Guam Adopts a Flexible McDonough Juror-Bias Framework, Confines Implied Bias to “Extreme” Cases, and Approves Non‑Corroboration Instructions in CSC Trials

1. Introduction

People of Guam v. Simmons arose from convictions for five counts of Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (CSC II) under 9 GCA § 25.20(a)(1) and (b), based on allegations that Derick James Simmons touched the vaginas of two minors under fourteen, R.D. and R.C. The trial featured two recurring, system-level issues in sexual offense prosecutions: (1) whether juries may be instructed that victim testimony in CSC cases need not be corroborated, and (2) how courts should evaluate post-verdict claims that a juror failed to disclose a relationship with a prosecution witness.

After conviction, Simmons moved for a new trial upon learning that Juror 12 had previously worked with and attended family events with J.D., the victims’ grandmother, R.D.’s legal guardian, and a prosecution witness. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing, found no actual or implied bias, and denied a new trial. On appeal, Simmons challenged: (1) the “non-corroboration” instruction, (2) the legal standard applied to the new-trial motion, and (3) admission of hearsay through a police officer.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Non-corroboration instruction affirmed: The court held the instruction tracked 9 GCA § 25.40 and was not misleading when viewed with the entire charge.
• New trial denial affirmed: The court approved use of the McDonough framework, adopted a more “objective and flexible” approach to its application, and adopted the majority rule that implied bias is presumed only in “extreme” or “exceptional” circumstances.
• Hearsay error found but harmless: The court held the officer’s repetition of abuse disclosures was inadmissible hearsay under Guam evidence law, cautioned prosecutors, but affirmed because the error was harmless.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Non-corroboration instruction: statutory fidelity and binding historical precedent

• People v. Welch (Crim. No. 90-00008A, 1990 WL 320365 (D. Guam App. Div. Oct. 30, 1990), aff’d, 958 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1992)): The Appellate Division approved an instruction modeled after 9 GCA § 25.40, reasoning it did not unduly emphasize the victim when the charge as a whole repeatedly instructed jurors on credibility assessment. Simmons treats Welch as binding on Guam trial courts until the Supreme Court of Guam addresses the issue, via People v. Quenga and People v. Palomo.
• Guam v. McGravey, 14 F.3d 1344 (9th Cir. 1994): The Ninth Circuit likewise approved a similar instruction, emphasizing that, read as a whole, the charge did not tell jurors to defer to the victim. The Simmons court relied on McGravey as reinforcing the “instructions as a whole” approach.
• Limtiaco v. Guam Fire Dep’t, 2007 Guam 10: Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court of Guam will not deviate from well-reasoned Appellate Division precedent “unless justified by reason.” Simmons found no sufficient reason to depart from Welch/McGravey.
• People v. Penaflorida, 2022 Guam 14; People v. Ehlert, 2019 Guam 3; People v. Cummins, 2010 Guam 19: These cases support looking to Michigan authority because Guam’s CSC statutes were patterned after Michigan’s.
• People v. Smith, 385 N.W.2d 654 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam): Used persuasively to support that instructing juries on the anti-corroboration rule can accurately reflect statutory law.
• People v. Cunningham, No. 366138, 2025 WL 211267 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished): Persuasive authority rejecting the argument that anti-corroboration rules are only for appellate sufficiency review; supports giving the instruction where defense emphasizes lack of corroboration.

B. Juror nondisclosure/new trial: adopting a Guam framework around federal constitutional baselines

• Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982): Establishes that juror partiality allegations can be addressed by a hearing allowing the defendant to attempt to prove actual bias. Simmons endorsed that the Superior Court met its constitutional duty by holding an evidentiary hearing.
• McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984): Supplies the two-prong framework for voir dire nondisclosure claims (inaccurate answer to a material question; truthful answer would support a for-cause strike). Simmons both approves using McDonough and refines how Guam will apply it.
• Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40 (2014): Cited to show McDonough’s continuing relevance in later Supreme Court jurisprudence.
• Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976): Used to explain why the McDonough plurality’s “dishonesty as dispositive” view is not necessarily the controlling holding, permitting Guam to adopt a more flexible approach consonant with the concurrences.
• United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) and United States v. Gonzalez, 906 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2018): Supplies Ninth Circuit definitions and framing for actual bias and implied bias analyses.
• United States v. Kvashuk, 29 F.4th 1077 (9th Cir. 2022): Provides the “extreme situation” standard for presuming implied bias—central to Simmons’s adoption of the majority rule.
• People v. Messier, 2014 Guam 34: Reinforces the trial court’s “significant discretion” on new-trial motions (including the “interests of justice” language in 8 GCA § 110.30(a)), shaping the deference Simmons gives on review.

C. Hearsay and “investigation background”: enforcing Guam’s limits

• People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3: The leading Guam authority limiting “background” testimony—officers may say they spoke to a witness, but generally may not disclose the substance of the conversation unless a hearsay exception applies. Simmons applies Roten’s rule, finds error, and performs a Roten-style harmlessness analysis.
• People v. Tedtaotao, 2016 Guam 9; People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1: Reaffirm Roten’s limitation and reinforce that “effect on listener” does not automatically permit substance-of-accusation testimony.
• People v. Perez, 2015 Guam 10: Explicitly rejects admitting “he touched me” statements as non-hearsay to explain why police investigated; Simmons relies on Perez to reject the People’s theory.
• People v. Caso, 2022 Guam 6: Distinguished: Caso involved GRE 801(d)(1)(C) prior identification, not general accusatory statements of misconduct.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The non-corroboration instruction: “accurate law” + “charge as a whole”

The court’s analysis begins with the anchor point that 9 GCA § 25.40 expressly provides: “The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated” in CSC prosecutions. Because Jury Instruction 4E tracked this language, the instruction was legally accurate—an important threshold in Guam’s jury-instruction review. The court then applied the “instructions as a whole” methodology, emphasizing that surrounding instructions repeatedly told jurors they were the sole judges of credibility, could accept or reject any witness, and should consider reasonableness and corroboration/contradiction across evidence.

Critically, the court rejected the idea that § 25.40 is merely an appellate sufficiency principle. While acknowledging the anti-corroboration rule historically supports sufficiency review, Simmons adopts the Michigan view (including People v. Cunningham) that informing jurors is permissible—especially where the defense argument invites a “no corroboration, no conviction” inference.

B. Juror nondisclosure: Guam’s refined McDonough approach

Simmons makes two doctrinal moves. First, it endorses the trial court’s use of McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood as an appropriate framework for post-verdict juror nondisclosure claims—especially where the defendant frames the motion as a Sixth Amendment impartial-jury violation. Second, the court clarifies how Guam will apply McDonough: it adopts an “objective and flexible” approach that considers surrounding circumstances rather than treating a juror’s assertion of “mistake” as ending the inquiry.

The court’s concern is practical and institutional: a rigid, purely subjective “personal honesty” approach could incentivize concealment (a juror can claim “I didn’t recognize the name,” even after later recognition). Simmons thus aligns Guam with the concurrences’ realism in McDonough: bias is often inferred from context, not admissions.

Even under this flexible approach, Simmons adopts the majority rule that implied bias is presumed only in “extreme” or “exceptional” circumstances—using the Ninth Circuit’s formulation from United States v. Kvashuk. The trial court’s finding that the relationship was “too tenuous” (former coworkers, limited recent contact) fell within the permissible range under abuse-of-discretion review.

C. Hearsay: reaffirming Roten/Perez limits, but affirming on harmlessness

Simmons forcefully reiterates a bright evidentiary line drawn in People v. Roten and People v. Perez: an officer may testify that a report was made and that an investigation began, but may not repeat the substance of accusatory out-of-court statements (e.g., “she was sexually assaulted,” “she was also assaulted”) under the “background” or “effect on listener” rubric. The court also underscores GRE 805 (hearsay within hearsay): each layer must be independently admissible.

Nonetheless, the court affirms because the statements were brief, the declarants testified and were cross-examined, the prosecutor did not exploit the hearsay in closing, and the hearsay was largely cumulative of the victims’ more detailed testimony. Simmons adds an institutional warning: repeated violations may trigger “more severe remedies” and possibly “prophylactic rules,” especially where such hearsay could impermissibly bolster a key witness.

3.3. Impact

A. CSC prosecutions: instruction practice is stabilized and arguably strengthened

• Trial courts now have Supreme Court of Guam approval to give a § 25.40-based instruction and, notably, an endorsed Michigan-style formulation (Model Criminal Jury Instruction 20.25).
• Defense strategy implications: Where the defense emphasizes “no corroboration,” Simmons supports giving an instruction that clarifies corroboration is not legally required—reducing the risk that jurors apply an extra-statutory corroboration requirement.
• Appellate review: The decision strongly entrenches the “instructions as a whole” lens for evaluating whether the instruction misleads or improperly elevates victim testimony.

B. Juror bias/new trial motions: Guam’s doctrinal baseline is now explicit

• Flexible McDonough in Guam: Courts may consider surrounding circumstances beyond a juror’s claim of mistake.
• Implied bias is narrow: Presumptive bias is reserved for “extreme” relationships or circumstances, aligning Guam with the dominant federal approach.
• Deference is decisive: Simmons signals that close factual calls about relationships and impartiality will often be affirmed under abuse-of-discretion review if the trial court held a hearing and made supported credibility findings.

C. Evidence law: renewed pressure on “background” hearsay practices

• Clear prosecutorial warning: Repetition of accusatory disclosures by law enforcement is error unless a hearsay exception (including each hearsay layer) is satisfied.
• Forward-looking: The court explicitly leaves open the possibility of stronger judicial responses if the pattern persists—particularly in credibility-driven cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Non-corroboration” rule (9 GCA § 25.40): In CSC cases, the law does not require additional evidence (like physical evidence or another witness) to “back up” the victim’s testimony. A jury may still demand corroboration as a matter of persuasion, but the law does not impose it as a legal prerequisite to convict.
• Actual bias vs. implied bias:
  • Actual bias means the juror is truly partial (e.g., cannot be fair).
  • Implied bias means the law treats certain relationships/situations as so risky that bias is presumed even if the juror claims fairness—limited in Simmons to “extreme” cases.
• The McDonough test: A defendant must show (1) a juror gave an inaccurate answer to a material voir dire question, and (2) the truthful answer would have supported a valid for-cause strike (typically by showing actual or implied bias). Simmons adds that courts should assess context and not stop solely because a juror says the inaccuracy was a “mistake.”
• Hearsay and “effect on the listener”: Hearsay is an out-of-court statement used to prove what it asserts. Sometimes words are offered only to show why someone acted (the “effect on the listener”), but Guam cases like Roten and Perez limit this: an officer can say a report was made and they investigated, but generally cannot repeat the accusation itself as “background.”
• Harmless error: Even if the trial court made an evidentiary mistake, an appellate court will affirm if it is more probable than not that the mistake did not materially affect the verdict (for non-constitutional errors).

5. Conclusion

People of Guam v. Simmons is a consolidating decision with three practical holdings. First, it cements that a § 25.40 non-corroboration instruction is permissible and not misleading when the charge repeatedly emphasizes juror control over credibility; it also expressly approves a Michigan-style model instruction for future use. Second, it meaningfully develops Guam’s juror-bias doctrine by adopting a flexible, context-sensitive approach to McDonough while simultaneously limiting presumed (implied) bias to rare “extreme” circumstances. Third, it reasserts strict limits on “background” hearsay through police witnesses, coupling a finding of harmlessness in this case with a pointed institutional warning aimed at preventing repetition.