Introduction

This commentary examines the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Poole, which settles a consequential retroactivity question in Michigan criminal law: whether the Court’s 2022 holding in People v. Parks—which, under the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment” (Const 1963, art 1, § 16), bars mandatory life-without-parole sentences for homicide offenders who were 18 years old at the time of the offense—applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court unanimously holds that it does, because Parks announced a substantive rule. In doing so, the Court corrects and overrules the state retroactivity analysis in People v. Carp to the extent it survived Montgomery v. Louisiana, and it reaffirms Michigan’s use of the Linkletter–Hampton framework, tempered by the substantive/procedural distinction articulated in People v. Gay.

The parties’ dispute arises from John Poole’s 2002 mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a homicide he committed at age 18. After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. Alabama (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), and the Michigan Supreme Court’s extension of Miller in Parks (2022) to 18-year-olds under the state constitution, Poole sought relief. The Court of Appeals vacated his sentence, holding that Parks applied retroactively. The prosecution sought further review, contending Parks should not reach final cases. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded for resentencing under MCL 769.25a.

Summary of the Opinion

• Holding: People v. Parks applies retroactively under Michigan’s state retroactivity principles because it announced a substantive rule placing mandatory life without parole (LWOP) for 18-year-old homicide offenders beyond the State’s power to impose under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.
• Framework: Michigan continues to apply the Linkletter v. Walker / People v. Hampton factors as refined in People v. Gay: while those factors guide retroactivity decisions, new rules affecting substantive rights “of a fundamental nature” are “normally to be accorded retrospective application.”
• Carp overruled: To the extent Carp’s state retroactivity analysis survived Montgomery, it is overruled. Carp misread Hampton and wrongly cabined the first Linkletter–Hampton factor to rules implicating “guilt or innocence.”
• Factor-by-factor: The first factor (purpose of the rule) and second factor (reliance) favor retroactivity; the third factor (administration of justice) weighs against retroactivity but is outweighed by the others and the rule’s substantive nature.
• Remedy: Affirmance of the Court of Appeals, vacatur of Poole’s mandatory LWOP sentence, and remand for resentencing under MCL 769.25a.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US 618 (1965) and People v. Hampton, 384 Mich 669 (1971): Established the three-factor retroactivity test (purpose, reliance, administration of justice) in Michigan. Poole reaffirms Michigan’s adherence to this framework for state retroactivity questions.
• People v. Gay, 407 Mich 681 (1980): Clarified that when “non-procedural or substantive rights of a fundamental nature are affected,” retroactivity is normally the rule; Linkletter–Hampton considerations are determinative only in rare cases. Gay supplies the controlling state-law lens in Poole.
• Teague v. Lane, 489 US 288 (1989): The U.S. Supreme Court’s federal retroactivity shift to a general rule of nonretroactivity for new procedural rules, subject to narrow exceptions. While Michigan is not bound to adopt Teague for state law (per Danforth), Teague serves as a federal “floor.”
• Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 US 264 (2008): States are not required to adopt Teague’s retroactivity framework; they may apply broader retroactivity rules under state law. Poole uses this to justify persisting with Linkletter–Hampton as Michigan’s state-law test.
• Miller v. Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012): Categorical prohibition on mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders under the Eighth Amendment; requires individualized consideration of youth-related mitigating factors.
• People v. Carp, 496 Mich 440 (2014): Held Miller was nonretroactive under both federal and state tests. Later undermined by Montgomery on the federal retroactivity question; Poole overrules Carp’s state retroactivity analysis.
• Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016): Held Miller announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Poole treats Montgomery’s substance/procedure analysis as persuasive for state-law purposes.
• People v. Parks, 510 Mich 225 (2022): Extended Miller’s bar on mandatory LWOP to 18-year-old homicide offenders under Michigan’s broader “cruel or unusual punishment” clause and applied MCL 769.25 protections in cases still on direct review.
• People v. Jahner, 433 Mich 490 (1989) and People v. Bullock, 440 Mich 15 (1992): Illustrate Michigan’s practice of affording relief when a punishment is later invalidated; cited to show the state’s commitment to remedying unlawful sentences for all similarly situated.
• People v. Young, People v. Markham, People v. Maxson, People v. Sexton: Cases Carp relied on to frame the first Linkletter–Hampton factor as focused on “guilt or innocence.” Poole explains that this lineage traces back to a misreading of Hampton’s survey of U.S. Supreme Court practice rather than a binding rule.
• Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000) and City of Coldwater v. Consumers Energy, 500 Mich 158 (2017): Provide the stare decisis framework used to evaluate whether to overrule Carp’s state retroactivity analysis.

Legal Reasoning

1) State law governs; Gay controls. Because Parks rests on state constitutional grounds (Const 1963, art 1, § 16), Michigan’s own retroactivity jurisprudence controls. Under Gay, the Court first asks whether the new rule is procedural or substantive. Substantive rules—those that place certain penalties beyond the State’s power—are normally retroactive.

2) Parks is substantive. Echoing Montgomery’s articulation, Poole characterizes Parks as a categorical guarantee that the State cannot impose mandatory LWOP on an entire class (homicide offenders who were 18 when they offended). That kind of prohibition “necessarily carries a significant risk” that affected defendants received a punishment the law cannot impose—classic substantive rule territory warranting retroactive application.

3) Correcting Carp’s misstep. Carp had confined the first Linkletter–Hampton factor to rules affecting “guilt or innocence,” relegating sentencing rules to nonretroactivity. Poole demonstrates that Carp’s reading lacks support in Hampton itself, which only surveyed federal cases; it did not adopt a categorical “guilt/innocence” limitation. Properly understood, the purpose inquiry is broader and, as with Miller and Parks, includes categorical bans on particular punishments for a class.

4) Applying the Linkletter–Hampton factors.

• Purpose of the new rule (Factor 1): Favors retroactivity. Like Miller (as understood by Montgomery), Parks announced a categorical constitutional limit on a penalty. Its purpose is to prevent the State from foreclosing the possibility of rehabilitation in the run of cases, reserving life without parole for rare, exceptional offenders after individualized sentencing.
• Reliance on the old rule (Factor 2): Favors retroactivity. The meaningful focus is the affected class—persons who received mandatory LWOP for homicides committed at 18 and whose cases were final when Parks issued. Continued reliance on pre-Parks law materially harms this group. Prosecutorial “reliance” carries less weight: mandatory LWOP was set by statute, prosecutors never needed to argue for it, and underlying convictions remain undisturbed.
• Administration of justice (Factor 3): Weighs against retroactivity because resentencings consume judicial resources and can be challenging for victims and communities. But this burden is outweighed by the first two factors and, critically, by the rule’s substantive character under Gay.

5) Stare decisis and overruling Carp’s state retroactivity analysis. Applying the standard stare decisis considerations, the Court finds: (a) Carp’s approach does not supply practical workability gains; (b) there has been minimal reliance on Carp because it was quickly undercut by Montgomery; and (c) changes in law (Montgomery’s substantive retroactivity holding) have undermined Carp’s foundation. Accordingly, Carp’s state retroactivity analysis is overruled to the extent it survived Montgomery.

6) Remedy and procedure. Because Parks operates retroactively and Poole’s case is on collateral review, resentencing proceeds under MCL 769.25a (the Legislature’s post-Miller framework for resentencing individuals entitled to retroactive relief). The Court affirms the Court of Appeals and remands for proceedings consistent with MCL 769.25a.

Impact

• Immediate class-wide relief: Individuals in Michigan serving mandatory LWOP for homicide offenses committed at age 18 are now entitled to seek resentencing on collateral review. Their convictions stand, but their sentences must be revisited consistent with the individualized framework embodied in MCL 769.25a.
• State retroactivity doctrine clarified: Michigan firmly reaffirms the Linkletter–Hampton test as governed by Gay’s substantive/procedural distinction. Substantive state-constitutional rules will generally apply retroactively, with the factors rarely defeating retroactivity.
• Carp’s narrowing rejected: The notion that only rules implicating “guilt or innocence” can satisfy the first factor is disapproved. Categorical sentencing limits on state power—like the ban on mandatory LWOP for an age-defined class—are paradigmatically substantive.
• Administrative consequences: Trial courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and victims’ services must prepare for resentencing hearings in affected cases. Although resource-intensive, the Court emphasizes that relief focuses on correcting unlawful sentences while leaving convictions intact.
• Broader constitutional practice: Poole underscores Michigan’s authority to provide more expansive protections under its constitution than the federal baseline and to adopt independent state-law retroactivity principles.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Retroactivity (state vs. federal): A new court decision can apply to cases still on direct appeal and, sometimes, to final cases on collateral review. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Teague framework governs federal retroactivity; Michigan is free to use its own test for state-law rulings. Michigan uses the Linkletter–Hampton factors, as refined by Gay.
• Substantive vs. procedural rules: Substantive rules categorically forbid certain punishments or criminal prohibitions (e.g., “mandatory LWOP may not be imposed on X class”), making covered sentences unlawful. Procedural rules regulate how trials or sentencings are conducted. Substantive rules are generally retroactive; procedural rules usually are not.
• “Cruel or unusual” vs. “cruel and unusual”: Michigan’s Constitution prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment,” a textual difference the Michigan Supreme Court has read to be at least as protective, and sometimes more protective, than the federal Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishments.” Parks rested on this broader state provision.
• Collateral review: Post-conviction proceedings (e.g., motions for relief from judgment) after a conviction and sentence are final. Retroactivity is crucial here because only some new rules apply to final cases.
• MCL 769.25 and 769.25a: Michigan’s statutes implementing individualized sentencing for homicide offenses committed by persons who were juveniles (and, after Parks, 18-year-olds) and providing resentencing procedures when retroactivity applies. In Poole, the Court directs use of MCL 769.25a because the case is on collateral review.
• Linkletter–Hampton factors: The three-part test examines (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) reliance on the old rule, and (3) impacts on the administration of justice. Under Gay, these factors rarely defeat retroactivity for substantive rules.
• Stare decisis: The doctrine of adhering to precedent. Courts may overrule precedent when it is unworkable, reliance interests are minimal, or changes in law/fact undermine the decision. Poole applies this to overrule Carp’s state retroactivity analysis.

Practical Implications and Next Steps

• Who is affected: Persons who received mandatory LWOP for homicides committed at age 18 and whose cases were final when Parks issued.
• Relief available: Resentencing under MCL 769.25a. The conviction is not disturbed; the sentencing court must conduct individualized sentencing consistent with Parks and the statutory framework.
• Procedural gateways: For prisoners with prior, unsuccessful collateral challenges, Poole confirms that a retroactive change in law can overcome bars on successive motions (as the Court had earlier recognized in this case when it allowed Poole’s application to proceed).
• System readiness: Prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts should prepare to identify eligible cases, give appropriate notices, and schedule hearings. Victim notification obligations and services will be central.
• Boundaries of the holding: Poole addresses retroactivity for 18-year-olds under Parks. It does not extend the age boundary, disturb underlying convictions, or guarantee release; it requires lawful resentencing.

Conclusion

People v. Poole is a landmark in Michigan’s state-constitutional and retroactivity jurisprudence. The Court’s core contributions are twofold. First, it declares that Parks’s categorical ban on mandatory LWOP for 18-year-old homicide offenders is a substantive rule and therefore retroactive under Michigan law. Second, it corrects course by overruling Carp’s misinterpretation of the state retroactivity test, clarifying that Michigan’s Linkletter–Hampton framework, as shaped by Gay, does not confine retroactivity to rules about “guilt or innocence.”

The opinion harmonizes Michigan law with Montgomery’s understanding of Miller, fortifies the state’s independent constitutionalism, and ensures that those serving sentences the law cannot impose are afforded individualized resentencing under MCL 769.25a. While the court system will bear the administrative load of resentencings, the decision prioritizes constitutional fidelity and the fair distribution of fundamental rights. In the broader legal context, Poole reaffirms that when Michigan declares a punishment beyond the State’s power under its own constitution, that declaration reaches backward as well as forward.