Paper Ballots Are a “Voting System”: Seventh Circuit Holds HAVA’s Accessibility Mandate Applies to Hand-Count Jurisdictions

Case: United States v. Town of Thornapple, Wisconsin, No. 24-2931 (7th Cir. July 14, 2025)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Panel: Brennan, St. Eve, and Lee, Circuit Judges (opinion by St. Eve, J.)

Introduction

In United States v. Town of Thornapple, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction requiring the Town of Thornapple, Wisconsin to provide at least one accessible voting system at each polling place for federal elections, as mandated by Section 301 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(3)(A)–(B). After the Town voted in 2023 to discontinue all electronic voting machines and to conduct elections exclusively with hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots, the United States sued, arguing the Town failed to provide an accessible system that would allow voters with disabilities to vote privately and independently.

The appeal turned on two issues: (1) whether a paper-ballot, hand-count method constitutes a “voting system” under HAVA, thus triggering HAVA’s accessibility requirements; and (2) whether the United States demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm justifying preliminary injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit answered yes to both, delivering a precedential clarification that HAVA’s accessibility mandate squarely applies to jurisdictions that conduct elections without electronic tabulators or direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines.

Summary of the Opinion

HAVA applies to paper-ballot jurisdictions: The court held that the Town’s paper-ballot, hand-count election method is a “voting system” under HAVA. Congress’s repeated references to “paper ballot voting systems” within § 301, as well as HAVA’s definition of “voting system” that expressly includes “practices and associated documentation” such as “paper ballots,” foreclose the Town’s argument that HAVA does not reach its method.
Distributive reading of “and” in the definition: Interpreting § 21081(b), the court concluded that the opening phrase “a voting system means” distributes to both (1) equipment and (2) practices/documentation. Thus, practices and associated documentation (including paper ballots) can themselves constitute a “voting system,” even absent mechanical or electronic equipment.
Accessibility requirement reaffirmed: Because the Town’s approach is a “voting system,” it must provide “at least one direct recording electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place” to afford equal access, privacy, and independence. 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(3)(A)–(B).
Irreparable harm: The court held the United States showed a likelihood of irreparable harm by demonstrating that voters with disabilities would be denied the opportunity to vote privately and independently in the absence of an accessible system—harm that need not be proven by past disenfranchisement and remains irreparable even if it affects few voters.
Preliminary injunction affirmed: The Seventh Circuit affirmed the injunction that required the Town to provide a HAVA-compliant accessible system and to train election officers accordingly, and that prohibited enforcement of the Town’s “no machines” resolution.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008): Provided the four-factor standard for preliminary injunctions—likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. Thornapple contested only the first two.
Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of East Chicago, 56 F.4th 437 (7th Cir. 2022): Clarified standards of review: legal conclusions de novo, factual findings for clear error.
Loja v. Main St. Acquisition Corp., 906 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U.S. 424 (2016)): Reinforced that statutory context and structure guide interpretation.
Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v. City of Waukegan, 128 F.4th 871 (7th Cir. 2025); White v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2021): Applied the presumption of consistent usage—that identical words carry the same meaning throughout a statute.
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. 9 (2018): Used for a basic textual point: adjectives modify nouns; “paper ballot voting systems” is a subset of “voting systems,” confirming that paper-based methods are within the statutory category.
Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024); Navy Fed. Credit Union v. LTD Financial Servs., LP, 972 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2020): Supported a context-driven reading of “and”—here, the court adopted a distributive reading so that both equipment and practices/documentation independently fall within “voting system.”
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); CFPB v. Townstone Financial, Inc., 107 F.4th 768 (7th Cir. 2024): Counseling against interpretations that frustrate statutory purpose. The court declined to create a loophole for hand-count locales that would undermine HAVA’s accessibility mandate.
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011): Clarified irreparable harm need not be occurring or certain before relief is granted; it must be likely and more than a mere possibility.
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017), abrogated on other grounds: Cited for the irreparable nature of harms not fully rectifiable by final judgment (the Town did not dispute the irreparable character here).
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992): Emphasized the centrality of ballot secrecy to democratic participation, grounding the injury in denial of private, independent voting.
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014): Even restrictions affecting small numbers of voters inflict irreparable injury in voting-rights contexts.
Florida State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2008); Colon-Marrero v. Velez, 813 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016): Cited for HAVA’s origins and objectives following the 2000 election controversies.

Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s analysis is fundamentally textualist, augmented by structural and purposive considerations. HAVA mandates that each voting system in a federal election be accessible to individuals with disabilities, providing equivalent access, privacy, and independence as afforded to other voters. 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(3)(A). To satisfy the mandate, jurisdictions must provide at least one DRE or “other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities” at each polling place. § 21081(a)(3)(B).

The Town contended that because it used only hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots, it had no “voting system” within the meaning of HAVA, and thus § 301’s accessibility obligations never attached. The court rejected this argument on three principal grounds:

Repeated statutory references to “paper ballot voting systems”: Section 301 refers multiple times to “paper ballot voting systems” (§ 21081(a)(1)(B), (c)(2)), signaling that “voting systems” include paper-based methods. By the presumption of consistent usage, the term “voting system” in § 21081(a)(3) likewise embraces paper systems.
Definition of “voting system” includes “paper ballots” and “practices and associated documentation”: HAVA defines “voting system” to mean both (1) equipment used in the voting process and (2) the “practices and associated documentation” used in that process—expressly including “paper ballots” (§ 21081(b)(2)(E)). The court read the introductory phrase “a voting system means” to apply distributively to both categories, so practices and documentation can independently constitute a “voting system,” even without equipment.
Avoiding a loophole that thwarts HAVA’s purpose: The Town’s equipment-centric reading would allow jurisdictions to evade HAVA’s accessibility obligations by eschewing machines entirely for counting or ballot production (e.g., hand counts or even mere use of printers). Because HAVA’s accessibility command centers on the act of casting a ballot with privacy and independence, not on how ballots are tabulated, the Town’s reading would be incongruent with the statute’s structure and purpose. The court therefore declined to “read in a loophole for hand counted paper ballots” in the face of clear textual indications that HAVA covers them.

This interpretive path synthesizes familiar canons: internal consistency (identical words, identical meanings), the ordinary function of adjectives (Weyerhaeuser), and a context-driven understanding of “and” (Pulsifer; Navy Federal), coupled with a purposive guardrail that disfavors readings that would neuter Congress’s stated objective to establish minimum, uniform federal election standards, including equal accessibility. See Pub. L. No. 107-252; 52 U.S.C. § 21081.

Irreparable Harm

On irreparable harm, the Town argued the government had not shown disenfranchisement or any concrete injury. The Seventh Circuit identified the cognizable injury as the denial of the opportunity for voters with disabilities to vote privately and independently, as HAVA guarantees. That harm:

Need not be proven by evidence of past disenfranchisement or a large number of affected voters (Michigan; League of Women Voters);
Is irreparable because once an election occurs without providing a private, independent voting option, the lost opportunity cannot be remedied after the fact (Whitaker); and
Is rooted in the significance of the secret ballot to democratic participation (McIntyre; Burson).

The testimony of the Town’s Chief Election Inspector described blind and mobility-impaired voters who had to disclose their choices to others to obtain assistance. The court held this record sufficiently supported the district court’s finding of a likely deprivation of private, independent voting absent an accessible system—regardless of whether some voters may prefer assistance or whether the number of affected voters is small. The injury lies in the lack of choice and the mandated loss of privacy/independence, not in actual non-participation.

Standard of Review and Scope of Appeal

The court reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Town challenged only likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. It did not dispute the balance of equities or public interest factors, and it did not contest that the harm, if established, is irreparable in kind. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the injunction in full, including ongoing provisions requiring training and prohibiting enforcement of the Town’s “no machines” resolution.

Impact

Thornapple establishes a clear rule for jurisdictions within the Seventh Circuit (Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin) and will be persuasive elsewhere:

Hand-count paper systems remain “voting systems” under HAVA: Local resolutions that eliminate all voting equipment cannot avoid HAVA’s accessibility obligations. Even if all ballots are hand-marked and hand-counted, each polling place in a federal election must still have at least one accessible system enabling voters with disabilities to vote privately and independently.
No DRE required—accessible alternatives suffice: Section 301 allows either a DRE or “other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities.” Many jurisdictions satisfy this with an accessible ballot-marking device (BMD) that produces a paper ballot, which can still be hand-counted. Thornapple reinforces that accessibility at the point of casting is the lodestar; jurisdictions may hand-count results without violating HAVA provided they furnish an in-booth accessible option.
Policy movements to “ban all machines” face a federal floor: Local or state policies driven by election-integrity movements favoring manual counting cannot lawfully eliminate accessible equipment altogether for federal elections. HAVA sets a federal minimum; States and localities may go further but not less.
Training and implementation matter: The opinion affirms injunctive terms requiring training of election officers on HAVA-compliant systems. Compliance is not just about procuring equipment; it includes effective procedures and capacity to deploy the system on Election Day.
Overlap with ADA and VRA is not a narrowing device: The court rejected the Town’s suggestion that parallel protections under the ADA or Voting Rights Act diminish HAVA’s scope. Overlapping statutory protections coexist; none provides a basis to constrict HAVA’s plain requirements.

Looking ahead, Thornapple equips the Department of Justice with circuit-level authority to challenge similar “paper-only” policies that omit accessible options. For election administrators, it clarifies a legally safe path: retain hand-marked paper ballots and even hand counting, but also provide at least one accessible voting system (often a BMD) at each polling place, along with training and appropriate procedures to ensure real, private, independent access for voters with disabilities.

Complex Concepts Simplified

HAVA § 301 accessibility requirement: Every polling place in a federal election must have at least one accessible voting system so that voters with disabilities can cast a ballot privately and independently, with nonvisual accessibility for blind or visually impaired voters. This can be a DRE or another accessible system, such as a ballot-marking device with audio and tactile controls.
“Voting system” under HAVA: Broadly defined to include both (1) equipment used to define, cast, count, and report votes, and (2) practices and documentation used in election administration—including paper ballots. The court read “and” to mean both categories independently count as “voting systems.”
Distributive reading of “and”: Sometimes “and” connects two independent categories, each sufficient on its own. Here, “a voting system means” both equipment and practices/documentation, not necessarily both together in every instance.
Preliminary injunction: A temporary court order to maintain the status quo or prevent harm while a case is litigated. The movant must show likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without the injunction, that equities favor relief, and that an injunction serves the public interest.
Irreparable harm in voting cases: Loss of the opportunity to vote—or to vote with equal privacy and independence—is harm that cannot be fixed after the election. Courts do not require proof that harm is already occurring or that it affects many voters; a likely future denial of rights to even a small number suffices.

Practical Compliance Notes for Election Officials

Providing an accessible system does not require abandoning paper ballots or hand counts. Many jurisdictions deploy a single accessible BMD per polling place while maintaining paper ballots and manual canvass procedures.
Ensure the accessible system offers nonvisual access (e.g., audio ballot, tactile keypad, compatibility with assistive devices such as sip-and-puff), preserves secrecy, and allows independent ballot review before casting.
Train poll workers on setup, troubleshooting, voter assistance protocols, and privacy safeguards for the accessible system.
Document procedures, testing, and maintenance consistent with HAVA’s inclusion of “practices and associated documentation” within “voting system” requirements.
Do not rely on human assistance as a substitute for an accessible system. Assistance must be an option the voter may choose, not the only available method.

Conclusion

United States v. Town of Thornapple establishes an important, clear rule: paper-ballot, hand-count election methods are “voting systems” under HAVA, and thus must satisfy HAVA’s accessibility mandate by providing at least one accessible system at each polling place that affords voters with disabilities the same privacy and independence as other voters. The court’s textual, structural, and purposive reasoning forecloses a would-be loophole for jurisdictions that seek to avoid accessible equipment by eliminating machines altogether.

Beyond reaffirming core principles of election accessibility and the constitutional value of ballot secrecy, the decision offers a practical path for jurisdictions committed to paper ballots and even hand counting: maintain those practices, but also deploy an accessible device and train staff accordingly. In the Seventh Circuit and beyond, Thornapple is likely to guide courts and election officials toward harmonizing paper-centric election administration with the federal floor of accessible, independent voting guaranteed by HAVA.