People v Jacobs: Personal Causation and the Survival of Raise‑the‑Age Removal Challenges After Guilty Pleas

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department’s decision in People v Jacobs, 2025 NY Slip Op 07124 (Dec. 23, 2025), is a significant interpretation of New York’s “Raise the Age” (RTA) regime, particularly Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 722, which governs adolescent offenders in the Youth Part of the criminal courts.

The case addresses two central and interrelated questions:

1. Whether an adolescent offender’s challenge to a Youth Part determination under CPL 722.23(2)(c) — specifically, a finding that the adolescent “caused significant physical injury” that disqualifies the case from removal to Family Court — is forfeited by a subsequent guilty plea.
2. How to interpret the statutory phrase “caused significant physical injury” in CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i): must the adolescent offender personally and directly cause the injury, or can the disqualifying factor be established by general accomplice (accessorial) liability principles under Penal Law § 20.00?

The majority answers:

• The removal-disqualification issue is not forfeited by a guilty plea and survives for appellate review; and
• The People must show that the adolescent offender personally and directly caused the significant physical injury to trigger disqualification from removal — mere accomplice liability is insufficient.

These holdings have substantial implications for adolescent offender practice, plea bargaining in the Youth Part, and the scope of prosecutorial leverage under RTA. The opinion also showcases a sharp division between the majority and a two-judge dissent over the general doctrine of what issues survive a guilty plea.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

• Defendant Anthony Jacobs was 16 years old at the time of a carjacking in which he participated with a codefendant.
• The codefendant was armed with a firearm, drove the vehicle that intercepted the victim, and fatally shot the victim during the incident.
• Jacobs was indicted for, among other charges, murder in the second degree and attempted robbery in the first degree, on a theory of accomplice liability (Penal Law §§ 20.00, 110.00, 125.25(1), (3), 160.15(2)).
• Because he was 16 at the time, Jacobs was an adolescent offender within the meaning of CPL 1.20(44) and RTA applied.

B. Procedural Posture

Under CPL 722.23, when an adolescent offender is indicted on certain qualifying violent felonies, the Youth Part must promptly conduct a review to determine whether the case should be removed to Family Court or retained in the criminal system.

• Within six days of arraignment, the Youth Part must review the accusatory instrument and relevant facts (CPL 722.23(2)(a), (b)).
• The court must order removal to Family Court unless the People prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, one of three disqualifying factors (CPL 722.23(2)(c)):
  1. The adolescent “caused significant physical injury to a person other than a participant in the offense” (subpar. (i));
  2. The adolescent “displayed a firearm, shotgun, rifle or deadly weapon” (subpar. (ii)); or
  3. The adolescent engaged in specified unlawful sexual conduct (subpar. (iii)).

Here, the People argued that Jacobs was disqualified from removal because he “caused significant physical injury” to the victim (CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i)), relying on his role as an accomplice to the carjacking and the resulting homicide.

The Youth Part agreed, found the disqualifying factor satisfied, and retained the case in the criminal court. Jacobs later pled guilty to attempted robbery in the first degree and was sentenced accordingly.

On appeal, he challenged:

1. The validity of his appeal waiver; and
2. The Youth Part’s determination that he “caused significant physical injury,” arguing that it improperly relied solely on accessorial liability rather than personal causation.

C. Holdings and Disposition

1. Appeal waiver invalid. The court holds that the written waiver of the right to appeal was invalid under People v Thomas and a line of recent Fourth Department cases, because it inaccurately suggested an “absolute bar” to appeal and purported to waive all postconviction remedies.
2. Removal challenge not forfeited by guilty plea. The majority holds that an adolescent offender’s challenge to a CPL 722.23(2)(c) disqualification finding is not forfeited by a guilty plea. The issue goes to the integrity and structure of the RTA process, not merely to evidentiary or technical matters, and thus survives the plea.
3. “Caused significant physical injury” requires personal, direct causation. The court interprets CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i) to require proof that the adolescent offender personally and directly caused the significant physical injury, not merely that he was criminally liable as an accomplice. Legislative history, statutory text, and causation principles support this reading.
4. Application to Jacobs. On the evidence presented at the Youth Part review (witness statements, cell phone video):
   • Jacobs knew his codefendant was armed;
   • Jacobs participated in the carjacking, including pounding on the victim’s car; but
   • He did not possess the gun, did not drive the car that blocked the victim, and did not take actions that directly facilitated the shooting (e.g., positioning the vehicle for a clear shot or blocking escape as in prior cases like McGee and Gourdine).
   The majority holds that his conduct did not “forge a link in the chain of causes which actually brought about” the victim’s death, and therefore the People did not meet their preponderance burden under CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i).
5. Remedy. The court:
   • Reverses the judgment;
   • Vacates the guilty plea; and
   • Remits for further Youth Part proceedings, including, if appropriate, a motion by the People to prevent removal on the separate ground of “extraordinary circumstances” under CPL 722.23(1)(a), (d).

Two justices (Curran and Smith, JJ.) dissent. They would hold that Jacobs’s challenge to the CPL 722.23 determination was forfeited by his guilty plea and would affirm the judgment.

III. Legal and Statutory Framework

A. Raise the Age, Youth Part, and Adolescent Offenders

New York’s RTA legislation (L 2017, ch 59, pt WWW) restructured the handling of 16- and 17‑year‑olds in the criminal justice system:

• Adolescent offender (AO): generally, a 16- or 17-year-old charged with certain felonies (CPL 1.20(44)).
• Youth Part: a specialized part of the superior court that handles AO cases (CPL 722.10).
• Default goal: remove most AO cases from the adult criminal system to Family Court, which applies the less punitive, more rehabilitative Family Court Act (CPL 722.23(1)(a)).

CPL 722.23 sets up a two‑stage process:

1. Initial disqualification review (subd. (2)). Within six days of arraignment, the Youth Part must review whether any of the three disqualifying factors under CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i)–(iii) are proven by the People by a preponderance of the evidence. If any is proven, removal to Family Court is barred at this stage.
2. Extraordinary circumstances review (subd. (1)). If no disqualifying factor is proven, the case does not automatically move to Family Court. Instead:
   • The People have 30 days to move to prevent removal on the ground that “extraordinary circumstances” exist (CPL 722.23(1)(a), (d)).
   • If the court finds extraordinary circumstances, the case remains in Youth Part; if not, it is removed to Family Court.

Separate from these determinations, CPL 722.23(4) allows the adolescent offender to waive the opportunity for removal to Family Court, but only “knowingly, voluntarily and in open court, in the presence of and with the approval of counsel and the court.”

IV. Issues Before the Court

A. Was the Appeal Waiver Valid?

Jacobs orally waived his right to appeal and signed a written waiver. However, the written waiver tracked language disapproved in People v Thomas and subsequent Fourth Department cases because it suggested:

• An absolute bar to taking a direct appeal; and
• A waiver of all state and federal postconviction remedies (e.g., CPL 440 motions, federal habeas).

The majority holds that the written waiver was “inaccurate and misleading.” Although the court’s oral colloquy corrected some misstatements (especially about an “absolute bar” to appeal), it did not cure the broader mischaracterization that all postconviction remedies were waived. The waiver was therefore invalid, and the court proceeded to consider the merits.

B. Does a Guilty Plea Forfeit a Challenge to a CPL 722.23 Disqualification Finding?

The key procedural question was whether Jacobs’s guilty plea barred him from challenging the Youth Part’s earlier determination that he was disqualified from removal because he “caused significant physical injury” under CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i).

The majority says no: this challenge survives the plea. The dissent says yes: it is forfeited because it is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional and the Legislature did not expressly preserve it.

C. How Should “Caused Significant Physical Injury” in CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i) Be Interpreted?

The core substantive issue was whether the People could satisfy CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i) by:

• Showing that Jacobs was criminally liable as an accomplice for the robbery and resultant homicide (Penal Law § 20.00); or
• Whether the statute instead demands proof that Jacobs personally and directly caused the victim’s significant physical injury.

The majority adopts the latter, narrower construction, grounded in:

• Plain statutory text;
• Legislative history of the Raise the Age law; and
• General criminal causation doctrine (e.g., People v Li).

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Guilty Pleas and Forfeiture Doctrine

• People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227 (2000).
  • Establishes that a guilty plea generally forfeits nonjurisdictional, nonconstitutional claims.
  • Recognizes narrow exceptions for issues:
    • Involving subject matter jurisdiction (e.g., insufficient accusatory instrument); or
    • Of constitutional dimension that go to “the very heart of the process” (e.g., constitutional speedy trial, double jeopardy, competency).
  • Introduces the key distinction between:

    “defects implicating the integrity of the process, which may survive a guilty plea, and less fundamental flaws, such as evidentiary or technical matters, which do not.”

• People v Taylor, 65 NY2d 1 (1985).
  • Discusses how some issues survive pleas depending on whether they relate to factual guilt vs fundamental procedural matters.
  • Important for the majority’s framing that the removal issue is not tied to factual guilt.
• People v Keizer, 100 NY2d 114 (2003).
  • Reaffirms that there is no “mechanical rule” about which claims survive pleas; the analysis is contextual.
• People v Prescott, 66 NY2d 216 (1985).
  • Emphasizes finality of guilty pleas absent jurisdictional or constitutional defects.

The majority uses these precedents to argue that the removal-disqualification determination affects the integrity and structure of the RTA process — not “mere” evidentiary or technical matters — and so should survive a plea. The dissent leans on the same line of cases to argue that removal is a nonconstitutional statutory matter and thus forfeited.

B. Appeal Waiver Cases

• People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545 (2019), cert denied 140 S Ct 2634 (2020).
  • Disapproved boilerplate appeal waivers that suggest an “absolute bar” to appeal and waiver of all collateral review.
• People v Nesmith, 235 AD3d 1239 (4th Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 964 (2025); People v Ocasio, 222 AD3d 1364 (4th Dept 2023); People v Fernandez, 218 AD3d 1257 (4th Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 1012 (2023); People v Mason, 236 AD3d 1354 (4th Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1010 (2025); People v Hughes, 199 AD3d 1332 (4th Dept 2021).
  • Fourth Department decisions invalidating similar appeal waivers under Thomas.
  • Jacobs continues this pattern.

C. Juvenile/Youthful Offender and Diversion Cases

• People v Weakfall, 108 AD3d 1115 (4th Dept 2013), lv denied 21 NY3d 1078 (2013); People v Charles M., 286 AD2d 942 (4th Dept 2001).
  • Fourth Department entertained challenges to removal-related decisions in juvenile offender cases despite guilty pleas.
  • Cited by the majority to show that similar issues have been treated as surviving pleas.
• People v Chavis, 151 AD3d 1757 (4th Dept 2017), lv denied 29 NY3d 1124 (2017).
  • Fourth Department reviewed a determination denying judicial diversion (CPL art 216) despite a guilty plea.
  • Used as analogy: removal determinations, like diversion eligibility, are structural decisions about the forum and type of proceeding, not about factual guilt.
• People v Middlebrooks, 25 NY3d 516 (2015).
  • Addresses youthful offender (YO) eligibility; distinguishes mandatory eligibility determinations from discretionary decisions.
  • Majority in Jacobs treats CPL 722.23(2)(c) disqualification as akin to a required eligibility determination rather than a discretionary removal decision.
• People v Woods, 143 AD2d 1068 (2d Dept 1988), lv denied 73 NY2d 898 (1989); People v Angelo F., 172 AD2d 686 (2d Dept 1991).
  • Second Department held that juvenile-offender removal decisions under former CPL 210.43 were nonjurisdictional and did not survive a guilty plea.
  • Relied on by the dissent to argue that AO removal under CPL 722.23 should be treated similarly.

D. Statutory Interpretation and Legislative History

• People v Golo, 26 NY3d 358 (2015).
  • Reiterates that statutory interpretation begins with the plain language as “the clearest indicator of legislative intent.”
• People v B.H., 62 Misc 3d 735 (Nassau County Ct 2018).
  • Early RTA case interpreting CPL 722.23(2)(c), concluding that disqualifying factors are not coextensive with general criminal liability and require personal conduct.
  • Jacobs favorably cites B.H., strengthening its reasoning with appellate endorsement.
• Simmons v Trans Express Inc., 37 NY3d 107 (2021).
  • Cited for the principle that legislative history may be consulted where language is ambiguous.
• Legislative history: NY Assembly Debate on 2017 Assembly Bill A3009C (Apr. 8, 2017).
  • Debate reflects an intent to disqualify only those AOs who:

    “directly caused the injury, who displayed the weapon in [their] own hand, and who personally engaged in the unlawful sexual conduct.”

  • Jacobs quotes this history to support a narrow reading of CPL 722.23(2)(c).

E. Causation in Criminal Law

• People v Li, 34 NY3d 357 (2019); People v Davis, 28 NY3d 294 (2016); People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692 (1976).
  • Articulate New York’s standard for criminal causation:
    • The defendant’s conduct must be a “sufficiently direct cause” of the result; it must “forge[] a link in the chain of causes” actually bringing about the harm.
    • The result must be reasonably foreseeable.
• People v McGee, 87 AD3d 1400 (4th Dept 2011), affd 20 NY3d 513 (2013); People v Gourdine, 154 AD2d 255 (1st Dept 1989), lv denied 75 NY2d 770 (1989).
  • Examples of cases where accomplice conduct directly facilitated a shooting:
    • McGee: defendant positioned a car to give a codefendant a clear shot.
    • Gourdine: defendant blocked the victim’s escape after the gun was drawn.
  • Jacobs uses these as contrasts: Jacobs’s conduct did not similarly “forge a link” in bringing about the shooting.

F. Other Analogies in the Dissent

• Statutory speedy trial: CPL 30.30 and pre‑2020 case law (e.g., People v O’Brien, 56 NY2d 1009 (1982)).
  • Before CPL 30.30(6) was added, statutory speedy trial claims were forfeited by a guilty plea, despite being extremely important and time-sensitive.
  • The dissent analogizes this to removal under CPL 722.23: both are statutory, time‑driven rights that did not (and do not) explicitly survive pleas unless the Legislature so provides.
• Venue cases: People v Harris, 182 AD3d 992 (4th Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 1066 (2020); People v Williams, 14 NY2d 568 (1964); People v Carvajal, 6 NY3d 305 (2005).
  • Venue defects are typically forfeited by guilty pleas.
  • The dissent likens AO removal decisions to venue determinations: allocating the case to the most appropriate forum, but not affecting the State’s power to prosecute.

VI. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Appeal Waiver (Briefly)

The majority — applying Thomas and its own cases — invalidates the appeal waiver because:

• The written form improperly suggests that an appeal is absolutely barred; and
• It purports to waive all state and federal postconviction remedies, which is beyond what a defendant may be required to waive as part of a plea.

Although the oral colloquy correctly clarified some aspects, it did not cure all the misleading written language. Consequently, the appellate court treats the waiver as invalid and fully reviews the defendant’s claims.

B. Why the Removal-Disqualification Issue Survives a Guilty Plea

1. Beyond factual guilt

The majority emphasizes that the CPL 722.23(2)(c) disqualification determination:

• Does not concern whether the defendant committed the charged crime; rather, it determines the procedural pathway (Family Court vs Youth Part) in which that criminal responsibility will be adjudicated.
• Therefore, even when a defendant admits factual guilt, the question of the proper forum — and thus the statutory mechanisms designed to promote rehabilitation — remains live and meaningful.

As the majority notes, the RTA scheme was designed to:

“provide an adolescent offender with a better chance at rehabilitation — and a diversion from future criminal activity — by expediting access to the additional services available through Family Court.”

Because a guilty plea typically removes the question of factual guilt but not the question of the appropriate rehabilitative forum, treating the removal challenge as forfeited would undermine the statute’s purpose.

2. Time sensitivity and legislative design

CPL 722.23 imposes very short timeframes:

• Youth Part review within six days of arraignment;
• People’s motion to prevent removal within 30 days.

The majority reasons that if appellate review of disqualification determinations were available only after trial (or after a defendant refused all plea offers and went to verdict), the very time-sensitive benefit of early Family Court intervention would often be lost. By then, much of the rehabilitative opportunity RTA was designed to secure would be irretrievable.

Thus, treating removal challenges as forfeited by guilty pleas would, in practice, compel adolescent offenders to choose between:

• Accepting plea bargains but permanently forgoing any review of possibly erroneous disqualifications from Family Court; or
• Insisting on trial simply to preserve an appellate challenge to the earlier RTA determination.

The majority views this as fundamentally inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent to hasten and prioritize the transfer of appropriate adolescent cases to Family Court.

3. Express waiver requirement under CPL 722.23(4)

A key statutory feature is CPL 722.23(4), which provides that an adolescent offender may waive the opportunity for removal to Family Court only:

“knowingly, voluntarily and in open court, in the presence of and with the approval of counsel and the court.”

The majority infers that the Legislature:

• Regarded the opportunity for removal as so important that it mandated a formal, express, on‑the‑record waiver, and
• Did not intend that such a right could disappear by implication or “forfeiture” simply because a defendant pled guilty.

The opinion explicitly rejects the dissent’s attempt to recharacterize this as a forfeiture issue:

“The legislature made clear that the issue of removal is of such importance with respect to an adolescent offender that a waiver cannot be assumed from a silent record. We decline to circumvent the statutory directive by framing the issue as one of forfeiture.”

4. Analogies to YO eligibility and diversion

The majority analogizes CPL 722.23(2)(c) determinations to:

• Mandatory eligibility determinations for youthful offender treatment (Middlebrooks); and
• Eligibility determinations for judicial diversion (Chavis).

In these contexts, courts have treated eligibility decisions as distinct from factual guilt, and in some instances, they have entertained appellate review notwithstanding pleas. The majority places removal-disqualification determinations in that same structural category.

C. Interpreting “Caused Significant Physical Injury” in CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i)

1. Textual analysis

The statutory phrase is:

“caused significant physical injury to a person other than a participant in the offense.”

The majority notes that the Legislature could have structured disqualification simply by reference to the charged offense (e.g., any AO indicted for a violent felony with a serious injury element is disqualified). Instead, it required additional fact‑specific findings about the adolescent’s particular conduct.

Critically, CPL 722.23(2)(c) does not incorporate, by reference, the accessorial liability provisions of Penal Law § 20.00. Nor does it state that an AO is disqualified simply because he is criminally liable for a violent felony in which serious injury or a weapon is involved.

From this, the majority concludes that the Legislature intended the disqualifying conditions to be narrower than the general scope of criminal liability under Penal Law § 20.00:

• Criminal liability (including as an accomplice) may be broad; but
• Disqualification from the RTA removal preference is limited to those who personally caused injury, personally displayed a weapon, or personally engaged in the sexual conduct described.

2. Legislative history

The Assembly debate on the RTA bill explicitly framed the disqualification factors as applying only to those who directly engaged in the specified conduct:

“[T]his language is meant to disqualify those adolescent offenders who directly caused the injury, who displayed the weapon in [their] own hand, and who personally engaged in the unlawful sexual conduct.” (Assembly Debate, Apr. 8, 2017, at 51–52.)

The majority reads this as confirmation that:

• The Legislature did not mean to make the disqualifying factors coextensive with general criminal liability (including accessorial liability).
• Instead, the disqualifier operates as a kind of “personal conduct” carve‑out to the general presumption of removal.

3. Criminal causation principles

Even apart from the accomplice‑liability issue, the majority examines whether Jacobs’s conduct “caused” the victim’s significant physical injury under criminal causation doctrine.

Under Li, Davis, and Stewart, causation generally requires:

1. The defendant’s conduct must be an actual contributory cause of the injury, forging a link in the chain of causes that brought about the result; and
2. The result must be reasonably foreseeable from that conduct.

In Jacobs, the People showed only that:

• Jacobs was a participant in the carjacking;
• He knew his codefendant was armed; and
• He pounded on the victim’s car.

The record did not show that Jacobs:

• Moved or positioned vehicles to facilitate the shooting (as in McGee);
• Blocked the victim’s escape after the gun was drawn (as in Gourdine); or
• Otherwise took actions that were a direct link in causing the victim’s death.

The majority therefore concludes that the People failed, even under a preponderance standard, to demonstrate that Jacobs’s conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of the victim’s fatal injuries to trigger CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i) disqualification.

D. Remedy and Procedural Consequences

The court makes an important procedural clarification: the failure to establish a disqualifying factor under CPL 722.23(2)(c) does not automatically entitle the adolescent offender to removal to Family Court.

Instead, the statute directs that the case must proceed under CPL 722.23(1). That means:

• The People may, within 30 days, move to prevent removal on the basis of “extraordinary circumstances” (CPL 722.23(1)(a), (d));
• The Youth Part must then decide whether extraordinary circumstances justify keeping the case in criminal court; and
• If no such circumstances are found, the case should then be removed to Family Court.

Because Jacobs had already pled guilty under a legal regime that improperly kept the case in the Youth Part, the plea is vacated and the case remanded for a fresh RTA process consistent with the opinion.

VII. The Dissent’s Perspective

A. Classification of the Issue: “Less Fundamental Flaw”

The dissent accepts the general Hansen framework but classifies the removal-disqualification issue as a “less fundamental flaw,” arguing:

• It is neither jurisdictional nor of constitutional dimension.
• It arises from a statutory right to an opportunity for removal, not from any constitutional principle.
• Therefore, under the usual rule, it is forfeited by a valid guilty plea.

The dissent underscores that CPL article 722 does not expressly state that removal determinations survive a guilty plea, unlike, for example:

• CPL 30.30(6), which now states that statutory speedy trial claims survive pleas; and
• CPL 710.70(2), which expressly preserves suppression issues after a plea.

From this silence, the dissent infers that the Legislature did not intend to create another category of issues that survive guilty pleas.

B. Waiver vs Jurisdiction

The dissent notes that CPL 722.23(4) allows a defendant to waive the opportunity for removal, arguing:

• If the right to removal is expressly waivable, then it cannot be a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, because jurisdiction cannot be waived.
• Thus, the removal issue is not jurisdictional, reinforcing that it should be forfeited by a plea.

The majority agrees that the issue is nonjurisdictional, but nonetheless classifies it as fundamental enough to survive a plea, based on integrity‑of‑process considerations; the dissent disagrees with this extension.

C. Analogies: Speedy Trial, Indictment Sufficiency, Venue, and Juvenile Removal

The dissent marshals several analogies to support forfeiture:

• Statutory speedy trial claims (pre‑CPL 30.30(6)). These were crucial and time-sensitive but nonetheless forfeited by a guilty plea — showing that mere importance or time sensitivity does not guarantee survival.
• Indictment sufficiency (nonjurisdictional defects). Challenges to the sufficiency of factual allegations in an indictment are forfeited by guilty pleas (Guerrero, Seymore, Scarbrough), and the dissent sees the evidentiary challenge to the disqualification determination as analogous.
• Venue challenges. Venue defects are typically forfeited by guilty plea; the dissent analogizes removal decisions to venue choices — determining the appropriate court, but not affecting the State’s power to prosecute.
• Juvenile offender removal under CPL 210.43. In Woods and Angelo F., the Second Department held that removal decisions in juvenile offender cases did not survive a guilty plea, and the dissent sees no reason to treat CPL 722.23 differently.

In short, the dissent regards the removal issue as important but not so fundamental as to survive a plea absent explicit legislative authorization.

VIII. Complex Concepts Explained

1. Adolescent Offender (AO)

An AO is generally a 16- or 17‑year‑old charged with certain felonies. Unlike juvenile delinquents (handled entirely in Family Court), AOs begin in the Youth Part of the criminal court but may be removed to Family Court under RTA.

2. Youth Part vs Family Court

• Youth Part: Part of the criminal court system, presided over by a criminal court judge, applying criminal procedure rules but with some youth‑specific safeguards.
• Family Court: Civil court applying the Family Court Act, focused more on rehabilitation, services, and supervision than on punishment and criminal records.

Removal to Family Court generally shields the youth from a permanent criminal conviction and subjects them to a more rehabilitative regime.

3. Accessorial (Accomplice) Liability

Under Penal Law § 20.00, a person is criminally liable for an offense committed by another when, acting with the required mental state, he “solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids” the other person in its commission. This means:

• An accomplice can be as guilty as the person who physically commits the act.
• However, Jacobs holds that this broad criminal liability does not automatically satisfy RTA disqualification standards, which require personal conduct.

4. “Significant Physical Injury”

This term is not explicitly defined in CPL 722.23 but is generally understood in line with Penal Law distinctions between “physical injury” and “serious physical injury.” “Significant” is in between — substantial harm, but the opinion focuses more on who causes it than on its quantitative degree.

5. “Preponderance of the Evidence”

A standard of proof used often in pretrial and civil contexts, meaning:

• More likely than not;
• Just over 50% probability.

At the CPL 722.23(2)(c) stage, the People must meet this standard to show that a disqualifying factor exists.

6. Extraordinary Circumstances

CPL 722.23(1)(d) allows the People to keep an AO case in the criminal system even if no disqualifying factor exists, but only if they prove that “extraordinary circumstances” justify doing so. This is a high, discretionary threshold, looking at the totality of circumstances (e.g., extreme violence, prior record, public safety concerns).

7. Forfeiture vs Waiver

• Waiver: The intentional, knowing relinquishment of a known right (e.g., a formal waiver of removal opportunity in open court under CPL 722.23(4)).
• Forfeiture: The loss of a right by operation of law, often through inaction or by entering a guilty plea, even without an explicit statement of waiver.

The majority resists treating the removal opportunity as subject to forfeiture by a plea, because the statute requires an explicit, on‑the‑record waiver; the dissent treats the effect of the plea as a forfeiture, not a waiver.

8. Jurisdictional vs Nonjurisdictional Defects

• Jurisdictional: Defects indicating the court lacks power to adjudicate (e.g., an accusatory instrument that fails to allege any offense). These can never be waived or forfeited.
• Nonjurisdictional: Errors in procedure, evidence, or statutory rights that can be waived or forfeited (e.g., many suppression issues, venue, statutory speedy trial).

Both majority and dissent agree that the removal determination is nonjurisdictional; they disagree on whether it is fundamental enough to survive a plea.

9. Criminal Causation

To say that a defendant “caused” a result in criminal law is more than saying the result followed in time. The conduct must:

• Be a substantial, actual factor in bringing about the result; and
• Make the result reasonably foreseeable.

Jacobs uses this framework to decide that Jacobs’s pounding on the car, while part of the crime, was not a sufficiently direct cause of the fatal shooting for purposes of CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i).

IX. Impact and Implications

A. Narrowing Disqualification Under Raise the Age

By rejecting accomplice liability as sufficient for CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i) disqualification, Jacobs narrows the set of AOs who are categorically barred from removal based on injury or weapon use. Key implications:

• Prosecutors must now prove that the AO personally and directly caused the injury or personally displayed the weapon.
• In multi‑defendant cases, an unarmed or less directly involved AO may not be disqualified simply because a codefendant shot or injured the victim.
• This likely increases the number of AO cases that proceed to the “extraordinary circumstances” phase and ultimately to Family Court, especially in group offenses.

B. Strategy for Defense and Prosecution

• Defense counsel:
  • Can challenge disqualification findings even after a guilty plea, at least in the Fourth Department, so long as there is no valid appeal waiver encompassing the issue.
  • Should build an evidentiary record at the CPL 722.23(2)(a) appearance addressing the adolescent’s personal conduct and causation.
  • Should resist any attempts to blur accomplice liability into the disqualification standard.
• Prosecutors:
  • May increasingly rely on the “extraordinary circumstances” motion if disqualification factors cannot be established under the narrower standard.
  • Will likely seek express waivers of the opportunity for removal under CPL 722.23(4) as part of plea negotiations, now that removal challenges are known to survive pleas.

C. Plea Bargaining and Finality

The decision softens the traditional finality attached to guilty pleas in AO cases by recognizing that certain structural issues survive. This:

• Reflects a policy choice to privilege the rehabilitative goals of RTA over absolute plea finality; but
• May lead to more appellate litigation over Youth Part removal determinations.

The tension between finality and juvenile rehabilitation is front and center in the majority/dissent divide and may draw future Court of Appeals review, particularly given differing approaches in other departments (e.g., Woods, Angelo F.).

D. Doctrinal Significance Beyond RTA

Jacobs also contributes to broader doctrines:

• Scope of issues surviving guilty pleas.
  • It pushes the boundary of what counts as “integrity of the process,” adding AO removal determinations to the list of issues that can be reviewed after a plea.
  • This may influence how courts characterize similar eligibility or forum‑selection determinations in other specialized contexts.
• Separation of criminal liability and procedural consequences.
  • The opinion underscores that criminal responsibility (including accomplice liability) does not automatically control all collateral procedural consequences (e.g., eligibility for certain rehabilitative tracks).
  • This conceptual separation could be invoked in other statutory eligibility and diversion schemes.

X. Conclusion

People v Jacobs establishes two important principles in New York’s adolescent offender jurisprudence:

1. An adolescent offender’s challenge to a Youth Part determination under CPL 722.23(2)(c) — specifically, whether the AO is disqualified from removal to Family Court — survives a guilty plea and is not forfeited, absent a valid, knowing, and express waiver under CPL 722.23(4).
2. The disqualification factor that an AO “caused significant physical injury” under CPL 722.23(2)(c)(i) requires proof that the adolescent personally and directly caused the injury; general accomplice liability under Penal Law § 20.00 is insufficient. The AO’s conduct must forge a direct causal link in the chain of events leading to the injury.

By tightly aligning the disqualification criteria with personal conduct, and by preserving appellate oversight of removal determinations despite guilty pleas, the decision reinforces the RTA statute’s rehabilitative orientation and its preference for routing appropriate youthful cases into the Family Court system. At the same time, it leaves prosecutors the tool of “extraordinary circumstances” to retain the most serious cases in criminal court.

The sharp dissent highlights unresolved tensions about the scope of issues that survive guilty pleas and about deference to legislative silence. As adolescent offender practice continues to evolve, Jacobs will likely serve as a leading authority on the interplay between criminal liability, causation, and the specialized procedural protections created by Raise the Age.