Partial Courtroom Closures in a Pandemic: Barrett v. Wyoming DOC Clarifies the Sixth-Amendment Standard

Partial Courtroom Closures in a Pandemic:
Barrett v. Wyoming Department of Corrections Clarifies the Sixth-Amendment Standard

Introduction

Barrett v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, No. 24-8062 (10th Cir. 2025) is the Tenth Circuit’s first published* treatment of how the Sixth-Amendment right to a public trial interacts with pandemic-era courtroom restrictions when the issue is presented through a federal habeas corpus request for a certificate of appealability (COA). Samuel J. Barrett, convicted in 2020 of multiple sexual offences in Wyoming state court, argued that COVID-19 safety measures—masking, social distancing, and limitations on public attendance—unconstitutionally closed his trial. After the federal district court denied his § 2254 petition and refused a COA, Barrett sought a COA from the Tenth Circuit.

The Court of Appeals not only declined to issue a COA but, in doing so, clarified:

  • When Waller v. Georgia’s four-factor test for total courtroom closures applies.
  • The distinction between total versus partial closures in the COVID-19 context.
  • That COVID-19 is a “substantial” (indeed, “compelling”) reason justifying a partial closure.
  • How procedural default and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel interrelate under § 2254.

(*Although the order is “non-precedential” under Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1, it carries persuasive weight and is the first post-pandemic decision to synthesize Veneno (2024) and Holder (2025) into the habeas/COA framework.)

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Judges Moritz, Eid, and Federico) held that Barrett failed to make the “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Key determinations:

  1. Public-Trial Claim (Claim 1). The trial court’s COVID plan did not amount to an unconstitutional closure. Barrett’s broadly-worded objection at trial (“entire format procedure”) was insufficient to trigger Waller. Limiting spectators to “as space permits” constituted only a partial closure, adequately justified by the pandemic.
  2. COVID-related Due-Process and Sixth-Amendment Claims (Claim 2 and sub-claims). Procedurally defaulted; Barrett could not show cause via ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAC) because the underlying claims lacked merit.
  3. Instructional Error, Transcript Omission, Juror Proximity, and Other Claims (Claims 3–6). Either meritless, unexhausted but plainly failing, or procedurally barred.
  4. Appellate IAC (Claim 7). Conclusive failure to satisfy Strickland: Barrett identified no non-frivolous issues that competent counsel neglected.
  5. Cumulative Error (Claim 8). No individual errors, so nothing to cumulate.

Therefore, no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s dismissal; the COA was denied and the appeal dismissed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) – establishes the four-factor test for total courtroom closures. The Tenth Circuit reiterated that the test is triggered only when the defendant specifically objects to closure.
  • United States v. Veneno, 107 F.4th 1103 (10th Cir. 2024) – clarified that a closure is total only when all spectators are removed; otherwise it is partial. Barrett relies heavily on Veneno, but the Court distinguished it because some public access remained (his brother attended).
  • United States v. Holder, 135 F.4th 887 (10th Cir. 2025) – recognized that COVID-19 constitutes a “substantial reason” for partial closures. Barrett inadvertently strengthened the State’s case by citing Holder.
  • Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) – articulates the COA standard. The Court repeatedly used Slack’s “debatable or wrong” language to assess each claim.
  • Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) – sufficiency-of-the-evidence benchmark; applied when Barrett contested Count 9.
  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – governing test for ineffective assistance; informs the “cause” analysis for procedural default.

2. Legal Reasoning Explained

a. Total vs. Partial Closure

“Even assuming that the social-distancing requirements effected a complete closure … the trial court had no obligation to conduct a Waller analysis … because Barrett did not specifically object to the partial exclusion.”

The Court anchors its reasoning in the defendant’s specific objection. Geders-type structural error is not presumed unless the record shows a clear objection to closure. Here, Barrett’s focus was on mask-related confrontation concerns, not on exclusion of the public.

b. Substantial Reason for Partial Closure

Under the Tenth Circuit’s “less onerous” standard for partial closures, the State need only show a “substantial reason.” Citing Holder and the U.S. Supreme Court’s COVID religion cases (Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo), the panel held that protecting public health during a global pandemic easily meets that test.

c. Procedural Default & Appellate IAC “Portal”

Wyoming PCR law treats an appellate IAC claim as a “portal” through which otherwise defaulted issues may be heard. The federal district court, and now the Tenth Circuit, insisted that Barrett first show the underlying claim’s merit; only then could counsel be deemed ineffective for omitting it. Because each underlying claim failed, the “portal” never opened.

d. COA Gatekeeping

The decision exemplifies the stringent COA standard post-AEDPA. Conclusory assertions, even novel pandemic-era ones, are insufficient without record citations and controlling authority.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

  1. Pandemic Jurisprudence. Courts now have persuasive guidance that COVID-19 protocols—when they allow some public presence or reasonable alternatives—rarely violate the public-trial right.
  2. Strategic Litigation. Defense lawyers must lodge specific objections to courtroom closures in real time; generic complaints will not preserve Waller arguments.
  3. Habeas Practice. Petitioners challenging pandemic protocols must overcome both procedural default and AEDPA deference. Barrett shows that failure to connect the dots between underlying merit and counsel’s deficiency will doom the petition.
  4. State-Court Planning. Trial courts in the Tenth Circuit can rely on Barrett, Veneno, and Holder to design narrowly-tailored attendance limits in future emergencies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Certificate of Appealability (COA)
Permission from a federal circuit court allowing a state prisoner to appeal the denial of a habeas petition. It issues only if “reasonable jurists could debate” the merits.
§ 2254 Habeas Corpus
Federal procedure enabling state prisoners to challenge convictions on federal constitutional grounds, but subject to stringent exhaustion and deference rules (AEDPA).
Procedural Default
Failure to follow a state procedural rule (e.g., raising an issue on direct appeal) bars federal review unless the petitioner shows “cause and prejudice” or “actual innocence.”
Waller Test
Four-part standard for total courtroom closures: (1) overriding interest; (2) closure no broader than necessary; (3) consideration of alternatives; (4) on-record findings.
Partial Closure Standard
Less demanding; the court need only identify a “substantial reason” to limit attendance, and the closure must be reasonable in scope.
Strickland Ineffective Assistance
Requires (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice (reasonable probability of a different result). Failure on either prong defeats the claim.

Conclusion

Barrett’s failed bid for a COA yields enduring instruction for courts and practitioners. It cements the principle that pandemic-related spectator limits are judged as partial closures, ordinarily justified by the compelling public-health interest, and that Waller’s rigorous analysis is triggered only by a timely, specific objection. Moreover, the case underscores AEDPA’s formidable barriers: without a carefully preserved and clearly articulated constitutional claim, habeas relief will remain out of reach. Going forward, Barrett will serve as persuasive authority on how public-trial rights, appellate-counsel duties, and pandemic realities intersect in the federal collateral-review landscape.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

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