People v. Benton: Antommarchi Rights, Disability, and Counsel’s Power to Waive Defendant’s Presence

I. Introduction

In People v. Benton, 2025 NY Slip Op 06559 (3d Dept Nov. 26, 2025), the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed a sexual-abuse conviction and ordered a new trial based on a violation of the defendant’s Antommarchi rights—the right to be present at material stages of trial, including certain sidebar or in‑chambers conferences. The decision is especially notable because:

It classifies an in‑chambers evidentiary conference concerning the defendant’s firing from his job as a material stage requiring the defendant’s presence.
It holds that a counsel-only waiver is invalid where the record does not show that the defendant was informed of Antommarchi rights and where counsel’s rationale rests on the defendant’s autism and an assumption that the defendant would not be “of benefit.”
It finds a Sandoval ruling to be an abuse of discretion, giving concrete guidance on the prejudicial impact of uncharged sexual-type conduct against a defendant in a sexual offense trial.

The case thus lies at the intersection of three important strands of New York criminal procedure:

The scope and waiver of Antommarchi rights;
The treatment of defendants with developmental disabilities in assessing their ability to participate in trial;
The balancing test for admission of prior bad acts under People v. Sandoval and its modern elaboration in People v. Weinstein.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges and Trial

The defendant, Tyler R. Benton, was 19 years old at the time of the alleged incident with a 12‑year‑old girl in the family locker room of the Fulton County YMCA. He was indicted on:

Rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35);
Sexual abuse in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.60[2]);
Endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10[1]).

At trial, the complainant (the only witness to what happened inside the stall) testified that Benton:

Kissed her breasts;
Performed oral sex on her;
Touched her vagina with his hand;
Penetrated her vagina with his penis.

The jury acquitted Benton of first-degree rape but convicted him of:

Sexual abuse in the second degree (count 2); and
Endangering the welfare of a child (count 3).

The trial court (Coffinger, J.) denied a post‑verdict motion to set aside the verdict, and sentenced Benton to two concurrent six‑year probation terms. Benton appealed.

B. Issues on Appeal

Benton raised multiple issues, the most significant being:

Weight of the evidence supporting his convictions.
Antommarchi violation: his absence from certain sidebar / in‑chambers conferences, including a pretrial evidentiary conference regarding his firing from the YMCA.
Sandoval error: the propriety of allowing the People to question him, if he testified, about two uncharged prior incidents (a bathroom cell phone recording and conduct as a lifeguard).
Jury instructions: whether the court erred by failing to specifically instruct the jury that the victim, her mother, and stepfather were “interested witnesses” given their parallel civil lawsuit.

The Third Department ultimately reversed on the Antommarchi ground and remitted for a new trial on counts 2 and 3, while also commenting on the Sandoval ruling and affirming the trial court’s approach to interested‑witness instructions.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Outcome

Judgment reversed, on the law.
Case remitted for a new trial on counts 2 and 3 (sexual abuse 2nd degree and endangering the welfare of a child).

B. Key Holdings

Weight of the evidence: The verdict was supported by the weight of the evidence despite the rape acquittal; the jury could reasonably credit parts of the complainant’s testimony (hand touching) while rejecting actual penile penetration.
Antommarchi rights violated:
- The in‑chambers conference on admissibility of evidence concerning Benton’s firing from the YMCA was a material stage requiring defendant’s presence.
- The record showed no proper knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver by Benton, either personally or through informed counsel.
- Counsel’s late, post‑ruling statement, “I can waive his appearance,” was insufficient and untimely.
- Any alleged off‑record waiver was both procedurally defective and substantively suspect, particularly where counsel relied on Benton’s autism to assert that his presence would be of no “benefit.”
- Reversal and a new trial were required under People v. Dokes and related cases.
Sandoval ruling:
- The separate judge (Hoye, J.) who issued the pretrial Sandoval ruling abused discretion by permitting inquiry into two uncharged sexual‑type incidents.
- Any probative value for credibility was outweighed by substantial prejudice, especially in a sex‑offense trial.
Interested‑witness instruction:
- No error in declining to give a specific “interested witness” charge naming the complainant and her family.
- The general interest/bias charge, plus full exploration of the civil lawsuit at trial, was sufficient.
Other points:
- Defendant’s legal sufficiency challenge was deemed abandoned and, in any event, unpreserved for lack of a renewed trial order of dismissal.
- Claims in defense counsel’s post‑verdict affirmation that were not grounded in the trial record could not support a CPL 330.30(1) motion.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Weight of the Evidence: Reconciling an Acquittal on Rape with a Conviction for Sexual Abuse

1. Legal Framework and Precedents

The court restated its typical standard for a weight of the evidence review, citing People v. Stowe, 240 AD3d 946 (3d Dept 2025):

“[W]e must first view the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether a contrary verdict would have been unreasonable; if not, we defer to the jury's credibility determinations and consider the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of the conflicting inferences ... to determine whether the weight of the evidence supports the verdict.”

This “neutral light” standard is distinct from legal sufficiency. Weight review allows the appellate court to sit in a limited “thirteenth juror” role, but with deference to the jury’s credibility assessments.

The relevant statutory provisions:

Sexual abuse in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.60[2]): sexual contact with a person less than 14.
“Sexual contact” (Penal Law § 130.00[3]): any touching of sexual or other intimate parts for the purpose of sexual gratification of either party.
Endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10[1]): knowingly acting in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child under 17.
Penetration (for rape, under former Penal Law § 130.00[1]): any penetration, however slight, of the vagina by the penis.

The court also cited:

People v. Roberts, 203 AD3d 1465 (3d Dept 2022): acknowledging that a contrary verdict may not be unreasonable where a case hinges on a single witness’s credibility.
People v. Swartz, 235 AD3d 1098 (3d Dept 2025): reinforcing deference to jury credibility findings in sex‑offense cases.
People v. Sharlow, 217 AD3d 1120 (3d Dept 2023): emphasizing that a jury may accept parts of a witness’s testimony while rejecting others.

2. Application to Benton

Benton’s argument hinged on an asserted inconsistency: if the only time he touched the complainant’s vagina with his hand was while penetrating her with his penis, how could the jury acquit of rape yet convict of sexual abuse (which in this case was charged as hand‑to‑vagina contact)?

The Third Department answered by closely parsing the complainant’s testimony:

She did testify that she “felt the tip of defendant’s penis in her vagina”—testimony that could support rape.
But she also testified that his hand was on her vagina “[w]hen he was trying to put his penis inside [her] vagina” (emphasis added).

This distinction allowed the jury, consistently with the evidence, to:

Conclude that the People failed to prove actual penetration beyond a reasonable doubt (thus acquittal on rape), but
Still find beyond a reasonable doubt that Benton touched her vagina with his hand in the course of attempting penetration (satisfying the “sexual contact” element for sexual abuse in the second degree).

The court explicitly recognized that a contrary verdict (i.e., acquittal) would not have been unreasonable given the reliance on a single witness, but nonetheless held that the guilty verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. This is a classic application of Sharlow: the jury may believe part of the complainant’s description (attempted penetration and hand contact) and disbelieve another part (actual penetration).

B. Antommarchi Rights and the Defendant’s Presence at Material Stages

1. The Core Right and its Origins

New York recognizes a robust state‑law right of a criminal defendant to be present at “every material stage” of trial, derived from:

CPL 260.20; and
People v. Antommarchi, 80 NY2d 247 (1992).

The Benton court, relying on People v. Malloy, 152 AD3d 968 (3d Dept 2017), and People v. Burton, 215 AD3d 1054 (3d Dept 2023), reaffirmed that:

The right includes participation in sidebar conferences and in‑chambers discussions that concern prospective juror bias, hostility, or other matters where the defendant can meaningfully contribute.

2. Waiver of Antommarchi Rights: Explicit and Implicit

The court drew heavily on People v. Girard, 211 AD3d 148 (1st Dept 2022), explaining:

Explicit waiver occurs when defendant or counsel makes a clear on‑the‑record statement that the right is being waived.
Implicit waiver occurs when the defendant is consciously aware of the right and does not exercise it.

Two overarching constraints guide either kind of waiver:

People v. Velasquez, 1 NY3d 44 (2003): the court need not follow a specific script, but a valid waiver must occur.
People v. Vargas, 88 NY2d 363, 375‑76 (1996): any waiver must be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice.

3. The Material Stage in Benton: The Pretrial Evidentiary Conference

During jury selection, several conferences were held in chambers about prospective jurors. The record was ambiguous on whether Benton was present for most of those. However, the critical Antommarchi error arose from a later, clear event:

After jury selection, but before trial, the court (Coffinger, J.) and the lawyers met in chambers, without Benton present.
They argued about whether the prosecution could present evidence that Benton was fired from his YMCA job after the incident.
The judge’s ruling turned on the precise reason for his termination—something about which Benton presumably had direct, personal knowledge.
Only after issuing its ruling did the court acknowledge that Benton was absent; at that point, defense counsel said, “I can waive his appearance.”

Citing People v. Simmons, 103 AD3d 1027 (3d Dept 2013), the Court held this was a material stage because:

The conference was aimed at determining the admissibility of important evidence.
Defendant’s personal knowledge of the facts made his presence relevant to counsel’s ability to contest admissibility.
Therefore, his presence would not have been “useless,” nor would the benefit be “but a shadow”—the test articulated in People v. Dokes, 79 NY2d 656, 662 (1992).

The court reinforced this conclusion with additional precedent:

People v. Roman, 88 NY2d 18 (1996): defendant’s presence is required when issues are being decided in a way that is tied to facts within defendant’s personal knowledge.
People v. Tubbs, 115 AD3d 1009 (3d Dept 2014): contrasted as a situation where defendant’s absence was harmless or where the conference was not a “material stage.”

4. The Defective Waiver and Its Timing

The Third Department found no valid waiver for several reasons:

Defendant never informed of his right:
- The trial court never advised Benton of his right to attend sidebar/in‑chambers conferences.
- There was no evidence that counsel independently explained this right to him.
- As in People v. McAdams, 22 AD3d 885 (3d Dept 2005), the absence of any indication that defendant was apprised of his Antommarchi rights precludes finding a knowing, intelligent waiver.
Counsel’s statement was insufficient on its face:
- Counsel’s comment, “I can waive his appearance,” mirrored the inadequate statement in People v. Geddis, 173 AD3d 1724 (4th Dept 2019), where counsel said “I’m okay with [his absence]” and the court nonetheless found the waiver defective.
- The phrase does not show that Benton himself made a voluntary choice after being informed of the right.
Waiver came too late:
- Even if the statement were substantively adequate (it was not), it was made after the conference and after the ruling.
- By then, defendant had already been excluded from the material stage, making the error complete.
- The court analogized to People v. Hoyt, 237 AD3d 1360 (3d Dept 2025), underscoring that pre‑waiver exclusions themselves are Antommarchi violations.

5. The Off‑Record “Waiver” and Autism-Based Assumptions

In the motion to set aside the verdict (CPL 330.30[1]), defense counsel filed an affirmation stating there had been an “informal discussion” with the court in which he supposedly waived Benton’s presence at sidebars, partly on the ground that “since Mr. Benton is autistic[,] I stated that his presence would not be of benefit to me.”

The Third Department found this deeply problematic on multiple levels:

Procedural defect (CPL 330.30[1]):
- Such a motion must be based on “[a]ny ground appearing in the record”.
- Off‑record events cannot supply the factual foundation, per People v. Giles, 24 NY3d 1066 (2014); People v. Wolf, 98 NY2d 105 (2002); People v. Jackson, 152 AD2d 977 (4th Dept 1989).
- So, as a matter of law, this “informal discussion” could not cure the Antommarchi problem.
Substantive defect and disability reasoning:
- An off‑the‑record Antommarchi waiver is categorically inadequate; it must appear on the transcript.
- Counsel’s rationale—that Benton’s autism meant his presence would not benefit the defense—reflected counsel’s unilateral judgment, not a voluntary choice by Benton.
- The trial court’s adoption of this reasoning (finding that Benton “would not have afforded the defense attorney any meaningful contribution”) was explicitly rejected by the Third Department.
- The record contained no evidence that Benton’s autism precluded him from contributing meaningfully at sidebars.

This component of the decision has broader significance: it effectively rejects the idea that a developmental or neurological diagnosis, standing alone, justifies assuming a defendant’s presence at material stages is pointless. Instead, the court insists on individualized, record‑based analysis and preservation of the defendant’s participation rights.

6. Remedy: Automatic Reversal

Citing People v. Dokes, the court concluded that the Antommarchi error required automatic reversal and a new trial. Where the defendant is excluded from a material stage at which his presence could assist the defense, the error is not subject to harmless‑error analysis; it is a structural flaw in the proceedings.

C. Sandoval Ruling: Prejudice of Uncharged Misconduct in Sex Cases

1. The Sandoval Framework

Under People v. Sandoval, and as recently refined in People v. Weinstein, 42 NY3d 439 (2024), the trial court must balance:

The probative value of prior convictions or bad acts on the defendant’s credibility; against
The risk of undue prejudice, especially the danger that the jury will misuse such evidence as propensity proof.

Weinstein underscores:

Trial courts must weigh whether the prior act truly bears on veracity, honesty, or reliability as a witness.
In certain contexts—like sexual offenses—uncharged sexual misconduct is particularly inflammatory and likely to cause unfair prejudice.

2. The Sandoval Evidence in Benton

Here, the People sought to cross‑examine Benton, if he testified, about two uncharged incidents:

A cell phone recording in a bathroom;
Conduct while he was employed as a lifeguard.

The Sandoval judge (Hoye, J.) allowed both. The Third Department held this was an abuse of discretion, even “assuming” arguendo that these incidents could bear on credibility. The court concluded that:

The prejudicial effect of these incidents—particularly in a trial about sexual abuse of a child—far outweighed
Any incremental probative value regarding truthfulness or veracity.

This part of the opinion has clear precedential weight: it warns trial judges that, post‑Weinstein, they must not reflexively admit sexually charged uncharged misconduct in sex‑offense trials under the banner of “credibility.” The risk that the jury will view such evidence as proof of sexual propensity is especially high in these cases.

D. Jury Instructions on Interested Witnesses

1. The Issue

Benton argued that the complainant, her mother, and stepfather were “interested witnesses” because they had filed a civil lawsuit against him and the YMCA. He sought a specific jury instruction labeling them as such.

2. The Court’s Resolution

The trial court instead gave a general instruction that the jury could consider whether any witness had an interest in the outcome. Additionally:

The existence and nature of the civil lawsuit were fully explored at trial before the jury.

The Third Department, relying on People v. Varughese, 21 AD3d 1126 (2d Dept 2005), held:

Under these circumstances, the general instruction was “properly balanced.”
The trial court did not err in declining to single out specific witnesses as “interested.”

This follows established New York practice: judges are not obligated to label particular witnesses as “interested” where the interest is obvious and thoroughly aired, and where a general bias/interest charge is given.

E. Footnotes: Legal Sufficiency and Record-Based Motions

1. Legal Sufficiency Abandoned and Unpreserved

In footnote 1, the court clarified:

Benton mentioned “legal sufficiency” but presented no distinct arguments; thus, the claim was treated as abandoned, citing People v. Rizvi, 126 AD3d 1172 (3d Dept 2015).
In any event, the claim was unpreserved because he failed to renew his motion for a trial order of dismissal at the close of his case, per People v. Marin, 239 AD3d 1028 (3d Dept 2025).

2. CPL 330.30(1) and the Record Requirement

In footnote 2, the court reemphasized that:

Post‑verdict motions under CPL 330.30(1) must be based on grounds “appearing in the record.”
Defense counsel’s affirmation attempting to add facts about Benton’s absence from jury‑selection sidebars could not be considered, as they were not in the trial transcript.
This follows People v. Giles, Wolf, and Jackson.

The footnote reinforces a fundamental appellate doctrine: the record is the record. Counsel cannot supplement it via affidavit to retroactively justify or explain trial events for purposes of post‑verdict relief.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Antommarchi Rights (Presence at Material Stages)

In plain terms:

You, as a criminal defendant, have the right to be in the room for important parts of your trial where decisions are made that might affect you—and where your knowledge or reactions might help your lawyer.
This includes:
- Questioning potential jurors about their bias (sidebars during voir dire);
- In‑chambers discussions about evidence, especially where the facts are within your knowledge.
You can sometimes choose to waive this right, but only if you:
- Know about the right;
- Understand it; and
- Voluntarily decide not to use it.
Your lawyer can state your waiver on the record, but only if you have been properly informed and genuinely agree.

B. Sandoval Hearings

A Sandoval hearing is a pretrial proceeding where the judge decides what prior convictions or bad acts the prosecutor can use to cross‑examine the defendant if the defendant chooses to testify. The judge must balance:

Whether the act really says something about the defendant’s honesty or reliability as a witness; versus
Whether it is likely to unfairly influence the jury to believe, “Once a bad person, always a bad person,” especially if the prior acts are similar to the current charge.

In Benton, allowing questioning about uncharged sexual‑type incidents in a sexual‑abuse trial was deemed too prejudicial relative to any credibility value.

C. Weight of the Evidence vs. Legal Sufficiency

Legal sufficiency asks: “Could any reasonable jury, on this evidence, find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt?”
Weight of the evidence asks: “Even if legally sufficient, was the verdict against the ‘weight’ of the credible evidence—did the jury get it badly wrong given all the proof?”

Sufficiency is about the minimum level of proof. Weight is about the overall persuasiveness and reliability of the proof, and it allows the appellate court to reweigh evidence, though with deference to the jury’s role in judging credibility.

D. “Material Stage” of Trial

A material stage is a part of the proceedings where:

Decisions are made that can significantly affect the outcome (like rulings on key evidence or juror bias); and
The defendant’s presence could reasonably help the lawyer—either by sharing information, giving input, or simply observing and reacting.

Not every sidebar is “material” (for example, some purely legal or administrative issues). But where facts unique to the defendant are debated, the stage is typically material.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Strengthening Antommarchi Protections

Benton continues and sharpens a line of Third Department authority that demands:

Trial judges clearly recognize which conferences are “material stages,” and
Either ensure the defendant’s presence or obtain a clear on‑the‑record waiver that is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

The decision also underscores that timing matters: an after‑the‑fact assertion by counsel cannot retroactively cure the exclusion from a material stage.

B. Disability, Autonomy, and Trial Participation

One of the most significant modern aspects of Benton is its rejection of a blanket, disability‑based assumption that a defendant with autism cannot meaningfully contribute to sidebar or in‑chambers discussions. The court:

Insisted that the record contained no evidence that Benton’s autism rendered his contributions valueless.
Criticized the notion—embraced by the trial court—that a diagnosis alone justifies systematic exclusion from sidebars.

This aligns New York criminal procedure more closely with contemporary views on disability rights and autonomy, emphasizing:

Individualized assessment, not categorical assumptions;
Presumption of capacity to participate;
The centrality of the defendant’s own choice in waiving participation rights.

C. Practical Guidance for Trial Courts and Counsel

For judges and defense attorneys in New York, Benton has clear operational messages:

Always inform the defendant, on the record, of the right to attend sidebar and in‑chambers material stages.
Document waivers on the record with some showing that the defendant understands the right being relinquished.
Do not rely on off‑record “understandings” or post‑hoc affidavits to prove Antommarchi waivers.
Where facts in defendant’s personal knowledge are central (e.g., reasons for termination), assume the conference is a material stage requiring presence or a valid waiver.
In Sandoval contexts, be especially cautious about admitting uncharged sexual misconduct in sex‑offense cases; apply Weinstein rigorously.

D. Future Litigation and Appeals

Benton will likely be cited in future cases for several propositions:

That evidentiary conferences about job termination or similar fact‑intensive background issues are “material stages” when the defendant has direct knowledge of the underlying events.
That counsel’s generalized assertion of waiver, without a record showing the defendant knew of his rights, is insufficient under Antommarchi.
That reliance on a defendant’s developmental diagnosis to justify broad exclusion from sidebars is inconsistent with the requirement that the defendant’s presence be deemed “useless” before exclusion can be allowed.
That, in the wake of Weinstein, Sandoval rulings admitting uncharged sexual‑type conduct in sex‑offense cases are highly vulnerable to reversal where the balancing of probative value and prejudice is not rigorously explained.

VII. Conclusion

People v. Benton is a significant Third Department decision that:

Affirms the jury’s discretion to accept part of a complainant’s testimony (hand‑to‑vagina contact) while rejecting another part (actual penetration), sustaining a sexual‑abuse conviction despite an acquittal on rape.
Clarifies and strengthens Antommarchi protections by:
- Designating fact‑laden evidentiary conferences as material stages when the defendant’s knowledge is relevant; and
- Rejecting counsel‑only, off‑record, after‑the‑fact, or disability‑based waivers that are not clearly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Applies modern Sandoval doctrine, in line with Weinstein, to hold that admitting uncharged sexual‑type misconduct as impeachment in a sex‑offense trial can be an abuse of discretion.
Confirms that general bias/interest instructions—combined with full exploration of a civil lawsuit at trial—can suffice without a special “interested witness” charge naming specific witnesses.

Beyond its immediate result—a new trial for Benton—this opinion stands as a pointed reminder that a defendant’s presence at trial is not a mere formality. It is a substantive right rooted in participation, autonomy, and the fairness of the adversarial process, and it cannot be lightly curtailed, whether by inattention to record‑making or by untested assumptions about a defendant’s abilities.