Paused-Clock Timeliness After Reopening and Strict Pleading Standards in Meme-Stock RICO/Antitrust Suits: Donnahue George v. Ken Griffin (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In an unpublished, per curiam opinion on the non-argument calendar, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a pro se investor’s sweeping lawsuit arising from the January 2021 “short squeeze” events surrounding GameStop and AMC. Plaintiff-Appellant Donnahue George sued a host of private and quasi-regulatory actors—Ken Griffin, Citadel entities, Robinhood, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC)—alleging market manipulation schemes that caused him investment losses.

This was the case’s second trip to the Eleventh Circuit. In the first, the court remanded after finding George’s appeal from a sua sponte dismissal for failure to file a joint scheduling report premature. On remand, the district court reopened the case and the defendants then filed motions to dismiss, which the district court granted. The Eleventh Circuit’s 2025 decision addresses two central issues:

Timeliness: Whether the defendants’ motions to dismiss, filed after the case was reopened, were timely.
Pleading sufficiency: Whether George adequately stated claims for breach of contract, civil RICO, attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

The court affirmed on both fronts. Notably, it explained how response deadlines operate when a case is dismissed and later reopened, and it reinforced the rigorous pleading standards governing RICO and antitrust claims—especially in the context of the 2021 short-squeeze litigation.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held:

Timeliness of motions post-reopening: The defendants’ motions to dismiss were timely. When the district court reopened the case and stated that “all previously issued orders in this action remain in effect,” the court effectively preserved and resumed the previously applicable response periods. Each defendant moved within the remaining time when measured from the date of reopening.
Breach of contract (Florida law): Dismissal affirmed. George did not identify a valid, enforceable contract with FINRA or DTCC, nor any specific contractual obligations breached.
Civil RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)): Dismissal affirmed. The complaint failed the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard; it did not specify the who/what/when/where/how of the alleged predicate acts (wire fraud and counterfeiting) and impermissibly lumped all defendants together.
Sherman Act § 2 (attempted monopolization): Dismissal affirmed. George both abandoned the argument by not briefing it adequately and failed to allege harm to competition in a properly defined relevant market.
Fourteenth Amendment: Abandoned on appeal. The appellant did not “plainly and prominently” brief the issue.

The judgment was affirmed in full.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 750 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2014): Cited for the district court’s broad discretion to manage its docket, set deadlines, and control filings. This undergirded the court’s acceptance of the district court’s approach to re-starting response deadlines upon reopening.
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997): Standard of review for docket management decisions (abuse of discretion).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Plausibility pleading standard; complaints must contain sufficient non-conclusory facts to infer liability, not labels or speculation.
Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 482 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2007): RICO claims are “a certain breed of fraud” and must meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements.
Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1997); Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010): A plaintiff cannot “lump” defendants together when alleging fraud; the complaint must specify the role of each defendant and the precise misrepresentations.
Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., 972 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2020); Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997): Elements of civil RICO and the predicate-act requirement.
Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estée Lauder Cos., Inc., 797 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2015); OJ Commerce, LLC v. KidKraft, Inc., 34 F.4th 1232 (11th Cir. 2022): Elements of Section 2 monopolization/attempted monopolization, including monopoly power in a relevant market and willful acquisition/maintenance.
Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2004); McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015): Antitrust claims require harm to competition (not merely to a competitor) within a well-defined relevant market.
In re Jan. 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litig., 105 F.4th 1346 (11th Cir. 2024): In the short-squeeze context, the court emphasized that defining the relevant market as the entire stock market makes market power harder to show; precise market definition matters.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2018) (applying Florida law); Fayad v. Univ. of Miami, 395 So. 3d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024): A breach of contract claim requires a valid, enforceable contract and a specific breached obligation.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008): Abandonment on appeal for issues not “plainly and prominently” briefed, including for pro se litigants.
Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89 F.4th 852 (11th Cir. 2023): De novo review standard for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.

Legal Reasoning

1) Timeliness of Post-Reopening Motions: A “Paused-Clock” Approach

The core procedural question was whether defendants’ motions to dismiss—filed ten days after the district court reopened the case—were out of time. The court held they were timely. The reasoning proceeds as follows:

After George filed his first amended complaint, several defendants waived service, extending their response deadlines to specific November 2021 dates under Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii). The district court also extended Citadel’s response deadline.
The court then dismissed the case on October 29, 2021, for failure to file a joint scheduling report—before those response deadlines had run. At that dismissal point, FINRA had 10 days left, Citadel and Robinhood 24 days, and DTCC 31 days.
When the case was reopened on April 2, 2024, the court ordered that “All previously issued orders in this action remain in effect.” The Eleventh Circuit read this to preserve and resume the previously applicable response periods.
Defendants filed their motions on April 12, 2024—within the remaining 10/24/31-day windows. Thus, the motions were timely.

The decision relies on the district court’s discretion to manage its docket and set deadlines (Smith), recognizing that, upon reopening and an express order preserving prior rulings, the “response clock” can pick up where it left off rather than restarting or expiring.

2) Breach of Contract (Florida Law): No Contract, No Claim

George alleged that FINRA and DTCC had “a contract with the American people to ensure an open and fair market.” The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal because:

Florida law requires a valid, enforceable contract between the plaintiff and each defendant, a breach of a specific contractual obligation, and resulting damages.
The complaint identified neither a contract between George and either entity nor any specific contractual term that was breached.
Conclusory assertions of a generalized “contract with the American people” do not satisfy Florida contract law.

3) Civil RICO: Rule 9(b) Particularity and No “Lumping”

To state a civil RICO claim, a private plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendants operated or managed an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (at least two predicate acts) causing injury to business or property. Because RICO claims are fraud-like, Rule 9(b) applies:

The complaint must specify the precise misstatements or acts, who made them, when and where they were made, how they misled the plaintiff, and what the defendants gained.
George alleged predicate acts of wire fraud and counterfeiting, referencing “fake shares,” “fabricated naked shorts,” and manipulation of AMC and GameStop prices. But he provided no particulars—no dates, communications, or specific actors tied to specific misrepresentations or transmissions.
The allegations improperly lumped all defendants together instead of delineating each defendant’s role in the supposed scheme.

On these deficiencies, the RICO count failed both Rule 9(b) and Twombly/Iqbal plausibility.

4) Sherman Act § 2 (Attempted Monopolization): No Market Harm Alleged, and Issue Abandoned

Section 2 requires allegations showing (i) possession of monopoly power in a relevant market and (ii) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, plus harm to competition within that market. The court held:

George abandoned the issue by offering only passing references without developed argument and authority.
Even on the merits, the complaint failed to allege harm to competition in a properly defined relevant market. Conclusory assertions that defendants could “control and manipulate” AMC’s price and that George “lost money” are insufficient under Spanish Broadcasting and McWane.
The court pointed, consistently with In re Jan. 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litig., to the difficulty of showing market power if the market is erroneously framed as the entire stock market rather than a narrower, economically coherent market (e.g., no-fee brokerage or payment-for-order-flow markets).

5) Fourteenth Amendment: Abandonment on Appeal

The court deemed the constitutional claim abandoned because it was not “plainly and prominently” briefed, applying Sapuppo and Timson’s rules that even pro se litigants must properly brief issues to avoid abandonment.

Impact

While unpublished and therefore non-binding, the decision is instructive in several respects:

Procedural timeliness after reopening: The Eleventh Circuit endorses a “paused-clock” understanding: when a case is dismissed and later reopened with an order that prior deadlines remain in effect, the remaining time to respond may resume from reopening. Litigants should scrutinize reopening orders, because timeliness may turn on the precise language the district court uses.
RICO in market-manipulation suits: The court reiterates that RICO claims premised on alleged short-selling or dark-pool activity must plead fraud with particularity. Generic allegations of “fake shares,” “wire fraud,” and market-wide schemes—without dates, actors, transmissions, or specific misrepresentations—will not survive dismissal.
Section 2 claims in the short-squeeze context: Plaintiffs must define a plausible relevant market and allege harm to competition—not just harm to themselves or to one stock’s price. The court’s cross-reference to the Short Squeeze multidistrict litigation underscores the analytical centrality of market definition and competitive harm.
Contract theories against market infrastructure/SROs: Absent a concrete, bilateral contract with identified terms, generalized appeals to public-facing missions or regulatory purposes will not state a breach of contract claim under Florida law.
Appellate briefing discipline for pro se litigants: Even pro se appellants must “plainly and prominently” brief each issue. Passing references are insufficient and result in abandonment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Per curiam, non-argument calendar, unpublished: A per curiam opinion is issued by the court collectively, without a single judge’s authorship. Non-argument calendar cases are decided without oral argument. Unpublished decisions are not binding precedent, though they can be persuasive.
Rule 12(a) timing and waiver of service: Normally, a defendant has 21 days to respond after service. If service is waived, the deadline extends to 60 days from the request for waiver. Courts can extend deadlines and, as here, preserve those deadlines upon reopening a dismissed case.
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility: A complaint must include factual content that, if true, makes liability more than merely possible or speculative. Conclusory labels do not suffice.
Rule 9(b) particularity (fraud/RICO): When a claim sounds in fraud (including RICO predicate frauds), the plaintiff must plead the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the fraud—precise statements, timing, speakers, venues, how the plaintiff was misled, and what the defendant gained. Group pleading (“lumping”) is disfavored.
RICO elements (civil): A plaintiff must allege an enterprise, that the defendant operated or managed it, a pattern (at least two predicate acts) of racketeering activity, and that the pattern proximately caused injury to the plaintiff’s business or property.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (attempted monopolization): Requires monopoly power (or a dangerous probability thereof) in a properly defined relevant market, willful acquisition/maintenance of that power, and harm to competition in that market. Harm to a competitor or to a single investor is not enough.
Relevant market: The set of products and geographic scope within which competition occurs. Overbroad markets (e.g., “the entire stock market”) usually fail because they mask competitive dynamics and market power analysis.
Harm to competition vs. harm to a competitor: Antitrust laws protect the competitive process, not individual market participants. Allegations should focus on reduced output, higher prices, lower quality, reduced innovation, or exclusionary effects within a defined market.
Abandonment on appeal: An issue not properly briefed—through developed argument and citation—is treated as waived, even for pro se litigants.
“Shotgun pleading” (footnote reference): A disfavored pleading style that incorporates all preceding allegations into every count, obscuring which facts support which claims. The panel noted that any challenge related to shotgun pleading or dismissal without prejudice was itself abandoned for inadequate briefing.

Conclusion

George v. Griffin affirms two practical lessons for litigants and courts in the wake of the meme-stock litigation wave. First, on procedure: when a case is dismissed and later reopened, deadlines can resume from where they left off if the court so orders—a “paused-clock” approach well within the district court’s docket-management authority. Second, on substance: civil RICO and Section 2 claims premised on market manipulation require precise, defendant-specific, and market-grounded allegations. Generalized accusations of manipulation, without Rule 9(b) particulars or antitrust market harm, will not survive Twombly/Iqbal scrutiny.

Additionally, the decision underscores that Florida breach of contract claims fail absent a valid, specifically alleged agreement and breach, and that appellate courts will treat insufficiently briefed issues as abandoned—even for pro se appellants. In the broader legal landscape, the opinion aligns with recent Eleventh Circuit guidance from the Short Squeeze MDL: plaintiffs must carefully define relevant markets and articulate competitive harm, not just personal loss, to advance antitrust claims arising from the unique dynamics of the 2021 trading events.