Introduction

People v. Belstadt, 2025 NY Slip Op 06460 (4th Dept Nov. 21, 2025), is a significant Fourth Department decision involving a 1993 homicide prosecuted nearly 25 years later as a “cold case.” The defendant, Joseph H. Belstadt, was convicted after a 2021 jury trial of murder in the second degree under Penal Law § 125.25(1) (intentional murder), and he appealed from the 2022 judgment of conviction.

The case sits at the intersection of several important criminal procedure themes:

• Use of re‑examined forensic evidence (microscopic hair comparison followed by DNA testing) in a decades‑old case.
• The scope of the Confrontation Clause under the Sixth Amendment when a testifying pathologist did not perform the original autopsy but relies on autopsy materials.
• Due process limits on preindictment delay (prompt prosecution) in serious felonies, and when a Singer hearing is or is not required.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to:

• The legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence;
• The admissibility of the pathologist’s opinion testimony under the Confrontation Clause;
• The constitutionality of the long delay between the 1993 homicide and the 2018 indictment under due process principles.

While the opinion does not announce a dramatic new rule, it meaningfully applies and refines recent New York precedents—particularly People v. Ortega (40 NY3d 463 [2023]) and People v. Johnson (39 NY3d 92 [2022])—to the context of cold‑case homicide prosecutions.

Summary of the Opinion

The victim, a 17‑year‑old girl, disappeared in September 1993 in Niagara County. Defendant was the last independently confirmed person to see her alive: witnesses and defendant’s own statements established that she entered his car around 1:30 a.m. on September 19, 1993. About a month later, her body was discovered in a ravine with an article of clothing knotted around her neck. Expert testimony established signs of a struggle and death by asphyxiation due to strangulation—homicide.

Over the years, investigators collected and re‑examined hundreds of pieces of physical evidence—hair, fibers, and other materials— from the victim’s body and from defendant’s vehicle. Early hair comparisons in 1997 by the Erie County lab had deemed a particular hair from defendant’s car “dissimilar” to the victim’s hair. In 2017, Niagara County analyst Mark Henderson re‑examined that hair using additional training and experience he had acquired over the years and concluded it matched the victim’s known pubic hair. A second visually similar pubic hair was located in the car sweepings; both hairs were ultimately genetically matched to the victim via DNA testing of the root tissue. Around the same time, fibers consistent with carpet from defendant’s car were found on the victim’s clothing. Defendant was indicted in 2018 and later convicted.

On appeal, the court held:

1. Legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence: The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (Contes; Bleakley), was legally sufficient to sustain the conviction, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (Danielson; Bleakley; Monk).
2. Confrontation Clause/autopsy testimony: The admission of opinion testimony from a pathologist who did not perform the original autopsy did not violate the Sixth Amendment under People v. Ortega, because the expert independently analyzed autopsy materials (photographs, measurements, etc.) and did not simply act as a conduit for the original medical examiner's conclusions.
3. Preindictment delay/due process: The roughly 25‑year delay between the crime and indictment did not violate defendant’s due process right to prompt prosecution under the five Taranovich factors, especially given the seriousness of the charge, the absence of pretrial incarceration, and the People’s showing of “good cause” based on extensive, evolving forensic investigation. A separate Singer hearing was not required because the evidentiary record—particularly Henderson’s sworn affidavit detailing the investigation—gave the court an adequate basis to resolve the issue.

The judgment of conviction was unanimously affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

1. Issues on Appeal and Their Framing

The appellate court addressed three principal issues:

1. Was the evidence legally sufficient, and was the verdict against the weight of the evidence?
2. Did admission of the pathologist’s testimony about cause and manner of death violate the Confrontation Clause?
3. Did the lengthy preindictment delay violate due process or require a Singer hearing?

Each issue implicates important doctrinal strands in New York criminal law: evidentiary sufficiency standards, evolving Confrontation Clause jurisprudence following Crawford and its New York progeny, and the state‑law due process doctrine of prompt prosecution governed by People v. Taranovich.

2. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

2.1. Legal Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

• People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620 (1983):
  The court cites Contes for the standard on legal sufficiency: on appellate review, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the People to determine if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Fourth Department explicitly states it applied this standard.
• People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 (1987):
  Bleakley is the foundational case distinguishing:
  • Legal sufficiency (minimum quantum of evidence as a matter of law); and
  • Weight of the evidence (the appellate court’s factual review power in the interest of justice).
  The court uses Bleakley both for sufficiency and for the broader method of weight‑of‑the‑evidence analysis.
• People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007):
  Danielson clarifies that weight‑of‑the‑evidence review requires viewing the evidence in light of the elements “as charged to the jury,” not as might have been charged. The court expressly follows this approach.
• People v. Monk, 57 AD3d 1497 (4th Dept 2008), lv denied 12 NY3d 785 (2009):
  Cited as an example of a homicide case where the Fourth Department conducted a weight‑of‑the‑evidence review, reinforcing that the same analytic framework applies here.
• People v. McGovern, 214 AD3d 1339 (4th Dept 2023), affd 42 NY3d 532 (2024):
  The citation appears in connection with whether the legal sufficiency challenge was preserved below. The court assumes arguendo that the challenge was preserved, and proceeds to reject it on the merits.

2.2. Confrontation Clause and Autopsy Testimony

• People v. Ortega, 40 NY3d 463 (2023):
  This is the key controlling precedent. Ortega addresses when the Confrontation Clause bars the prosecution from using a testifying expert as a vehicle for admitting a non‑testifying medical examiner’s conclusions from an autopsy report. The Court of Appeals held:
  • The Confrontation Clause does not categorically bar use of information from autopsy reports.
  • An expert may offer their own opinions based on primary data (photographs, measurements, etc.).
  • A violation occurs when the expert simply relays or adopts the absent examiner's testimonial conclusions rather than performing an independent analysis.
  The Fourth Department holds that the testifying pathologist in Belstadt fell on the permissible side of Ortega.
• People v. Austin, 237 AD3d 736 (2d Dept 2025); People v. Taveras, 228 AD3d 410 (1st Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 1054 (2024); People v. Rivers, 225 AD3d 899 (2d Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 929 (2024):
  These recent Appellate Division cases show how lower courts have been implementing Ortega:
  • In each, the testifying expert did not perform the autopsy but was permitted to testify because they independently reviewed autopsy materials and formed their own opinions.
  • The Fourth Department aligns itself with these decisions, confirming a cross‑departmental consensus on how Ortega should be applied.

2.3. Due Process, Preindictment Delay, and Singer Hearings

• People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975):
  This is the leading New York case on due process challenges to delay in bringing a defendant to trial. Although often discussed in “speedy trial” contexts, here it is invoked for the state due process right to prompt prosecution. Taranovich sets out five factors:
  1. Length of the delay.
  2. Reasons for the delay.
  3. Nature of the underlying charge.
  4. Whether there was an extended period of pretrial incarceration.
  5. Whether the defense has been impaired by the delay.

  Taranovich emphasizes that no one factor is controlling and that the factors must be applied to the specific circumstances of each case.

• People v. Johnson, 39 NY3d 92 (2022):
  The Court of Appeals’ modern restatement of the Taranovich analysis in the context of preindictment delay. Johnson underscores:
  • The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating “good cause” for delay once a defendant has shown substantial delay and some prejudice.
  • Serious felony charges weigh heavily in favor of tolerating longer investigative delays.
  The Fourth Department explicitly cites Johnson in describing the Taranovich test and implicitly follows Johnson’s approach to the “good cause” inquiry.
• People v. Rogers, 103 AD3d 1150 (4th Dept 2013), lv denied 21 NY3d 946 (2013); People v. Chatt, 77 AD3d 1285 (4th Dept 2010), lv denied 17 NY3d 793 (2011); People v. Johnson, 211 AD3d 1633 (4th Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 1111 (2023):
  These are prior Fourth Department decisions dealing with preindictment delay and “good cause,” especially in serious felony investigations. They are cited to show consistency: in each case, extensive, complex investigation over time has been accepted as “good cause.”
• People v. Singer, 44 NY2d 241 (1978):
  Singer addresses preindictment delay and the circumstances under which a court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to assess whether the prosecution’s delay is justified. A so‑called “Singer hearing” is not automatic; it is required when the record does not already provide sufficient information to resolve the issue.
• People v. Ballowe, 173 AD3d 1666 (4th Dept 2019); People v. Gathers, 65 AD3d 704 (2d Dept 2009), lv denied 13 NY3d 859 (2009):
  These cases hold that no Singer hearing is necessary where the papers before the court (e.g., affidavits, investigative records) give a “sufficient basis” to determine whether delay was justified. The Fourth Department relies on this authority to reject Belstadt’s request for a hearing.

3. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.1. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence in a Cold‑Case Context

3.1.1. The Evidence Considered

The court, applying Contes and Bleakley, details a combination of forensic and circumstantial evidence:

• Last‑seen evidence:
  Defendant was the last independently confirmed person to see the victim alive; he admitted giving her a ride, corroborated by multiple witnesses.
• Forensic hair and DNA evidence:
  Two pubic hairs recovered from different locations in defendant’s car were ultimately genetically matched via DNA to the victim.
• Fiber evidence:
  Fibers consistent with the carpet in defendant’s car were found on the victim’s clothing.
• Defendant’s movements and behavior:
  • Shortly before, he went to a police station over a traffic ticket, declined to go to Canada with friends, and chose instead to “drive around” upset.
  • Friends did not see his car parked where expected upon their return from Canada.
  • A witness later observed defendant alone in a wet car; he said he had “just washed it.”
  • In subsequent days, he attempted to fabricate an alibi by asking four friends to lie and say he had gone to Canada with them.
  • He was absent from school during the week after the victim’s disappearance.
• Prior conduct with another young woman:
  In summer 1993, defendant had driven another young woman near the location where the victim’s body was ultimately found—suggesting familiarity with or use of that secluded area.
• Evidence of intent and method:
  • The victim’s body was found with clothing knotted around her neck.
  • An expert testified that the state of the body and clothing indicated a struggle and death by asphyxiation (strangulation), and the manner of death was homicide.
• Jailhouse confession‑type evidence:
  A jailhouse informant testified that defendant had admitted strangling a girl in the early 1990s and leaving the body outdoors—consistent with the charged homicide’s modus operandi.

3.1.2. Intent to Kill

For murder in the second degree under Penal Law § 125.25(1), the People had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, acting with the intent to cause the death of another, caused that death. Intent is rarely proved by direct evidence; it is inferred from the circumstances.

Here, the court relies on:

• The ligature (clothing knotted around the victim’s neck);
• Expert testimony of homicide by asphyxiation following a struggle;
• Defendant’s alleged admission to a jailmate of strangling a girl and leaving her body outdoors.

These facts permit a rational jury to infer intentional, not accidental, causation of death.

3.1.3. Reconciling the Defendant’s Version of Events

Defendant claimed he only drove the victim a short distance and dropped her off at a church stairway. The court notes this claim is inconsistent with the forensic evidence—particularly the victim’s pubic hair in different locations inside defendant’s car and car‑carpet fibers on her clothing.

The appellate court’s role in sufficiency review is not to choose between conflicting inferences but to ask whether a rational jury could reasonably reject defendant’s version, which it clearly could. Under Bleakley, the same evidence supports the conclusion that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence.

3.2. Confrontation Clause: Independent Review of Autopsy Materials

Defendant argued that the testifying pathologist—who did not perform or observe the original autopsy—violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by relying on the autopsy report.

The Fourth Department, applying Ortega, reasons:

• The Confrontation Clause does not “entirely preclude” expert use of testimonial autopsy materials.
• What matters is whether the expert supplies an independent analysis of primary data (e.g., photos, anatomical measurements, video, physical observations) rather than merely reciting or endorsing the prior examiner’s conclusions.
• The record indicates the pathologist in Belstadt did exactly what Ortega permits: he independently reviewed autopsy materials and formed his own opinion as to cause and manner of death.

The court notes:

“Here, the record reflects that the testifying expert, who did not perform or observe the autopsy, reached his conclusions based on an independent review of the proper materials rather than the conclusions of the performing medical examiner.”

The citation to Austin, Taveras, and Rivers reinforces that this is now the settled approach across departments in the wake of Ortega.

3.3. Due Process and Preindictment Delay in a Cold‑Case Murder

3.3.1. Application of the Taranovich Factors

The delay here—from 1993 homicide to 2018 indictment—is undeniably substantial. Applying Taranovich and Johnson, the court weighs:

1. Extent of the delay:
   The court acknowledges the delay was “substantial.” That factor weighs in defendant’s favor.
2. Reasons for the delay:
   This is the core of the analysis. The People submitted a sworn affidavit from analyst Mark Henderson, laying out:
   • Decades of investigative efforts;
   • Thousands of hours dedicated to the case;
   • Use of multiple forensic laboratories (Niagara County, Erie County, out‑of‑state labs, consultant review);
   • Limitations posed by the volume and nature of car sweepings and physical evidence; and
   • How later forensic developments (including DNA testing of hair roots) ultimately produced incriminating results.

   The court holds that these facts show “good cause” for the delay. This aligns with Rogers, Chatt, and Johnson (AD3d), which accept ongoing, complex investigation—especially where scientific methods evolve—as a legitimate reason for preindictment delay.

3. Nature of the underlying charge:
   First‑degree violent felony (intentional murder) is the most serious category of crime. New York courts consistently treat homicide charges as strongly favoring tolerance of longer investigative delays.
4. Pretrial incarceration:
   The court emphasizes that defendant “was not arrested on that charge until he was indicted.” Thus, he did not endure a lengthy period of pretrial incarceration attributable to this homicide charge—this factor weighs against finding a due process violation.
5. Prejudice to the defense:
   The court concedes that the lengthy delay “may have caused some degree of prejudice to defendant,” but concludes that the People’s “good cause” showing outweighs this prejudice. There is no specific finding that defense witnesses or evidence were critically lost; rather, general prejudice from passage of time is treated as present but insufficient to override the other factors.

Summing up, the court finds that, although factor (1) and arguably factor (5) support the defendant, factors (2)–(4)—strongly influenced by the nature of the charge and the investigative justification—support the People. Under Taranovich and Johnson, the balance favors the prosecution, and no due process violation is found.

3.3.2. No Singer Hearing Required

Defendant also argued that at minimum he was entitled to a Singer hearing on the issue of preindictment delay.

Relying on Ballowe, Rogers, and Gathers, the court holds that a hearing was unnecessary because:

“The record provided the court with ‘a sufficient basis to determine whether the delay was justified.’”

The key feature here is Henderson’s detailed sworn affidavit. It gave the motion court a factually rich narrative of the investigative efforts, rendering live testimony unnecessary. Thus, Belstadt reinforces the principle that:

• A Singer hearing is not automatic in every case of long preindictment delay;
• Adequate documentary or affidavit‑based showings of investigative good cause can suffice to decide the issue on papers.

4. Impact and Future Application

4.1. Cold‑Case Homicides and Forensic Re‑Examination

Belstadt is especially consequential for cold‑case prosecutions involving evolving forensic technology:

• It affirms that a murder conviction may rest in substantial part on evidence discovered or re‑interpreted decades after the crime, including:
  • Re‑evaluation of previously examined physical evidence (such as hair determined “dissimilar” in the 1990s);
  • Subsequent DNA testing of biological material (hair root tissue) not previously testable or tested.
• By treating this re‑examined forensic evidence as part of a legally sufficient circumstantial case, the court signals that:
  • Past forensic conclusions are not immutable; and
  • Updated methods and expertise can legitimately reopen and strengthen prosecutions decades later.

For prosecutors, this decision endorses the use of:

• Continuous, documented forensic work over time as both evidentiary support and justification for delay; and
• Re‑analysis of long‑stored evidence in light of new scientific techniques.

For defense counsel, the case underscores:

• The need to carefully scrutinize the reliability of late‑acquired forensic conclusions (e.g., chain of custody, lab practices, error rates, prior inconsistent forensic assessments).
• The importance of robust cross‑examination on why earlier forensic opinions changed and what that says about the technique’s reliability.

4.2. Consolidation of Ortega in Autopsy‑Based Prosecutions

The decision cements Ortega’s framework in the Fourth Department:

• Prosecutors can safely call a pathologist who did not perform the autopsy if that expert independently analyzes primary autopsy materials and articulates their own conclusions.
• Defense Confrontation Clause objections should now focus on:
  • Whether the testifying expert actually examined the primary data; and
  • Whether they are simply repeating the non‑testifying examiner’s conclusions or relying on that examiner’s written report as substantive evidence.

Belstadt, alongside Austin, Taveras, and Rivers, effectively instructs trial courts:

• To admit expert testimony grounded in independent review; and
• To scrutinize—and potentially exclude—testimony that functions merely as a “mouthpiece” for non‑testifying medical examiners.

4.3. Due Process and “Good Cause” for Long Preindictment Delay

On the preindictment delay front, Belstadt further develops Johnson’s guidance:

• Seriousness of the charge (murder) allows a very long delay if supported by:
  • Detailed, documented investigative efforts; and
  • Substantial reliance on evolving forensic capabilities.
• The People’s burden of showing “good cause” can be met through:
  • A robust, sworn affidavit from a lead investigator or forensic analyst; and
  • Documented use of external labs, consultants, and evolving scientific techniques over many years.
• Pretrial incarceration remains a critical Taranovich factor; absence of long pretrial custody weighs significantly against a due process violation.
• Generalized prejudice from the passage of time—without a concrete showing of critical lost evidence—will not necessarily defeat a “good cause” showing in a homicide case.

Practically, this means:

• Cold‑case homicide prosecutions in New York remain viable even decades after the crime, provided that law enforcement can substantively document ongoing investigative work rather than unexplained dormancy.
• Defense arguments for dismissal on due process grounds should focus on:
  • Unexplained investigative gaps or neglect by law enforcement;
  • Concrete examples of lost exculpatory evidence or witnesses; and
  • Any periods of unjustified inactivity despite available leads or technology.

4.4. Threshold for Singer Hearings

The decision clarifies that:

• A Singer hearing is not required whenever a defendant alleges substantial preindictment delay;
• A detailed evidentiary record (e.g., sworn affidavit like Henderson’s) can obviate the need for live testimony and an evidentiary hearing;
• Courts will look at whether the record—if taken as true—adequately explains the delay and allows a reasoned application of the Taranovich factors.

For future cases, prosecutors are implicitly encouraged to:

• Prepare comprehensive affidavits documenting investigative timelines in anticipation of preindictment delay motions; and
• Use such affidavits to avoid or narrow the need for an evidentiary hearing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Legal Sufficiency vs. Weight of the Evidence

These are two separate appellate review standards:

• Legal sufficiency (from Contes and Bleakley):
  The court asks: If we take the People’s evidence at face value and view it in the light most favorable to them, could a rational jury find that each element of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt?
  If the answer is “yes,” the evidence is legally sufficient—even if another jury might have acquitted.
• Weight of the evidence (from Bleakley, Danielson):
  A more searching review; the appellate court examines the whole record and may weigh the evidence and credibility to decide whether the jury’s verdict was against the “overwhelming weight” of the evidence. This is closer to a factual review power.

2. Confrontation Clause and “Testimonial” Evidence

The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” which usually means:

• Key prosecution witnesses must testify in court; and
• The defendant must have had a prior opportunity to cross‑examine them if their prior statements are used.

After Crawford v. Washington, “testimonial” statements—like formal reports prepared for prosecution—generally cannot be admitted without the ability to cross‑examine the declarant. For autopsy reports:

• If an autopsy report is prepared in a context clearly related to criminal investigation, parts of it may be “testimonial.”
• Under Ortega, however, a new expert can testify about cause of death if they independently analyze objective autopsy materials (photos, measurements, etc.) and give their own opinion, without simply repeating the original examiner’s statements.

3. Preindictment Delay vs. Statutory Speedy Trial

New York distinguishes:

• Preindictment delay / prompt prosecution (due process):
  Concerned with the time between the crime and the formal accusation. There is no fixed time limit; courts weigh factors under Taranovich.
• Post‑accusation delay / statutory speedy trial:
  Governed by CPL 30.30, with specific numerical time limits from accusatory instrument to trial, subject to exclusions. This was not the main issue in Belstadt; the focus was on the decades before indictment.

4. Singer Hearing

A Singer hearing (from People v. Singer) is an evidentiary hearing focused on whether preindictment delay was justified or violated due process. It is:

• Not automatic; it is required when the record does not provide sufficient information to decide the issue; and
• Often involves testimony from investigators about what they did over the years and why the delay occurred.

In Belstadt, the court held a hearing was unnecessary because the record—especially Henderson’s affidavit—already provided that information.

Conclusion

People v. Belstadt stands as a noteworthy application of modern New York criminal procedure in the context of a cold‑case homicide. The Fourth Department:

• Upheld a murder conviction grounded in re‑examined forensic evidence and long‑developing investigative efforts;
• Clarified that, under Ortega, independent expert review of autopsy materials by a non‑performing pathologist satisfies the Confrontation Clause;
• Confirmed that decades‑long preindictment delay in a homicide case does not violate due process where the prosecution can show “good cause” through extensive, evolving forensic investigation and where the defendant did not endure extended pretrial incarceration;
• Reaffirmed that a Singer hearing is not mandatory when the documentary record sufficiently explains the reasons for delay.

The decision reinforces New York’s willingness to sustain cold‑case prosecutions when supported by careful forensic work and detailed documentation, while simultaneously articulating clear limits and procedures for Confrontation Clause and due process challenges. In doing so, Belstadt contributes a practical, fact‑rich illustration of how courts may balance fairness to defendants against society’s strong interest in prosecuting serious violent crimes—no matter how much time has passed.