I. Introduction

This appeal arises from a pro se civil action filed by Jonathan Harrington after a six-day commitment at Broward Health Imperial Point’s mental health facility in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Harrington sued: (i) Broward Health Imperial Point (“BHIP”), (ii) Calvin Glidewell (alleged CEO), and (iii) Centene Corporation (his health insurer). The complaint asserted seven state-law claims and two federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The jurisdictional story drove the outcome. Harrington’s complaint initially invoked diversity jurisdiction, but he later conceded that was mistaken and argued instead that federal-question jurisdiction existed because he pleaded § 1983 claims. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pleading deficiencies, and failure to state a claim.

On appeal, the key issues were:

• Whether the § 1983 allegations were substantial enough to create federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
• If jurisdiction was absent, whether dismissal could be entered with prejudice.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Harrington’s § 1983 claims were “patently untenable”: the complaint offered only conclusory “under color of law” assertions and did not plausibly allege that any defendant was a state actor or acted under color of state law—an essential element of § 1983.

However, the court held that the district court erred by dismissing with prejudice. When subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking, a federal court has no power to enter a merits judgment; the proper disposition is dismissal without prejudice. The panel therefore vacated the “with prejudice” aspect and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• Patel v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc. — Provided the standard of review: subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. This framed the appellate posture as an independent jurisdictional assessment rather than deference to the district court.
• Household Bank v. JFS Grp. (quoting Baker v. Carr) — Supplied the boundary between (i) a weak federal claim that still confers jurisdiction and (ii) a claim so “attenuated and unsubstantial” as to be “absolutely devoid of merit” or “frivolous,” which fails to confer federal-question jurisdiction at all. The court used this line to justify treating Harrington’s § 1983 counts as jurisdictionally defective rather than merely inadequately pleaded.
• Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders and McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., Inc. — Emphasized the “important distinction” between lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The panel relied on these cases to apply the “patently without merit” jurisdictional test instead of a Rule 12(b)(6) merits analysis.
• Resnick v. KrunchCash, LLC — Operationalized the standard: a claim may be jurisdictionally meritless when an essential element lacks any “plausible foundation,” making the claim “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” The court applied this directly to the missing “state action” element in Harrington’s § 1983 allegations.
• Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec'y of State for State of Ala. — Restated the core requirement that § 1983 addresses constitutional (and certain federal statutory) violations committed “under color of state law.” This anchored the element the complaint failed to plausibly allege.
• Lindke v. Freed — Reinforced that § 1983 “only protects against acts attributable to a State, not those of a private person.” This Supreme Court authority strengthened the panel’s insistence on a plausible attribution theory.
• Harvey v. Harvey — The opinion’s centerpiece for the mental-health-commitment context. Harvey held that a private hospital treating a patient under a state involuntary commitment statute was not a state actor under any of the recognized tests. The panel treated Harrington’s case as materially analogous and used Harvey to reject the notion that use of Florida’s Baker Act transforms private actors into state actors.
• Focus on the Fam. v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth. — Supplied the “three distinct tests” for attributing private conduct to the state: (1) public function, (2) state compulsion, and (3) nexus/joint action. The panel used this structure to show the complaint did not plausibly satisfy any pathway to state action.
• Spencer v. Lee — Cited through Harvey to reinforce that involuntary commitment is not a function “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state” (undercutting the public function test), and that commitment statutes do not necessarily “encourage commitments” (undercutting compulsion theories).
• Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. and Fla Bros., Inc. v. Brooks — Used to reject state action by regulation/acquiescence: extensive regulation or statutory permission is not enough; “mere acquiescence” in private conduct does not convert it to state action. These cases supported the panel’s conclusion that Florida’s Baker Act, standing alone, does not create a close nexus/joint action.
• Bell v. Hood — Provided the foundational principle that federal-question jurisdiction exists for colorable federal claims but not for claims that are wholly insubstantial or frivolous. The court invoked Bell to conclude the federal claims were too meritless to support § 1331.
• Stalley ex rel. United States v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc. — Controlled the remedy: when subject-matter jurisdiction is absent, a dismissal must be without prejudice because the court lacks power to render a judgment on the merits. The panel relied on Stalley to vacate the “with prejudice” component.
• 18A Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4436 — Cited to underscore the settled preclusion principle: a jurisdictional dismissal does not bar a later action on the same claims (no merits adjudication).

B. Legal Reasoning

The court proceeded in two steps: (1) jurisdiction, then (2) the form of dismissal.

1. Why federal-question jurisdiction failed despite § 1983 being pleaded.
The panel acknowledged the general rule that pleading a federal cause of action ordinarily suffices to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But it applied the “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” exception: a district court may dismiss for lack of jurisdiction when the federal claim is so meritless that it cannot genuinely be said to “arise under” federal law.

2. The missing essential element: action “under color of state law.”
Section 1983 requires a defendant’s conduct be fairly attributable to the state. The court emphasized that “only in rare circumstances” are private parties treated as state actors and used the three-test framework:

• Public function: The complaint did not plausibly allege that BHIP (or any defendant) performed a function “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.” The court reiterated that involuntary commitment is not such an exclusive function, citing Harvey v. Harvey (and Spencer v. Lee).
• State compulsion: The complaint did not allege coercion or significant encouragement by the state to commit the alleged wrongdoing. Importantly, the panel explained that Florida’s Baker Act uses permissive language (“may”) and does not compel or encourage commitment. This paralleled Harvey v. Harvey’s treatment of commitment statutes.
• Nexus/joint action: The complaint did not allege interdependence or joint participation with state officials. Merely operating under a statutory framework or being regulated is not enough under Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. and Fla Bros., Inc. v. Brooks.

3. Conclusory “color of law” labels were not enough.
The court summarized the complaint’s key § 1983 paragraphs and found they largely asserted conclusions (e.g., defendants acted “under the color of law”) without material facts showing state compulsion, joint action with officials, or performance of an exclusive public function. Under the jurisdictional standard (as articulated through Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders and Resnick v. KrunchCash, LLC), the absence of a plausible foundation for the “state action” element rendered the § 1983 claims “patently meritless,” defeating federal-question jurisdiction.

4. Remedy: no merits disposition without jurisdiction.
Having concluded jurisdiction was lacking, the court held the district court could not dismiss with prejudice. Under Stalley ex rel. United States v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., the correct judgment is dismissal without prejudice, because the court lacks power to decide the merits.

C. Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion is significant in three practical ways within Eleventh Circuit practice:

• Screening of private-party § 1983 claims: The decision reinforces that conclusory “under color of law” allegations—without concrete facts tying private hospitals, staff, or insurers to state action—can fail not only on the merits but at the jurisdictional threshold where the claim is wholly insubstantial. This can end federal cases earlier, before merits litigation.
• Baker Act litigation posture: The panel’s reliance on Harvey v. Harvey and its reading of the Baker Act’s permissive “may” language signals skepticism toward attempts to convert involuntary mental health commitments at private facilities into § 1983 cases absent pleaded involvement by state actors (courts, law enforcement, or other officials) in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.
• Correct form of dismissal: The vacatur underscores a recurring procedural safeguard: when jurisdiction is missing, dismissal must be without prejudice. This matters for claim preservation and refiling strategy (e.g., pursuing state-law claims in state court or repleading federal claims with non-frivolous state-action facts).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Federal-question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331): A federal court can hear cases “arising under” federal law. Usually, asserting a federal statute is enough—unless the federal claim is so baseless that it is essentially not a real federal dispute.
• “Wholly insubstantial and frivolous” claims: A narrow exception: if the federal claim has no plausible legal or factual foundation, the court treats it as inadequate to invoke federal jurisdiction at all.
• Section 1983 “under color of state law”: § 1983 applies to misconduct fairly attributable to the government. Private parties generally are not liable unless their conduct is effectively governmental.
• State action tests:
  • Public function: the private party is doing something only the government traditionally does.
  • State compulsion: the government coerced or significantly encouraged the specific conduct.
  • Nexus/joint action: the private party and government acted together or were interdependent in the challenged conduct.
• Dismissal “with prejudice” vs. “without prejudice”: “With prejudice” means the claim is over (cannot be refiled). “Without prejudice” means the court is not deciding the merits and the claim may be refiled in a proper court or with proper jurisdictional allegations. When jurisdiction is missing, only “without prejudice” is allowed.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s central contribution is procedural and jurisdictional discipline: pleading § 1983 labels does not automatically open the federal courthouse when the complaint lacks a plausible foundation for the essential “state action” element. Where the federal claim is “patently meritless,” federal-question jurisdiction fails under the insubstantiality doctrine, and the case must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Equally important, the decision reaffirms the limit on federal judicial power: absent jurisdiction, a court cannot enter a merits judgment. The appropriate remedy is dismissal without prejudice, preserving the formal distinction between jurisdictional defects and merits adjudication.