Partial Sovereign-Immunity Denials Are Immediately Appealable; Ex parte Young “Enforcement” Turns on Concrete Statutory Duties (Not Referral, Guidance, or Texas AG Criminal-Prosecution Assertions)

I. Introduction

Case: Mi Familia Vota v. Gregory Abbott (consolidated appeals, including challenges brought by the LUPE, MFV, and OCA plaintiff groups).
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Date: December 31, 2025.
Statute at issue: Texas’s Election Protection and Integrity Act of 2021, S.B.1, an omnibus revision of the Texas Election Code covering voter registration list maintenance, early voting administration, vote-by-mail identification and cure procedures, poll watchers, voter assistance, and new election crimes/civil penalties.

The consolidated plaintiffs (voter-advocacy organizations and individual voters/assistors) sued various Texas officials—principally the Texas Secretary of State and the Texas Attorney General—alleging that dozens of S.B.1 provisions violate the U.S. Constitution (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and federal statutes (including the Voting Rights Act, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act). The State officials moved to dismiss largely on two threshold grounds: (1) sovereign immunity and (2) standing.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision is a jurisdiction-and-immunity roadmap for large, provision-by-provision election-law challenges: it clarifies when interlocutory review is available, sharply limits who counts as a proper Ex parte Young defendant for § 1983 claims, and ties the standing “traceability/redressability” inquiry to the same enforcement-connection analysis.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Interlocutory jurisdiction affirmed: Relying on Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg, the court held it may hear an interlocutory appeal from a denial of sovereign immunity even when immunity would not dispose of all claims in the case.
Pendent appellate jurisdiction over standing (limited): Because Article III traceability/redressability “significantly overlap” with the Ex parte Young enforcement-connection inquiry, the court reviewed traceability/redressability for the § 1983 claims.
VRA claims not barred by sovereign immunity: The court reaffirmed that the VRA “validly abrogated state sovereign immunity,” citing OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas.
Secretary of State: Proper Ex parte Young defendant only for provisions where S.B.1 assigns her concrete operational duties that “compel or constrain” compliance (e.g., voter-roll comparison/sanction mechanisms; prescribing mandatory official forms for vote-by-mail and voter-assistance processes). Not a proper defendant for many other provisions (e.g., early voting site rules, ballot printing/straight-ticket ban, criminal offenses, and provisions where her role is merely referral/guidance or too attenuated from actual enforcement).
Attorney General: Proper Ex parte Young defendant only for S.B.1 § 2.06, which expressly authorizes him to sue to recover civil penalties; not proper for other provisions because he lacks independent criminal-prosecution authority under Texas law (per Ostrewich v. Tatum and State v. Stephens) and had not shown willingness/authority to enforce S.B.1’s civil-penalty scheme in § 8.01 (including representations noted in Paxton v. Longoria).
Standing (traceability/redressability) satisfied as to the remaining § 1983 claims against the Secretary and Attorney General for the provisions the court found they enforce.

Disposition: The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of motions to dismiss, substantially narrowing the set of S.B.1 provisions that can be pursued under § 1983 against the Secretary and Attorney General.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction and the collateral-order doctrine

Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg: The controlling Fifth Circuit precedent on the key jurisdictional question. The court treated Ogg as establishing a class-wide rule: states may take an interlocutory appeal from a denial of sovereign immunity even if some claims (e.g., VRA/ADA) remain regardless of the immunity ruling.
Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Phillips: Plaintiffs relied on its “entire lawsuit” phrasing to argue interlocutory review requires complete immunity. The court, via Ogg, rejected reading Phillips as imposing a complete-disposition requirement.
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.: The Supreme Court anchor for collateral-order review of Eleventh Amendment immunity denials. The court read it as supporting immediate review of immunity questions, not as limiting review to cases where all claims would be dismissed.
Behrens v. Pelletier and Mitchell v. Forsyth: Used by analogy to qualified-immunity interlocutory appeals; the Fifth Circuit drew support from the principle that immunity appeals can proceed even when fewer than all claims are at issue.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, and Fifth Circuit applications (Leonard v. Martin, BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., L.L.C.): Provided the general collateral-order framework (conclusive, separate from merits, effectively unreviewable later).

2. Pendent appellate jurisdiction and standing overlap

Byrum v. Landreth: The Fifth Circuit standard—issues must be “inextricably intertwined” with an independently appealable order.
City of Austin v. Paxton and Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex., Dep't of Ins., Div. of Workers' Comp.: Quoted for the proposition that standing traceability and Ex parte Young analyses “significantly overlap,” justifying pendent review of traceability/redressability on the § 1983 claims.
Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg (standing portion): Distinguished. In Ogg the court declined pendent standing review where the remaining standing questions involved statutory claims from which the defendant was not immune and the case was “ill-suited” for standing analysis. Here, standing and immunity were aligned around the same § 1983 claims.
FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med. and Sprint Comm'cns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc.: Cited for the “flip sides of the same coin” relationship between causation and redressability.

3. The Ex parte Young enforcement-connection requirement (and how to apply it)

Ex parte Young: The foundational exception allowing suits for prospective relief against state officials who have “some connection with the enforcement of the challenged act.” The court reiterated the Fifth Circuit’s provision-by-provision approach.
Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Scott (TARA) and Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg: Supplied the “three guideposts” for enforcement connection: (1) particular duty beyond a general duty to enforce laws; (2) demonstrated willingness; and (3) conduct that compels or constrains obedience.
Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott (TDP): Central to the Secretary-of-State holdings. It treated the Secretary’s duty to design mandatory official voting forms as sufficient enforcement connection because local officials must use those forms, so the Secretary can “compel or constrain” compliance via form design.
Lewis v. Scott and Richardson v. Flores: Counterweight precedents limiting suits against the Secretary where challenged provisions are enforced through local officials’ ballot-processing/verifications rather than through Secretary-prescribed forms.
Ostrewich v. Tatum: Decisive for the Attorney General’s lack of independent criminal-prosecution power after State v. Stephens, and influential for rejecting “guidance/training” as enforcement connection for the Secretary.
NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton: Cited to frame when public actions can amount to threats suggesting enforcement “on the horizon.”
Paxton v. Longoria: Used to undermine willingness/authority arguments for § 8.01 civil-penalty enforcement by the Attorney General, based on his representation that he lacked authority in that context.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction: a rule for partial immunity denials

The court’s first key move was to treat sovereign-immunity denials as immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine even when only some claims are immunity-barred. The opinion reads Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg as settling the question for a “class of decisions,” consistent with Behrens v. Pelletier’s insistence that appealability is assessed categorically rather than order-by-order.

Practically, this prevents a state from being forced through discovery and merits litigation on claims that should have been dismissed on immunity grounds merely because other claims (e.g., VRA) survive regardless.

2. Ex parte Young applied “provision-by-provision” to S.B.1

The opinion then operationalizes the Fifth Circuit’s evolving Young doctrine: the right defendant depends on whether the named official has a specific statutory role that meaningfully drives compliance. The court repeatedly rejects purely supervisory, advisory, or attenuated roles as insufficient.

a. Secretary of State: where the court found a sufficient enforcement connection

Voter registration list maintenance: S.B.1 §§ 2.05, 2.06, 2.07. The Secretary was held suable because S.B.1 places her at the center of operational steps: entering agreements with DPS, performing required list comparisons, issuing notices to registrars that trigger mandatory registrar duties, and sanctioning registrars for noncompliance. The court also credited allegations of affirmative activity (post-2020 “forensic audit” statements) as evidence of willingness.
Vote-by-mail and voter-assistance forms: §§ 4.12, 5.01, 5.02, 5.03, 5.08, 5.10, 5.13, 6.01, 6.03, 6.05, 6.07. Following TDP, the court treated the Secretary’s mandatory duty to prescribe official forms (which local officials must use) as a sufficient mechanism to “compel or constrain” compliance. Even if local officials ultimately reject applications or enforce requirements, the Secretary’s design choices are part of the causal chain and are directly redressable by an injunction ordering compliant forms.

b. Secretary of State: where the court rejected enforcement connection

Referral/reporting roles are not enforcement: §§ 2.04, 2.08 and related criminal/civil provisions (including §§ 4.01, 4.06, 4.07, 4.09, 5.04, 6.06, 7.02, 7.04, 8.01). The court held the Secretary’s receipt or referral of information is too attenuated. It also reasoned that referring matters to the Attorney General cannot constitute meaningful enforcement where the Attorney General lacks independent criminal-prosecution authority under Texas law.
Ballot-verification/cure mechanics enforced by local actors: §§ 5.06, 5.07, 5.11, 5.12, 5.14, 6.04. Guided by Richardson v. Flores, the court treated these as local ballot-processing functions, not Secretary enforcement. The Secretary’s generalized supervisory posture does not create a Young connection.
Early voting site rules and straight-ticket ban: §§ 3.04, 3.09, 3.10, 3.12, 3.13, 3.15. Relying on Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, Tex. Democratic Party v. Hughs, and TARA, the court concluded these are administered by local election officials; Secretary rulemaking authority is not the same as enforcement authority.

c. Attorney General: a narrow surviving role based on express civil-suit authority

The court held the Attorney General is a proper Young defendant only for S.B.1 § 2.06, because that section expressly authorizes him to sue to recover civil penalties for registrar noncompliance. This statutory design gave him direct coercive power over counties (via civil litigation), and the court found allegations (including his “Election Integrity Unit” press release) sufficient to show willingness—distinguishing City of Austin v. Paxton and TDP as cases involving either unrelated litigation histories or statements not sufficiently tied to impending enforcement.

d. Attorney General: broad rejection of criminal-prosecution-based enforcement

For the remaining provisions, the court relied on Ostrewich v. Tatum and State v. Stephens to hold the Attorney General lacks independent authority to prosecute election crimes. Accordingly, statutes like Texas Election Code § 273.021(a) cannot supply the requisite enforcement connection for Young purposes. The court further declined to credit § 8.01 as a basis for enforcement, noting the Attorney General’s own position in Paxton v. Longoria and the absence of demonstrated willingness to bring civil actions under that section.

3. Standing: traceability/redressability ride on the same rails

The court’s standing holding is tightly cabined: it addressed only traceability and redressability for the remaining § 1983 claims (not injury-in-fact; not statutory claims). It held standing exists where the Secretary/Attorney General have the enforcement connection already identified. Two precedents anchor this:

Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott (TDP): Standing exists where the Secretary would have to change official forms after an invalidation, even if local officials directly interact with voters. Partial redress is enough (citing Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski).
OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas: The court emphasized that facial invalidity of a Texas election statute is fairly traceable to the State and its Secretary of State as “chief election officer,” even when county officials are the immediate implementers.

C. Impact

Earlier and more frequent interlocutory immunity appeals: By extending collateral-order jurisdiction to partial immunity denials (via Ogg), the decision makes threshold immunity fights more immediately reviewable in complex election litigation, likely slowing merits proceedings while narrowing defendants and claims early.
Sharper defendant selection in Texas election challenges: Plaintiffs cannot reliably sue statewide officials for every election provision. This opinion reinforces that many election-administration rules are enforced by local officials, and statewide officials’ general supervisory or advisory functions often will not satisfy Young.
Form-design duties remain a key “hook”: The Secretary’s role in prescribing mandatory official forms continues (post-TDP) to be one of the most viable statewide enforcement connections for § 1983 claims—particularly in vote-by-mail and voter-assistance contexts.
Texas AG’s election-crime posture is constrained in federal court: After Ostrewich/Stephens, plaintiffs face major obstacles to suing the Attorney General as an election-crime enforcer. His surviving exposure is narrow and tied to express civil-enforcement grants (like § 2.06) plus credible allegations of willingness.
Dissent spotlights a fault line: Judge Oldham’s partial dissent attacks what he labels the Fifth Circuit’s “No Nexus Rule,” arguing Ex parte Young requires a nexus between the defendant’s enforcement and the plaintiff’s injury—not merely between the defendant and the statute. While not controlling, it signals potential future en banc or Supreme Court interest in tightening Young doctrine and limiting what resembles “statute-as-defendant” litigation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Sovereign immunity (Eleventh Amendment immunity): A doctrine preventing private parties from suing a state (or state officials in their official capacities) in federal court unless an exception applies (or Congress validly abrogates immunity).
Ex parte Young exception: Allows suits for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against a state official only if the official has “some connection” to enforcing the challenged law. The Fifth Circuit applies this provision-by-provision and looks for concrete statutory duties, willingness to enforce, and some coercive effect.
Collateral-order doctrine: A narrow exception to the final-judgment rule (28 U.S.C. § 1291) allowing immediate appeal of certain non-final orders—here, denials of sovereign immunity—because immunity is meant to protect against the burdens of litigation itself.
Pendent appellate jurisdiction: Discretionary authority to review additional interlocutory issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with an appealable order. Here, traceability/redressability standing for § 1983 claims was treated as intertwined with the Young enforcement-connection question.
Standing: traceability and redressability: The plaintiff must show the defendant is a cause of the injury (traceability) and that a court order against that defendant would likely help (redressability). The court emphasized that partial remedies can suffice, especially where officials control mandatory forms or operational steps.

V. Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit’s decision substantially narrows statewide-official exposure to § 1983 election challenges by insisting on a concrete, provision-specific enforcement connection under Ex parte Young. It simultaneously expands practical access to immediate appellate review by holding (following Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg) that states may appeal immunity denials even when other claims remain in the case. On the merits, the court preserves § 1983 challenges against the Texas Secretary of State primarily where she prescribes mandatory official forms or performs operational voter-roll list functions, and it limits § 1983 exposure of the Texas Attorney General largely to the one provision where S.B.1 expressly grants him civil-penalty enforcement authority (§ 2.06). The dissent underscores an unresolved doctrinal tension—whether Young should require a tighter defendant–plaintiff nexus—positioning the case as a significant waypoint in the Fifth Circuit’s continuing recalibration of sovereign immunity, election litigation, and the architecture of who may be sued to stop enforcement of state election laws.