Pending Discovery Does Not Block Summary Judgment Absent Rule 56(d), and § 1983 Malicious Prosecution After a Warrant Requires a Franks-Style Falsehood or Omission

1. Introduction

In Besosa-Noceda v. Capó-Rivera (1st Cir. Jan. 7, 2026), plaintiffs Marilyn Besosa-Noceda and Juan Pablo Rodríguez-Torres—also acting for their minor children—appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of Puerto Rico officials: a police officer (Daniel E. Rivera Torres), a prosecutor (Carmen Nereida Santana Torres), and the prosecutor’s supervisor (José B. Capó-Rivera).

The dispute arose after Besosa relocated from Puerto Rico to Texas with the minor child she shared with Emmanuel Santiago-Melendez. Santiago objected to the move and initiated both civil custody-related proceedings and a criminal complaint alleging unlawful deprivation of custody. Although a municipal judge initially found no probable cause to issue an arrest warrant, a prosecutor sought “revision” before a superior judge, who then found probable cause and issued a warrant. Besosa was arrested in Texas, extradited, and detained, but ultimately obtained dismissal at a later preliminary hearing.

Besosa sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Puerto Rico law for malicious prosecution, contending (i) the prosecution and pretrial detention were unsupported by probable cause and (ii) defendants failed to investigate adequately and/or presented falsehoods. On appeal, she also argued the district court erred by ruling on summary judgment while a subpoena dispute remained unresolved.

The First Circuit affirmed, crystallizing two practical rules: (1) a party must invoke Rule 56(d) to resist summary judgment on the ground that discovery is incomplete; and (2) when an arrest warrant issues on a judicial probable-cause finding, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on pretrial detention generally requires proof meeting the Franks v. Delaware deliberate/reckless falsehood-or-omission standard.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Discovery/timing: The court held that an unresolved discovery dispute does not bar ruling on a “fully briefed” summary judgment motion, particularly where the nonmovant failed to file a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) motion explaining why additional discovery was essential.
§ 1983 malicious prosecution: Because a superior judge issued an arrest warrant on a finding of probable cause, Besosa could survive summary judgment only by adducing evidence that the warrant was procured through deliberate or reckless false statements or material omissions consistent with Franks v. Delaware, as applied in Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor. She failed to do so.
Investigation theory rejected: The court rejected the argument that defendants’ allegedly inadequate investigation (without “red flags” undermining the complainant’s credibility) could satisfy Franks.
Rule 6 presence argument rejected: The court found no identified federal constitutional right to be present at the Puerto Rico Rule 6 probable-cause hearing for issuance of an arrest warrant and noted Puerto Rico law permits such hearings in absentia.
Commonwealth malicious prosecution: The Puerto Rico claim failed for the same core reason: a warrant supported by a judicial probable-cause determination defeats malicious prosecution absent proof that it was obtained via knowingly false testimony.
Appellate record defects: The court emphasized that missing record citations and untranslated Spanish materials constrained appellate review and that ambiguities would be resolved against the appellant.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Appellate posture, record rules, and consequences of inadequate citations/translations

Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice: Cited for the standard summary-judgment posture—facts are recited in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. The court invoked this baseline but immediately warned it could not fully indulge it due to briefing and record defects.
Fryar v. Curtis: Used twice to underscore (i) the appellate court’s discretion to dismiss or limit review when Rule 28’s record-citation requirements are violated, and (ii) that ambiguities created by such deficiencies may be resolved against the appellant.
Dávila v. Corporación De P.R. Para La Difusión Pública and In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.: Together, these authorities enforced two related constraints: untranslated foreign-language documents cannot be considered on appeal, and materials not part of the district court record are not part of the appellate record. This became dispositive as to Besosa’s “false information at the second Rule 6 hearing” theory because the relevant hearing material was not available in English.
Puerto Ricans for P.R. Party v. Dalmau: Reinforced the translation principle with an institutional warning: the “outcome of a case” should not turn on a non-English document.
United States v. Martínez-Hernández: Cited for waiver principles when a litigant fails to support factual objections with record citations.
Universal Truck & Equip. Co. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc. and United States v. Zannino: Used to reject underdeveloped or perfunctory appellate arguments, including the attempt to maintain claims against the supervisor (Capó-Rivera) and vague references to alternative theories (e.g., abuse of process).

B. PROMESA bankruptcy stay/discharge issues (bypassed)

Díaz-Báez v. Alicea-Vasallo and Borrás-Borrero v. Corporación del Fondo del Seguro del Estado: These cases supported the panel’s decision to bypass complicated PROMESA-related stay/discharge questions because the merits could be resolved without them and affirmance avoided any realistic risk of Commonwealth liability that might conflict with bankruptcy protections. The court’s approach reflects a pragmatic sequencing principle: decide what is necessary, avoid what is not.

C. Discovery disputes and Rule 56(d)

Nieves-Romero v. United States: Provided the controlling premise that open discovery does not, by itself, prevent summary judgment where the motion is fully briefed.
Jones v. Secord: Central to the court’s holding: Rule 56(d) is “not self-executing,” and the nonmovant must affirmatively request relief and make a showing tailored to the missing facts and their materiality.
Rivera-Torres v. Rey-Hernández: Quoted within Jones for Rule 56(d)’s purpose as a “safety net” preventing courts from “swing[ing] the summary judgment axe too hastily,” while still placing the burden on the party who needs discovery to properly invoke the rule.

D. Summary judgment review

MacRae v. Mattos: Supplied the de novo standard and the requirement to draw reasonable inferences for the nonmovant—again, within the limits imposed by the deficient record presentation.

E. § 1983 malicious prosecution, probable cause, and the Franks gateway

Pagán-González v. Moreno: Provided the elements for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim predicated on pretrial detention: (i) seizure pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause; and (ii) favorable termination.
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor and Franks v. Delaware: These are the doctrinal keystone. Where a judicial officer issued a warrant upon a probable-cause finding, the plaintiff must show that the legal process was corrupted by deliberate falsehoods or reckless disregard for the truth (including material omissions) attributable to the defendant official(s). The panel treated Franks as the necessary mechanism to reconcile a facially valid warrant with a claimed Fourth Amendment violation.
United States v. Tanguay: Used for multiple propositions: officers generally have no duty to investigate “fully” before seeking a warrant; they need not “exhaust every possible lead”; but they may have a further duty when “red flags” make the complainant’s veracity suspect, and Franks extends to material omissions.
United States v. Barbosa: Reinforced the “no duty to investigate fully” principle and framed it specifically in the warrant-application context.
Beard v. City of Northglenn: Quoted (via Tanguay) for the idea that probable cause does not require “overwhelming corroborative evidence” or interviewing all conceivable witnesses.
St. Amant v. Thompson: Provided the “obvious reasons” / credibility red-flag formulation referenced by Tanguay, anchoring the threshold for when failure to investigate can be “reckless disregard for the truth.”
Garmon v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. and Pina v. Children's Place: Supported the court’s insistence that speculation cannot defeat summary judgment—critical to rejecting the “conduit prosecutor” theory (that Rivera/Santana fed falsehoods to the substitute prosecutor).
Baker v. McCollan: Served as a limiting principle: acquittal or release (and by analogy, later dismissal for lack of probable cause) does not automatically imply a constitutional tort. Otherwise, every failed prosecution would yield a federal damages claim.

F. Puerto Rico Rule 6 practice and Commonwealth malicious prosecution

Pueblo v. North Caribbean: Cited to show that Puerto Rico Criminal Procedure Rule 6 authorizes a hearing for issuance of an arrest warrant in the defendant’s absence, undermining Besosa’s argument that non-notice/nonattendance itself established illegality.
Díaz-Nieves v. United States: Provided the elements of Puerto Rico malicious prosecution (including malice and lack of probable cause) and the warrant-probable-cause barrier absent knowingly false testimony to obtain the warrant—paralleling the federal Franks logic.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The court’s handling of an incomplete/defective appellate presentation

The opinion is candid that the appellant’s briefing defects shaped the appellate lens: absent record citations and English translations, the court limited its factual reconstruction and resolved ambiguities against the appellant. This is not merely a technical scolding; it operates as a substantive gatekeeping rule. The practical lesson is that appellate courts will not reconstruct a party’s case when the party fails to do so within the rules.

B. Why the unresolved subpoena dispute did not prevent summary judgment

The panel treated the discovery issue as fundamentally procedural: if Besosa believed she could not fairly oppose summary judgment without subpoenaed material, she had to use Rule 56(d) and make the required showing (what facts are missing, why they are obtainable within a reasonable time, and how they would change the outcome). Having failed to do so—and having omitted the dispute from her summary judgment opposition—she could not later fault the district court for ruling.

The reasoning also reflects docket-management realism (explicitly noted in Jones v. Secord): it is the litigant’s responsibility to flag timing problems and seek specific relief, not the court’s responsibility to infer it from scattered filings.

C. The warrant and the “Franks gateway” to § 1983 malicious prosecution liability

The pivotal analytic move is the court’s insistence that the existence of a judicial probable-cause determination supporting an arrest warrant changes the plaintiff’s burden. The claim is not simply, “there was no probable cause in fact,” because the legal process itself produced a probable-cause finding. To hold officers/prosecutors liable for a Fourth Amendment violation in that setting, the plaintiff must show the probable-cause finding was procured through corruption of the process—i.e., deliberate or reckless falsehoods or material omissions under Franks v. Delaware, as applied in Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor.

On the record properly before the court, Besosa could not identify:

a specific false statement by Rivera or Santana used to obtain the warrant;
a specific material omission made deliberately or recklessly;
or “red flags” known to defendants that made reliance on Santiago reckless under United States v. Tanguay’s framework.

D. Rejection of the “inadequate investigation” theory

The court applied the settled principle (from United States v. Barbosa and United States v. Tanguay) that probable cause is a practical standard and does not demand maximal investigation. Liability based on investigative inadequacy arises only in narrow circumstances—where there are “obvious reasons” to doubt the complainant’s veracity (a credibility “red flag”) such that proceeding without further inquiry becomes reckless. The panel found no such evidence here, emphasizing that Rivera and Santana took steps consistent with ordinary practice: interviews, sworn statement, consultation with counsel, and document collection.

E. The second Rule 6 hearing: translation/record problems and causation

Besosa’s most direct path to a Franks showing would have been proof that falsehoods were presented at the second Rule 6 hearing that produced the warrant. The opinion, however, forecloses that route on two independent grounds:

Appellate inadmissibility: without an English translation, the court would not consider what occurred at that hearing (Dávila v. Corporación De P.R. Para La Difusión Pública; Puerto Ricans for P.R. Party v. Dalmau).
Lack of attribution: even if falsehoods were presented, it was undisputed that neither Rivera nor Santana attended; and the “conduit” theory (that they fed lies to the substitute prosecutor) was unsupported speculation insufficient under summary judgment standards (Garmon v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.; Pina v. Children's Place).

F. Presence at Rule 6 hearings

The panel disposed of the “right to be present” argument by combining (i) the absence of any identified federal constitutional authority establishing such a right and (ii) Puerto Rico authority indicating Rule 6 permits hearings in absentia (Pueblo v. North Caribbean), especially given the availability of later proceedings (here, a preliminary hearing at which Besosa obtained dismissal).

G. Commonwealth malicious prosecution tracks the warrant barrier

For Puerto Rico law, the court applied Díaz-Nieves v. United States to require malice and lack of probable cause, and to treat a judicial probable-cause warrant as defeating the claim absent knowingly false testimony to obtain that warrant. Because the evidentiary shortcomings that defeated the federal claim equally defeated the “knowing falsity” requirement, the Commonwealth claim fell with it.

3.3. Impact

Procedural discipline in discovery-summary judgment sequencing: The decision reinforces that a pending discovery dispute is not self-executing protection against summary judgment. Parties must promptly and specifically invoke Rule 56(d) and connect missing discovery to material facts.
Practical tightening of § 1983 malicious prosecution after a warrant: The case underscores the centrality of the Franks framework where legal process includes a judicial probable-cause determination. Plaintiffs must build a record that targets falsity/omission, intent/recklessness, and materiality—not simply later failure of the prosecution.
Puerto Rico litigation realities in federal court: The opinion is a pointed reminder that untranslated Spanish materials may become functionally unusable on appeal and that record-citation failures can shape (or end) the case. This has outsized impact in District of Puerto Rico litigation given the frequency of Spanish-language sources.
Rule 6 hearings and due process framing: While the court did not definitively articulate the full constitutional contours of Rule 6 practice, it signaled that the mere fact of in-absentia probable-cause hearings for warrants is not, without more, a federal constitutional violation—particularly where later adversarial safeguards exist.
PROMESA avoidance as case-management: The panel’s bypass of PROMESA stay/discharge questions illustrates an approach future litigants should anticipate: if the merits resolve the case without bankruptcy entanglement, the court may decline to decide PROMESA issues.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court decides there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to win as a matter of law—so no trial is needed.
Rule 56(d): A mechanism for the nonmoving party to request more time for discovery before summary judgment is decided. It requires a specific explanation of what evidence is missing, why it matters, and why it can likely be obtained.
Probable cause: A commonsense standard requiring a fair probability—based on the known facts—that a person committed an offense (or that evidence will be found in a place, in the search context).
“Seizure pursuant to legal process”: Detention that occurs through formal judicial mechanisms—such as an arrest warrant or arraignment—rather than an on-the-spot warrantless arrest alone.
The Franks standard: From Franks v. Delaware: even if a judge issued a warrant, it can still violate the Fourth Amendment if officials obtained it by knowingly lying or acting with reckless disregard for the truth (including by omitting key facts), and the lie/omission was material to probable cause.
Puerto Rico “Rule 6” hearing: A proceeding under the Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure used to determine probable cause for an arrest warrant. The opinion notes Puerto Rico law allows this hearing to occur without the defendant present.
PROMESA automatic stay / discharge injunction: Bankruptcy protections under PROMESA that can temporarily halt litigation (automatic stay) or bar certain claims outside the bankruptcy process after discharge (discharge injunction). The court avoided deciding these issues because it affirmed on the merits.

5. Conclusion

Besosa-Noceda v. Capó-Rivera reinforces two operational rules with significant day-to-day consequences in civil rights litigation. First, incomplete discovery does not itself prevent summary judgment; the party who needs discovery must timely invoke Rule 56(d) with a concrete, materiality-focused showing. Second, when an arrest warrant issues based on a judicial probable-cause finding, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim premised on pretrial detention generally requires evidence satisfying the Franks v. Delaware framework—deliberate or reckless falsehoods or material omissions attributable to the defendants.

The opinion also serves as a procedural caution: appellate courts will not rely on untranslated materials or reconstruct a record that a party failed to properly cite and develop. In combination, these themes make the decision a strong reaffirmation that civil rights claims must be built—and preserved—through disciplined record development, precise procedural motions, and evidence targeting the legal standard that governs warrants and probable cause.