People of Michigan v. Borton: A Judicial Call to Reconcile Michigan’s Shackling-Prejudice Doctrine with Deck and Chapman

Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
Date: December 29, 2025
Disposition: Application for leave to appeal denied; separate writings by THOMAS, J. (concurring) and WELCH, J. (dissenting), joined by CAVANAGH, C.J.

Important framing: The Court’s denial order does not create binding merits precedent. The significance of the decision lies in the competing separate writings: (i) Justice THOMAS’s concurrence questioning Michigan’s post-trial “no visibility, no prejudice” approach to shackling in light of binding federal due-process law, and (ii) Justice WELCH’s dissent arguing that multiple acknowledged trial errors—including shackling—warranted plenary review and possible relief, including under a cumulative-error theory.

1. Introduction

People of the State of Michigan v Zacharie Scott Borton arises from a multiple-homicide prosecution following the discovery of three elderly men shot to death at a property in Grass Lake, Michigan. Defendant admitted shooting two victims but claimed self-defense and denied shooting the third. A jury convicted him of first-degree murder (for one victim), second-degree murder (for another), second-offense felony-firearm, and stealing a financial transaction device; the jury could not reach a verdict on the remaining open-murder count and on carjacking, which were later dismissed via nolle prosequi.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals acknowledged “multiple errors” at trial yet found no prejudice warranting reversal. Defendant sought leave in the Michigan Supreme Court. The Court denied leave. Justice THOMAS concurred but criticized the underdevelopment of Michigan shackling law in the wake of Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622 (2005). Justice WELCH dissented, arguing the errors (other-acts evidence, jury-view protocol, and midtrial shackling) merited oral argument and review, particularly under cumulative-error principles.

Key issues highlighted by the separate writings:

Whether Michigan’s prejudice framework for unjustified restraints—often turning on whether jurors saw the restraints—comports with federal due process under Deck v Missouri and harmless-error rules under Chapman v California, 386 US 18 (1967).
Whether the defendant was improperly excluded from a jury view without an affirmative waiver of the right to be present under People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229 (1984).
Whether improper admission of other-acts evidence under former MRE 404(b)(1) prejudiced a self-defense case, under People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52 (1993) and People v Denson, 500 Mich 385 (2017).
Whether multiple errors should be assessed cumulatively under People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361 (2001), People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261 (1995), and People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575 (2002).

2. Summary of the Opinion (Order and Separate Writings)

2.1 The Court’s order

The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because it was “not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.”

2.2 THOMAS, J. (concurring)

Justice THOMAS agreed leave should be denied on this record but wrote separately to flag a systemic problem: Michigan’s shackling jurisprudence is “underdeveloped,” gives “insufficient attention” to Deck v Missouri, and may employ a prejudice framework that is difficult to reconcile with Deck and preserved constitutional-error doctrine under Chapman v California.

Although the trial court’s midtrial decision to impose leg restraints was concededly erroneous under Michigan law (People v Dunn, 446 Mich 409 (1994)) and federal law (Deck v Missouri), the lower courts denied relief because they found the defendant failed to prove any juror saw the restraints. Justice THOMAS questioned (a) whether non-visibility should be treated as eliminating prejudice categorically, and (b) whether the burden allocation is consistent with Deck, which places the harmless-error burden on the state for unjustified visible shackling.

2.3 WELCH, J. (dissenting) (joined by CAVANAGH, C.J.)

Justice WELCH would have heard oral argument on leave because multiple errors occurred and might have affected the outcome. The dissent identified three “actual errors”:

Improper admission of other-acts domestic incidents under former MRE 404(b)(1).
Improper exclusion of defendant from the jury view absent an affirmative waiver under People v Mallory and related constitutional and statutory protections.
Unjustified midtrial shackling in violation of People v Dunn and Deck v Missouri.

The dissent also emphasized cumulative error, arguing the “divided outcome” (some convictions, one hung count) could indicate a close case in which improper propensity evidence and midtrial restraints might have tipped the balance.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Shackling / restraints and due process

People v Dunn, 446 Mich 409 (1994): Michigan’s foundational case requiring a “finding supported by record evidence” that restraints are necessary to prevent escape, injury, or to maintain order. Both separate writings treat the trial court’s midtrial restraints as concededly erroneous under Dunn. Justice THOMAS also notes Dunn predates Deck and that the “jury did not see” language in Dunn was not necessarily dispositive because Dunn ordered a new trial on other grounds.
Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622 (2005): The controlling federal due-process decision. It forbids routine visible shackling absent “special need,” identifies three core rationales (presumption of innocence, meaningful defense, dignified proceedings), and applies Chapman v California harmless-error burden allocation when the error is preserved. Justice THOMAS criticizes Michigan appellate decisions for not substantively integrating Deck.
Chapman v California, 386 US 18 (1967): The federal preserved constitutional error harmlessness standard; the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict. Justice THOMAS reads Michigan’s “defendant must show prejudice” approach as potentially inconsistent with Chapman where Deck applies.
People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181 (2009); People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31 (2008); People v Dixon, 217 Mich App 400 (1996): These cases supply the frequently cited Michigan formulation: even if restraints were improperly imposed, the defendant must show prejudice; and there is no prejudice if the jury could not see the restraints. Justice THOMAS focuses on this line as the doctrinal “status quo” potentially in tension with Deck.
People v Davenport, 488 Mich 1054 (2011); People v Porter, 493 Mich 972 (2013); People v Arthur, 495 Mich 861 (2013): Short orders that referenced Deck without full merits development; used by Justice THOMAS to show the absence of a thorough, binding Michigan treatment post-Deck.
People v Willie Johnson, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 21, 2024 (Docket No. 363544): An example of a Michigan appellate court applying Deck to reverse a conviction (not binding precedent, but illustrative).
Out-of-state comparators cited by Justice THOMAS: People v Allen, 222 Ill 2d 340 (2006) (Illinois recognizes restraints may offend due process even if not visible); People v Buchanan, 13 NY3d 1 (2009) (New York: inadequate justification for stun belt warranted new trial without focusing on visibility); People v Jackson, 58 Cal 4th 724 (2014) (California considered visibility and other adverse effects); Commonwealth v Romero, 595 Pa 275 (2007) (Pennsylvania: no prejudice where restraint not visible and no evidence of psychological hindrance).
People v Horton, 506 Mich 966 (2020) (MCCORMACK, C.J., dissenting): Cited to underscore the lived reality that restraints can undermine the presumption of innocence and, in self-representation settings, may be “constructively visible.”

B. Right to presence at a jury view

People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229 (1984): Central authority for the proposition that a jury view is part of the trial and the defendant has a right to be present absent affirmative waiver. Justice WELCH relies heavily on Mallory to critique the trial court’s handling of the view.
Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400 (1988): Cited for the principle that presence at trial sustains fundamental trial-participation rights.

C. Other-acts evidence under former MRE 404(b)(1)

People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52 (1993): Sets the modern framework for other-acts admissibility and the interaction with relevance (MRE 402) and unfair prejudice (MRE 403).
People v Denson, 500 Mich 385 (2017): Reinforces that when the prosecution’s relevance theory depends on similarity, a “striking similarity” is required.
United States v Commanche, 577 F3d 1261 (CA 10, 2009): Quoted (via Denson) for the observation that other-acts evidence is “strong medicine,” particularly corrosive where self-defense is the core disputed issue.

D. Standards of review, postconviction procedure, and cumulative error

People v Bryant, 491 Mich 575 (2012): clear-error review of trial-court fact findings (invoked in Justice THOMAS’s discussion of whether jurors saw restraints).
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973): basis for a “Ginther hearing” to develop ineffective-assistance and related claims; held here on remand.
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361 (2001); People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261 (1995); People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575 (2002): the Michigan cumulative-error framework (aggregate only “actual errors,” and the inquiry is cumulative unfair prejudice).
People v Yarbrough, 511 Mich 252 (2023): cited to highlight unconscious bias concerns that can be triggered by cues like shackling.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. What the separate writings identify as the doctrinal fault line

Justice THOMAS isolates two embedded assumptions in Michigan’s commonly applied approach (as expressed in People v Payne drawing on People v Horn, People v Dixon, and People v Dunn):

Visibility-as-the-only-prejudice premise: the idea that restraints matter only if jurors see or know about them.
Justice THOMAS argues Deck v Missouri describes broader harms—impairment of the meaningful defense and damage to courtroom dignity—suggesting that nonvisible restraints may still implicate due process, or at least should not be treated as categorically harmless.
Defendant-bears-prejudice premise even after objection: the idea that even preserved shackling error requires the defendant to prove prejudice (including juror awareness).
Justice THOMAS contrasts this with Deck’s statement that unjustified visible shackling is inherently prejudicial and with Chapman’s rule placing the harmlessness burden on the state for preserved constitutional error.

B. The dissent’s focus: prejudice, timing, and cumulative effect

Justice WELCH accepts that multiple errors occurred and disputes the lower courts’ “no prejudice” conclusions. On shackling, the dissent emphasizes:

Midtrial onset: shackling began after several days, plausibly signaling to jurors that the defendant had become dangerous or disruptive.
Repeated standing for the jury: a routine that risks revealing or audibly signaling restraints.
Practical proof difficulties: jurors may be reluctant to admit that restraints influenced them, even if they noticed them.

The dissent then aggregates the three errors (other-acts propensity risk, exclusion from jury view, and shackling) under cumulative-error doctrine, arguing the case may have been close and thus especially susceptible to compounding prejudice.

C. The procedural overlay: emerging court-rule guidance

Justice THOMAS notes that effective January 1, 2024, Michigan adopted MCR 6.009 and amended MCR 6.001 to provide procedural guidelines protecting the right to be free from unjustified restraints in “any court proceeding that is or could have been before a jury . . . .” The concurrence cites People v Tallman, 513 Mich 893 (2023) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) summarizing these amendments.

Although the rules did not apply to Borton’s trial, they are part of the opinion’s forward-looking significance: Michigan’s procedural law is moving toward more formal scrutiny of restraints, while Michigan’s substantive prejudice framework remains contested.

3.3 Impact

While the denial order leaves the conviction intact, the separate writings may shape future litigation and appellate development in three practical ways:

Inviting a direct post-Deck merits case: Justice THOMAS explicitly signals that Michigan’s restraint-prejudice doctrine “may warrant this Court’s attention in a future case,” teeing up an eventual clarifying decision reconciling People v Payne’s prejudice requirement with Deck v Missouri and Chapman v California.
Reframing burdens and evidentiary expectations: The concurrence highlights how hard it is for defendants to prove juror awareness. Future litigants may press for a burden shift (or at least a less rigid visibility requirement) grounded in preserved constitutional error principles.
Strengthening trial-level restraint procedure: With MCR 6.009 in force for new cases, trial courts should be more consistent in making on-the-record, particularized findings—reducing the frequency of “routine” restraints and generating clearer records for appellate review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Shackling” / “restraints”: physical devices (e.g., leg irons, handcuffs, stun belts) restricting a defendant’s movement in court. The constitutional concern is that restraints can signal dangerousness, impair communication with counsel, and diminish courtroom dignity.
“Particularized justification”: a case-specific, evidence-supported explanation (risk of escape, risk of harm, disruption risk) required before imposing restraints; a generalized “serious charges” rationale is insufficient under People v Dunn and Deck v Missouri.
“Harmless error” (Chapman standard): for preserved federal constitutional error, the prosecution must show beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict (Chapman v California).
“Other-acts evidence” (former MRE 404(b)(1)): evidence of prior bad acts that generally cannot be used to prove a person is the type who would commit the charged crime. It may be admissible for specific, non-propensity purposes (intent, identity, absence of mistake, etc.), but must still be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial (People v VanderVliet; People v Denson).
“Jury view”: jurors visit a location relevant to the case. Michigan treats it as part of the trial, meaning the defendant generally has the right to be present unless he affirmatively waives that right (People v Mallory).
“Ginther hearing”: a post-trial evidentiary hearing used to develop a record for ineffective-assistance and related claims (People v Ginther).
“Cumulative error”: multiple actual errors may collectively create unfair prejudice even if no single error warrants reversal by itself (People v Knapp; People v Bahoda; People v LeBlanc).

5. Conclusion

People v Borton is procedurally a denial of leave, but substantively a pointed exchange about trial fairness and, in particular, the constitutional significance of unjustified restraints. Justice THOMAS’s concurrence highlights a potential mismatch between Michigan’s frequently applied “no visibility, no prejudice” approach (rooted in People v Payne and related cases) and the federal due-process framework articulated in Deck v Missouri and Chapman v California. Justice WELCH’s dissent, joined by the Chief Justice, frames the case as one where multiple acknowledged errors—other-acts evidence, jury-view exclusion, and midtrial shackling—may have combined to deny a fair trial under cumulative-error principles.

The decision’s broader legal significance lies less in what the Court did (deny review) than in what the separate writings preview: a likely future reckoning over how Michigan should evaluate preserved shackling errors, how burdens should be allocated, and whether nonvisible restraints can still undermine due process—now against the backdrop of Michigan’s newer procedural protections in MCR 6.009.