Pederson v. State (2026 ND 1): Summary Disposition Error When Ineffective-Assistance Claims Are Dismissed Without a State Motion and Without an Evidentiary Hearing

I. Introduction

In Pederson v. State, 2026 ND 1, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed a Cass County district court’s summary dismissal of Jason (a.k.a. Katheryn) Robert Pederson’s application for postconviction relief following (1) a jury conviction for terrorizing and (2) a later probation revocation based on firearm possession. Pederson, self-represented, asserted broad constitutional violations, challenged the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, alleged evidence withholding, argued ineffective assistance of counsel (including in probation revocation proceedings), and sought to disqualify the trial judge.

The appeal presented four practical postconviction questions: (1) whether a jurisdictional challenge can be procedurally barred; (2) whether the court had to hold a hearing on summary disposition motions under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2; (3) whether summary disposition was proper on ineffective-assistance claims; and (4) whether denial of the judge-disqualification motion was an abuse of discretion.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Subject matter jurisdiction: The district court erred by treating the issue as barred by misuse of process, because jurisdiction can be raised “at any time,” but the error was harmless because Cass County had jurisdiction over offenses committed within the county.
No hearing required on summary disposition motions: The district court did not violate N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(3) because Pederson did not timely secure a hearing after the stay from her attempted appeal ended.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: Summary disposition was error because the State did not move for summary disposition on those claims; the Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance.
Judge disqualification: The district court applied the correct standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
All other postconviction claims: Summary dismissal was affirmed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Procedural default limits vs. jurisdictional claims

Heyen v. State, 2001 ND 126, ¶ 11, 630 N.W.2d 56; Williamson v. State, 2025 ND 66, ¶ 12, 18 N.W.3d 921; and Noorlun v. State, 2007 ND 118, ¶ 7, 736 N.W.2d 477:
These cases supply the court’s working definition of “misuse of process” in postconviction litigation—i.e., an “inexcusable” failure to raise an issue earlier in the trial, on appeal, or in initial postconviction proceedings. They provided the framework the district court attempted to apply, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed as the general rule.
Lavallie v. Jay, 2020 ND 147, ¶ 5, 945 N.W.2d 288:
This precedent drove the Court’s key correction: subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised “at any time,” meaning procedural bars like misuse of process do not apply to jurisdictional challenges. The State conceded the district court erred on this point.
Interest of N.L., 2022 ND 235, ¶ 11, 982 N.W.2d 857:
This case supplied the appellate standard: when jurisdictional facts are undisputed, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. The Court applied that approach to conclude Cass County had jurisdiction.

2. Hearing practice under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2

State v. Craig, 2019 ND 123, ¶ 5, 927 N.W.2d 99:
The Court relied on this decision to restate what a “complete request” for oral argument requires under Rule 3.2: timely brief, request, scheduling, and notice to the opposing party. This standard supported affirmance because Pederson did not timely secure a new hearing date after the stay ended.
State v. Hamre, 2019 ND 86, ¶ 18, 924 N.W.2d 776:
This case was used to reinforce that self-represented litigants receive no procedural leniency; Pederson remained bound by the 14-day scheduling requirement in N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(3).

3. Summary disposition and ineffective assistance in postconviction cases

Bridges v. State, 2022 ND 147, ¶ 5, 977 N.W.2d 718:
Provided the baseline that postconviction proceedings are civil in nature, governed by civil procedure, and the applicant bears the burden of proof.
Almklov v. State, 2025 ND 27, ¶ 6, 17 N.W.3d 583:
This was the Court’s central doctrinal anchor on summary disposition: (1) ineffective-assistance claims are ordinarily ill-suited for summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing, yet (2) summary denial can be upheld when the applicant is “put to [her] proof” and fails to produce competent supporting evidence after the State points out an evidentiary absence. The Court distinguished that situation from this case because the State did not move for summary disposition on ineffective assistance at all.
Atkins v. State, 2017 ND 290, ¶ 8, 904 N.W.2d 738 (citing Steinbach v. State, 2003 ND 46, ¶ 17, 658 N.W.2d 355); and Davies v. State, 2018 ND 211, ¶ 10, 917 N.W.2d 8:
These cases support the burden-shifting concept on summary disposition motions in postconviction proceedings: once a summary disposition motion challenges evidentiary sufficiency, the applicant must respond with competent evidence to earn a hearing. Pederson clarifies that this “put to the proof” mechanism did not occur for ineffective assistance because there was no State motion targeting those claims.

4. Disqualification (“recusal”) standards

Sume v. State, 773 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000):
The Court used this out-of-state authority to sharpen terminology: “recusal” is typically voluntary, whereas “disqualification” is the litigant-driven process to remove a judge. While not altering substantive North Dakota standards, the citation improves precision in future motion practice.
Rath v. Rath, 2016 ND 46, ¶ 31, 876 N.W.2d 474:
This case supplied the governing test: whether a reasonable person could reasonably question the judge’s impartiality on all the facts, and that disqualification is not required for spurious or vague accusations.
State v. Glaum, 2024 ND 47, ¶¶ 23, 37, 4 N.W.3d 540:
Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing disqualification decisions and defined what constitutes an abuse (unreasonable, arbitrary, unconscionable action; lack of rational mental process; or misapplication of law).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction: not procedurally barred, but still lacking on the merits

The Court separated two ideas: (1) whether the jurisdiction claim could be barred (it could not), and (2) whether it was correct (it was not). Applying Lavallie v. Jay and de novo review under Interest of N.L., the Court concluded Cass County district court had subject matter jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8 and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06(1) because Pederson conceded the relevant conduct occurred within Cass County. The procedural error was therefore harmless under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(a).

2. Hearings on summary motions: Rule 3.2’s scheduling requirement is enforced

The Court applied the text of N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(3) and the four-step framework in State v. Craig. Although Pederson originally noticed a hearing date, proceedings were stayed during her attempted appeal from the disqualification order. After dismissal of that appeal, she did not secure a hearing within 14 days; under the rule, the request was waived and the motion was properly decided on briefs. State v. Hamre closed the gap by emphasizing that self-representation does not relax procedural requirements.

3. Ineffective assistance: the dispositive procedural defect

The Court’s principal reversal rests on a straightforward procedural mismatch: the State expressly sought summary disposition of all claims except ineffective assistance, and even requested an evidentiary hearing on ineffective-assistance issues. Despite that posture, the district court summarily dismissed ineffective assistance for lack of genuine issues. The Supreme Court held this was error because the “put to the proof” rationale described in Almklov v. State is triggered when the State moves for summary disposition and points out missing evidence; here, the State did not.

The remedy was not a merits determination but a process correction: the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance. Notably, the Court did not decide whether counsel was ineffective; it decided that the claim could not be summarily disposed of on this record and motion posture.

4. Disqualification: adverse rulings and unsupported accusations are insufficient

Applying Rath v. Rath and reviewing under State v. Glaum, the Court held the district court properly assessed whether a reasonable person could question impartiality and adequately explained why Pederson’s allegations (that the judge “lied” about transcript issues) were unsupported and largely amounted to dissatisfaction with process and rulings. The denial was reasoned and within discretion.

C. Impact

1. A practical new guardrail in North Dakota postconviction procedure

Pederson’s most consequential holding is procedural: when the State does not move for summary disposition on ineffective-assistance claims, a district court errs by summarily dismissing those claims. In practice, this incentivizes clearer motion practice and creates a check against sua sponte summary termination of ineffective-assistance claims without the “notice-and-proof” structure described in Almklov v. State.

2. Continued emphasis on strict compliance with Rule 3.2

The decision reinforces that parties must actively re-secure hearing dates after stays or procedural interruptions; a previously noticed date does not preserve the right to a hearing indefinitely. This is especially important in postconviction cases where litigants often proceed pro se.

3. Jurisdiction remains evergreen, but harmless-error analysis may end the inquiry

While the Court reaffirmed that jurisdiction can be raised at any time, it also showed that correcting the procedural label may not change the outcome when jurisdiction plainly exists; harmless-error analysis can dispose of the issue efficiently.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Postconviction relief: A civil proceeding where a convicted person challenges the conviction/sentence (or related proceedings) after the direct appeal process.
Summary disposition (summary judgment concept): Ending a postconviction case without a trial-like hearing when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Misuse of process (N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(2)): A procedural bar for claims that were inexcusably not raised earlier (or for repetitive, frivolous applications).
Res judicata: A “already decided” rule; issues actually litigated and finally resolved generally cannot be relitigated in a later proceeding.
Subject matter jurisdiction: The court’s legal power to hear the kind of case presented; it cannot be waived and can be raised at any time.
De novo review: The appellate court decides the issue fresh, without deferring to the district court’s legal conclusion.
Ineffective assistance of counsel (Strickland framework): Typically requires showing (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice—a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different absent counsel’s errors.
Disqualification vs. recusal: “Recusal” often refers to a judge’s voluntary stepping aside; “disqualification” is the litigant’s motion to remove the judge.

V. Conclusion

Pederson v. State both tightens and clarifies North Dakota postconviction practice. It reaffirms that subject matter jurisdiction is never forfeited by procedural default, enforces Rule 3.2’s strict mechanics for obtaining hearings, and—most importantly—holds that it is error to summarily dismiss ineffective-assistance claims when the State did not move for summary disposition on those claims. The remand for an evidentiary hearing underscores the Court’s continued recognition that ineffective-assistance allegations often require live fact development rather than paper adjudication.