Guam Adopts Maryland v. Craig as the Governing Sixth Amendment Standard for Two-Way Remote Testimony by Adult Witnesses (Rejecting a Categorical Deposition Requirement)

I. Introduction

In People of Guam v. Stefan Keanu Camacho, 2025 Guam 16, the Supreme Court of Guam addressed whether the prosecution may present an adult witness’s testimony at a murder trial via live, two-way video over the defendant’s objection, consistent with the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. The witness—Guam’s former Medical Examiner, Dr. Jeffrey Nine—performed the alleged victim’s autopsy. After relocating to Ohio, Dr. Nine asserted he could not travel to Guam due to serious medical circumstances affecting his wife and child, for whom he provided essential care.

The key issue was whether the trial court’s authorization of remote testimony violated Camacho’s constitutional right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The Supreme Court took the interlocutory appeal to clarify a question “of general importance in the administration of justice,” namely: what legal framework governs two-way video testimony by an adult witness and how must a trial court justify it.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Guam affirmed the Superior Court’s order permitting Dr. Nine to testify remotely at Camacho’s trial. The Court held:

• Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), remains good law unless and until the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly overrules it, notwithstanding tension with Crawford v. Washington.
• The Court adopted Craig as Guam’s governing standard for prosecution-requested remote testimony by adult witnesses via two-way video.
• Under the Craig test, the People met their burden on this record to show (1) necessity to further an important public policy and (2) procedural assurance of reliability.
• The Court emphasized the ruling is narrow and case-specific: future requests—including those involving Dr. Nine—require a hearing and fresh findings; remote testimony is not automatic.
• The Court rejected the view that the theoretical availability of depositions renders remote trial testimony categorically “unnecessary,” declining to follow interpretations associated with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The Sixth Amendment baseline and the “face-to-face” preference: Coy v. Iowa and Guam precedent

The Court reiterated that the Confrontation Clause ordinarily guarantees a defendant the right to be physically present and face-to-face with adverse witnesses, citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (as quoted through other authorities). It situated this principle in its own caselaw: People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1 (right to confrontation not absolute) and People v. Callahan, 2018 Guam 17 (face-to-face requirement cannot “easily be dispensed with”).

2. The governing exception framework: Maryland v. Craig

The doctrinal center of the opinion is Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), which allows denial of face-to-face confrontation only if (1) it is necessary to further an important public policy and (2) the testimony’s reliability is otherwise assured. Although Craig arose from one-way video testimony of a child victim in a sexual abuse case, the Guam Supreme Court aligned with the majority of jurisdictions extending its framework to adult witnesses and two-way video.

3. The post-Craig challenge: Crawford v. Washington and the reliability critique

The Court squarely confronted the argument (raised in other jurisdictions and discussed at oral argument) that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) undermines Craig by rejecting judicial “reliability” balancing in favor of a more procedural, historically grounded approach.

The opinion traced the internal doctrinal tension: Crawford overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and echoed themes from Justice Scalia’s Craig dissent, emphasizing that confrontation is a procedural guarantee rather than a free-floating reliability inquiry. Nonetheless, Guam joined most courts in holding that Crawford did not explicitly overrule Craig, so Craig remains binding Supreme Court precedent for the in-court presentation question.

4. Competing approaches to two-way video: United States v. Gigante (outlier), United States v. Yates, and United States v. Carter

The Court canvassed three primary approaches used elsewhere:

• United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999): permits two-way video upon “exceptional circumstances” and “interest of justice,” reasoning it preserves confrontation sufficiently to dispense with Craig. Guam rejected this as insufficiently protective and too much of an outlier.
• United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc): applies Craig to two-way video and underscores the necessity finding; the trial court relied on this framing, and Guam found it consistent with requiring an evidentiary hearing and case-specific findings.
• United States v. Carter, 907 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2018): applies Craig, but has been read to treat depositions as preferable, sometimes defeating “necessity” for live remote trial testimony. Guam expressly declined to adopt a categorical deposition preference.

5. Persuasive state authority and factual analogies: People v. Coulthard and others

The trial court relied on People v. Coulthard, 307 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383 (Ct. App. 2023), which upheld remote testimony under pandemic-related constraints and childcare issues. Guam viewed the reliance as “somewhat misplaced” because Coulthard was grounded in COVID-19 conditions, but still treated it as supportive of recognizing nontrivial welfare-based policy concerns when combined with other case-specific factors.

The opinion also drew on a range of state and federal decisions to illustrate national division and emerging practice, including Wrotten v. New York, 560 U.S. 959 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of certiorari) to underscore that two-way video is “not obviously” resolved by Craig, while still proceeding on the dominant approach that Craig governs unless the U.S. Supreme Court says otherwise.

6. Guam-specific confrontation framing: People v. Kotto and Organic Act references

The Court reaffirmed that the Organic Act incorporates the Sixth Amendment and also provides an independent confrontation right, citing People v. Kotto, 2020 Guam 4. But because Camacho did not develop a distinct Organic Act argument, the Court resolved the appeal under the Sixth Amendment framework.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Threshold holding: Craig governs two-way adult testimony in Guam

The Court first made a precedential clarification for Guam: Craig applies to two-way video testimony of adult witnesses. It rejected two alternatives: (i) the Second Circuit’s Gigante approach (too permissive), and (ii) a categorical Crawford-style bar unless “unavailability” plus prior cross-examination is satisfied (too rigid and ill-fitting for live in-court testimony format disputes, and not requested by Camacho).

2. Prong One (“important public policy” + “necessity”): a cumulative, fact-bound finding

The opinion emphasized that mere convenience, cost, or generalized efficiency is insufficient. It also agreed that “mere inconvenience to a witness” cannot justify denying face-to-face confrontation.

The Court nonetheless found necessity satisfied on a narrow, record-specific combination of concerns:

• Family medical caregiving (usually insufficient standing alone): Dr. Nine’s wife and child had serious, documented conditions; Dr. Nine (a physician) administered critical care and testified credibly that travel would place their treatment in life-threatening peril.
• Public policy favoring admissibility and use of Medical Examiner evidence: the Court invoked Guam’s statutory scheme, including 10 GCA §§ 81101-81113 and especially 10 GCA § 81111, to recognize a governmental interest in the Medical Examiner’s investigatory function and the legal system’s access to autopsy-related evidence.
• Policy favoring prompt resolution of criminal cases (insufficient alone): the Court treated this as a supporting, not dispositive, factor, consistent with other jurisdictions rejecting speedy resolution as a standalone justification.

Critically, the Court rejected a doctrinal shortcut used elsewhere: it held that the mere theoretical possibility of an in-person deposition does not categorically defeat “necessity”. The Court reasoned that Craig does not impose a deposition prerequisite, and that for geographically remote jurisdictions like Guam, a rigid deposition preference can generate impractical or rights-distorting outcomes.

3. Prong Two (“reliability otherwise assured”): oath, cross, demeanor—and safeguards against coaching

The Court found reliability satisfied because remote two-way testimony preserves core confrontation features: oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor. It rejected Camacho’s “virtual oath” argument, noting that perjury liability is real for a witness testifying from Ohio, pointing to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.11, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621(1), and 9 GCA § 52.15.

The opinion also offered forward-looking guidance: when the witness is outside the courthouse, trial courts must implement additional procedures to ensure the witness is not coached and is not improperly consulting notes, documents, or electronics—concerns tied to the confrontation function of verifying identity and preventing testimonial manipulation.

C. Impact

1. A clarified Guam framework for remote adult testimony

The central doctrinal impact is that Guam now has an explicit appellate holding that Maryland v. Craig governs two-way, live video testimony by adult witnesses. Trial courts must conduct an evidentiary hearing (when contested) and make case-specific findings on both prongs.

2. No categorical deposition requirement; pragmatic sensitivity to Guam’s geography

The Court’s rejection of a categorical deposition requirement is particularly significant for Guam’s justice system. It reduces pressure to adopt a rule that can be disproportionately burdensome where witnesses (and defendants in custody) would otherwise need transcontinental travel. This stance also signals that “necessity” is not defeated by hypothetical alternatives that are legally possible but practically disruptive.

3. A narrow holding with a cautionary ceiling

The Court emphasized its holding is “narrow” and not a standing authorization for Dr. Nine to testify remotely in all cases. The People retain the burden each time, and defendants retain the ability to contest necessity and reliability based on changed circumstances or a different record.

4. A roadmap for litigating medical-examiner testimony logistics

Given Dr. Nine reportedly performed numerous autopsies in pending cases, this opinion will likely become the primary template for future motions in Guam involving relocated expert witnesses central to cause-of-death proof. Parties can expect disputes to focus on (i) the concreteness of the claimed hardship, (ii) whether alternate arrangements can mitigate it without impairing confrontation, and (iii) the robustness of anti-coaching/anti-reference protocols.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Confrontation Clause (Sixth Amendment): A criminal defendant’s right to confront (face and challenge) witnesses who testify against him—most notably through live testimony and cross-examination.
• Face-to-face confrontation: The traditional in-court setup where the witness and defendant are physically present in the same room. The Court treats this as the default, but not absolute.
• Two-way video testimony: A live video feed where the witness can see the courtroom and the courtroom can see the witness (unlike one-way systems).
• Maryland v. Craig test: A constitutional exception allowing remote testimony only if (1) it is necessary to further an important public policy and (2) reliability is otherwise assured through procedures like oath, cross-examination, and demeanor observation.
• “Case-specific findings”: The judge must base the decision on evidence in the particular case (not general statements like “it’s inconvenient”).
• Interlocutory appeal: An appeal allowed before the case ends, used here to resolve an important legal question affecting trial procedure.

V. Conclusion

People of Guam v. Camacho establishes a clear Guam rule: Maryland v. Craig governs the admissibility of two-way, live remote testimony by adult witnesses over a defendant’s objection. The Court affirmed remote testimony on a narrow record where severe caregiving needs, Guam’s interest in Medical Examiner evidence, and trial-administration concerns collectively made remote testimony “necessary,” and where the confrontation substitutes (oath, cross, demeanor observation) could be made reliable with appropriate safeguards.

The opinion is best read as both a doctrinal adoption and a warning: remote testimony is constitutionally permissible in Guam, but only through careful, evidence-based, case-by-case adjudication that treats face-to-face confrontation as the norm and exceptions as rare.