Patterson v. Meta: No Products‑Liability Workaround to Section 230; Algorithmic Recommendation Is a Protected Editorial Function (and Alternatively First‑Amendment‑Protected)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Appellate Division, Fourth Department’s decision in Patterson v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04447 (July 25, 2025). The consolidated appeals arise from civil actions filed by survivors and family members of victims of the racially motivated mass shooting in Buffalo on May 14, 2022. Plaintiffs sued numerous “social media defendants” across platforms, alleging negligence and products liability based on allegedly addictive and radicalizing design features and content‑recommendation algorithms that, they contend, fueled the shooter’s radicalization and conduct.

At stake was whether Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230) and the First Amendment bar state‑law tort claims—specifically strict products liability and failure‑to‑warn—premised on algorithmically curated third‑party content and engagement‑driving design. The trial court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Fourth Department reversed, dismissed the claims against the social media defendants, and articulated a sweeping rule: there is no products‑liability exception to Section 230, and, alternatively, algorithmic curation qualifies as protected editorial activity under the First Amendment.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Department reversed the denial of CPLR 3211(a)(7) motions and dismissed all claims against the social media defendants at the pleading stage.
Holding 1: Section 230 immunity applies to plaintiffs’ tort claims—including strict products liability and failure to warn—because the theories “treat [defendants] as publishers” of information provided by others. There is no products‑liability carve‑out to § 230.
Holding 2 (in the alternative): If algorithmic recommendations are deemed defendants’ own “first‑party” speech (as the Third Circuit suggested in Anderson v. TikTok), the curation itself is protected expressive activity under the First Amendment (per the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Moody v. NetChoice). Either way, the claims cannot proceed.
Algorithms: The court adopted the Second and Fourth Circuits’ view (Force v. Facebook; M.P. v. Meta) that ranking, arranging, and recommending third‑party content are core “editorial” functions that do not negate publisher status under § 230.
Distinctions: The court distinguished Lemmon v. Snap (the “Speed Filter” case) because the defect there caused harm independent of third‑party content; in Patterson, plaintiffs’ harm theory is “inextricably intertwined” with the content consumed.
Causation: Even an “addiction‑only” theory (divorced from content) would fail on proximate causation grounds because the shooter’s criminal acts constitute a superseding cause not reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary course of events.
Procedural posture: The court emphasized that § 230 immunity should be applied “at the earliest possible stage,” making early dismissal essential to the statute’s purpose.

Factual and Procedural Background

The shooter, a teenager, planned a racist attack influenced by “Great Replacement” ideology, traveled to Buffalo, and murdered ten people, injuring three others. He pled guilty in state court; federal charges remain pending.
Plaintiffs alleged the shooter used numerous platforms (Facebook/Instagram, YouTube/Google, Reddit, Discord, 4chan, Twitch/Amazon, Snap) and that addictive design features and recommendation algorithms radicalized him by serving increasingly violent, racist content, maximizing engagement, and isolating him.
Claims included negligence, unjust enrichment, and strict products liability for defective design and failure to warn.
Defendants moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), invoking § 230 and the First Amendment. Supreme Court (Erie County) denied dismissal; defendants appealed.
The Fourth Department reversed, dismissed claims against the social media defendants, and dismissed two appeals as moot because pleadings had been superseded.

Issues Presented

Does § 230 immunize social media platforms from state‑law tort claims—including products liability—predicated on harms allegedly caused by algorithmically recommended third‑party content?
Do content‑recommendation algorithms transform platforms into creators or “developers” of information, stripping § 230 protection?
Even if algorithmic rankings are deemed platforms’ own speech, does the First Amendment protect such editorial curation?
Can an “addictive design” theory untethered from content survive pleading‑stage scrutiny in light of proximate causation and intervening criminal acts?

Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) The Section 230 framework and its broad application

Relying on Barnes v. Yahoo!’s three‑part test, the court focused on whether plaintiffs’ theories “treat [defendants] as publishers” of third‑party content. Plaintiffs conceded that the online racist materials were constitutionally protected speech and that platforms cannot be liable merely for hosting such content. The court held:

Platforms are “providers of interactive computer services.”
Plaintiffs’ theories, even if labeled “products liability,” would impose liability for how defendants displayed and prioritized others’ content—classic publishing functions.
Thus, § 230(c)(1) immunity applies. The court emphasized Congress’s design to preserve a vibrant, minimally regulated Internet and the strong federal appellate consensus favoring broad immunity (citing Zeran; Force; Shiamili; Backpage.com; Almeida; Nemet Chevrolet; Word of God Fellowship v. Vimeo).

2) Algorithms as editorial functions; no products‑liability exception

The court adopted the Second Circuit’s analysis in Force v. Facebook and the Fourth Circuit’s in M.P. v. Meta: arranging and displaying information from others via algorithms remains a traditional editorial function. Algorithms do not convert platforms into “developers” or speakers of the underlying content; they are tools for sorting and ranking at Internet scale.

Crucially, the court rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to reframe publication conduct as defective product design. The Barnes test looks to the theory’s substance rather than labels: if liability depends on how a platform curated third‑party content, § 230 applies. The court expressly held there is no products‑liability exception to § 230.

3) The First Amendment as an alternative and independent bar

Addressing the Third Circuit’s contrary reasoning in Anderson v. TikTok, the Fourth Department explained that even if algorithmic recommendations are viewed as the platform’s own speech, the curatorial function is itself expressive activity. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Moody v. NetChoice, the court characterized the inclusion, exclusion, and organization of third‑party speech in a feed as protected editorial expression. Although Moody’s algorithm discussion was dicta, the court deemed it authoritative and persuasive.

This produced the opinion’s hallmark synthesis: for algorithmic feeds, it is a “Heads I win, Tails you lose” dynamic favoring platforms—either the conduct is publication of others’ content (and § 230 applies), or it is the platform’s own editorial speech (and the First Amendment applies). In the court’s view, at least one (and often both) shields will apply; “under no circumstances are they protected by neither.”

4) Causation and intervening criminal acts

The court added a proximate‑cause analysis as a backstop: an “addiction‑only” theory, even if severed from content, would fail because the shooter’s subsequent criminal acts were not foreseeable in the ordinary course and thus broke the causal chain (citing Tennant and Turturro). The court underscored that plaintiffs’ own allegations make content central: the shooter allegedly became addicted to white‑supremacist content, not to neutral materials such as cooking videos, making the claims “inextricably intertwined” with third‑party content and publication.

5) Distinguishing Lemmon; rejecting Anderson; responding to the dissent

Lemmon v. Snap: The Ninth Circuit allowed a products claim to proceed where the “Speed Filter” feature allegedly induced dangerous driving; the defect there operated independently of third‑party content. By contrast, the Patterson claims rest on the nature and impact of content shown to the shooter—squarely within § 230.
Anderson v. TikTok: The Fourth Department found Anderson unpersuasive because its rule would expose platforms using recommendation algorithms to liability for every tort, including defamation, contrary to § 230’s purpose of repudiating Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy.
Dissent: The dissent framed the case as about addictive product design and the duty to warn minors, citing Lemmon, A.M. v. Omegle, and the Social Media Adolescent Addiction MDL. The majority responded that plaintiffs’ pleadings, read fairly, hinge on the harm of the content displayed; that content‑dependent design theories cannot evade § 230; and that expanding “development” to encompass algorithmic curation would eviscerate § 230 across torts.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Zeran v. AOL (4th Cir. 1997): Foundational decision that § 230 creates immunity from liability for third‑party content, motivating early dismissal to avoid chilling speech; embraced by the Fourth Department.
Barnes v. Yahoo! (9th Cir. 2009): Articulated the three‑part test for § 230 immunity; the Patterson court applies Barnes to look past labels to the liability theory’s substance.
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group (N.Y. 2011): New York’s high court recognized robust § 230 immunity unless the platform itself is a content provider; Patterson relies on Shiamili’s reasoning and publisher/speaker framing.
Force v. Facebook (2d Cir. 2019): Held that algorithmic recommendation is a publishing function; central to Patterson’s holding that algorithms do not strip § 230 protection.
M.P. v. Meta (4th Cir. 2025): Factually analogous mass‑shooting case; the Fourth Circuit dismissed under § 230, analogizing algorithmic curation to traditional editorial choices. Patterson aligns itself expressly with M.P.
Calise v. Meta (9th Cir. 2024) and LeadClick (2d Cir. 2016): Reinforce that courts examine whether a theory treats the defendant as a publisher; labels like “product defect” do not control.
Anderson v. TikTok (3d Cir. 2024): Treated algorithmic promotion as first‑party speech outside § 230. Patterson rejects Anderson’s approach as incompatible with § 230’s text and purpose and as destabilizing to defamation law.
Lemmon v. Snap (9th Cir. 2021): Recognized a narrow path where a design feature itself, independent of content, creates risk; Patterson distinguishes Lemmon and cabins it to its facts.
Moody v. NetChoice (U.S. 2024): Recognized editorial selection and organization of third‑party speech as protected expression. Patterson leans on Moody’s reasoning as an alternative First Amendment ground.
Packingham v. North Carolina (U.S. 2017) and Reno v. ACLU (U.S. 1997): Emphasize the centrality of the Internet as a public square; used in Patterson to reinforce § 230’s structural role in protecting online discourse.
Word of God Fellowship v. Vimeo (1st Dept 2022) and Nemet Chevrolet (4th Cir. 2009): Stress applying § 230 at the earliest stage to avoid protracted litigation costs; Patterson follows suit.
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy (Nassau Sup. Ct. 1995): The decision § 230 was enacted to overturn; Patterson warns that Anderson’s logic revives Stratton Oakmont’s problems.
New York tort and duty cases (Terwilliger; Dummitt; Espinal; Derdiarian; Tennant; Turturro): Cited primarily in the dissent to classify platforms as “products” and in the majority for causation; the majority does not resolve the “product” question because § 230 is dispositive.

Impact and Implications

No products‑liability end‑run around § 230 in New York’s Fourth Department. Plaintiffs cannot repackage publication‑based harm as design defect where the injury theory depends on the content served.
Algorithms are editorial. Within the Fourth Department (and persuasively beyond), recommendation, ranking, sorting, and feed organization are treated as protected editorial functions for § 230 purposes.
First Amendment backstop. Even if a court accepted Anderson’s first‑party speech framework, Patterson indicates that the same curatorial choice is speech protected by the First Amendment, creating a dual shield.
Early dismissal will be routine. Trial courts are instructed to resolve § 230 issues at the pleading stage to prevent chilling effects from prolonged litigation.
Constraints on “addictive design” claims. To the extent such claims cannot be disentangled from content exposure, Patterson makes dismissal likely. “Addiction‑only” theories face separate proximate‑cause headwinds when harm is inflicted on third parties via criminal acts.
Forum and circuit dynamics. Patterson deepens the split with Anderson and aligns New York state appellate law with Force and M.P. Expect forum shopping and petitions seeking clarification from the New York Court of Appeals and potentially the U.S. Supreme Court.
MDL and AG litigation. The decision casts doubt on products‑liability approaches in social‑media addiction litigation where content consumption is integral to alleged harm, at least in New York state courts within the Fourth Department.
Platform design incentives. Platforms gain stronger certainty that ranking and recommendation per se do not create tort liability for third‑party content. Truly “non‑content” features that cause harm (à la Lemmon) remain a category to watch.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 230 basics: It protects “providers” of interactive computer services from being treated as the publisher of information provided by others. If a claim seeks to hold a platform liable for how it hosts, organizes, or displays third‑party content, § 230 usually applies.
Publisher vs. content provider: A platform loses § 230 only when it is itself responsible, in whole or part, for creating or developing the harmful information. Curation and ranking generally do not equal “development.”
Algorithms as editorial tools: Feeds must rank and order vast quantities of posts; that editorial judgment—automated or manual—does not turn the platform into the author of the underlying content.
“No products‑liability exception”: Relabeling a publication‑based injury as “defective design” or “failure to warn” does not avoid § 230 when the alleged harm flows from third‑party content.
Dicta: Statements in judicial opinions that are not strictly necessary to the holding. Patterson treats Moody’s algorithm‑speech reasoning as persuasive, even if technically dicta, because it came from a supermajority of the Supreme Court and squares with the underlying principles.
Proximate cause and superseding cause: A defendant is liable only for harms proximately caused by its conduct. Deliberate criminal acts often break the causal chain unless they were reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary course.

Unresolved or Open Questions

Scope of “development”: How far does “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information” extend in § 230(f)(3)? The dissent would apply it to algorithms that personalize and push content; the majority rejects that view for recommendation functions.
Friend‑suggestion vs. content recommendation: Patterson notes plaintiffs did not plead “friend‑ and content‑suggestion” algorithms of the Force dissent’s type; whether such networking functions change the § 230 analysis remains open in New York.
Algorithms “based solely on user behavior”: Moody noted but did not analyze feeds that respond exclusively to user behavior without independent standards; Patterson observes plaintiffs did not allege “solely” behavior‑based algorithms.
Purely non‑content defects: Features that cause harm independent of content (e.g., hardware‑like defects, or Lemmon‑type inducements) may still be actionable. Patterson reinforces the line but does not define its outer limits.
Products status of platforms: The majority assumes arguendo but does not decide whether platforms are “products” for New York strict liability. The dissent would answer yes based on control, standardization, and duty‑to‑warn factors.

Practical Guidance

For plaintiffs:
- Pleading around § 230 requires a harm theory genuinely independent of third‑party content. Design‑defect allegations that hinge on what content was shown will likely be dismissed.
- Expect aggressive motions to dismiss and reliance on Patterson, Force, M.P., and Moody. Be prepared to articulate non‑publication conduct and a causation chain not reliant on criminal acts.
For defendants:
- Raise § 230 early and emphasize the editorial nature of ranking and recommendation. Cite Patterson’s “no products‑liability exception” and the need for early dismissal.
- Assert the First Amendment alternative per Moody. Frame curation as expressive editorial choice.
- Develop proximate‑cause defenses where intervening criminal acts are involved.
For trial courts:
- Focus on whether the theory treats the platform “as a publisher” of others’ content. Apply § 230 at the pleadings stage when appropriate.
- Distinguish content‑independent design claims (Lemmon‑type) from content‑dependent curation claims.

Conclusion

Patterson v. Meta is a consequential statement of New York law on the scope of platform immunity. The Fourth Department squarely holds that algorithmic recommendation and feed ranking are editorial functions protected by Section 230 when the alleged harm derives from third‑party content, and that there is no products‑liability escape hatch to repackage publication conduct as defective design. Moreover, even if algorithmic curation is characterized as the platform’s own speech, Patterson embraces the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Moody that such curation is protected expression under the First Amendment. This dual‑track protection—what the court calls a “Heads I win, Tails you lose” framework—makes it difficult to maintain state‑law tort claims predicated on the harms of content exposure.

At the same time, the decision leaves limited room for claims targeting genuinely content‑independent defects in platform features, consistent with Lemmon, and flags proximate‑cause challenges for “addiction‑only” theories involving criminal violence. As legislatures and courts continue to grapple with social media’s risks, Patterson crystallizes a robust, early‑dismissal approach to § 230 and positions New York’s Fourth Department firmly with the federal circuits that view algorithmic curation as core editorial conduct protected by both statute and the Constitution.