Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp.: Establishing Standards for Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases

Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp.: Establishing Standards for Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases

Introduction

PARKER v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION et al., decided by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York on October 17, 2006, is a pivotal case in the realm of toxic tort litigation. This case centers on Eric Parker, a former gas station attendant, who alleged that prolonged exposure to benzene in gasoline led to his diagnosis of acute myelogenous leukemia (AML). Parker filed a lawsuit against Mobil Oil Corporation and several third-party defendants, claiming negligence in failing to warn him about the dangers of benzene exposure or provide adequate protective measures.

The key issues in this case revolved around the admissibility of expert testimony regarding medical causation. Mobil Oil and other defendants sought to exclude Parker's expert opinions on the grounds of scientific unreliability, invoking the FRYE v. UNITED STATES standard. The lower courts had conflicting views on whether Parker’s experts met the necessary standards to establish causation, leading to an appellate review focused on the application of admissibility tests for expert evidence in toxic tort cases.

Summary of the Judgment

In a decisive ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants, effectively dismissing Parker's claims. The court scrutinized the methodologies employed by Parker's experts to establish a causal link between benzene exposure and AML. It concluded that the experts failed to provide sufficiently reliable evidence under the prevailing Frye standard, primarily due to the lack of precise quantification of hormone exposure and inability to demonstrate that exposure levels exceeded any practical threshold for causing AML.

The court emphasized the necessity for expert testimony in toxic tort cases to be based on generally accepted scientific principles and methodologies. Since Parker's experts did not meet this criterion, their testimonies were deemed inadmissible, and the summary judgment in favor of Mobil Oil and other defendants was upheld.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment heavily relied on established precedents concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. Central to the court's analysis was the FRYE v. UNITED STATES (1923) standard, which mandates that scientific evidence must be generally accepted within the relevant scientific community to be admissible. Key cases cited include:

  • FRYE v. UNITED STATES, 293 F. 1013 (DC Cir. 1923) – Established the standard for scientific evidence admissibility based on general acceptance.
  • People v. Wesley, 83 NY2d 417 – Applied the Frye standard in the New York context.
  • STUBBS v. CITY OF ROCHESTER, 226 NY 516 – Discussed the application of the Frye test to expert causation testimony.
  • SELIG v. PFIZER, Inc., 185 Misc. 2d 600 – Addressed the reliability of expert opinions under Frye.

These precedents collectively shaped the court's approach to evaluating whether Parker's expert testimonies adhered to the requisite scientific standards.

Legal Reasoning

The Court of Appeals dissected the legal frameworks governing expert testimony, distinguishing between the Frye standard and the federal Daubert standard. While some amici curiae advocated for adopting the Daubert criteria, the court reaffirmed the applicability of Frye within New York State.

The court's reasoning focused on the reliability of the methodologies used by Parker's experts to establish causation. It highlighted the absence of precise quantification of benzene exposure, a critical factor in demonstrating a direct link to AML. The court underscored that without establishing a clear dose-response relationship or exceeding a practical threshold of exposure, the expert testimonies lacked the scientific robustness required under Frye.

Additionally, the court acknowledged alternative methodologies for establishing causation, such as qualitative assessments and comparative exposures, but emphasized that any such methods must be generally accepted within the scientific community to withstand Frye scrutiny.

Impact

The decision in Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp. has significant implications for future toxic tort litigation in New York. By reaffirming the strict application of the Frye standard, the court set a high bar for plaintiffs seeking to introduce expert causation evidence. This ruling emphasizes the necessity for precise scientific methodologies and robust evidence to establish causation in cases involving exposure to toxic substances.

Furthermore, the decision may influence how expert witnesses prepare and present their testimonies, encouraging a greater focus on proprietary, widely accepted scientific methods and comprehensive exposure quantification. It also serves as a precedent for courts to maintain rigorous standards in admitting scientific evidence, thereby striving to prevent the introduction of speculative or unverified expert opinions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Frye Standard

The Frye standard is a legal test used to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. Under this standard, scientific evidence is considered admissible if the methodology or scientific principle is "generally accepted" by experts in the relevant field.

Daubert Standard

The Daubert standard, which applies in federal courts and some states, evaluates scientific evidence based on its relevance and reliability, considering factors like testability, peer review, error rates, and general acceptance.

Differential Etiology

Differential etiology is a method used by medical experts to determine the cause of a disease by systematically ruling out other potential causes until the most probable cause remains.

Time-Weighted Average (TWA)

TWA is a measure used to represent the average exposure to a substance, such as benzene, over a standard work shift, typically eight hours. It helps in assessing the potential health risks associated with occupational exposure.

Parts Per Million (PPM)

PPM is a unit of measurement used to express the concentration of a substance in air or other media. For instance, 1 PPM indicates that one part of a substance is present per one million parts of air.

Conclusion

The Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp. decision underscores the judiciary's commitment to upholding stringent standards for the admissibility of expert scientific testimony in toxic tort cases. By affirming the application of the Frye standard, the Court of Appeals emphasized the need for reliable, widely accepted scientific methodologies in establishing causation. This ruling not only affects the outcome of individual cases but also shapes the broader landscape of environmental and occupational litigation by setting clear precedents for evidence admissibility.

For legal practitioners and plaintiffs in toxic tort cases, this decision highlights the critical importance of comprehensive and methodologically sound expert testimonies. It serves as a reminder that without robust scientific support, claims of causation may falter under judicial scrutiny. Consequently, future litigants must ensure that their expert evidence aligns with established scientific consensus to withstand the rigorous demands of appellate review.

Case Details

Year: 2006
Court: Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Attorney(S)

Kreindler Kreindler LLP, New York City ( Marc S. Moller and Blanca I. Rodriguez of counsel), and Baggett, McCall, Burgess, Watson Gaughan, Lake Charles, Louisiana ( William B. Baggett, Sr., Wells T. Watson and Jeffrey T. Gaughan of counsel), for appellant. Where the causal link between benzene and leukemia is established science, and plaintiff's expert uses the generally accepted methodology of differential etiology to opine that plaintiff's 17-year exposure to benzene caused his leukemia, there is no Frye test novel science issue, and it is for the jury to decide whether benzene caused plaintiff's leukemia by a preponderance of the evidence, taking account of the facts surrounding plaintiff's exposure to benzene, his personal risk factors, and the expert's testimony based on deductive clinical reasoning and scientific data. ( Stubbs v City of Rochester, 226 NY 516; Ruggiero v Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F3d 249; Marsh v Smyth, 12 AD3d 307; People v Wesley, 83 NY2d 417; People v Wernick, 89 NY2d 111; People v Lee, 96 NY2d 157; People v Carroll, 95 NY2d 375; People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217; People v Jeter, 80 NY2d 818; People v Taylor, 75 NY2d 277.) Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman Dicker LLP, Newark, New Jersey, and New York City ( Robert J. Kelly, Richard E. Lerner, Robert P. Scott and Suna Lee of counsel), for Mobil Oil Corporation and another, respondents. I. To defeat a motion for summary judgment in a case requiring expert proof, the expert's opinion must be predicated upon reliable facts and data. ( Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851; Amatulli v Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 NY2d 525; Romano v Stanley, 90 NY2d 444; United States v Benson, 941 F2d 598.) II. The Appellate Division correctly subjected plaintiffs unsworn expert reports to Frye scrutiny and properly deemed them insufficient to defeat defendant's motion. ( People v Wesley, 83 NY2d 417; Frye v United States, 293 F 1013; People v Wernick, 89 NY2d 111; Selig v Pfizer, Inc., 185 Misc 2d 600, 290 AD2d 319; Hammond v Alekna Constr, 269 AD2d 773; Collins v Welch, 178 Misc 2d 107; Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579; Gallegos v Elite Model Mgt. Corp., 195 Misc 2d 223; Zafran v Zafran, 191 Misc 2d 60; Cameron v Knapp, 137 Misc 2d 373.) III. Plaintiff's reliance upon the "differential etiology" methodology to avoid Frye scrutiny is misplaced. ( Frye v United States, 293 F 1013; McClain v Metabolife Intl., Inc., 401 F3d 1233; Bitler v A.O. Smith Corp., 391 F3d 1114; Norris v Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F3d 878; Hall v Baxter Corp., 947 F Supp 1387; Stubbs v City of Rochester, 226 NY 516; Ruggiero v Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F3d 249; Cavallo v Star Enter., 892 F Supp 756, 100 F3d 1150; Sutera v Perrier Group of Am. Inc., 986 F Supp 655; Whiting v Boston Edison Co., 891 F Supp 12.) IV Plaintiff's reliance on the practical probability test is misplaced, since no such test exists. ( Matter of Miller v National Cabinet Co., 8 NY2d 277; Dangler v Town of Whitestown, 241 AD2d 290; Farkas v Saary, 191 AD2d 178; Smith v Johnson Johnson Co., 6 Misc 3d 1001[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51670[U]; Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 24 AD3d 375; Hallahan v Ashland Chem. Co., 267 AD2d 657.) Smith Mazure Director Wilkins Young Yagerman, P.C., New York City ( Joel Simon of counsel), for Island Transportation Corporation, respondent. I. The Appellate Division was correct in ruling that under Frye v United States ( 293 F 1013), plaintiff's expert testimony was inadmissible. ( Zito v Zabarsky, 28 AD3d 42; Whiting v Boston Edison Co., 891 F Supp 12; Sutera v Perrier Group of Am. Inc., 986 F Supp 655; Berk v St. Vincent's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 380 F Supp 2d 334; Becker v National Health Prods., Inc., 896 F Supp 100.) II. The Appellate Division properly granted summary judgment. ( Gadman v Catalfo, 251 AD2d 370; Cobb v New York City Hous. Auth., 251 AD2d 362; Shinn v Lefrak Org., 239 AD2d 335.) III. Plaintiff-appellant's argument was not raised in the lower court and is therefore not properly before this Court. Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale ( James Quinn, Jay D. Kenigsberg and Harris J. Zakarin of counsel), for Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc., respondent. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the opinions of plaintiff's expert were based upon principles and procedures generally accepted in the relevant scientific community and therefore admissible under the Frye rule. ( Frye v United States, 293 F 1013.) Locks Law Firm, PLLC, New York City ( Seth R. Lesser of counsel), and Val Washington for American Trial Lawyers Association and another, amici curiae. I. The Appellate Division erred in applying the Frye test to the foundational inquiry into whether a particular expert properly applied a generally accepted methodology to the facts of the case. ( Marsh v Smyth, 12 AD3d 307; Zito v Zabarsky, 28 AD3d 42; People v Wesley, 83 NY2d 417; Frye v United States, 293 F 1013; People v Brown, 97 NY2d 500; People v Lee, 96 NY2d 157; McCarthy v Handel, 297 AD2d 444; People v Reynolds, 193 Misc 2d 697; Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579; Sutera v Perrier Group of Am. Inc., 986 F Supp 655.) II. This Court should not impose on trial judges the responsibility to act as gatekeeper to scrutinize whether an expert has properly applied a generally accepted methodology. ( Barefoot v Estelle, 463 US 880; In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F2d 238, revd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574; Christophersen v Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F2d 1106, 503 US 912; Ferebee v Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F2d 1529; In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F3d 717, 513 US 1190; Moore v Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F3d 269; Maye v Stearns, 19 AD3d 902; People v Middleton, 54 NY2d 42; Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore, 439 US 322; Galloway v United States, 319 US 372.) Metzer Law Group, APLC, Long Beach, California ( Raphael Metzger of counsel), for Council for Education and Research on Toxics and others, amici curiae. I. A worker should not be required to quantify his cumulative benzene dose, because cumulative dose has not been validated as the scientifically valid dose metric for assessing leukemogenis risk from benzene exposure, and other dose metrics may be more relevant. II. A plaintiff in a benzene leukemia case should not be required to quantify his cumulative benzene dose, because benzene monitoring is rarely done and estimating a worker's cumulative benzene dose by experimentation or modeling is either impossible or impracticable. ( Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607.) III. There is no persuasive scientific evidence that a threshold for benzene-induced leukemia exists, and substantial scientific evidence negates the existence of a threshold for benzene-induced leukemia. IV As more and more scientific research is done, increasingly lower levels of benzene exposure are being reported to cause leukemia. V Individual factors of susceptibility, i.e., genetic polymorphisms of susceptibility — rather than a worker's benzene dose — are the primary determinants of a worker's risk of leukemia. VI. A quantified dose is not needed to prove that benzene exposure caused a worker's leukemia; benzene induction of leukemia can often be proved by pathology, by cytogenetics, and other means. Mayer, Brown, Rowe Maw, Washington, D.C. ( Andrew J. Pincus, Charles A. Rothfeld and Rajesh De of counsel), and National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc. (Robin S. Conrad and Amar D. Sarwal of counsel), for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, amicus curiae. I. When expert scientific testimony is necessary to establish the causal connection between plaintiff's alleged injury and defendant's product or conduct, the decision whether to admit or exclude such evidence is of critical importance. ( Frye v United States, 293 F 1013; Lara v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 305 AD2d 106; Savage v Union Pac. R.R. Co., 67 F Supp 2d 1021; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F Supp 1223; Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579; General Electric Co. v Joiner, 522 US 136; People v Wesley, 83 NY2d 417; People v Wernick, 89 NY2d 111; People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217; People v Lee, 96 NY2d 157.) II. This Court should affirm the Appellate Division because expert causation testimony is subject to the same standard as all other scientific evidence and is admissible only if it relies upon generally accepted principles to show a link between plaintiff's injury and defendant's product or conduct. ( Frye v United States, 293 F 1013; People v Wesley, 83 NY2d 417; Styles v General Motors Corp., 20 AD3d 338; Heckstall v Pincus, 19 AD3d 203; Pauling v Orentreich Med. Group, 14 AD3d 357; Selig v Pfizer, Inc., 290 AD2d 319; Zito v Zabarsky, 28 AD3d 42; Lewin v County of Suffolk, 18 AD3d 621; Del Maestro v Grecco, 16 AD3d 364; Saulpaugh v Krafte, 5 AD3d 934.) III. Failure to preserve the standard for admission of expert causation testimony would subvert the fairness of the trial process, produce insupportable results, and impose significant burdens on the judicial system. ( In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F Supp 1223.) Malaby, Carlisle Bradley, LLC, New York City ( Robert C Malaby and David P. Schaffer of counsel), Crowell Moring LLP, Washington, D.C. ( William L. Anderson and Jennifer G. Knight of counsel), and Shook, Hardy Bacon, LLP (Victor E. Schwartz and Mark A. Behrens of counsel), for Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., amicus curiae. I. Careful scrutiny of novel tort expert evidence is a necessary part of modern tort jurisprudence under Frye v United States ( 293 F 1013) or Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ( 509 US 579). ( General Electric Co. v Joiner, 522 US 136; Bartel v John Crane, Inc., 316 F Supp 2d 603, affd sub nom. Lindstrom v A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F3d 488; Nelson v Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F3d 244.) II. A "differential diagnosis" performed by these and other experts is reviewable under Frye v United States ( 293 F 1013). ( General Electric Co. v Joiner, 522 US 136; Lust By Through Lust v Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 89 F3d 594.) III. Low-dose exposure cases require a more rigorous dose assessment than the anecdotal stories and subjective terminology applied by Drs. Landrigan and Goldstein. ( Brock v Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F2d 307, 884 F2d 166; Chambers v Exxon Corp., 81 F Supp 2d 661; Allen v Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F3d 194; Hall v Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F Supp 1387; Conde v Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F Supp 972; Norris v Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F3d 878; In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F Supp 2d 1217; Allison v McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F3d 1300; McClain v Metabolife Intl., Inc., 401 F3d 1233; Bartel v John Crane, Inc., 316 F Supp 2d 603; Mitchell v Gencorp Inc., 165 F3d 778.) Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City ( Leonard Koerner, Fay Leoussis, Christopher G. King, Amy London and Elizabeth S. Natrella of counsel), for City of New York and another, amici curiae. New York State courts must exercise a strong gatekeeping role to ensure that only expert opinion evidence on causation that is based on sound scientific principles and methodologies is admitted into evidence. In the instant case, the Appellate Division correctly determined that plaintiff did not meet his burden to show that the expert opinion was based on a scientifically reliable methodology. ( People v Wesley, 83 NY2d 417; Frye v United States, 293 F 1013; Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579; People v LeGrand, 196 Misc 2d 179; Buchholz v Trump 767 Fifth Ave., LLC, 5 NY3d 1; Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542; Romano v Stanley, 90 NY2d 444; Matter of Angel A., 92 NY2d 430; People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217; Del Maestro v Grecco, 16 AD3d 364.) Debevoise Plimpton LLP, New York City ( Anne E. Cohen, Robert D. Goodman and Genevieve A. Pope of counsel), and Hugh F. Young, Jr., Reston, Virginia, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., amicus curiae. I. This Court should articulate a test for trial courts to follow when determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony that ensures that causation evidence is reliable and genuinely scientific. ( Frye v United States, 293 F 1013; People v Wesley, 83 NY2d 417; People v Wernick, 89 NY2d 111; Clemente v Blumenberg, 183 Misc 2d 923; Saulpaugh v Krafte, 5 AD3d 934; Selig v Pfizer, Inc., 290 AD2d 319; Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 24 AD3d 375; Amorgianos v National R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F3d 256; In re Joint E. S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F3d 1124; Castellow v Chevron USA, 97 F Supp 2d 780.) II. Plaintiff's radical and one-sided proposals to rewrite the law governing admissibility of expert causation evidence should be rejected. ( Saulpaugh v Krafte, 5 AD3d 934; Selig v Pfizer, Inc., 290 AD2d 319; Hymowitz v Eli Lilly Co., 73 NY2d 487; Matter of DES Mkt. Share Litig., 79 NY2d 299; Elswick v Nichols, 144 F Supp 2d 758; Haggerty v Upjohn Co., 950 F Supp 1160, 158 F3d 588; Sutera v Perrier Group of Am. Inc., 986 F Supp 655; Whiting v Boston Edison Co., 891 F Supp 12; Black v Food Lion, Inc., 171 F3d 308; Glastetter v Novartis Pharms. Corp., 107 F Supp 2d 1015, 252 F3d 986.) Jordan and Moses, Saint Simons Island, Georgia ( Randall A. Jordan and Mary Helen Moses of counsel), Louis P. Warchot, Washington, D.C., and Daniel Saphire for Association of American Railroads, amicus curiae. The Court should affirm the Appellate Division's holding that a plaintiff is required to prove dose by reliable scientific evidence. ( Mancuso v Consolidated Edison Co. of NY, Inc., 56 F Supp 2d 391; O'Conner v Commonwealth Edison Co., 807 F Supp 1376, 13 F3d 1090; Claar v Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F3d 499; Kernan v American Dredging Co., 355 US 426; Wills v Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F3d 32; Whiting v Boston Edison Co., 891 F Supp 12; Sutera v Perrier Group of Am. Inc., 986 F Supp 655; Castellow v Chevron USA, 97 F Supp 2d 780; Mitchell v Gencorp, Inc., 165 F3d 778; Wright v Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F3d 1105.) National Legal Scholars Law Firm, EC, Lyme, New Hampshire ( Anthony Z. Roisman of counsel), for Margaret A. Berger and others, amici curiae. I. The Appellate Division committed reversible error by misapplying the existing New York State Frye/Wesley standard for the admissibility of expert evidence and by impermissibly adopting the federal Daubert standard, which it also misapplied. ( People v Forte, 279 NY 204; Frye v United States, 293 F 1013; People v Wesley, 83 NY2d 417; Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395; LeChase Data/Telecom Servs., LLC v Goebert, 6 NY3d 281; Speller v Sears, Roebuck Co., 100 NY2d 38; In re Joint E. S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F3d 1124; Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304; Amorgianos v National R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F3d 256; Marmo v IBP Inc., 360 F Supp 2d 1019.) II. The Appellate Division erred in granting summary judgment because it weighed the evidence and failed to give the appropriate deference to the substantial evidence offered by plaintiff. ( Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542; Reeves v Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 US 133; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295; LeChase Data/Telecom Servs., LLC v Goebert, 6 NY3d 281; Speller v Sears, Roebuck Co., 100 NY2d 38; Buchholz v Trump 767 Fifth Ave., LLC, 5 NY3d 1; David v County of Suffolk, 1 NY3d 525.) III. Alternatively, the Appellate Division impermissibly granted summary judgment without allowing Eric Parker to fully complete discovery and present his experts' full reports. ( JMD Holding Corp. v Congress Fin. Corp., 4 NY3d 373.) IV This Court should retain the Frye/Wesley standard for admissibility, and reject the invitation to adopt the federal Daubert standard, because (a) adopting a precise exposure measurement requirement would unacceptably exacerbate the risk that toxic exposure victims will be denied access to the courts and thereby be deprived of the opportunity to obtain compensation for their injuries, (b) courts are ill-equipped to engage in the detailed scientific analyses that Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ( 509 US 579) requires and (c) New York courts are too overburdened by rising caseloads and too limited in their resources to adopt Daubert and absorb the burgeoning burdens and costs that accompany the inevitably proliferating Daubert motions and Daubert hearings. ( Zito v Zabarsky, 28 AD3d 42; People v Campbell, 97 NY2d 532; Ferebee v Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F2d 1529, 469 US 1062; Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F3d 1311; Cortes-Irizarry v Corporacion Insular De Seguros, 111 F3d 184; Padillas v Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F3d 412.)

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