Paternity-by-Estoppel Secures Standing for Grandparent Visitation: O’Connell v. Clay (Ind. 2025)

Introduction

In O’Connell v. Clay, the Indiana Supreme Court resolved a recurring problem at the intersection of paternity, agreed visitation orders, and the Grandparent Visitation Act (GVA), Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1. The core question: When a custodial mother has previously stipulated in an agreed court order that a deceased man is the child’s father (including agreeing to add him to the birth certificate and changing the child’s surname), can she later renounce that position to defeat a paternal grandmother’s standing to seek visitation under the GVA on the ground that paternity was never formally established?

Justice Goff, writing for the Court, answered “no.” Applying long-standing principles of equitable estoppel—rooted in the “paternity-by-estoppel” line of cases—the Court held that the mother’s stipulations and conduct are the legal equivalent of a paternity determination in this context. As a result, the mother is estopped from denying paternity to defeat the grandmother’s standing, and the trial court’s orders enforcing grandparent visitation remain in place. The decision both clarifies appellate finality principles and significantly extends the practical reach of paternity-by-estoppel to grandparent-visitation standing disputes.

Case Background and Procedural History

• The parties: Jennifer O’Connell (Mother) and Jeffrey Clemens (Father) were an unwed couple whose daughter was born in July 2013. Father died about eighteen months later. Donna Clay (Grandmother) is the paternal grandmother.
• 2018 petition and agreed order: In July 2018, Grandmother petitioned for visitation and to establish Father’s paternity, attaching a “Personal Paternity Analysis Report” indicating a high probability of paternity. After a September hearing (transcript unavailable), the represented parties submitted an Agreed Order: Mother (1) consented to a visitation schedule; (2) agreed to change the child’s surname to O’Connell-Clemens; (3) agreed to add Father to the child’s birth certificate; and (4) “acknowledged in open Court and on the record” that Father was the child’s father. The trial court approved the Agreed Order.
• Subsequent disputes: Within months, Mother moved to cease visitation alleging neglect; Grandmother countered with contempt motions. The trial court largely kept the Agreed Order in place and found Mother in contempt for noncompliance.
• 2022–2023 proceedings: Grandmother sought custody and appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL). The GAL ultimately recommended joint legal custody with Grandmother as primary physical custodian. Mother responded with a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, asserting Grandmother never had standing because Father never formally established paternity.
• Trial court’s Post-Hearing Order: The court denied Mother’s motion, kept the Agreed Order in force, declined the GAL’s custody recommendation for lack of statutory authority, addressed paternity for purposes of visitation, and discharged the GAL.
• Court of Appeals: Reversed in a memorandum decision, holding Grandmother lacked standing because paternity was never established for a child born out of wedlock.
• Indiana Supreme Court: Granted transfer, vacated the Court of Appeals decision, and affirmed the trial court.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s decision proceeds in two parts. First, on appellate jurisdiction, it held the trial court’s Post-Hearing Order “disposed of all issues as to all parties,” making it a final, appealable judgment. Even if any ruling were interlocutory, it would merge into the final judgment for appellate review.

Second, on the merits, the Court held that Mother is equitably estopped from denying Father’s paternity to attack Grandmother’s standing under the GVA. Drawing on Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513 (Ind. 1997), and related authorities, the Court emphasized that when a trial court accepts the parties’ stipulations that a man is the child’s father—especially where Mother also changed the child’s surname, added Father to the birth certificate, and received Social Security survivor benefits premised on paternity—those stipulations are “the legal equivalent of a paternity determination” for purposes of this visitation dispute. While Mother (like any parent) may seek future modification of visitation, she cannot now defeat standing by contradicting her earlier judicial admissions.

The Court also declined to revisit the merits of the 2018 Agreed Order (including evidentiary and constitutional arguments) as those issues are no longer appealable. And it rejected Mother’s claim that Grandmother misrepresented the DNA report, noting no evidence of misrepresentation was presented. The judgment was affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Grandparent Visitation Act and Purpose
  • In re Visitation of J.P.H., 709 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999): Explains the GVA’s purpose—promoting intergenerational contact and balancing parental rights with maintaining grandparent-grandchild relationships. Establishes that if a petitioning grandparent falls outside the GVA’s specified classes, standing is lacking and the petition must be denied as a matter of law.
  • K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453 (Ind. 2009): Reiterates grandparents have no independent constitutional liberty interest but the GVA reflects legislative recognition that contact with grandparents can serve a child’s best interests.
• Definition of “Child” and Paternity Concepts
  • Ind. Code § 31-9-2-13(a): Defines “child” for purposes of Title 31 proceedings as a “child of both parties to the marriage,” which includes a child “born out of wedlock to the parties.” The Court used this framework to import the “child of the marriage” analysis from dissolution cases into the GVA context.
  • Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513 (Ind. 1997): A seminal dissolution case holding that a dissolution court’s acceptance of the parties’ stipulation that a child is a “child of the marriage” can be the legal equivalent of a paternity determination, precluding those parties from later challenging it, absent extraordinary circumstances. The Court here drew on Russell to treat Mother’s stipulations in the grandparent-visitation context as estopping her from denying paternity.
  • Cochran v. Cochran, 717 N.E.2d 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, and Cooper v. Cooper, 608 N.E.2d 1386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993): Recognize dissolution courts’ authority to resolve “child-of-the-marriage” issues and to order blood testing when paternity is vigorously contested.
  • In re S.R.I., 602 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. 1992): Emphasizes Indiana’s policy interest in correctly identifying biological parentage for medical, psychological, and support reasons—limits on equitable estoppel are recognized to protect accurate parentage determinations.
• Paternity-by-Estoppel and Related Equitable Doctrines
  • Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601 (Ind. 1994): Former husband estopped from denying paternity after consenting to artificial insemination and holding the child out as his own; the decree declared the child a child of the marriage.
  • Sheetz v. Sheetz, 63 N.E.3d 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016): Husband estopped from disclaiming paternity where wife relied on his representations and he instructed her not to involve the biological father or file a paternity action. But see Judge Najam’s dissent noting appellate caution against using estoppel to impose support on non-biological, non-adoptive fathers.
  • In re Paternity of H.H., 879 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008): Mother estopped from challenging paternity after executing a paternity affidavit, despite both parents knowing putative father was not the biological father.
  • Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 679 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied: Laches barred wife from rebutting husband’s presumed paternity where she encouraged his parental relationship despite contrary blood-test evidence and failed to timely establish paternity in another man.
  • Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997): Mother who stipulated to a provisional GVA order could not later argue it was void ab initio—closely analogous to this case’s estoppel reasoning.
  • Matter of Estate of Peters, 206 N.E.3d 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023): The repudiation of a child in prior divorce proceedings did not settle paternity for heirship purposes; illustrates limits of preclusion across different contexts.
• Appellate Jurisdiction and Finality
  • Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 2012) and Appellate Rule 5: Final orders dispose of all issues as to all parties, ending the particular case and leaving nothing for future determination.
  • Bacon v. Bacon, 877 N.E.2d 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007): Interlocutory orders precede final hearing on the merits and do not determine the entire controversy.
  • Appellate Rule 14(A)–(B): Some interlocutory orders are appealable as of right; others require certification and acceptance.
  • Matter of Adoption of A.E., 191 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022): Non-appealable interlocutory rulings merge into the final judgment.
  • School City of Gary v. Continental Electric Co., 301 N.E.2d 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973): Denial of a motion to dismiss is generally not a final, appealable order.
  • T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719 (Ind. 2023): Addresses proper use of Trial Rule 60(B)(6) to set aside void judgments.
• Standard of Review
  • Berryman v. State, 127 N.E.3d 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019): De novo review for statutory interpretation.
  • In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017): Standing is reviewed de novo.
• Concurring Perspective on Estoppel Doctrine
  • Molter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment: Agrees the standing argument is not properly before the Court absent a Rule 60(B)(6) motion and concurs in the affirmance. He notes the majority’s estoppel discussion, characterizing it as dicta in his view, and suggests what the majority calls “paternity by estoppel” may be more precisely “judicial estoppel,” citing Red Lobster Rests. LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159 (Ind. 2024), but declines to break new ground without briefing.

2) Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in two principal moves—first, a jurisdictional ruling on finality, and second, application of equitable estoppel to bar a standing challenge in a GVA proceeding.

• Finality and Appellate Jurisdiction

  Although the Court of Appeals recast Mother’s appeal as from a Rule 60(B) ruling to avoid jurisdictional hurdles, the Supreme Court deemed such recharacterization unnecessary. The trial court’s Post-Hearing Order denied Mother’s motion to dismiss, declined to modify custody as requested by Grandmother (for lack of statutory authority), addressed paternity in light of the Agreed Order, discharged the GAL, and declared that all prior visitation orders would remain in effect. This resolved “all issues as to all parties,” resulting in a final, appealable judgment under Ramsey. Even if any discrete ruling were interlocutory, it merged into the final judgment. The Court therefore proceeded to the merits.

• Standing under the GVA and Estoppel

  The GVA allows paternal grandparents to petition for visitation when one of three conditions applies: (1) a parent is deceased; (2) the parents’ marriage was dissolved; or (3) the child was born out of wedlock and the father “established paternity in relation to the child.” Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1(a)–(b). Grandmother proceeded under subsection (a)(3). Mother argued Father never established paternity through statutory channels (e.g., juvenile-court paternity action or paternity affidavit), so Grandmother lacked standing as a matter of law.

  The Supreme Court rejected Mother’s position by invoking the equitable doctrine reflected in Russell. In dissolution cases, the Court has treated the acceptance of a parties’ stipulation that a child is a “child of the marriage” as the legal equivalent of a paternity determination, barring those parties from later contradicting that stipulation absent extraordinary circumstances. While GVA proceedings are not dissolutions, they fall within Article 31-17, and the statutory definition of “child” (which includes children born out of wedlock to the parties) confirms the translatability of the “child-of-the-marriage” frame into other family-law contexts within Article 31.

  Applying those principles here, the Court emphasized three undisputed facts embodied in the 2018 Agreed Order and related conduct:

  • Mother acknowledged “in open Court and on the record” that Father was the child’s father;
  • Mother agreed to add Father to the child’s birth certificate and to change the child’s surname to O’Connell-Clemens; and
  • Mother received Social Security survivor benefits premised on Father’s paternity.

  Under these circumstances, the trial court’s acceptance of the stipulations was “the legal equivalent of a paternity determination,” and it would be inequitable to allow Mother now to disavow paternity to strip Grandmother of standing and unwind years of court-supervised visitation. This is classic estoppel: a party who secured or accepted a judicial benefit by asserting a fact cannot later contradict that fact to the other party’s prejudice. The Court therefore held Mother is estopped from denying Grandmother’s standing under the GVA.

  Importantly, the Court acknowledged limits on equitable estoppel in paternity cases—Indiana’s policy of accurate parentage identification and the protection of the child’s and putative father’s ability to bring independent paternity actions remain intact. But those concerns do not permit a parent to reverse course years later, after judicial stipulations and reliance, to defeat a grandparent’s visitation petition.

• Other Issues

  The Court declined to entertain Mother’s arguments that the 2018 Agreed Order relied on inadmissible paternity evidence or infringed her constitutional rights to the care, custody, and control of her child; those matters were tied to the final 2018 order and are no longer appealable. As to alleged misrepresentation in the attached DNA report, the Court noted the absence of any supporting evidence.

3) Likely Impact and Practical Consequences

• Grandparent-Visitation Standing

  O’Connell v. Clay is a significant clarification: In GVA cases, a custodial parent who has stipulated to paternity in a court-approved order—and acted consistently with that position—cannot later argue that paternity was not “established” to defeat a paternal grandparent’s standing. The Court did not hold that equitable estoppel “creates” paternity for all purposes; rather, it precludes a parent from denying previously stipulated paternity to undercut a visitation order. The effect, functionally, is that judicially accepted stipulations can satisfy the GVA’s standing predicate via estoppel as to the stipulating parent.

• Extension of Russell beyond Dissolution

  The decision extends the practical reach of Russell’s paternity-by-estoppel concept into the grandparent-visitation arena (Article 31-17), not just dissolution and support contexts. Trial courts may treat accepted stipulations about paternity in GVA proceedings as the legal equivalent of a paternity determination for purposes of barring later inconsistent positions by the stipulating party.

• Finality and Appellate Practice

  The Court’s jurisdictional analysis underscores: When a post-hearing order resolves all pending issues (e.g., denies a motion to dismiss, addresses custody petitions, discharges a GAL, and keeps or modifies visitation orders), it is final and appealable. Even if a discrete ruling (such as denial of a 12(B)(6) motion) would be interlocutory in isolation, it merges into the final judgment. Practitioners should attack claimed voidness of earlier agreed orders through Rule 60(B)(6), but where a comprehensive post-hearing order has issued, finality analysis will focus on whether all issues have been resolved.

• Parental Rights and Constitutional Considerations

  The case does not recalibrate the constitutional framework (e.g., Troxel-type deference to fit parents). It addresses standing and estoppel, not the substantive best-interests or constitutional analysis governing whether visitation should be granted or modified. Parents still retain the ability to seek modification of visitation based on changed circumstances and the child’s best interests, Ind. Code § 31-17-5-7.

• Practice Pointers
  • For grandparents: Preserve and document any judicial admissions by parents concerning paternity. Where a court has accepted stipulations and ordered name or birth-certificate changes, those facts can be outcome-determinative on standing.
  • For parents: Be cautious when entering stipulations about paternity in GVA matters. If paternity is genuinely disputed, insist on proper statutory adjudication rather than stipulation. Once accepted by the court, stipulations are difficult to unwind.
  • For trial courts: When parties stipulate to paternity and the court accepts those stipulations in an order, later attempts to defeat standing by renouncing paternity may be barred by estoppel. Consider creating a clear record of the stipulation and the court’s acceptance.
  • Procedural posture: Attacks on long-final agreed visitation orders should be brought via Trial Rule 60(B)(6), but be prepared that equitable estoppel may defeat them.
• Open Questions
  • Labeling the doctrine: The concurrence suggests “judicial estoppel” is the more precise label for what occurred here. Future cases may refine the nomenclature and analytic framework—whether treated as paternity-by-estoppel or judicial estoppel, the operative effect in standing disputes may be the same.
  • Scope and limits: The Court emphasized Indiana’s policy favoring accurate parentage identification. O’Connell does not authorize imposing support obligations on non-biological, non-adoptive fathers via estoppel, nor does it foreclose a child’s or putative father’s separate paternity action.
  • Alternative GVA paths: The Court noted Grandmother might have pursued subsection (a)(1) (a parent is deceased), but deemed any such argument waived. The precise interaction between subsection (a)(1) and unadjudicated paternity remains for another day.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Standing: The legal right to bring a claim. Under the GVA, a paternal grandparent has standing to petition for visitation only if specific statutory conditions are met—here, relevantly, if the child was born out of wedlock and the father’s paternity is “established.”
• Equitable Estoppel / Paternity-by-Estoppel: A fairness-based doctrine preventing a party from contradicting a prior position or representation on which others and the court have relied. In paternity contexts, it can stop a parent (or alleged father) from denying paternity after earlier asserting or accepting it in court.
• Judicial Estoppel: A related doctrine preventing a litigant from taking inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings to gain an unfair advantage. The concurrence suggests this is the better label for the Court’s approach in O’Connell.
• “Child of the Marriage”: A statutory term used in dissolution and related proceedings, defined to include children born out of wedlock to both parties. Acceptance of a stipulation on that status can be treated as a paternity determination between those parties.
• Final vs. Interlocutory Orders: A final order ends the case as to all issues and parties; an interlocutory order is a mid-case ruling. Interlocutory rulings typically are not immediately appealable unless certified or appealable as of right. Interlocutory rulings merge into a later final judgment for appellate review.
• Trial Rule 12(B)(6) vs. 60(B)(6): A 12(B)(6) motion seeks dismissal for failure to state a claim and is generally interlocutory if denied. A 60(B)(6) motion seeks to set aside a void judgment; rulings on such motions are final and appealable. The proper vehicle to attack a long-final order as void is Rule 60(B)(6).

Conclusion

O’Connell v. Clay cements a practical and equitable rule for GVA litigation: A parent who has judicially acknowledged a father’s paternity—by stipulating in open court, agreeing to add him to the birth certificate, changing the child’s surname, and accepting benefits hinging on paternity—cannot later reverse course to defeat a paternal grandparent’s standing. By treating such stipulations as the legal equivalent of a paternity determination for purposes of estoppel, the Court reinforces stability in children’s relationships with grandparents and forecloses strategic, after-the-fact standing challenges to long-standing visitation orders.

At the same time, the Court respects the limits of estoppel in Indiana paternity law: accurate parentage identification remains a core policy; the child’s and any putative father’s rights are unaffected; and parents retain the ability to seek future modification of visitation based on the child’s best interests. Procedurally, the Court’s finality analysis provides a clear roadmap for appeal timing and the merger of interlocutory rulings into final judgments.

The headline takeaway: In Indiana, stipulated and court-accepted acknowledgments of paternity can, via estoppel, satisfy the GVA’s standing predicate as against the stipulating parent. Parties and counsel should proceed with care when crafting agreed visitation orders, recognizing that what is stipulated today may decisively shape tomorrow’s standing and appellate outcomes.