” of the recording he claimed showed pre-Miranda invocations of counsel, yet did not introduce it at the hearing or use it to impeach the officer.

The Court further reduced any potential harm by noting that, pursuant to a stipulation by a subsequently appointed special prosecutor, the challenged interview statements were not introduced or referenced at trial—eliminating trial prejudice even if suppression had been litigated differently.

B. Medical examiner testimony: cause-of-death opinions are allowed; “homicide” labels are not

The decision draws a careful line. The medical examiner testified to a detailed medical cause of death—subarachnoid hemorrhage, rib fractures, and internal bleeding “due to blunt force trauma”—and explained why he excluded natural, accidental, or suicidal causes. The Court deemed that helpful expert context beyond ordinary juror experience and consistent with admissible “ultimate issue” testimony.

Crucially, the expert did not characterize the death as a “homicide” (the error flagged by People v Every) and did not imply who was responsible—preserving the jury’s role to determine criminal agency and intent.

C. Cross-examination: not “collateral” when it tests a defense theory

Defendant’s defense sought to shift blame to the injured person via a roommate’s testimony about alleged self-incriminating statements. The People’s cross-examination asked whether, when, and how the roommate communicated that account to police. The Court treated that as directly relevant to a substantive issue (the viability and reliability of the third-party-culpability narrative and the circumstances under which it emerged), not merely a collateral attack on general credibility.

D. Jury note response: meaningful compliance without a “magic words” transcript

Although defendant pointed to an absence of a specific notation that the injured person’s testimony was read back, the Court relied on the broader record: notes were marked, read to counsel, counsel had opportunities to comment and object, and the jury was informed in open court that the requested readbacks would occur. The court reporter recorded that the requested testimony was read back, and the jury did not ask follow-up questions—supporting the inference that the jury received the complete information sought, consistent with People v Aguilar and People v O'Rama.

3) Impact

Suppression practice: The opinion underscores that reopening is not a second chance to present evidence already in the defendant’s possession. Defense counsel should treat Huntley hearings as the primary forum for litigating alleged invocations and must build the record then; later claims of “different recordings” will face a steep diligence hurdle.
Expert testimony boundaries: The case reinforces an operational distinction for trial courts: medical examiners may explain cause of death and exclusion of non-criminal explanations, but should avoid the term “homicide” when it functions as a legal conclusion rather than a medical classification.
Third-party culpability and rebuttal: When a defendant advances an affirmative theory that someone else committed the crime, the People may probe surrounding circumstances (including whether the claim was reported and when) because that bears on the factual narrative, not just impeachment on a collateral point.
Jury notes and appellate records: The decision signals that incomplete transcript notations will not automatically yield reversal or reconstruction where the record otherwise shows O’Rama-compliant procedures and the jury’s request appears satisfied.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Huntley hearing: A pretrial hearing to decide whether a defendant’s statements to law enforcement may be used at trial (typically focusing on voluntariness and Miranda compliance).
CPL 710.40 (4): The statute allowing a defendant to renew a suppression motion and reopen a hearing only when genuinely new, pertinent facts were discovered that could not have been found earlier with reasonable diligence.
Miranda / invocation of counsel: If a suspect requests a lawyer during custodial interrogation, police must generally stop questioning. Whether and when the request occurred is often litigated at a Huntley hearing.
“Invading the province of the jury”: Experts may explain technical matters, but cannot decide the case’s legal questions for the jurors—such as declaring that a death was a “homicide” in the sense that a crime was committed.
Collateral issue (impeachment rule): Parties generally cannot introduce extrinsic proof solely to contradict a witness on a point that matters only to credibility. But if the point also matters to a real issue in the case (here, the defense’s third-party culpability theory), it is not “collateral.”
Mode of proceedings error: A rare, fundamental trial error affecting the basic structure of the proceeding that can require reversal even without an objection. The Court found none here.
O’Rama compliance (jury notes): Courts must share the contents of jury notes with counsel, allow meaningful input, and provide a meaningful response on the record.

Conclusion

People v Bjork consolidates several practical trial and appellate lessons: reopening a suppression hearing demands a concrete, diligence-based showing and will not be granted where the defendant already possessed the evidence; medical examiner testimony is admissible when confined to medical cause and exclusion of alternatives, but not when it characterizes the death as “homicide” or implies culpability; cross-examination that tests the foundation of an affirmative defense theory is not “collateral” simply because it also bears on credibility; and jury-note challenges will fail absent preservation or a clear O’Rama/mode-of-proceedings defect. In combination, the opinion strengthens procedural discipline—both in pretrial litigation and in building a record capable of supporting appellate relief.