Parental Rehabilitation as a “Change in Circumstances” and the Mandatory Hearing Requirement in Montana Parenting Plan Modifications — Commentary on In re Parenting of A.M.B.-B., 2025 MT 270

Parental Rehabilitation as a “Change in Circumstances” and the Mandatory Hearing Requirement in Montana Parenting Plan Modifications

Commentary on In re the Parenting of A.M.B.-B., 2025 MT 270 (Mont. Sup. Ct.)

I. Introduction

The Montana Supreme Court’s decision in In re the Parenting of A.M.B.-B., 2025 MT 270, is a significant development in Montana family law, particularly in the interpretation of “change in circumstances” and “adequate cause” for hearings on motions to amend parenting plans under §§ 40‑4‑219 and 40‑4‑220, MCA. It also provides important guidance on when a parent’s rehabilitation can trigger reconsideration of a no‑contact parenting plan and on the proper use of “vexatious litigation” findings and fee‑shifting provisions.

The case arises from a highly conflicted relationship between the parents, marked by serious domestic violence, a ten‑year order of protection, criminal convictions, and an original parenting plan that completely barred the father, Daniel Whitby, from any contact with his son, A.M.B.-B. The mother, Reina Irene Cazabal‑Boe, was awarded sole parenting rights and full decision‑making authority. In the years following entry of the 2018 parenting plan, Whitby repeatedly sought to modify the plan to obtain some form of parenting time, asserting significant personal rehabilitation and changed circumstances. The district court, relying entirely on the written record, twice denied him even an evidentiary hearing and ultimately labeled his efforts “bordering on frivolous and vexatious,” awarding attorney fees to Cazabal‑Boe.

On appeal, the Supreme Court framed three principal issues:

  1. Whether the district court erred in determining that a change in circumstances did not occur and therefore denying a hearing under § 40‑4‑220, MCA.
  2. Whether the district court erred in refusing to amend the parenting plan under § 40‑4‑219, MCA.
  3. Whether the Standing Master and district court erred in awarding attorney fees and effectively treating Whitby as a vexatious litigant under §§ 40‑4‑212(4)(b) and 40‑4‑219(5), MCA.

The Court’s answer to each, in substance, was that the district court misapplied the statutory framework and abused its discretion. The decision strengthens procedural protections for parents seeking modification, clarifies that parental rehabilitation can qualify as a child‑centered “change in circumstances,” and narrows the circumstances under which motions to modify may be deemed vexatious or frivolous.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Relationship History and Initial Proceedings

Whitby and Cazabal‑Boe are the biological parents of A.M.B.-B, born in January 2018. The relationship between the parties deteriorated severely before the child’s birth. In July 2017, several months before A.M.B.-B’s birth, Cazabal‑Boe obtained a ten‑year order of protection against Whitby based on allegations of violent assault and rape. In December 2017, Whitby was charged with multiple criminal offenses against her, including Partner or Family Member Assault (PFMA), Criminal Mischief, and Unlawful Restraint.

In May 2018, after the child’s birth, Cazabal‑Boe petitioned in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court (Yellowstone County) to establish a parenting plan. Her proposed plan requested that Whitby have:

  • no visitation rights, and
  • no communication with the child,

based on allegations of physical, sexual, mental, and emotional abuse and neglect toward her before and during pregnancy.

Whitby counter‑petitioned, arguing it was in the child’s best interest to live with him because of alleged drug use by Cazabal‑Boe and her family, and because he claimed she had been physically and verbally abusive to him. A hearing was held before a Standing Master on July 25, 2018. Cazabal‑Boe appeared pro se and testified; Whitby did not appear, claiming he was delayed by traffic due to a visit from the Vice President.

B. The Original Parenting Plan (2018)

On August 17, 2018, the Standing Master issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Parenting Plan Order adopting Cazabal‑Boe’s proposal. The court cited:

  • Whitby’s chemical dependency problems, and
  • anger management concerns

as reasons to deny him any parenting time. The resulting plan:

  • gave Cazabal‑Boe sole parenting of the child; and
  • prohibited Whitby from having any communication or parenting time with the child at all.

In December 2018, Whitby entered guilty pleas to several offenses against Cazabal‑Boe, including PFMA, Unlawful Restraint, and Criminal Destruction of or Tampering with a Communication Device.

C. Whitby’s 2019 Motion to Modify

In February 2019, Whitby filed a motion to modify the parenting plan, accompanied by an affidavit. He asserted that:

  • he had been kept from seeing his son;
  • he had been unable to attend the 2018 hearing but had attempted to call the court (albeit too late);
  • he had paid partial child support; and
  • he sought at least 50% custody, essentially re‑proposing his earlier rejected parenting plan.

On June 12, 2019, the Standing Master denied this motion without a hearing, concluding there had been no change in the child’s circumstances.

D. Whitby’s 2024 Motion to Modify and Fee Award

On October 2, 2024, Whitby again moved to modify the parenting plan. This time, he asserted a series of post‑plan developments designed to directly address the concerns that justified the original no‑contact plan:

  • completion of an anger management course, supported by a letter documenting his progress;
  • a psychological evaluation revealing no major issues;
  • two years of sobriety;
  • participation in a twelve‑step addiction and recovery program;
  • over a year of clean random urinalysis tests (UAs); and
  • ongoing counseling.

He also alleged material changes in the child’s household, including that Cazabal‑Boe had separated from her spouse and other family‑system changes, some with potential legal consequences such as termination/adoption filings (as summarized in ¶ 17).

On January 13, 2025, a new Standing Master dismissed his motion again without a hearing, finding no change in circumstances affecting the child and awarding attorney fees to Cazabal‑Boe. The Standing Master characterized Whitby’s conduct over seven years—including:

  • two attempts to amend the parenting plan,
  • two attempts to dismiss the order of protection, and
  • two attempts to change the child’s name

—as “bordering on frivolous and vexatious.”

E. District Court Review and Second Denial of a Hearing

Whitby filed objections to the Standing Master’s findings, arguing abuse of discretion and asserting that his affidavits established significant change in circumstances affecting the child’s best interests.

On March 14, 2025, the district court adopted the Standing Master’s order in full:

  • again denied Whitby’s motion to amend;
  • again refused to hold an evidentiary hearing; and
  • affirmed the award of attorney fees to Cazabal‑Boe.

The court emphasized Whitby’s:

  • criminal history; and
  • failure to comply with prior court orders, including failure to complete a psycho‑sexual evaluation and a forty‑hour anger management or PFMA program ordered in earlier proceedings.

Whitby appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Katherine Bidegaray, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed and remanded.

A. Holdings

  1. Denial of a Hearing Was an Abuse of Discretion (Issue 1).
    The Court held that Whitby’s affidavits, taken as true for screening purposes under § 40‑4‑220, MCA, alleged a plausible “change in circumstances of the child” within the meaning of § 40‑4‑219(1), MCA. Because his allegations, if proven, could materially affect the child’s best interests, the statute required the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. By resolving disputed facts and credibility purely on affidavits and denying any hearing, the district court abused its discretion.
  2. Merits of Modification Cannot Be Decided Without a Factual Record (Issue 2).
    Because the district court never held a hearing, it lacked an adequate evidentiary foundation to decide whether the parenting plan should be amended under § 40‑4‑219(1), MCA. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the merits denial and remanded for:
    • a full evidentiary hearing; and
    • fresh, best‑interest findings based on that record, including consideration of safeguards such as supervised or therapeutic contact, if appropriate.
  3. Attorney Fee Award and Vexatious Label Were Improper (Issue 3).
    The Court held that labeling Whitby’s 2024 motion “vexatious” and awarding attorney fees was inconsistent with the statutory scheme—particularly §§ 40‑4‑212(4)(b) and 40‑4‑219(5), MCA—and with the record. His motion was supported by specific sworn allegations of rehabilitation and household changes, and there were no findings that he had failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the plan or that his motion was frivolous or harassing. The Court reversed the fee award and rejected the vexatious‑litigant characterization.

B. Central Legal Principles Articulated

  • Parental rehabilitation and stability can constitute a “change in the circumstances of the child.”
    Although § 40‑4‑219(1), MCA, speaks in terms of the child’s circumstances, the Court confirmed that post‑plan changes in a parent’s conduct, treatment, and stability can qualify as child‑centered changes when they directly affect the feasibility and safety of a parent‑child relationship.
  • The “adequate cause” threshold for a hearing is distinct from the merits.
    At the § 40‑4‑220, MCA, screening stage, the court must accept the movant’s sworn allegations as true and ask only whether, if proven, they could justify amendment in the child’s best interests—not whether they ultimately will. Disputed credibility or competing affidavits require an evidentiary hearing.
  • Static no‑contact parenting plans must remain responsive to a child’s development and parental changes.
    The Court emphasized that a parenting plan that permanently bars contact from infancy through school age, with no built‑in path for potential progression, may become unreasonable if the reasons for restriction materially change.
  • “Vexatious” and fee‑shifting findings require strict statutory compliance and evidence.
    Repeated filings are not automatically vexatious; sanctions must rest on findings that the movant acted without good faith compliance efforts and that the motion is frivolous or constitutes harassment under §§ 40‑4‑212(4)(b), 40‑4‑219(5), MCA.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework for Modifying Parenting Plans

1. § 40‑4‑219(1), MCA — “Change in Circumstances” and Best Interests

Under § 40‑4‑219(1), MCA, a court may amend a final parenting plan only when:

  1. a “change has occurred in the circumstances of the child”; and
  2. “the amendment is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.”

Crucially, the change must be based on facts:

  • that arose after entry of the prior plan; or
  • that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior plan.

Montana jurisprudence has long held that this standard is demanding, intended to provide stability and finality in children’s lives while preserving flexibility when genuine changes arise.

2. § 40‑4‑220, MCA — “Adequate Cause” for a Hearing

Section 40‑4‑220, MCA, addresses the gatekeeping function when a parent moves to amend a parenting plan:

  • The moving party must file an affidavit setting forth the factual basis for amendment.
  • The non‑moving party may file an opposing affidavit.
  • The court must then determine whether “adequate cause is established by the affidavits based on the best interests of the child.”

If adequate cause is established, the statute provides that the court “shall set a hearing.” The Supreme Court interprets this as a mandatory obligation once the threshold is met; the court may not decide disputed factual or credibility issues solely on the papers.

3. Vexatious Motions and Attorney Fees — §§ 40‑4‑212(4)(b) and 40‑4‑219(5), MCA

Two provisions address vexatious modification motions and fee‑shifting:

  • § 40‑4‑212(4)(b), MCA: A motion to amend a final parenting plan is “vexatious” if made:
    “without making a good faith effort to comply with the provisions of the parenting plan or with dispute resolution provisions of the final parenting plan.”
  • § 40‑4‑219(5), MCA: Attorney fees and costs must be assessed against a party if:
    “the court finds that the amendment action is vexatious and constitutes harassment.”

Thus, for fees to be mandatory:

  1. the motion must be vexatious; and
  2. it must also constitute harassment.

The Supreme Court’s opinion emphasizes that this is a narrow sanctioning mechanism aimed at deterring bad‑faith litigation—not at penalizing parents for invoking statutory modification procedures on a good‑faith factual basis.

B. Precedents and Their Influence on the Court’s Decision

1. In re the Parenting of L.R., 2023 MT 235

L.R. is the backbone precedent in this decision, cited repeatedly. It established, among other points:

  • the standard of review for denial of an evidentiary hearing (abuse of discretion);
  • the “adequate cause” framework under § 40‑4‑220, MCA; and
  • concern about parenting plans that become “static” and fail to evolve with the child’s maturation and the family’s changing circumstances.

The Court in A.M.B.-B. relies on L.R. to underscore two key ideas:

  1. A court may not resolve credibility and disputed factual issues solely on competing affidavits if § 40‑4‑220 mandates a hearing.
  2. A plan that effectively “locks in” a no-contact arrangement from infancy through school age, without a mechanism for evolution, may become unreasonable—particularly when the initial risk factors are alleged to have changed.

Thus, L.R. supports the conclusion that Whitby’s allegations of rehabilitation and changed household realities, if true, require an evidentiary hearing—not summary dismissal.

2. Guffin v. Plaisted‑Harman, 2010 MT 100

Guffin is cited for the standard of review and description of abuse of discretion:

  • Findings underlying decisions on parenting plans are reviewed for clear error.
  • A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or beyond the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice.

In A.M.B.-B., the Court uses this framework to characterize the district court’s refusal to hold a hearing, and its fee award, as an abuse of discretion that produced substantial injustice.

3. In re the Parenting of C.J., 2016 MT 93

C.J. confirms:

  • district courts possess broad discretion in parenting matters; and
  • appellate courts presume the district court carefully evaluated the evidence and reached the correct result, absent clearly erroneous findings.

However, C.J. also recognizes that such discretion has limits. In A.M.B.-B., the Supreme Court found those limits were exceeded when the district court:

  • refused to hold a hearing despite a substantial factual showing; and
  • relied on the paper record to make findings that effectively negated Whitby’s sworn allegations without evidence testing.

4. Sian v. Kooyer, 2010 MT 178; In re Marriage of Clay, 2007 MT 228; In re Marriage of Carter, 2003 MT 19

These three cases collectively support the Court’s construction of “circumstances of the child” as encompassing parental changes that materially affect the child’s life:

  • Sian: Parental disability, relocation, and loss of employment changed the child’s living realities.
  • Clay: A parental move requiring excessive travel to school constituted a change in circumstances.
  • Carter: A parent’s interstate relocation significantly altered the child’s environment.

The Court in A.M.B.-B. synthesizes these cases to make a broader doctrinal point (¶ 13):

Although § 40‑4‑219(1), MCA, focuses on “circumstances of the child,” parental developments may qualify when they materially affect the child's interests and day‑to‑day life.

This is the doctrinal pivot that allows Whitby’s alleged progress in treatment, sobriety, and stability to count as a candidate “change in circumstances” warranting a hearing.

5. In re Marriage of D’Alton, 2009 MT 184

D’Alton is invoked by Cazabal‑Boe to argue that mere passage of time or routine developmental milestones (e.g., a child’s aging) do not establish a change in circumstances. The Supreme Court acknowledges this principle but distinguishes D’Alton (¶ 14):

  • D’Alton cautions against treating normal growth and the mere lapse of time as sufficient changes.
  • But A.M.B.-B. involves a static, categorical no‑contact order from infancy through age seven, with no mechanism for progression, and allegations that the core reasons for no‑contact (substance abuse, anger issues) have materially changed.

Thus, the Court emphasizes that D’Alton:

“does not address a situation like this one,” where a no‑contact plan persists unchanged despite substantial alleged rehabilitation and developmental changes, and where the original facts have materially evolved.

6. In re Marriage of Oehlke, 2002 MT 79; In re Marriage of Hay, 246 Mont. 372 (1990)

These cases are often cited for the proposition that a party seeking to modify a parenting plan bears a “heavy burden” and that parenting plans are not to be routinely disturbed. The Court addresses this line of authority at ¶ 15:

  • The “heavy burden” principle governs the ultimate decision to modify a plan, not the preliminary question of whether to grant a hearing.
  • At the affidavit stage, the question is only whether the movant’s allegations, if proven, plausibly establish a change in circumstances affecting the child’s best interests.

Whitby’s showing—which includes rehabilitation efforts, sobriety, treatment, evaluations, and household changes—is explicitly described as going “well beyond the ‘mere passage’ of time at issue in D’Alton.”

7. Patton v. Patton, 2015 MT 7

Patton supplies two pieces of doctrine:

  • The definition of abuse of discretion as action beyond the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice (¶ 17, ¶ 27).
  • The standard governing review of attorney fee awards.

The Court uses Patton to underscore that:

  • denying a hearing despite a colorable factual showing, and
  • imposing fees without proper statutory findings

are both abuses of discretion warranting reversal.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Parental Rehabilitation as a “Change in Circumstances of the Child”

A central doctrinal contribution of A.M.B.-B. is its explicit recognition that “circumstances of the child” under § 40‑4‑219(1), MCA, are not limited to events directly involving the child, such as a change of school or health status. Rather, the Court holds that:

  • Post‑plan changes in a parent’s conduct, treatment, and stability—such as successful completion of anger management, sobriety, mental health evaluations, and ongoing counseling—may qualify as changes in the child’s circumstances when they affect:
    • the feasibility,
    • safety, and
    • appropriateness
  • of a parent‑child relationship.

This is not an expansion of the statute beyond its text; rather, it is an interpretation of how parental factors intersect with the child’s lived reality. The Court explains (¶ 13) that the statutory focus on the child:

“does not exclude parental rehabilitation, stability, or conduct when those developments bear directly on the feasibility and safety of parent-child contact.”

In this case, the original no‑contact plan was grounded squarely in Whitby’s then‑current issues:

  • chemical dependency;
  • anger management problems; and
  • serious domestic violence leading to a ten‑year order of protection and criminal convictions.

Whitby’s 2024 motion alleged, in detailed and documented terms, that these foundational concerns had changed materially. The Court reasoned that if those allegations are true, they necessarily alter the child’s circumstances because they:

  • change the risk calculus associated with any form of contact, and
  • reopen the question of whether the child can safely benefit from a relationship with his legally recognized father under controlled conditions.

Thus, the Court firmly rejects Cazabal‑Boe’s contention that “parent‑focused improvements are categorically irrelevant” (¶ 16).

2. Adequate Cause and the Mandatory Hearing Requirement

The second major doctrinal point is procedural: the relationship between “adequate cause” under § 40‑4‑220, MCA, and the statutory obligation to hold a hearing.

The analysis proceeds in two steps (¶ 12):

  1. Do Whitby’s affidavits, if true, plausibly allege a statutory change in the child’s circumstances under § 40‑4‑219(1), MCA?
  2. If so, do those allegations trigger the mandatory hearing requirement under § 40‑4‑220, MCA?

On the first question, as discussed, the Court answers yes: his allegations of sustained rehabilitation and household changes, directly tied to the reasons for the original no‑contact order, are sufficient to allege a child‑centered change in circumstances (¶¶ 13–16).

On the second question, the Court stresses several points:

  • At the § 40‑4‑220 screening stage, the court must:
    • take the movant’s sworn allegations as true for purposes of the threshold inquiry; and
    • avoid resolving dispositive credibility disputes on competing affidavits.
  • The movant is not required to prove safety conclusively or establish the merits at this stage; rather, he must show enough to warrant examining the issues through live evidence.
  • Where there are acknowledged past risks (such as domestic violence), those risks do not justify foregoing a hearing; they inform:
    • the scope,
    • structure, and
    • rigor
    of the hearing and any potential plan (e.g., supervised or therapeutic contact, conditions tied to ongoing treatment).

The Court explicitly states (¶ 17):

“At the § 40‑4‑220, MCA, screening stage, the court must take the movant’s sworn allegations as true for purposes of determining whether adequate cause exists, not for determining their accuracy or merit, and it cannot resolve credibility or factual disputes without evidence.”

Given Whitby’s allegations of:

  • the child’s developmental progression (from infancy to school age);
  • changes in the child’s household, including separation from a spouse and potential termination/adoption implications; and
  • sustained parental rehabilitation,

the Court concludes that the “constellation” of these allegations “readily meets ‘adequate cause’ for a hearing” (¶ 17).

The upshot: once adequate cause is shown, the statute’s “shall set a hearing” language is mandatory, not discretionary. The district court’s refusal to hold a hearing, while simultaneously treating Whitby’s allegations as insufficient and penalizing him with fees, was thus beyond the bounds of reason and constituted an abuse of discretion (¶ 18).

3. Static No‑Contact Plans and the Need for Evolution

Although the Court does not declare static no‑contact plans per se unlawful, it clearly expresses concern about plans that lack any realistic path for re‑assessment as the child matures and as parents change.

Citing L.R., the Court notes (¶ 13) that a parenting plan may become “unreasonable when, on the facts presented, it lacks a realistic means of evolving in response to a child’s maturation and a parent’s demonstrated improvements.” The plan at issue here:

  • barred all contact from birth through age seven;
  • contained no mechanism for gradual reintegration; and
  • was based on factors (substance use, anger, violence) that Whitby specifically claimed to have addressed.

The Court’s approach:

  • does not compel any particular modification; it explicitly leaves the ultimate decision to the district court on remand;
  • does, however, require the court to re‑evaluate a static plan when substantial post‑plan developments are alleged and adequately supported, especially where the child has matured significantly.

4. Best‑Interest Merits Reserved for Remand

On the second issue—whether the plan should be amended—the Court is careful not to overstep its role. Because no evidentiary hearing occurred, there is no factual record on which to:

  • assess Whitby’s credibility; or
  • evaluate the comparative risks and benefits of introducing contact, even under supervision.

Accordingly, the Court:

  • vacates the merits denial of modification; and
  • remands for an evidentiary hearing and “fresh best‑interest findings” under § 40‑4‑219(1), MCA (¶¶ 20–22).

On remand, the district court is instructed to consider:

  • whether a plan structured with “appropriate safeguards” (such as therapeutic reunification, professionally supervised visits, sobriety monitoring, and compliance benchmarks) could safely reintroduce contact;
  • if the court determines that significant risks persist, it must:
    • make specific, evidence‑based findings explaining why continued restrictions remain necessary; and
    • explain, based on the evidence, whether and why the existing level of restriction is still necessary.

This ensures that any continued restriction of parental contact is justified by current, tested evidence rather than historical concerns alone.

5. Vexatious Litigation and Attorney Fees

The third issue concerns the Standing Master’s and district court’s decision to award attorney fees against Whitby based on a finding that his conduct was “bordering on frivolous and vexatious.”

The Supreme Court analyzes this under §§ 40‑4‑212(4)(b) and 40‑4‑219(5), MCA, and finds several problems:

  1. Lack of Statutory Basis for Vexatiousness.
    Under § 40‑4‑212(4)(b), MCA, a motion to amend is vexatious if the movant seeks modification “without making a good faith effort to comply with the provisions of the parenting plan or with dispute resolution provisions” of the plan. The record did not indicate:
    • that Whitby failed to comply with the no‑contact terms; or
    • that he bypassed any required dispute‑resolution mechanisms in bad faith.
  2. Absence of Findings of Frivolousness or Harassment.
    Section 40‑4‑219(5), MCA, mandates fees only when the court finds that the amendment action:
    • is vexatious; and
    • constitutes harassment.
    The district court made no such specific findings. Instead, it appears to have treated the mere fact of multiple filings over seven years as sufficient, without any analysis of motive or objective reasonableness—despite a five‑year gap between the 2019 and 2024 motions and substantial new supporting allegations in 2024.
  3. Inconsistency with the Adequate‑Cause Standard.
    As the Court notes (¶ 27), it is logically inconsistent to:
    • deny a hearing while acknowledging that Whitby’s motion rests on a colorable change‑in‑circumstances theory; and
    • simultaneously characterize the motion as vexatious or frivolous.
    A non‑frivolous motion supported by specific, sworn allegations and evidence of rehabilitation is precisely the kind of filing the statutory framework contemplates, not one it seeks to punish.

The Court concludes that the fee award:

“exceeded the bounds of reason” and thus constituted an abuse of discretion. (¶ 27)

The attorney fee award is reversed, and the “vexatious” label is effectively disapproved (¶ 28).

D. Impact and Implications

1. For Future Parenting‑Plan Modification Motions

This decision recalibrates—and clarifies—the threshold for obtaining a hearing on a motion to modify a parenting plan in Montana:

  • Lower threshold for hearing than for ultimate modification.
    The “heavy burden” cases continue to govern final modifications, but a movant need only make a plausible, sworn showing of post‑plan changes that could affect the child’s best interest to obtain a hearing.
  • Parental rehabilitation is legally relevant.
    Parents who were originally restricted because of substance abuse, violence, or instability can now clearly rely on documented rehabilitation efforts as a basis for seeking a hearing, so long as those changes bear on the child’s safety and welfare.
  • Affidavit practice becomes more critical.
    Lawyers must draft detailed, specific, and well‑documented affidavits, knowing that if those facts, taken as true, meet the statutory standard, the court must hold a hearing.

2. For Parents with Domestic‑Violence Histories

The case sits at a sensitive intersection of:

  • the need to protect survivors and children from further abuse; and
  • the recognition that some perpetrators of past abuse may, in rare but real instances, achieve meaningful rehabilitation.

A.M.B.-B. does not minimize the dangers of domestic violence. To the contrary:

  • It notes Whitby’s serious past offenses and non‑compliance with earlier programming.
  • It does not order contact or grant any parental time.
  • It explicitly leaves risk assessment to the district court, guided by evidence and conditioned safeguards.

However, the decision confirms that historical violence, while critically important, does not automatically foreclose any possibility of future contact if the parent can:

  • demonstrate credible, sustained rehabilitation; and
  • show that safe, structured contact could be in the child’s best interests.

Courts must therefore balance:

  • the real risk of re‑traumatization and coercion; against
  • the child’s potential benefit from having a relationship with a rehabilitated parent, under strict safeguards, if truly safe.

3. For District Court and Standing Master Practice

This opinion sends a clear message to district courts and standing masters:

  • Do not decide contested facts on affidavits alone when § 40‑4‑220 is triggered.
    If adequate cause is shown, a hearing is mandatory. Courts must avoid conflating the threshold “adequate cause” inquiry with the ultimate merits.
  • Make specific, evidence‑based findings.
    Whether maintaining restrictions or granting modifications, courts must tie their reasoning to:
    • current, credible evidence; and
    • clear statutory criteria.
  • Use “vexatious” and fee‑shifting provisions sparingly and correctly.
    Fee awards for alleged vexatious conduct must:
    • follow the precise statutory definitions;
    • be supported by explicit findings; and
    • not be used as a punitive response to non‑frivolous modification efforts.

4. For Children’s Interests and the Design of Parenting Plans

The decision reaffirms that parenting plans are not static instruments; they are meant to be:

  • responsive to the child’s maturation; and
  • capable of adjusting to credible evidence of changed circumstances, including positive changes.

In particular, the Court suggests that:

  • categorical, indefinite no‑contact plans for infants may need built‑in review mechanisms, especially as the child approaches school age; and
  • plans should anticipate that courts may later consider whether:
    • therapeutic reunification,
    • supervised contact, or
    • other safeguards
    might safely serve the child’s evolving needs and interest in a parental relationship.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Change in Circumstances of the Child”

This means a significant change in the child’s life or environment after the original plan was made, or facts the court did not know at that time. It can include:

  • the child’s living arrangements;
  • the people in the household;
  • the child’s needs or health; and
  • changes in a parent’s behavior or stability that affect the child’s safety and well‑being.

2. “Adequate Cause” for a Hearing

“Adequate cause” is a screening threshold. It does not mean the moving parent has already proved the case. Instead, it asks:

“If everything in the movant’s sworn affidavit is true, is there a legally sufficient reason to hold a full hearing to see whether the plan should be changed?”

If the answer is yes, the court must hold a hearing; it cannot simply believe one parent’s affidavit over the other’s.

3. “Abuse of Discretion”

An abuse of discretion occurs when a judge:

  • acts arbitrarily (without reasonable explanation);
  • fails to use careful, conscientious judgment; or
  • goes beyond what is reasonable, causing a serious injustice.

In this case, refusing a hearing despite a solid, sworn factual showing and then punishing the movant with fees was beyond what the law allows.

4. “Vexatious” and “Frivolous” Motions

A motion is “vexatious” in this context when a parent files to amend a parenting plan even though:

  • they have not tried in good faith to follow the existing plan; or
  • they have not obeyed dispute resolution steps required by the plan.

“Frivolous” usually means the motion has no reasonable legal or factual basis—no serious argument can be made in its favor.

The statutes require that fees be awarded only when the motion is both:

  • vexatious; and
  • a form of harassment.

5. “Best Interests of the Child”

This is the guiding principle in custody and parenting plan cases. Courts look at many factors, such as:

  • the child’s physical safety and emotional security;
  • the stability of the child’s home and school life;
  • each parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs;
  • the history of domestic violence or abuse; and
  • the importance of ongoing relationships with safe, supportive caregivers.

Even where a parent has rehabilitated, the court must still decide whether any contact—especially in a high‑risk history—truly serves the child’s best interests, and if so, how to structure it safely.

VI. Conclusion

In re the Parenting of A.M.B.-B., 2025 MT 270, is a substantial clarification of Montana’s parenting‑plan modification law. The Court firmly establishes that:

  • Parental rehabilitation and improvements in stability can constitute a “change in the circumstances of the child” when they bear on the feasibility and safety of reintroducing contact.
  • The “adequate cause” requirement in § 40‑4‑220, MCA, is a genuine procedural safeguard: once affidavits plausibly allege child‑centered changed circumstances, the court must hold a hearing and cannot decide the case on paper alone.
  • Static no‑contact plans, especially those imposed in infancy and carried through school age, must be revisited when the underlying conditions have allegedly changed in ways that might safely permit structured contact.
  • Vexatious‑litigant labels and attorney fee sanctions are reserved for clear cases of bad faith, frivolity, or harassment—not for colorable, evidence‑supported efforts to invoke statutory modification procedures.

By reversing the denial of a hearing, vacating the merits denial of modification, and rejecting the fee award against Whitby, the Montana Supreme Court reinforces the dual commitments of family law:

  • to protect children and survivors of domestic violence through cautious, evidence‑based risk assessment; and
  • to honor the possibility that genuine parental change—carefully scrutinized and appropriately safeguarded—can warrant revisiting even the most restrictive parenting plans.

Going forward, A.M.B.-B. will likely serve as a key precedent in Montana for:

  • parents seeking to show that their rehabilitation merits re‑evaluation of restrictive orders;
  • courts determining when hearings are mandatory in modification proceedings; and
  • litigants and judges navigating the proper use of “vexatious” findings and fee‑shifting in the sensitive arena of parenting disputes.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Montana

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