Parsons v. County of Steuben: Ladder Removal Held Outside Labor Law § 240(1) Where Securing Would Contradict the Work Plan; Slippery Crushed‑Gravel Pad Recognized as an Enumerated Work Surface Under § 241(6)

Parsons v. County of Steuben: Ladder Removal Held Outside Labor Law § 240(1) Where Securing Would Contradict the Work Plan; Slippery Crushed‑Gravel Pad Recognized as an Enumerated Work Surface Under § 241(6)

Introduction

In Parsons v. County of Steuben (2025 NY Slip Op 04359, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 25, 2025), the court addressed a familiar but recurring question in New York construction and premises liability law: when does Labor Law § 240(1) (“Scaffold Law”) apply to a ladder-related accident, and how do the Industrial Code provisions under § 241(6) interact with winter conditions and temporary site surfaces?

The plaintiff, an employee of subcontractor Mid-State Communications & Electronics, Inc. (“Mid-State”), was injured when a 40-foot extension ladder fell during end-of-day takedown at a rural worksite. The owner/easement holder, County of Steuben (“County”), had contracted with Motorola Solutions, Inc. (“Motorola”), which in turn subcontracted the installation work to Mid-State. The accident occurred after coworkers untied straps securing the ladder to a wooden telephone pole and began retracting it; either the coworker or the ladder slipped on ice atop a crushed-gravel pad, causing the ladder to fall and strike plaintiff.

Key issues included: (1) whether § 240(1) applied to a falling ladder being actively removed; (2) whether § 241(6) claims premised on slippery-surface and ladder-footing regulations survive summary judgment; (3) whether § 200/common-law negligence claims lie against the County and Motorola; and (4) the viability of common-law and contractual indemnification cross-claims among defendants.

Summary of the Judgment

  • Labor Law § 240(1): The court affirmed dismissal of the § 240(1) claim. The ladder, while a “falling object,” did not “require securing” for the purpose of the work because it was in the process of being removed; requiring it to be secured would have been contrary to the work plan. Defendants showed no protective device could have prevented the fall during takedown.
  • Labor Law § 241(6): Claims predicated on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) (slippery surfaces) and 23-1.21(b)(4)(ii) (firm ladder footings) survive. The crushed-gravel pad at the base of the pole qualified as an enumerated work surface, and defendants failed to eliminate issues of fact on violation and causation.
  • Labor Law § 200/Common-Law Negligence: As to the County, summary judgment was properly denied; the County failed to establish lack of actual/constructive notice of the icy condition. As to Motorola, the § 200 and negligence claims were dismissed—plaintiff abandoned them and Motorola demonstrated a lack of negligence.
  • Indemnification and Contribution:
    • Common-law indemnity and contribution against Motorola: Dismissed. Motorola established it was not negligent; the County failed to raise an issue of fact.
    • Contractual indemnification: The County’s contractual indemnification claim against Motorola survives. The contract covers liability “to the extent it is caused by the negligence of Motorola, its subcontractors, or their employees or agents,” and issues of fact remain as to Mid-State’s negligence.
    • Conditional indemnification from Mid-State: Motorola’s request first raised on appeal was not preserved and was rejected.
  • Disposition: The order was modified to dismiss plaintiff’s § 200 and negligence claims against Motorola and to dismiss the County’s common-law indemnity and contribution cross-claims against Motorola. In all other respects—including dismissal of § 240(1) and the survival of § 241(6) and contractual indemnity—the order was affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Fabrizi v 1095 Ave. of the Ams., L.L.C., 22 NY3d 658 (2014):
    Fabrizi clarifies that a plaintiff proceeding under § 240(1) on a “falling object” theory must show that the object was being hoisted/secured or required securing for the undertaking. Parsons applies Fabrizi to a ladder being removed and holds that at that precise stage the ladder did not require securing for the task.
  • Salazar v Novalex Contr. Corp., 18 NY3d 134 (2011):
    Salazar introduced the “contrary to the objectives of the work plan” concept, limiting § 240(1) where safety measures would frustrate the very work. Parsons relies on Salazar to conclude it would be illogical to require the ladder to remain secured to the pole while being removed.
  • Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259 (2001):
    Reinforces that § 240(1) does not cover every object that falls at a worksite; the protection is tethered to elevation-related hazards requiring enumerated devices. Parsons uses Narducci to demarcate the limits of the statute in routine ladder takedown.
  • Shaheen v Hueber-Breuer Constr. Co., 4 AD3d 761 (4th Dept 2004):
    Informs the analysis where a ladder’s condition or securing is not implicated by § 240(1). Parsons cites it to support dismissal where the ladder did not require securing during removal.
  • Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335 (2011); Wilinski v 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 NY3d 1 (2011):
    Both amplify that § 240(1) covers certain falling object scenarios when protective devices are necessary and feasible. Parsons distinguishes these by finding no device feasibly could prevent the fall while unstrapping and retracting the ladder.
  • Bazdaric v Almah Partners LLC, 41 NY3d 310 (2024):
    The Court of Appeals’ articulation of what constitutes “the type of work surface enumerated” in 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d). Parsons applies Bazdaric to hold that a crushed-gravel pad at the base of a pole qualifies, expanding practical application of the slippery-surface rule beyond conventional indoor floors or fixed walkways.
  • Baker v City of Buffalo, 90 AD3d 1684 (4th Dept 2011):
    Supports the proposition that defendants must negate both violation and causation to win summary judgment under § 241(6). Parsons follows Baker in holding defendants fell short.
  • Menear v Kwik Fill, 174 AD3d 1354 (4th Dept 2019); Forman v Carrier Corp., 172 AD3d 1920 (4th Dept 2019); Mayer v Conrad, 122 AD3d 1366 (4th Dept 2014):
    These § 200 cases set the burden: defendants must show lack of creation or notice of dangerous conditions. Parsons applies the standard to deny the County’s motion.
  • Bacon v Shults Mgt. Group, Inc., 233 AD3d 1481 (4th Dept 2024):
    Addresses abandonment: failure to oppose or brief an issue is deemed abandonment. Parsons uses this to dismiss § 200 and negligence claims against Motorola.
  • Provens v Ben-Fall Dev., LLC, 163 AD3d 1496 (4th Dept 2018); Lagares v Carrier Term. Servs., Inc. (appeal No. 2), 204 AD3d 1456 (4th Dept 2022); York v Thompson Sta. Inc., 172 AD3d 1593 (3d Dept 2019); Dejesus v Downtown Re Holdings LLC, 217 AD3d 524 (1st Dept 2023); Barto v NS Partners, LLC, 74 AD3d 1717 (4th Dept 2010):
    Collectively establish that common-law indemnification and contribution require negligence by the proposed indemnitor. Parsons, finding no negligence by Motorola, dismisses the County’s common-law indemnity and contribution claims.
  • Vega v FNUB, Inc., 217 AD3d 1475 (4th Dept 2023); Allington v Templeton Found., 167 AD3d 1437 (4th Dept 2018):
    Confirm that contractual indemnity turns on the agreement’s language. Parsons enforces a clause covering negligence of Motorola’s subcontractor, preserving the County’s contractual indemnity claim against Motorola.
  • Sodhi v Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 175 AD3d 914 (4th Dept 2019); Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984 (4th Dept 1994):
    Issues raised for the first time on appeal are unpreserved. Parsons applies this to reject Motorola’s late claim for conditional indemnity from Mid-State.

Legal Reasoning

1) Labor Law § 240(1) — Falling Ladder During Removal

The court accepted that the ladder was a “falling object” but emphasized that § 240(1) imposes liability only when the object was being hoisted/secured or required securing for the work. Because coworkers were actively removing the ladder, they had to untie the straps and retract it; re-securing it would have defeated the removal process. Aligning with Salazar, the court deemed any such securing requirement “contrary to the objectives of the work plan.” Defendants also offered evidence—bolstered by plaintiff’s own testimony—that “no protective devices could have been used” to prevent the fall during takedown. Plaintiff’s expert failed to identify any feasible safety device or method that could have been used in that precise work posture. On this record, § 240(1) did not apply, and dismissal was warranted.

2) Labor Law § 241(6) — Slippery Surface and Ladder Footings

Plaintiff grounded § 241(6) on two Industrial Code sections:

  • 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) (slippery surfaces): Employers must not permit use of “a floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface” in a slippery condition; ice, snow, and other substances must be removed, sanded, or covered.
  • 12 NYCRR 23-1.21(b)(4)(ii) (ladder footings): Ladder footings must be firm; slippery surfaces and insecure objects cannot be used as footings.

Guided by Bazdaric, the court held that the crushed-gravel pad at the base of the pole constituted an enumerated work surface for § 1.7(d) purposes. The icy condition on that surface, coupled with the requirement of firm ladder footings under § 1.21(b)(4)(ii), created triable issues on regulatory violation and causation that defendants failed to negate. Therefore, summary judgment dismissing § 241(6) was properly denied.

3) Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence

Because plaintiff’s theory sounded in a premises condition (ice), not means and methods, the landowner-duty standard applied: the County had to prove lack of creation or notice of the condition to win summary judgment. The County did not carry that initial burden. Conversely, plaintiff abandoned § 200 and negligence claims against Motorola by failing to oppose or brief them, and Motorola separately showed a lack of negligence; those claims were dismissed as against Motorola.

4) Indemnification and Contribution

  • Common-law indemnity and contribution against Motorola: Both require negligence by the party to be indemnified/contributed against. Motorola established it was not negligent; the County raised no triable issue. The cross-claims were dismissed.
  • Contractual indemnity: The County–Motorola contract obligates Motorola to indemnify the County “to the extent” the County’s liability is caused by the negligence of Motorola, its subcontractors, or their employees/agents. Because questions of fact remain regarding Mid-State’s negligence (Mid-State being Motorola’s subcontractor), Motorola was not entitled to summary judgment on the County’s contractual indemnity claim.
  • Conditional indemnity/contribution from Mid-State: Motorola’s request, raised for the first time on appeal, was unpreserved and rejected.

Impact and Significance

  • Clarified limits of § 240(1) in ladder takedown: Parsons fortifies a practical boundary: when workers are in the act of removing a ladder and the work plan necessitates undoing any securing mechanism, courts will resist imposing a § 240(1) requirement to re-secure or otherwise employ protective devices that would frustrate removal. This is a notable application of Salazar’s “contrary to the objectives” principle to ladder removal.
  • Expanded practical reach of § 241(6) on outdoor surfaces: By treating a crushed-gravel pad as an enumerated “work surface” under § 1.7(d), Parsons, following Bazdaric, underscores that § 241(6) can meaningfully police icy or snowy conditions on temporary or semi-permanent outdoor work areas—not just traditional floors or interior walkways.
  • Winter conditions and ladder footings: The survival of claims under § 1.21(b)(4)(ii) reiterates that ladders cannot be set or used on slippery, insecure footing; failure to mitigate ice or ensure firmness creates triable issues for owners, contractors, and agents.
  • Owner/easement holder exposure under § 200: The County’s inability to establish lack of notice illustrates that easement holders functioning as “owners” for Labor Law purposes will face § 200 scrutiny when site conditions are alleged.
  • Indemnification architecture: Parsons distinguishes common-law indemnity (fault-based) from contractual indemnity (agreement-based). Even when an upstream contractor like Motorola is free of negligence (defeating common-law indemnity and contribution), contractual indemnity may still be viable if the clause expressly covers negligence of subcontractors and issues of fact remain as to the subcontractor’s fault.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Labor Law § 240(1) (Scaffold Law): Imposes absolute liability on owners, contractors, and their agents for elevation-related risks to workers if proper safety devices are not provided or are inadequate. It does not cover every accident involving height; the risk must be of the kind contemplated by the statute and preventable by enumerated devices.
  • “Falling object” theory: To recover under § 240(1), the plaintiff must show the object was being hoisted/secured or required securing for the job. If securing the object would have thwarted the very work (e.g., removing a ladder that must first be unstrapped), § 240(1) likely does not apply.
  • Labor Law § 241(6): Creates a non-delegable duty on owners, contractors, and their agents to comply with specific, concrete Industrial Code rules. Unlike § 240(1), comparative negligence can reduce recovery. Violations must be a proximate cause of the injury.
  • 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) (slippery surfaces): Prohibits permitting employees to use slippery work surfaces; requires removal, sanding, or covering of ice/snow/water to ensure safe footing.
  • 12 NYCRR 23-1.21(b)(4)(ii) (ladder footings): Demands firm ladder footings and forbids use on slippery surfaces or insecure objects (e.g., boxes, bricks).
  • Labor Law § 200/common-law negligence: A codification of the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace. For premises conditions (like ice), the owner must lack actual or constructive notice to avoid liability at summary judgment.
  • Common-law indemnification vs. contribution: Both require wrongdoing by the party from whom relief is sought. If a party is free from negligence, claims for common-law indemnity and contribution against it fail.
  • Contractual indemnification: Determined solely by contract language. Clauses that cover negligence of “contractor, its subcontractors, or their employees/agents” can shift risk even where the contractor itself is fault-free, provided a covered actor may have been negligent.
  • Abandonment on motion/appeal: Failing to oppose a motion ground or to brief an issue on appeal can abandon that claim, resulting in dismissal without reaching the merits.

Practice Implications

  • For owners/contractors in winter conditions: Parsons reinforces the need for proactive ice/snow management on outdoor work platforms or pads, including temporary gravel work areas, to comply with § 1.7(d) and to ensure firm ladder footings under § 1.21(b)(4)(ii).
  • For § 240(1) litigation involving ladder removal: Parties should document the work plan and necessity of unsecuring ladders during takedown. Evidence that no feasible protective device could be used in the precise posture of removal can be dispositive.
  • For risk transfer: Contract drafters should consider indemnity language that explicitly covers subcontractor negligence. Parsons shows such clauses can preserve contractual indemnity even when the prime contractor is exonerated of negligence.
  • For motion practice: Do not assume a seemingly peripheral claim will be ignored; failure to oppose or brief can forfeit otherwise defensible claims (as occurred with plaintiff’s § 200/negligence claims against Motorola).
  • For classification of work surfaces: Expect courts to treat practical, temporary, or semi-permanent outdoor working pads as enumerated surfaces under § 1.7(d), expanding potential § 241(6) exposure.

Conclusion

Parsons v. County of Steuben meaningfully refines New York construction accident jurisprudence on three fronts. First, it delineates a clear boundary for § 240(1): a ladder in active removal, which must be unstrapped and retracted, does not “require securing,” and imposing such a requirement would be contrary to the work plan, foreclosing Scaffold Law liability. Second, it strengthens § 241(6) enforcement in winter settings by recognizing a crushed-gravel pad as an enumerated work surface under 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) and by reaffirming the imperative of firm ladder footings under 12 NYCRR 23-1.21(b)(4)(ii). Third, it clarifies indemnity doctrine: while common-law indemnity and contribution fail absent negligence by the proposed indemnitor, contractual indemnity may proceed where the contract covers subcontractor negligence and factual issues remain.

The decision’s practical effect is to channel icy-surface, ladder-footing disputes toward § 241(6) and § 200 frameworks while narrowing § 240(1) exposure in the discrete context of ladder takedown. For litigants and risk managers, Parsons underscores the importance of winter site maintenance, tailored work plans, precise motion practice, and carefully drafted indemnity provisions that account for subcontractor conduct.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, New York

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