The court, quoting People v Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138 (3d Dept 2025), restates the basic structure of the People’s continuing discovery duty:

“[T]here is ‘a continuing duty to provide discoverable materials expeditiously, and [the People] shall file a supplemental COC identifying any additional information. The People must also provide an explanation for the delayed disclosure. Where a COC was filed in good faith after exercising due diligence and the disclosures were reasonable under the circumstances, the filing of a supplemental COC shall have no effect on the validity of the initial COC, though the court may issue an appropriate sanction as detailed in CPL 245.80.’”

This framework, reaffirmed in Coffey, distinguishes:

• the validity of the initial COC and corresponding SOR (which affects CPL 30.30 readiness); and
• the possibility of sanctions under CPL 245.80 for late disclosure, even where the initial COC was validly filed in good faith.

D. People v Bay – The Due Diligence Standard and Burden of Proof

People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023), is the Court of Appeals decision that anchors the entire analysis. Coffey quotes and applies several key holdings from Bay:

1. Due diligence factors. Bay identified several relevant factors in assessing whether the People exercised “due diligence” in discovery:

   “the efforts made by the prosecution and the prosecutor’s office to comply with the statutory requirements, the volume of discovery provided and outstanding, the complexity of the case, how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence, the explanation for any discovery lapse, and the People’s response when apprised of any missing discovery” (41 NY3d at 212).

2. Continuing duty and supplemental COC. Bay acknowledged that the People have a continuing discovery obligation and may file supplemental COCs. A later supplemental COC does not retroactively invalidate an earlier good-faith, reasonable COC, though late disclosure may warrant sanctions.
3. Burden on the prosecution. Bay holds that once a defendant moves for dismissal under CPL 30.30 on the basis of a defective COC:

   “the People bear the burden of establishing that they did, in fact, exercise due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the initial COC despite a belated or missing disclosure. If the prosecution fails to make such a showing, the COC should be deemed improper, the readiness statement stricken as illusory, and — so long as the time chargeable to the People exceeds the applicable CPL 30.30 period — the case dismissed” (41 NY3d at 213).

4. No prejudice requirement. Critically, Bay makes clear that, under the former CPL 245.50 regime, a defendant need not show prejudice to obtain dismissal of an indictment when the People’s readiness is illusory due to a defective COC:

   “a defendant need not show prejudice to obtain a dismissal for the People’s failure to timely comply with discovery mandates” (see 41 NY3d at 214).

Coffey squarely applies these principles and corrects the County Court’s departure from them.

E. People v Gaskin and People v James – No Prejudice Requirement and the Remedy of Remittal

The Third Department also heavily relies on the Fourth Department’s reasoning in People v Gaskin, 214 AD3d 1353 (4th Dept 2023), and its own prior decision in People v James, 229 AD3d 1008 (3d Dept 2024).

From Gaskin, Coffey adopts two important propositions:

1. CPL 245.50 (former [1]) is:

   “clear and unambiguous … [and] establish[es] that a [COC] is proper where its filing is in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances” (214 AD3d at 1355).

2. On a CPL 30.30 motion, “the question is not whether defendant was prejudiced by an improper [COC]” (id. at 1355).

Applying the same logic, Coffey explains that the County Court’s focus on “no prejudice” was legally mistaken. Both James and Gaskin also provide a procedural model: where the trial court has not properly determined whether the People’s COC was filed in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances, the Appellate Division will:

“hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter … to determine whether the People’s [COC] was proper under the terms of CPL 245.50 … and thus whether the [SOR] was valid” (see Gaskin, 214 AD3d at 1355; James, 229 AD3d at 1012).

Coffey follows this exact remedial path.

F. People v Williams and People v Contompasis – Elaborating the Bay Framework

People v Williams, 224 AD3d 998 (3d Dept 2024), is another Third Department case applying Bay. Coffey cites Williams for:

• reaffirming that the People bear the burden of demonstrating due diligence once the COC is challenged via a CPL 30.30 motion (224 AD3d at 999–1000), and
• confirming, in line with Bay, that prejudice is not required to invalidate an improper COC for speedy trial purposes (id. at 1004 n 5).

People v Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138 (3d Dept 2025), is cited for broader structural propositions about article 245:

• that article 245 ties the People’s trial readiness to their discovery obligations, and
• that the statute provides a mechanism for continuing discovery via supplemental COCs without necessarily invalidating an earlier good-faith COC.

Together, Bay, Gaskin, James, Williams, and Contompasis form a coherent and now well-settled framework. Coffey does not create this framework but applies and reinforces it in the Third Department, while correcting a trial-level deviation.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in People v Coffey

A. The Core Holding: Prejudice Is Not the Standard Under Former CPL 245.50

At the heart of Coffey is the appellate court’s rejection of the County Court’s reliance on lack of prejudice to deny the CPL 30.30 motion. The Third Department states:

“On appeal, defendant argues that County Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based upon the finding that defendant did not sustain any prejudice. We agree.”

The opinion then explains:

“CPL 245.50 (former [1]) ‘clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly] … establish[ed] that a [COC] is proper where its filing is in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances’ (People v Gaskin, 214 AD3d 1353, 1355 [4th Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Bay, 41 NY3d at 209, 210). Thus, “[o]n a CPL 30.30 motion, the question is not whether defendant was prejudiced by an improper [COC]” (People v Gaskin, 214 AD3d at 1355; see People v Bay, 41 NY3d at 213).”

In other words:

• The correct inquiry is: Was the COC filed in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances?
• The incorrect inquiry (used by the County Court) is: Was the defendant prejudiced by the discovery lapse?

By explicitly “agreeing” with the defendant that the trial court’s prejudice-based approach was wrong, the Third Department:

• cements the non-prejudice standard under former CPL 245.50 for CPL 30.30 purposes, and
• signals to trial courts and litigants that the focus must be on the quality of the prosecution’s efforts at the time of the initial COC.

B. What the County Court Failed to Do

The Third Department notes:

“On this record, it appears that the court did not evaluate and determine whether the People’s alleged discovery violations invalidated the People’s COC and SOR (see People v James, 229 AD3d 1008, 1011 [3d Dept 2024]; People v Gaskin, 214 AD3d at 1355).”

The opinion characterizes the County Court’s ruling as one that:

• found “no prejudice,”
• declared the SOR timely,
• but did not undertake a clear Bay-style analysis of whether the People had in fact:
  • exercised due diligence, and
  • made reasonable inquiries to locate and disclose all known discoverable material.

In the Third Department’s view, this omission is not a mere technical gap; it is a legal error requiring remittal.

C. The Required Analysis on Remand

The appellate court therefore orders:

“In light of the court’s failure to consider whether the People’s [COC] was filed in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances despite the [alleged] discovery [violations], we hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court to determine whether the People’s [COC] was proper under the terms of CPL 245.50[, as it was in effect at the time,] and thus whether the [SOR] was valid (People v Gaskin, 214 AD3d at 1355; see People v James, 229 AD3d at 1012).”

Practically, on remand, County Court must now:

1. Apply the Bay due diligence factors to the People’s discovery efforts as of July 15, 2021, and any later readiness dates.
2. Determine whether the initial COC was:
   • filed in good faith, and
   • reasonable under the circumstances, taking into account:
     • the volume and complexity of the case,
     • what discovery was outstanding (e.g., redacted vs. unredacted materials; CI-related records),
     • how obvious such omissions should have been,
     • the explanation for any delays, and
     • the People’s response once omissions came to light.
3. Based on that determination, decide whether the SOR was valid and, if not, calculate CPL 30.30 time chargeable to the People.
4. If the chargeable time exceeds six months, dismiss the indictment.

The Appellate Division reserves final decision on the appeal until those factual and legal determinations are made.

D. Distinguishing Between Dismissal and Sanctions

The opinion also implicitly reminds readers of an important conceptual distinction:

• CPL 30.30 dismissal is a structural remedy for untimely readiness. It flows from invalid readiness (illusory SOR) once the People’s COC is found improper.
• CPL 245.80 sanctions address discovery misconduct or delays even where the COC was filed in good faith. Those sanctions can range from orders to disclose, to adverse inferences, to preclusion, and—in some circumstances—dismissal, often with prejudice analysis.

Under former law, the question whether a COC is valid for CPL 30.30 purposes is separate from whether discovery lapses warrant sanctions. Coffey underscores that prejudice analysis belongs, if at all, on the sanctions side (CPL 245.80), not in the determination of COC validity for speedy trial purposes—at least under the pre–August 7, 2025 statutory framework.

VI. Temporal Reach of the 2025 Amendments to CPL Article 245

A. Footnote 1: Which Version of Article 245 Applies?

The opinion includes an important clarification in footnote 1:

“It is noted that CPL article 245 was recently amended, which amendments took effect on August 7, 2025, and apply to ‘all criminal actions pending on such date and all actions commenced on or after such date’ (L 2025, ch 56, part LL, § 8). Inasmuch as this criminal action terminated years prior to these amendments’ effective date, they do not apply (see CPL 1.20 [16] [c]).”

Key points:

• Effective date: August 7, 2025.
• Scope clause: The amendments apply to:
  • criminal actions pending on that date; and
  • criminal actions commenced thereafter.
• Termination: Under CPL 1.20 (16) (c), a “criminal action” generally terminates upon:
  • the imposition of sentence, or
  • the dismissal or other final disposition of the charges.

Coffey’s criminal action:

• began in May 2021 (felony complaint), and
• terminated with sentencing on March 9, 2023, well before August 7, 2025.

Therefore, the former version of CPL article 245, as in effect between May 3, 2020 and August 7, 2025, is the governing law.

B. Footnote 2: The New Standard Under Amended CPL 245.50

Footnote 2 foreshadows significant changes wrought by the 2025 amendments:

“It is noteworthy that the recent amendments to CPL article 245 (see infra n 1) no longer indicate mandatory dismissal and include consideration of prejudice (see CPL 245.50, as amended by L 2025, ch 56, part LL, § 4 [eff Aug. 7, 2025]).”

Under the amended CPL 245.50:

• The statutory language that had led courts (via Bay and its progeny) to treat certain dismissals as effectively mandatory upon a defective COC appears to have been removed or modified.
• New text explicitly contemplates “consideration of prejudice” in the COC context.

Although the exact post-amendment language is not reproduced in the opinion, the implication is clear:

• For criminal actions pending on or after August 7, 2025, courts must now incorporate prejudice analysis into their COC and remedy determinations under the revised statute.
• For actions, like Coffey’s, that had already terminated before that date, the prior, non-prejudice regime continues to govern.

Thus, Coffey has its primary doctrinal effect on the large cohort of pre-amendment cases and appeals. For new and pending cases under the amended statute, its relevance is more historical and interpretive: it clarifies the old standard and helps distinguish when the new prejudice-based framework kicks in.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Certificate of Compliance (COC)

A COC is a formal document filed by the prosecutor stating, in substance:

• “We have complied with our discovery obligations under CPL article 245 after due diligence and reasonable inquiry, and all known discoverable materials have been disclosed or made available.”

Under former CPL 245.50:

• A COC must be truthful and reasonable when filed.
• If important known materials are missing and the prosecution has not exercised due diligence, the COC is improper.
• An improper COC cannot validly support a Statement of Readiness for CPL 30.30 purposes.

B. Statement of Readiness (SOR) and “Illusory Readiness”

A SOR is the prosecution’s formal announcement—either orally on the record or in writing—that it is ready for trial. However:

• Under article 245, the People generally cannot validly declare readiness until they have properly complied with discovery and filed a valid COC.
• If the SOR is based on an improper COC, the readiness is called “illusory.” It does not stop the CPL 30.30 speedy trial clock.

C. Due Diligence and Reasonable Inquiry

“Due diligence” and “reasonable inquiry” are practical standards. The court, following Bay, looks at:

• What did the prosecution do to identify and collect discoverable material?
• How much material existed and how complex was the case?
• Were any missing items obvious or obscure to a reasonably careful prosecutor?
• Why was anything late or missing?
• Once problems were pointed out, did the prosecution fix them quickly and transparently?

If, under these factors, the prosecutor’s efforts were reasonable when the COC was filed, the COC can still be valid even if some items were later discovered and produced via a supplemental COC.

D. Darden Hearing

A Darden hearing (from People v Darden, 34 NY2d 177) arises when probable cause for a search warrant is based on a confidential informant’s information. To protect the informant’s identity while safeguarding the defendant’s rights, the court may:

• review the informant or related materials in camera (outside the presence of the defendant), and
• determine whether the informant’s information sufficiently supports probable cause.

In Coffey, the discovery of the CI’s role in the state’s case triggered a Darden hearing and led to a protective order limiting what CI-related information could be disclosed directly to the defense.

E. Protective Order Under CPL 245.70

A protective order allows the court to:

• limit, defer, condition, or regulate discovery disclosures
• to protect witnesses, preserve the confidentiality of certain information, or prevent harm.

In Coffey’s case:

• The People sought and obtained a protective order regarding the CI’s affidavits and criminal history.
• Defense counsel did not object.

A protective order does not eliminate the People’s obligation to exercise due diligence. Rather, it may affect how certain information is disclosed (e.g., in camera review, redactions, or delayed disclosure).

F. Criminal Action “Termination”

For purposes of determining which statutory regime applies, CPL 1.20 (16) (c) defines when a “criminal action” terminates—usually upon sentencing or dismissal. This matters here because:

• If a criminal action terminated before August 7, 2025, the old version of CPL article 245 applies.
• If it was still pending on August 7, 2025, the amended version applies.

Coffey’s case had already terminated in 2023, so the prior regime governs.

VIII. Impact and Implications

A. For Pre–August 7, 2025 Cases: Reinforcing the Non-Prejudice Standard

For all criminal actions governed by the former CPL 245.50, People v Coffey provides clear Third Department authority that:

• The validity of a COC turns on good faith and reasonableness under the circumstances, not on whether the defendant can show prejudice.
• Where the trial court has denied a CPL 30.30 motion primarily because the defendant was not prejudiced by discovery lapses, appellate courts may:
  • deem that an error in legal standard,
  • hold the appeal in abeyance, and
  • remit to the trial court to apply the correct Bay-derived due diligence analysis.

This will likely affect a large number of pending appeals in the Third Department involving pre-2025 COC challenges, as well as motions in the trial courts where similar reasoning was employed.

B. Guidance to Prosecutors

The case underscores for prosecutors that:

• They must be prepared to make a detailed record of:
  • the steps taken to locate and disclose discovery,
  • the reasons for any delays, and
  • their responses to defense complaints about missing items.
• They cannot rely on the argument that the defendant suffered “no prejudice” to salvage an otherwise defective COC under the former statute.
• Protective orders do not immunize them from the due diligence standard; they must still act promptly within the constraints imposed by the order.

In practice, this means that when filing a COC, the prosecution should:

• confirm, to the extent reasonably possible, that no obvious categories of discoverable material are missing;
• document their efforts to obtain and review materials from police agencies and other sources; and
• anticipate that a court may later scrutinize those efforts against the Bay factors.

C. Guidance to Defense Counsel

For the defense, Coffey confirms several strategic points:

• On a CPL 30.30 motion grounded in discovery noncompliance, you do not have to prove prejudice (for actions governed by the former article 245).
• Instead, focus on:
  • what items were missing as of the COC date,
  • how obvious those omissions should have been, and
  • any evidence that the People failed to inquire or follow up adequately.
• Where appropriate, press courts to make explicit findings on due diligence and reasonableness, not merely on whether eventual disclosure cured any harm.

D. Guidance to Trial Courts

Trial courts in the Third Department are now on clear notice that:

• They must separate:
  • COC validity and CPL 30.30 readiness (a structural question governed by due diligence), from
  • any sanctions or remedial measures (where prejudice may be relevant under CPL 245.80 or under amended article 245).
• They must build a record demonstrating that they:
  • have considered the Bay due diligence factors, and
  • have decided whether the COC was proper under the “good faith and reasonable under the circumstances” standard.

Failing to do so invites remittal on appeal, as seen in Gaskin, James, and now Coffey.

E. Looking Forward: Cases Under the Amended Article 245

While Coffey itself is governed by the former CPL 245.50, its discussion of the 2025 amendments highlights a turning point:

• Future cases (actions pending on or commenced after August 7, 2025) will operate under a statutory scheme that:
  • explicitly incorporates prejudice into COC-related determinations, and
  • eliminates mandatory dismissal for certain discovery lapses.
• Courts will need to reconcile the new text of CPL 245.50 with existing case law (including Bay), adjusting doctrines to the new statutory language.

Nevertheless, Coffey will remain important for:

• interpreting and applying the old regime in pre-amendment cases and appeals;
• illustrating how the Legislature’s 2025 amendments consciously shifted away from the prior non-prejudice, mandatory-dismissal-leaning model; and
• providing a contrast that will inform judicial construction of the new statute (courts may ask what mischief the Legislature sought to avoid or remedy by expressly adding prejudice and softening dismissal language).

IX. Conclusion

People v Coffey is a focused but important decision within New York’s evolving discovery and speedy trial jurisprudence. The Third Department’s central message is straightforward:

• Under former CPL 245.50 (in effect until August 7, 2025), the validity of a Certificate of Compliance turns on whether it was filed in good faith and was reasonable under the circumstances, meaning the prosecution exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries.
• On a CPL 30.30 motion challenging readiness based on an allegedly defective COC, prejudice to the defendant is not the controlling standard. The defendant does not need to show prejudice to obtain dismissal if the COC is improper and the People’s chargeable time exceeds the statutory limit.
• Where a trial court denies dismissal based predominantly on the absence of prejudice and fails to decide whether the COC satisfies the Bay standard, the proper remedy is to withhold decision and remit for a correct application of CPL 245.50 and CPL 30.30.

By reaffirming and consolidating the principles from Bay, Gaskin, James, and Williams, Coffey provides clear guidance to all actors in the criminal justice system for pre-amendment cases. At the same time, its careful recognition of the 2025 amendments to CPL article 245 marks the boundary between the old, non-prejudice regime and the new, explicitly prejudice-sensitive framework. In that sense, Coffey stands as both a capstone to one legal era and a signpost to the next.