Second Circuit Re-emphasizes the Lower Summary-Judgment Bar under the NYCHRL for Mixed-Motive Disability-Discrimination Claims

I. Introduction

In Parker v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, Inc., No. 24-688-cv (2d Cir. June 27, 2025) (amended summary order), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revisited the disparate analytical frameworks applied to disability-discrimination claims brought under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the more expansive New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).

Plaintiff-appellant Marian E. Parker, a technology-risk specialist terminated during her 90-day probationary period, alleged that Israel Discount Bank of New York (IDB) fired her because of limitations stemming from a finger injury. The district court granted summary judgment to IDB on all claims. On appeal, the Second Circuit:

• Affirmed dismissal of Parker’s ADA and NYSHRL claims, finding insufficient evidence of pretext.
• Vacated dismissal of her NYCHRL claim and remanded, holding that—even on the same factual record—a reasonable jury could find for Parker under the City law’s lenient mixed-motive standard.

Although issued as a non-precedential Summary Order, the decision sharply underscores the practical divergence between federal/state and New York City employment-discrimination regimes, offering valuable guidance to litigants, employers, and lower courts.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. ADA & NYSHRL. Applying the familiar three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the court assumed arguendo that Parker met her prima facie burden but agreed with the district court that she failed, at step three, to rebut IDB’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons: missed deadlines and substantive errors in her Work Plan during probation.

2. NYCHRL. Analyzed “separately and independently,” the City claim survived summary judgment. The panel held that Parker’s evidence—her supervisor’s forwarding of an email referencing her injury to HR, coupled with his alleged irritation over her therapy appointments—narrowly sufficed to create a triable issue whether disability played “one of a number of mixed motives” in her firing, as articulated in Bennett v. Health Management Systems and Cadet-Legros v. NYU Hosp. Ctr.

Accordingly, the case returns to the Southern District of New York for further proceedings on the NYCHRL claim (or for the court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – Sets the tripartite burden-shifting sequence for federal disparate-treatment claims. The court employed it for both ADA and NYSHRL analyses.
• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) – Articulates the “no reasonable jury” standard governing summary judgment, quoted for the legal threshold.
• Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2019) & McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) – Recent Second-Circuit ADA decisions reaffirming McDonnell Douglas.
• Sista v. CDC Ixis N.A., Inc., 445 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006) – Clarifies methods of proving pretext; quoted to explain how plaintiffs may impeach employer rationales.
• Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N.A., Inc., 715 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2013) – The Second Circuit’s leading admonition that NYCHRL claims be treated more liberally. Provides doctrinal backbone for separately analyzing City claims.
• Bennett v. Health Management Systems, Inc., 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1st Dep’t 2011) – Allocates burden to defendants at summary judgment under NYCHRL; cited for the “any evidentiary route” language.
• Cadet-Legros v. NYU Hosp. Ctr., 21 N.Y.S.3d 221 (1st Dep’t 2015) – Emphasizes plaintiff’s lighter burden to show that at least one employer reason is “false, misleading, or incomplete.”

Together, these authorities shaped a bifurcated analytic path: strict under federal/state law; generous under the City code.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step-Three Failure under ADA/NYSHRL.
   • Record undisputedly showed Parker (a) missed a key Work Plan deadline and (b) submitted an error-laden document even after an extension. IDB regarded these deficiencies as disqualifying during a probationary period.
   • Parker’s “pretext” evidence—deadline flexibility, supervisor’s email forwarding, perceived anger—was deemed insufficient. The court noted a documented timeline showing IDB had already decided to terminate before the contentious email arrived.
   • Conclusory, self-serving statements of hostility cannot defeat summary judgment (Fletcher v. Atex).
2. NYCHRL’s Lower Bar.
   • The defendant (not the plaintiff) bears the summary-judgment burden to show no reasonable jury could find discrimination by any route (Bennett).
   • A plaintiff need show merely that one employer reason is “incomplete” or that discrimination was a motive, not the motive (Cadet-Legros).
   • Applying these standards, the same evidentiary sliver—the email referencing Parker’s inability to take notes, coupled with the supervisor’s reputed irritation—could support a finding of mixed motives, precluding summary judgment.

C. Anticipated Impact

1. Litigation Strategy. Plaintiffs bringing parallel ADA/NYSHRL/NYCHRL claims will capitalize on the City law’s lower evidentiary threshold, knowing that even a thin record may reach a jury. Conversely, employers face a heavier summary-judgment burden for NYC-based employees and may settle earlier.

2. Probationary Employment. The case illustrates that the NYCHRL’s protections extend full force to probationary employees; “at-will” or “probationary” labels will not immunize employers from mixed-motive scrutiny.

3. Judicial Economy & Supplemental Jurisdiction. The panel expressly left to the district court whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction on remand. District courts, wary of protracted federal-court trials over local-law claims, may increasingly decline jurisdiction where only NYCHRL claims remain.

4. Summary Orders as Persuasive Authority. Although non-precedential, Second-Circuit Summary Orders often guide district judges. This decision will likely be cited informally for the proposition that minor evidence can defeat summary judgment under NYCHRL’s mixed-motive theory.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary Judgment – A procedural device that allows a court to decide a case without a trial if, viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, no reasonable jury could rule in its favor.
• Probationary Period – Initial employment interval during which an employer evaluates an employee’s performance and may terminate with minimal internal process.
• Burden-Shifting (McDonnell Douglas) –
  1. Plaintiff: present prima facie case (membership in protected class, adverse action, etc.).
  2. Employer: articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.
  3. Plaintiff: prove that reason is pretext for discrimination.
• Pretext – A false or insincere reason given to mask real discriminatory intent.
• Mixed-Motive – An employment decision motivated by both lawful and unlawful reasons. Under NYCHRL, any role played by discrimination is actionable.
• Supplemental Jurisdiction (§ 1367) – Federal courts may hear state-law claims tied to a federal case, but can decline once federal claims are dismissed.

V. Conclusion

Parker v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., Inc. reinforces a critical lesson: identical facts may yield divergent outcomes depending on the statutory lens. While the ADA and NYSHRL require plaintiffs to clear the stringent pretext hurdle, the NYCHRL—rooted in New York City’s “uniquely broad and remedial” objectives—demands far less at the summary-judgment stage, especially in mixed-motive scenarios.

For practitioners, the case stresses meticulous treatment of NYCHRL claims, careful documentation of performance issues, and heightened awareness that probationary status offers no safe harbor under City law. For courts, the decision offers a succinct restatement of the comparative analytic frameworks and signals continued vitality of Mihalik and Bennett. Even as a Summary Order, Parker provides persuasive authority and a practical roadmap for the divergent paths federal and City discrimination claims take inside New York’s courthouses.