Introduction

In United States v. Kevin Jamal Jones, No. 23-4713 (4th Cir. Oct. 24, 2025) (published), the Fourth Circuit addressed a familiar supervised-release dispute: when does a special condition of release impermissibly delegate a “core judicial function” to the Probation Office, in violation of Article III? The defendant argued that a special condition concerning “substance abuse testing” unlawfully allowed probation to decide how many drug tests he must take. The government countered that the condition merely addressed payment logistics for testing already mandated by the court.

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge King affirmed. Reading the supervised-release conditions together and in a commonsense way, the court held that Special Condition 10 governs only the mechanism and cost-sharing for drug testing already required by Mandatory Condition 3, which explicitly assigns the determination of testing frequency to the court. Because no authority over the number of tests was delegated to probation, there was no error—plain or otherwise.

The opinion, published and thus precedential within the Fourth Circuit, clarifies that probation may administer payment logistics for drug testing through a court-approved sliding scale without usurping the judiciary’s role over the scope of the liberty restriction. It also underscores a method for interpreting supervised-release conditions: read the conditions together and discern their ordinary, commonsense meaning.

Case Background and Procedural Posture

Jones pleaded guilty to production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The district court (D.S.C., Chief Judge Timothy M. Cain) sentenced him to 256 months’ imprisonment followed by lifetime supervised release. As relevant here:

• Mandatory Condition 3 required Jones to submit to one drug test within 15 days of release and “at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.”
• Special Condition 10 required Jones to submit to substance abuse testing “to determine if [he has] used a prohibited substance” and to contribute to the cost of such testing, “not to exceed the amount determined reasonable by the court approved ‘U.S. Probation Office’s Sliding Scale for Services,’” and to cooperate in securing any third-party payment (e.g., insurance or Medicaid).

Jones did not object to Special Condition 10 at sentencing. On appeal, he argued that the condition unconstitutionally delegated to probation the core judicial function of determining how many drug tests he could be required to take. Because there was no contemporaneous objection, the Fourth Circuit reviewed for plain error.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court held that Special Condition 10 does not delegate any authority to probation over the number of drug tests. Instead, it allocates financial responsibility and directs cooperation with a payment mechanism—probation’s court-approved sliding scale. The number of drug tests remains “as determined by the court” under Mandatory Condition 3.

The panel emphasized:

• The plain text of Special Condition 10 concerns cost and payment logistics for testing “ordered by the district court,” not testing quantity or frequency.
• Mandatory Condition 3 unambiguously reserves to the court the authority to determine testing frequency.
• Both parties, at oral argument, agreed that Special Condition 10 addresses payment only; the court adopted that reading, explaining it is the ordinary, commonsense interpretation when the conditions are read together.

Because there was no error, the appeal failed at the first prong of plain-error review. The court therefore affirmed and denied as moot the government’s motion to dismiss based on an appeal waiver in the plea agreement.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Ellis, 112 F.4th 240 (4th Cir. 2024): The court recognized that “a district court violates Article III when it delegates a core judicial function to the probation officer.” Ellis frames the nondelegation principle governing supervised-release conditions. In Jones, the panel did not need to decide whether determining the number of drug tests is a core judicial function because, as construed, Special Condition 10 did not delegate that determination at all.
• United States v. Williams, 130 F.4th 177, 187 (4th Cir. 2025): Williams explains probation may “fill in certain details” and undertake “administrative supervisory responsibilities” so long as the district court establishes the broad principles of the conditions. The Jones panel relied on this to confirm that managing payment logistics via a court-approved sliding scale is a permissible administrative task for probation—not an Article III function.
• United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1994): Conditions of supervision “can be written—and must be read—in a commonsense way.” The Fourth Circuit invoked this interpretive admonition to read Mandatory Condition 3 and Special Condition 10 together rather than in isolation, which resolved any perceived ambiguity in favor of a nondelegation reading.
• United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 215 (4th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 429 (4th Cir. 2000): These decisions supplied the four-part plain-error framework. In Jones, the court’s conclusion that there was no error under prong one ended the analysis.
• United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 115, 118 (4th Cir. 1998): Confirms that a defendant may challenge supervised-release conditions on direct appeal. The court invoked Johnson in a footnote to confirm the appeal’s posture.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s method was textual and structural:

• Textual focus: Special Condition 10 requires testing “to determine if [Jones] has used a prohibited substance” and then regulates how costs will be handled—namely, by requiring Jones to contribute up to amounts “determined reasonable by the court approved ‘U.S. Probation Office’s Sliding Scale for Services,’” with cooperation in securing third-party payment. Nothing in the condition assigns to probation the power to decide “how many” tests Jones must take.
• Structural reading: Mandatory Condition 3 expressly reserves the determination of testing frequency to the district court (“as determined by the court”). Special Condition 10 therefore functions as a supplemental, administrative adjunct: it facilitates payment for whatever testing the court orders under Mandatory Condition 3. Reading the conditions together avoids a false conflict and adheres to Gallo’s commonsense approach.
• Concessions at argument: Both sides agreed the special condition addresses payment, not frequency. The court emphasized that its holding rests on the unambiguous text, while noting that the parties’ agreement “serves to cement” the analysis.
• Permissible delegation: Citing Williams, the panel recognized that probation can “fill in certain details” and handle “administrative supervisory responsibilities,” like cost administration via a court-approved sliding scale. That role does not intrude on Article III.
• Plain error prong one: Because the court identified no deviation from a legal rule, the challenge failed at the threshold, obviating consideration of prongs two through four.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Drafting clarity for district courts: The decision reinforces the importance of keeping judicial decisions about the scope of liberty restrictions—such as testing frequency—explicitly with the court (“as determined by the court”), while using separate special conditions to assign administrative and cost-related implementation to probation.
• Safe harbor for cost administration: Probation may manage payment logistics for court-ordered drug testing through a court-approved sliding scale without violating Article III. Including the “court-approved” qualifier evidences judicial oversight and helps insulate conditions from nondelegation challenges.
• Strategy for supervised-release challenges: Defense challenges premised on unconstitutional delegation will face headwinds where conditions can be read together to preserve judicial control over core decisions and to cabin probation’s role to administration. The court’s reliance on a commonsense reading reduces the likelihood of success for hyper-literal or siloed interpretations.
• Preservation matters, but text matters more: Although Jones proceeded under plain-error review due to the lack of a contemporaneous objection, the panel’s no-error determination shows that, when the text and structure are clear, preservation may be inconsequential. Still, parties seeking to develop doctrine on “core judicial functions” should object at sentencing to preserve broader constitutional issues.
• Unresolved constitutional line: The court did not decide whether the number of drug tests is categorically a “core judicial function” (the argument was rendered unnecessary by the text). That question remains for a case in which a condition actually assigns testing frequency to probation.
• Publication choice: By resolving the merits and declaring the government’s appeal-waiver motion moot, the Fourth Circuit provided a precedential clarification that will guide probation officers, sentencing courts, and litigants across the circuit on how to draft and interpret testing-related conditions post-Ellis and Williams.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article III nondelegation in supervised release: Federal judges must make core judicial decisions themselves. In the supervised-release context, this typically includes defining the scope of the liberty restriction (e.g., whether and to what extent a condition applies). Probation can implement and administer conditions, but may not decide core questions that alter the extent of the punishment.
• Mandatory vs. special conditions:
  • Mandatory conditions are required by statute and apply automatically (e.g., at least three drug tests, with frequency “as determined by the court”).
  • Special conditions are tailored to the defendant and case circumstances. They can specify logistics, providers, cost-sharing, and other details, so long as they do not transfer core sentencing decisions to probation.
• “Court-approved sliding scale”: A schedule of fees used by probation to assess a defendant’s contribution toward services (like testing or treatment) that has been expressly approved by the court. This approval confirms judicial oversight and keeps the arrangement within permissible administrative delegation.
• Plain-error review: On appeal, if a party did not object in the district court, reversal requires showing (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. If there is no error at all under prong one, the inquiry ends.
• “Commonsense” reading of conditions: Courts read all conditions together and in context rather than in isolation, aiming for the ordinary meaning that harmonizes provisions and avoids unintended conflicts.

Conclusion

United States v. Jones provides a clear, practical rule for supervised-release drafting and review in the Fourth Circuit: special conditions that govern the cost and administration of court-ordered drug testing—implemented through a court-approved probation sliding scale—do not unconstitutionally delegate a core judicial function. The number and frequency of drug tests remain within the judiciary’s sole purview under Mandatory Condition 3.

The opinion reinforces two guideposts. First, probation may “fill in certain details” and perform “administrative supervisory responsibilities,” but only within broad principles established by the court. Second, supervised-release conditions must be read together in a commonsense manner; where the mandatory condition assigns the testing frequency to the court, a separate special condition addressing payment will not be reinterpreted to transfer that authority to probation.

While the court left open the broader constitutional question of whether testing frequency is inherently a core judicial function, its reasoning signals that any condition purporting to vest that decision in probation would face serious Article III concerns under Ellis and Williams. For now, Jones offers a stable blueprint: keep core decisions with the judge, let probation handle logistics, and make the court’s oversight explicit.