People v Young (2025): Context-Based Proof of the Three‑Month Duration Element and Holistic Due‑Diligence Review of Discovery Compliance

I. Introduction

In People v Young, 2025 NY Slip Op 06452 (4th Dept Nov. 21, 2025), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, addresses three significant issues in New York criminal practice:

How far the prosecution may go in introducing highly prejudicial evidence of related sexual abuse without violating the Molineux rule on uncharged crimes.
What quantum and kind of proof is legally sufficient to establish the “not less than three months” duration element for the offense of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, which underpins predatory sexual assault against a child.
How courts must apply the post‑People v Bay standard for evaluating the propriety of a certificate of compliance (CoC) under CPL 245.50 and its effect on statutory speedy trial readiness under CPL 30.30, especially when the prosecution has failed to disclose voluminous digital evidence.

The defendant, James Young, was convicted after a jury trial of predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law former § 130.96), based on repeated sexual abuse of his girlfriend’s daughter, then 9–10 years old. On appeal, he challenged:

The admission of testimony that his girlfriend, at his direction, also sexually abused the child and sent him videos and photos of that abuse (a claimed Molineux violation).
The legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence as to the statutorily required “course of sexual conduct” over at least three months.
The denial of his CPL 30.30 motion, premised on the prosecution’s failure to disclose voluminous social media records obtained in a related federal case, and the consequent alleged invalidity of the People’s certificate(s) of compliance and readiness.

The majority upholds the evidentiary rulings and finds the evidence sufficient and not against the weight, but it holds the case, reserves decision, and remits for a new ruling on the statutory speedy trial motion under the framework articulated in People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023). Two Justices (Greenwood, Nowak, JJ.) dissent, concluding that the People failed to carry their burden of proving that the sexual conduct spanned the required three-month period, and would dismiss the indictment outright.

The decision is thus important on two fronts:

It clarifies the use of contextual and narrative inferences to satisfy the temporal element in child sex course-of-conduct prosecutions—and shows an explicit split within the Fourth Department over how far those inferences may reasonably go.
It refines, in light of Bay, how trial courts must analyze whether the prosecution has exercised “due diligence” in discovery before filing a CoC—and rejects reliance on prejudice-based reasoning or sanctions alone as a cure.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture and Result

The defendant appealed from a March 25, 2022 Monroe County Court judgment convicting him, on a jury verdict, of predatory sexual assault against a child.
The Fourth Department:
- Affirmatively rejects challenges to the admission of the girlfriend’s testimony about her own abuse of the child and the videos/photos sent to defendant.
- Holds that the evidence is legally sufficient (and the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence) to establish that the sexual conduct occurred over a period of at least three months.
- Rejects the claim that the sentence is unduly harsh or severe.
- Identifies legal error in the County Court’s analysis of the statutory speedy trial motion (CPL 30.30) and discovery compliance (CPL 245), because the court applied a prejudice-based sanction standard rather than the Bay due‑diligence standard for a valid CoC.
- Holds the case and remits for County Court to determine, under the correct standard and potentially after further submissions, whether the People exercised “due diligence” in trying to obtain and disclose the federal social media records before filing their CoC.
The panel thus does not reach a final affirmance or reversal; the appellate decision is effectively interlocutory pending the trial court’s new determination on the discovery/30.30 issue.

B. Core Holdings

Molineux / Other-Bad-Acts Evidence The girlfriend’s testimony that:
- she sexually abused the child at defendant’s direction, and
- sent him videos and photos of that abuse upon his demand,
did not constitute classic Molineux “other crimes” evidence because it was “relevant to the very same crime for which defendant was on trial” (People v Frumusa, 29 NY3d 364). Even if characterized as Molineux, the evidence was admissible to “complete the narrative” and provide background, and its probative value outweighed its prejudice.
Legal Sufficiency and the Three‑Month Duration Element Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, there was a valid line of reasoning for the jury to conclude that:
- The abuse began shortly after the child and her mother moved into defendant’s home immediately after the child finished third grade (June–July 2019).
- The abuse then recurred approximately weekly until a few days before defendant’s April 2020 arrest.
On that view, the People proved that the course of sexual conduct lasted “not less than three months” (Penal Law former § 130.75[1][b]), satisfying the element incorporated into predatory sexual assault against a child (former § 130.96).
Weight of the Evidence and Sentencing Applying the traditional Bleakley standard, and deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations especially in child sex cases, the majority finds no basis to disturb the verdict on weight-of-evidence grounds, nor to modify the sentence as unduly harsh or severe.
Automatic Discovery, Certificates of Compliance, and Trial Readiness The trial court:
- Found that the People failed to fulfill their discovery obligations under former CPL 245.20(1)(u) by not disclosing extensive social media records obtained by federal prosecutors pursuant to a warrant in a related federal case.
- Determined the failure was in good faith and imposed a sanction of preclusion of those records at trial.
- Nonetheless concluded that the preclusion sanction “cured” any defect in the CoC, thus validating the People’s statement(s) of trial readiness for CPL 30.30 purposes.
The Fourth Department holds this analysis legally erroneous:
- The proper inquiry is whether the People exercised “due diligence” and made “reasonable inquiries” to comply with automatic discovery when filing the CoC (Bay, 41 NY3d at 211).
- Good faith alone is not sufficient; it “cannot cure a lack of diligence.”
- A sanctions/prejudice analysis under CPL 245.80 (prejudice to the defendant and appropriate remedy) is distinct from, and cannot substitute for, the Bay due‑diligence inquiry into the validity of the CoC and readiness.
- Following Bay and Cooperman, the due‑diligence inquiry must be holistic, not a rigid item-by-item test.
Because the trial court never actually decided whether the People exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain and disclose the federal records, remand is required.
Dissent The dissenters would reverse and dismiss the indictment because, in their view, the record contains no non‑speculative “markers” from which a rational jury could conclude that the abuse spanned at least three months. They read the record as lacking any evidence of when the first incident of abuse occurred beyond that it happened after the child moved in with the defendant.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Evidentiary Issue: Molineux, Narrative Evidence, and the Girlfriend’s Abuse of the Child

1. The Defense’s Molineux Argument

The defendant argued that the County Court violated the seminal rule of People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), by allowing the girlfriend to testify that:

She herself sexually abused the child at the defendant’s direction; and
She recorded and sent videos and photos of that abuse to the defendant.

Under Molineux, evidence of uncharged crimes or misconduct is generally inadmissible when offered merely to prove a defendant’s criminal propensity. Such evidence may be admitted only for limited purposes (e.g., motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme or plan, identity), and even then only if its probative value outweighs its potential prejudice.

2. Majority’s First Ground: Not Molineux at All

The majority avoids a full Molineux analysis by concluding that the challenged testimony is not Molineux evidence in the first place, relying on People v Frumusa, 29 NY3d 364 (2017):

“The court properly concluded that the testimony did not constitute Molineux evidence, and thus its admission did not violate that exclusionary rule, inasmuch as it was ‘relevant to the very same crime for which . . . defendant [was] on trial’ (People v Frumusa, 29 NY3d 364, 370 [2017]…).”

In Frumusa, the Court of Appeals held that when acts are part and parcel of the charged scheme, they are not “other” crimes for Molineux purposes. The Fourth Department here extends that principle to a child sex context where:

The charged crime is predatory sexual assault against a child, whose underlying element is a course of sexual conduct (former Penal Law § 130.75[1][b]).
The girlfriend’s acts of abusing the child, at defendant’s direction and for his sexual gratification (as evidenced by demands for photos/videos), are treated as inextricably tied to the defendant’s own ongoing abuse of the child.

Thus, rather than being a separate uncharged crime presented solely to blacken the defendant’s character, the girlfriend’s actions are treated as part of the same criminal episode and pattern relevant to the jury’s understanding of:

The nature and extent of defendant’s sexual exploitation of the child;
The power dynamics and grooming involved; and
The full course of conduct alleged in the indictment period.

This approach aligns with prior Fourth Department decisions such as:

People v Hymes, 174 AD3d 1295 (4th Dept 2019), affd 34 NY3d 1178 (2020), and
People v Perkins, 196 AD3d 1107 (4th Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 1028 (2021),

where evidence of related acts in the same scheme was held to fall outside Molineux because it was intrinsic to the charged offense.

3. Alternative Ground: Narrative/Background Evidence

The court also offers an alternative holding: even if the girlfriend’s testimony is treated as Molineux evidence, it is still admissible under a recognized exception:

“The court also properly concluded in the alternative that, even if the testimony constituted Molineux evidence, it was admissible inasmuch as it was ‘relevant to complete the narrative of the events charged in the indictment . . . and to provide necessary background information’ (People v Morris, 21 NY3d 588, 594 [2013]; see generally People v Hu Sin, — NY3d —, —, 2025 NY Slip Op 03100, *2-4 [2025])…”

Under People v Morris, 21 NY3d 588 (2013), so‑called “background” or “narrative” evidence may be admitted to:

Explain the relationships among the parties,
Provide context for the charged conduct, and
Enable the jury to understand how and why events unfolded as alleged.

This exception is often invoked where excluding such evidence would leave the jury with an incomplete, confusing, or misleading picture of the alleged crime. The Court of Appeals’ recent decision in People v Hu Sin (2025) is cited as reiterating and refining the analysis for narrative/background evidence and the balancing of probative value against prejudice (although the instant opinion does not delve into Hu Sin’s facts).

4. Probative Value vs. Prejudice

Finally, the court emphasizes that, assuming Molineux applies, the girlfriend’s testimony satisfies the familiar balancing test:

“…and ‘the probative value of the evidence outweigh[ed] the potential for prejudice to . . . defendant’ (People v Leonard, 29 NY3d 1, 7 [2017]; see generally Hu Sin, — NY3d at —, 2025 NY Slip Op 03100, *3).”

Leonard confirms that even if evidence falls within a permissible Molineux category, it must still be excluded if its prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Here, the court implicitly reasons that:

The girlfriend’s abuse at defendant’s direction is highly probative of his control over the child and the nature of the predatory pattern.
The evidence helps the jury understand the full scope and mechanics of the charged course of conduct, not just isolated incidents.
Although the evidence is inherently inflammatory, its relevance to the charged crime is substantial enough to justify admission under careful instructions (the opinion does not detail the jury charge, but such limiting instructions are normally expected).

5. Impact of the Evidentiary Holding

Practically, Young signals that in child sexual abuse prosecutions:

Evidence that a third party abused the victim at the defendant’s direction, or for the defendant’s gratification, may be treated as intrinsic to the charged offense, not “other bad acts.”
Even when characterized as Molineux evidence, such testimony can be admitted to complete the narrative, provided probative value outweighs prejudice.
Defense counsel must be prepared for broader contextual evidence about the dynamics of abuse and exploitation, particularly in “course of conduct” offenses.

This is likely to strengthen prosecutorial ability to present a fuller, and often more disturbing, picture of the abuse pattern, especially where the defendant orchestrates abuse via intermediaries or through digital exploitation.

B. Legal Sufficiency of the “Three‑Month” Duration Element

1. The Governing Statutes

Predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law former § 130.96) required, in relevant part, that the defendant:

Be 18 years old or more;
Commit the crime of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree; and
That the victim be under 13 years old.

The version of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree applicable at the time (former Penal Law § 130.75[1][b]) required:

A defendant aged 18 or older,
Who engages in “two or more acts of sexual conduct”, including at least one act of sexual intercourse, with a child under 13,
“Over a period of time not less than three months in duration.”

Thus, proof of the three‑month temporal span is an element of the offense. Failure to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt renders a conviction legally insufficient.

2. The Majority’s Sufficiency Standard

The majority applies the standard articulated in People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007), and reaffirmed in People v Li, 34 NY3d 357 (2019):

The evidence is legally sufficient if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, there exists “a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences” by which a rational jury could find each element proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
All reasonable inferences are indulged in the People’s favor; credibility is for the jury, and appellate courts assume the jury credited the People’s witnesses.

3. Evidence as to Timing and Frequency

Key facts from the child’s and girlfriend’s testimony, as read by the majority, include:

The child finished third grade and, immediately afterwards (June or July 2019), she and her mother moved into defendant’s residence.
The child testified that the sexual conduct by defendant began only after the move and continued on “numerous occasions” on an approximately weekly basis.
She testified that the last incident occurred “[a] couple days before” defendant’s arrest in mid‑April 2020.
Some of the abuse occurred when she was alone at home with defendant; the girlfriend testified that:
- She worked regular daytime hours during the summer of 2019; and
- During the summer recess, the child would “hang out with” defendant when she was out of school and the girlfriend was working.

Notably, the child did not give a specific date, or even month, for the first incident. The question is whether the jury could reasonably infer, without engaging in speculation, that:

The first incident occurred relatively soon after the move‑in (early in the summer of 2019), and
There were at least two acts (including one act of intercourse) over a span of at least three months.

4. Majority’s Reasoning and Use of Precedents

The majority relies on People v Paramore, 288 AD2d 53 (1st Dept 2001), and People v Brown, 194 AD3d 1398 (4th Dept 2021), among others:

In Paramore, the First Department held that “a fair reading of the child’s testimony, in context,” allowed an inference that abuse began soon after a particular event (there, too, in relation to a move‑in), satisfying the temporal element.
In Brown, the Fourth Department upheld sufficiency where a child victim’s contextual testimony—though not date‑specific—supported the conclusion that abuse occurred over the statutorily required period.

Adopting this approach, the majority in Young reasons:

“Contrary to defendant’s contention and the dissent’s conclusion, upon viewing the evidence in the appropriate light, we conclude that ‘a fair reading of the child’s testimony, in context, establishes that’ defendant engaged in sexual conduct with the child for the first time soon after the girlfriend and the child moved into defendant’s residence…”

Combined with:

The girlfriend’s testimony about working full‑time during the summer when the child was home and with defendant, and
The child’s description of weekly abuse and the last incident just days before the April 2020 arrest,

the court holds there is a “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences” to find that:

The first abuse took place in June or July 2019; and
The conduct continued through mid‑April 2020, clearly spanning at least three months.

The majority also cites other “course of conduct” cases upholding sufficiency with less‑than‑precise date evidence where some temporal “markers” allowed the jury to fix the period, e.g.:

People v Judkins, 41 AD3d 1046 (3d Dept 2007);
People v Raymo, 19 AD3d 727 (3d Dept 2005).

5. Weight of the Evidence

On the separate question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the court invokes People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 (1987) and emphasizes special deference in child sex cases:

“‘Jury resolution of credibility issues, particularly those involving sex-related conduct with a victim of tender years who may have difficulty recalling precise dates and times of the acts, will not be disturbed absent manifest error’ (People v Arnold, 107 AD3d 1526, 1528 [4th Dept 2013]…).”

Finding no “manifest error” in how the jury evaluated the child’s and girlfriend’s testimony, the majority sustains the verdict on weight grounds.

6. The Dissent’s Contrary View: The “No Markers” Problem

The dissent focuses narrowly on the temporal element and insists that, in this record, the necessary inferences cannot be drawn without speculation. Key points:

The child testified that:
- She had multiple intercourse incidents with defendant;
- The last occurred a few days before police arrived in April 2020; and
- The abuse always happened when she was “living with” defendant.
However, she did not testify at all as to when the first abuse occurred—no month, season, grade, age, holiday, or other “marker.”
The prosecutor never asked her to identify when the first incident happened; the trial court’s statement that it was “soon after she moved in” is, in the dissent’s view, unsupported by the record.

The dissent invokes a line of cases stressing the need for some temporal “marker” to anchor a duration finding:

People v Partridge, 173 AD3d 1769 (4th Dept 2019): reversed where there were “no ‘markers’ in the evidence at trial about when the conduct began.”
People v Adolph, 206 AD3d 753 (2d Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1148 (2022): insufficient proof of the required period.
People v Harrell, 235 AD3d 1294 (4th Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1009 (2025): similar duration‑proof concerns.
Other cases where a season, school year, age, holiday, or location served as a temporal anchor: Woods, Hughes, Sorrell, Schroo, Garcia, Robinson, Cuadrado, Carter, Raymo.

The dissent also points out that:

The child testified that:
- Sometimes the girlfriend was in the house during abuse,
- Abuse during the week would occur after school (not exclusively summer),
- Abuse could happen on weekends as well.
Therefore, the mere fact that the girlfriend worked during the day in the summer does not logically establish that the first incident occurred in summer 2019.

On this view, in the absence of any explicit statement by the child as to when the first incident occurred, the jury could not non‑speculatively conclude that at least two acts occurred over a period of three months or more. The dissent would therefore:

Reverse the conviction as legally insufficient; and
Dismiss the indictment outright because no lesser included offense is supported by the evidence, referencing People v Moorhead, 224 AD3d 1225 (4th Dept 2024).

7. Doctrinal Tension and Future Implications

The split between the majority and dissent highlights an ongoing tension in New York law on child sex “course of conduct” crimes:

Majority approach: Willingness to draw robust inferences from context (move‑in timing, weekly abuse pattern, arrest date, caregiver work schedule) to infer the minimum duration.
Dissent’s approach: Greater insistence on some explicit temporal “marker” directly tied to the onset of abuse—without which any conclusion about the length of the course is seen as speculative.

Practically, Young offers several lessons:

Prosecutors should affirmatively elicit temporal markers from child witnesses whenever possible—seasons, grades, holidays, approximate ages, or linkage to major events—to safeguard the sufficiency of duration elements.
Defense counsel can rely on Partridge, Adolph, and the present dissent to challenge convictions where the only basis for the three‑month finding is thin contextual inference.
Appellate courts may continue to diverge on how generous to be in drawing such inferences; further clarification by the Court of Appeals is possible.

C. Automatic Discovery, Certificates of Compliance, and Trial Readiness

1. The New York Automatic Discovery Framework

New York’s post‑reform discovery regime (CPL art. 245) imposes broad automatic disclosure obligations on the People. Under former CPL 245.20(1)(u), the prosecution had to disclose, among other things, certain electronic and digital evidence in their possession or control (including material held by law enforcement agencies working with them).

Before declaring readiness for trial under CPL 30.30, the People must file a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) under CPL 245.50, attesting that they have exercised “due diligence” and made “reasonable inquiries” to identify and disclose all discoverable material.

A defective CoC—filed without due diligence—makes any statement of readiness “illusory,” and the CPL 30.30 speedy trial clock continues to run.

2. The Discovery Dispute in Young

Here, the People:

Obtained (or had access to) voluminous social media records seized by federal prosecutors through a search warrant in a “related federal criminal action.”
Failed to provide those records to the defense before certifying compliance and announcing readiness.

The defense moved to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds, arguing:

The undisclosed federal social media records were discoverable under CPL 245.20(1)(u).
The failure to disclose them rendered any CoC improper.
Consequently, the People’s statement(s) of readiness were invalid, and the CPL 30.30 time limit was exceeded.

3. County Court’s Ruling and Its Flaw

The trial court:

Agreed the People violated their discovery obligations by not disclosing the federal records.
Found the failure was in good faith.
Imposed a discovery sanction: precluding the People from using the undisclosed records at trial.
Concluded that this sanction “cured” any defect in the CoC, thereby validating the People’s readiness for CPL 30.30 purposes.

The Fourth Department holds that this analysis “applied the wrong standard,” relying on its own prior decision in People v Gaskin, 214 AD3d 1353 (4th Dept 2023), and the Court of Appeals’ decision in People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023).

4. The Bay Standard: Due Diligence vs. Prejudice

In Bay, the Court of Appeals clarified that:

The key question in assessing the validity of a CoC is whether the People exercised “due diligence” and made “reasonable inquiries” to ascertain the existence of discoverable materials at the time they certified compliance (41 NY3d at 211).
Good faith is necessary but not sufficient: “while good faith is required, it is not sufficient standing alone and cannot cure a lack of diligence” (id. at 212).
Whether due diligence was exercised must be assessed holistically, taking account of multiple, non‑exclusive factors (such as volume of material, complexity, access to other agencies’ files, specific defense requests, etc.).

By contrast, CPL 245.80 governs sanctions for discovery violations and focuses on prejudice to the defendant and the appropriate remedial measure (preclusion, continuance, etc.).

The Fourth Department explains that the trial court improperly:

“…conflated the standard applicable to requests for sanctions under CPL 245.80—which does involve a prejudice analysis—with the standard for evaluating the propriety of a certificate of compliance for purposes of determining whether the People’s statement of readiness was valid” (quoting Gaskin, 214 AD3d at 1355).

In other words:

It is one thing to say, “the People violated discovery but acted in good faith; preclusion is an adequate sanction and the defendant is not prejudiced at trial.”
It is another, separate question to ask, “did the People exercise due diligence in seeking out and disclosing all discoverable material before filing the CoC?”
A finding of good faith and the imposition of a sanction do not automatically cure a deficient CoC or retroactively validate trial readiness.

5. Holistic, Not Item‑by‑Item, Review

The majority further clarifies how Bay should be applied, citing People v Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216 (4th Dept 2024), and People v Sumler, 228 AD3d 1350 (4th Dept 2024):

“In Bay, the Court of Appeals made clear that whether the People exercised due diligence is not to be examined in a vacuum. To that end, the non-exclusive list of factors articulated by the Court in that case calls for a holistic assessment of the People’s efforts to comply with the automatic discovery provisions, rather than a strict item-by-item test that would require us to conclude that a [certificate of compliance] is improper if the People miss even one item of discovery.”

This is a critical refinement:

It rejects an overly rigid “zero‑tolerance” approach—where any missed item, however minor, automatically invalidates the CoC.
But it also insists that courts must examine the actual efforts made by the People (or not made) to discover and disclose material within their sphere of knowledge or control.

Thus, even where voluminous material (like federal social media records) has not been disclosed, a CoC might still be valid if:

The People made reasonable attempts to obtain it from the federal authorities;
They reasonably believed, based on clear legal or factual grounds, that they did not have possession or control for CPL 245 purposes; or
They disclosed the status of such material to the defense and the court in good faith.

Conversely, if the People made no serious attempt to inquire about the federal records or simply ignored them, the CoC may be invalid, and readiness would be illusory.

6. The Remand and What It Requires

Because the trial court never actually decided whether the People exercised due diligence under the correct Bay standard, the Fourth Department:

Holds the case and reserves decision;
Remits for County Court to:
- Apply the Bay due‑diligence analysis to the People’s efforts regarding the federal social media records; and
- Determine whether the CoC was proper at the time of filing, and thus whether the People’s readiness was valid for CPL 30.30 purposes.

Depending on what the trial court finds on remand, the resulting appellate disposition may range from an ultimate affirmance to reversal and dismissal on speedy trial grounds.

7. Preservation Rulings and Their Practical Significance

The opinion also contains instructive rulings on preservation:

The People’s alternative ground for affirmance was not preserved, and in any event could not be reviewed on defendant’s appeal because the trial court did not issue an adverse finding on that distinct issue (citing Walker, Baker, and Garrett).
The defendant failed to preserve his argument regarding the timing of the People’s initial CoC filing (citing Guerrero, Pitts), and the Appellate Division declined interest‑of‑justice review.

For litigants, this underscores:

The importance of making clear, specific objections at the trial level on all aspects of CoC validity and readiness, including when the CoC was filed relative to discovery milestones.
The need for prosecutors, when arguing for affirmance on alternate grounds, to ensure those grounds were explicitly argued below and ruled on, so they are properly preserved for appellate review.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Molineux Evidence

What it is: Evidence that a defendant (or others) committed uncharged crimes or bad acts, introduced not to prove those crimes themselves but as circumstantial proof of a fact in issue.

General rule: Such evidence is inadmissible when its main purpose is to show the defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit crime.

Exceptions: It may be admitted for limited purposes—motive, intent, identity, common scheme or plan, absence of mistake, or to complete the narrative/background—so long as:

It is genuinely relevant for that purpose, and
Its probative value outweighs its risk of unfair prejudice.

In Young: The court holds the girlfriend’s abuse of the child at defendant’s direction is part of the same crime and, alternatively, admissible to complete the narrative.

2. Narrative/Background Evidence

This is evidence that:

Helps the jury understand the context of the charged crime,
Explains the relationships and sequence of events,
Prevents a misleading or confusing narrative.

Even if such evidence touches on uncharged misconduct, it can be admitted if necessary to tell a coherent story and if its probative value exceeds the prejudice.

3. Legal Sufficiency vs. Weight of the Evidence

Legal sufficiency asks: Could any rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, find each element proven beyond a reasonable doubt? It is a narrow, deferential inquiry focused on whether the verdict is legally possible.
Weight of the evidence asks: After weighing the evidence in a neutral way, does the appellate court conclude that the jury’s verdict was against the “weight” of the credible evidence? This is a broader review of the record’s persuasiveness, but courts still give deference to the jury, especially on credibility.

In Young, the majority finds both that the evidence is legally sufficient and that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence.

4. Course of Sexual Conduct and “Markers”

“Course of sexual conduct” statutes criminalize repeated abuse over a period of time (e.g., at least three months). Because child victims often cannot give precise dates, courts accept approximate references (e.g., “when I was in fourth grade,” “in the winter,” “around Christmas,” “when we lived in the blue house”) as temporal “markers.”

Where no such markers exist—especially as to when the abuse started—courts may find the duration element insufficiently proven, as in Partridge and Adolph. The majority in Young finds that the move‑in date, weekly pattern, and arrest date together suffice; the dissent disagrees.

5. Certificates of Compliance (CoC) and CPL 30.30 Readiness

Before declaring ready for trial (stopping the CPL 30.30 clock), the prosecution must file a CoC certifying that they:

Have provided all discoverable material, or
Have exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries to locate such material.

If the CoC is invalid (no due diligence), the readiness statement is “illusory,” and the case continues to age toward dismissal. Bay instructs that:

Good faith is required but not enough;
Courts must examine the totality of the People’s efforts, not just whether they missed any item.

6. Sanctions vs. Due Diligence

CPL 245.80 sanctions analysis:

Focuses on what remedy is appropriate for a discovery violation,
Looks at prejudice to the defendant (e.g., need for continuance, preclusion, mistrial).

Due diligence/CoC analysis:

Focuses on the prosecution’s efforts at the time they certified discovery complete,
Determines whether their readiness statement validly stopped the CPL 30.30 clock.

They are related but distinct. A sanction can address prejudice at trial but does not automatically validate a previously defective CoC.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

1. For Child Sex Offense Prosecutions

Expanded use of contextual inferences: Young confirms that appellate courts may allow juries to infer the three‑month duration element from contextual evidence—like move‑in timing, caregiver work schedules, and arrest dates—when read together with a child’s testimony of repeated, regular abuse.
Prosecutorial practice: Nonetheless, the dissent and cases like Partridge and Adolph show that failure to elicit temporal “markers” remains dangerous. Prosecutors should:
- Ask explicitly when the abuse began and ended,
- Tie it to school years, holidays, ages, moves, or other life events,
- Document any inability of the child to recall precise times.
Defense strategy: Defendants can continue to argue that absent specific temporal markers, any finding of a three‑month course is speculative; the dissent in Young provides fresh appellate support for that position.

2. For Evidence Law and Molineux Practice

Intrinsic vs. extrinsic acts: The decision underscores that acts by others (here, the girlfriend) can be considered part of the same criminal transaction when directed by the defendant and closely tied to the charged offense, reducing the need for a full Molineux analysis.
Narrative evidence in sexual abuse cases: Courts are likely to continue admitting narrative/background evidence showing the full pattern of exploitation, especially in “course of conduct” crimes, subject to Leonard and Hu Sin’s balancing test.

3. For Discovery and CPL 30.30 Practice

Bay’s reach clarified: Young confirms that:
- Good faith and sanctions do not by themselves validate a CoC;
- Trial courts must analyze whether the People took reasonable steps, in context, to obtain and disclose discoverable materials, including those held by other agencies (here, federal prosecutors).
Holistic due‑diligence assessment: Courts are instructed to:
- Consider multiple factors—volume, complexity, inter‑agency coordination, timing, etc.—before deciding if a CoC is invalid.
- Avoid a simplistic rule that any single missing item automatically dooms a CoC.
Parallel federal investigations: When federal authorities hold evidence relevant to a state prosecution, Young flags the need for:
- Clear inquiry and communication between state prosecutors and federal offices;
- Documented efforts to obtain or confirm the unavailability of such material;
- Transparent disclosure to defense and court about what has and has not been obtained.
Litigation stakes: A finding of lack of due diligence on remand could render the People’s readiness statement illusory, potentially leading to dismissal under CPL 30.30. This possibility will likely incentivize more robust discovery practices statewide.

4. For Appellate Review and Preservation

Importance of preservation: The decision reiterates that parties must:
- Raise specific grounds (including CoC timing issues) in the trial court;
- Obtain rulings on alternate theories they may later wish to use on appeal.
Limited scope of review: Appellate courts will not entertain unpreserved arguments or issues on which the trial court did not rule adversely to the appealing party.

VI. Conclusion

People v Young is a significant Fourth Department decision at the intersection of evidentiary law, child sex offense doctrine, and New York’s modern discovery and speedy trial framework.

On the evidentiary side, the court:

Affirms broad admissibility of context‑rich, and sometimes deeply prejudicial, evidence in child sex prosecutions, so long as it is intrinsic to the charged offense or necessary to complete the narrative, and
Signals that the dynamics of exploitation—here, directing a caregiver to abuse the child and transmit images—are central to understanding predatory sexual assault against a child.

On the sufficiency side, the majority and dissent lay bare a key doctrinal tension: how far courts may go in inferring the statutorily required duration of a “course of sexual conduct” based on contextual evidence, in the absence of explicit temporal markers. The majority’s willingness to infer a three‑month period from the move‑in date, weekly abuse, and arrest timing contrasts with the dissent’s insistence on more specific anchoring testimony.

Most importantly for criminal practice, Young applies and sharpens People v Bay:

Trial courts must conduct a holistic due‑diligence analysis to determine the validity of a CoC; prejudice and sanctions under CPL 245.80, and mere good faith, do not end the inquiry.
This analysis is particularly pressing where voluminous electronic or inter‑agency evidence exists, such as federal social media records in related cases.

By holding the case and remitting for a proper due‑diligence finding, the Fourth Department underscores that discovery compliance is not a mere formality: it is a condition precedent to valid trial readiness and to the running—or tolling—of the CPL 30.30 clock. The ultimate disposition of Young will depend on the County Court’s application of Bay, but even at this stage, the opinion stands as an important precedent shaping how New York courts evaluate contextual proof of duration in child sex cases and how they scrutinize prosecutorial discovery efforts under the state’s reformed discovery regime.