Padilla Stops at Deportation: First Circuit Rejects Duty to Warn of Permanent Reentry Bars and Tightens Diligence for Coram Nobis in Aceituno v. United States

Introduction

In Aceituno v. United States, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of the extraordinary writ of coram nobis to Walter Aceituno, a Guatemalan national and former lawful permanent resident who pleaded guilty in 2014 to cocaine trafficking offenses. The district court had permitted Aceituno to withdraw his plea nearly a decade later on the theory that his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to advise him that his plea would not only lead to deportation but would also permanently bar his future reentry to the United States.

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Lynch held that:

Padilla v. Kentucky obligates defense counsel to inform a noncitizen client whether a plea carries a risk of deportation; it does not constitutionally require advice about a permanent reentry bar or other collateral immigration disabilities beyond removal.
Coram nobis petitioners must act with diligence. Pursuing immigration relief in the administrative system does not excuse a multi-year delay in seeking to attack the criminal conviction that triggered immigration consequences; such challenges can and should be pursued concurrently where possible.
The district court clearly erred in its factfinding by mischaracterizing the testimony of the immigration attorney and abused its discretion in granting the writ.

The ruling narrows the scope of counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties in the immigration-plea context to deportation advice and underscores stringent timeliness and equitable constraints on coram nobis relief.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting coram nobis and quashed the writ. The court held that:

Unreasonable delay: Aceituno failed to adequately explain why he waited approximately ten years after his plea—and years after learning in December 2014 of a permanent reentry bar—to seek relief from his criminal judgment. His pursuit of immigration remedies did not justify the delay in collaterally attacking the conviction.
No ineffective assistance: Counsel’s constitutional duty under Padilla is to warn of the risk of deportation. Aceituno’s counsel did that—and more—by advising that deportation was a certainty. There is no Sixth Amendment requirement to advise about a permanent bar to reentry. The district court’s contrary conclusion was legal error.
Clear factual error: The district court clearly erred in stating that the immigration attorney testified a reasonable lawyer “should have” advised about a permanent reentry bar; the record shows the attorney believed his Padilla obligations were satisfied.
Equities do not support the writ: Given Aceituno’s admitted guilt, the benefits he gained from his plea, the substantial passage of time, and finality interests, the extraordinary remedy was unwarranted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954): The foundational case recognizing coram nobis as an extraordinary remedy to correct errors “of the most fundamental character” in criminal cases when the petitioner is no longer in custody. Morgan frames the high bar for relief.
United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249 (1st Cir. 2012): Authoritative First Circuit articulation of coram nobis standards: the writ is “hen’s-teeth rare,” requiring (1) a satisfactory explanation for not seeking earlier relief; (2) ongoing significant collateral consequences; and (3) a fundamental error. Even if met, courts retain discretion to deny relief where justice does not demand it. The panel leans on George repeatedly to enforce rigor and finality.
Woodward v. United States, 905 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2018): Reiterates the tripartite test and the discretionary nature of the writ. The court uses Woodward to frame the coram nobis inquiry and to emphasize that satisfying the three prongs is necessary but not sufficient.
Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2016): Confirms that even where the tripartite criteria are met, relief may be denied if “justice” does not compel it—a backstop that the panel deploys against granting relief in this case.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010): The cornerstone for counsel’s duty regarding immigration advice in plea bargaining: counsel must inform a client whether a plea carries a risk of deportation. The First Circuit adopts a narrow reading—Padilla does not extend to other immigration consequences such as permanent inadmissibility or reentry bars.
United States v. Chan, 792 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2015): Cited to reinforce that Padilla’s holding is limited to deportation. The First Circuit aligns with this view.
United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009): Emphasizes the exceptional nature of coram nobis and finality concerns; the opinion uses Denedo to caution against expanding coram nobis to imperil finality “in a great number of cases.”
Standards of review:
- United States v. Castro-Taveras and United States v. Rodriguez underpin de novo review of legal conclusions; a “material error of law” is always an abuse of discretion (United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 128 F.4th 358 (1st Cir. 2025)).
- United States v. Marquez and Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R. frame the clear-error standard for factfinding.
- United States v. Manon clarifies mixed standard for ineffective assistance claims after an evidentiary hearing: facts for clear error, law de novo.
Timeliness and diligence in coram nobis:
- Foont v. United States, 93 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1996): Coram nobis requires reasonable diligence to ensure litigation finality.
- Ragbir v. United States, 950 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. 2020): Administrative pursuit of immigration relief does not excuse delay in filing coram nobis; petitioners can pursue both concurrently.
- Thornburg v. United States, 574 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Kroytor, 977 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Delhorno, 915 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 2019); Mendoza v. United States, 690 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2012): All invoked to illustrate that multi-year, unexplained delays are fatal to coram nobis petitions.
Collateral attack availability while on supervision:
- Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2003): Supervised release satisfies “custody” for habeas-like remedies, indicating Aceituno could have sought § 2255 relief while on supervised release.
- Delhorno also cited to explain that § 2255’s one-year clock can run from when the relevant facts could have been discovered through due diligence, underscoring that the December 2014 ICE notice could have started the clock.
Strickland/Hill framework: The opinion recites the familiar two-part test for ineffective assistance in the plea context from Hill v. Lockhart and the presumption of competence from Harrington v. Richter, though the deficiency prong is dispositive here given the scope of Padilla.

Legal Reasoning

1) The timeliness/diligence prong: delay was unreasonable

The First Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong lens to the delay analysis. The question is not whether the petitioner persistently pursued immigration remedies, but whether he exercised reasonable diligence in seeking relief from the criminal conviction itself. The court emphasized:

Aceituno learned from ICE in December 2014 that his conviction entailed a permanent reentry bar. Yet for years he did not attack the criminal judgment that produced that consequence.
While on supervised release after his 2014 sentencing, he could have filed a timely § 2255 motion; he did not. He also did not move to withdraw his plea.
Spending years litigating immigration relief (e.g., withholding or CAT) does not excuse failure to concurrently pursue relief from the criminal conviction, per Ragbir and Foont.
The record also undermined the district court’s premise that “everything he did” after learning of the bar was aimed at removing it; he did not target the conviction that triggered the bar.
The totality—ten-year lapse from plea; roughly nine years after receiving ICE’s “Warning to Alien Ordered Removed or Deported”; and four-plus years in Guatemala without seeking criminal relief—compelled a finding of unreasonable delay under circuit and sister-circuit caselaw.

2) Padilla’s scope: no Sixth Amendment duty to advise about permanent reentry bars

The panel concluded the district court committed a legal error by expanding Padilla’s duty beyond deportation. Padilla framed the question and holding in terms of removal: counsel must inform a client whether a plea carries a risk of deportation. In this case:

Both counsel advised Aceituno before the plea that he faced deportation—and, indeed, that deportation was certain. The plea agreement and colloquy reinforced this understanding.
Padilla does not impose a constitutional obligation to advise about other downstream immigration disabilities, such as a permanent bar to reentry. The opinion adopts the view that “Padilla’s holding applies only to deportation,” citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Chan.
Because counsel satisfied Padilla’s deportation-advice requirement, there was no deficient performance under Strickland, and thus no “error of the most fundamental character” for coram nobis purposes.

The court also noted the immigration attorney’s testimony reflecting that, even regarding “permanency,” immigration law can present pathways—however limited—to future temporary returns, undercutting the premise that permanent inadmissibility was a simple, inevitable, and constitutionally mandated subject of advice at the time of the plea.

3) Clear factual error: mischaracterization of counsel’s testimony

The district court found that the immigration attorney “testified, uncontradicted,” that a reasonable attorney should have advised about a permanent bar. The First Circuit found this plainly contradicted by the record:

The attorney testified that he believed he met his Padilla obligations, that he had given competent advice about deportation risk (indeed, certainty), and that no complete immigration consultation was requested.
He did not admit ineffective assistance, nor did his testimony establish a prevailing professional norm that constitutionally required advising about permanent reentry bars.
Given these record facts, the district court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous.

4) Equitable discretion: the writ is not warranted

Even if the tripartite prerequisites were satisfied, the court held the equities would not support coram nobis relief:

Aceituno repeatedly admitted the underlying drug-trafficking conduct and received a significant benefit from his plea (a substantially reduced guidelines range and time-served sentence).
He affirmed at the time that he wanted to plead guilty “regardless of any immigration consequences,” undermining later claims that different immigration advice would have altered his decision.
Reopening a decade-old conviction would impair finality and potentially prejudice the government’s ability to retry the case, especially where the defendant gained the benefit of his bargain and years have passed.
Extending Padilla beyond deportation would jeopardize finality “in a great number of cases,” contradicting the Supreme Court’s caution in Denedo and Morgan that coram nobis is for exceptional circumstances.

Impact

Practical consequences for defense counsel

Constitutional floor clarified: In the First Circuit, Padilla constitutionally requires advice about the risk of deportation, not about additional immigration collateral consequences (e.g., permanent reentry bars, inadmissibility, or eligibility for future relief).
Best practices vs. constitutional minimum: While many practitioners may choose to give broader immigration advice (and should document it), the Sixth Amendment does not compel advice beyond deportation in this circuit.
Documentation matters: Plea agreement language and colloquy acknowledgments that deportation is likely (or certain) will carry significant weight in later challenges.

Guidance for coram nobis litigants and courts

Strict diligence requirement: Petitioners must promptly pursue relief from criminal judgments once they know the facts underpinning their claims. Immigration administrative litigation does not toll or excuse delay; concurrent pursuit is expected where possible.
Record accuracy is essential: District courts must scrupulously adhere to the evidentiary record; mischaracterizing testimony can constitute clear error.
Equity and finality: Courts will be skeptical of coram nobis attacks on long-final guilty pleas, especially where the defendant admitted guilt, derived significant benefit from the plea, and waited years to act.

Plea bargaining and judicial colloquies

Plea form language upheld: Clauses warning of deportation consequences and noting uncertainty about immigration effects—paired with the defendant’s affirmation of a desire to plead despite such consequences—fortify the record against later collateral attacks.
No new Padilla extensions: Judges and counsel need not convert plea hearings into comprehensive immigration advisories beyond the deportation risk requirement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of error coram nobis: A rare, post-judgment remedy available to correct fundamental legal or factual errors in a criminal case when the defendant is no longer “in custody” and cannot use § 2255. The petitioner must:
- Explain why earlier relief was not sought;
- Show continuing collateral consequences from the conviction;
- Demonstrate an error of “the most fundamental character.”
Even then, courts may deny relief if justice does not compel it.
Padilla v. Kentucky duty: Defense counsel must advise a noncitizen client whether a plea carries a risk of deportation. The First Circuit confirms that this duty does not extend to other collateral immigration consequences like permanent reentry bars.
Strickland/Hill ineffective assistance in plea cases: To vacate a plea, a petitioner must show (1) deficient performance—counsel’s advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) prejudice—a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the defendant would have gone to trial. Courts presume counsel acted reasonably.
Deportation vs. inadmissibility/reentry bars: Deportation (removal) expels a noncitizen from the U.S. Inadmissibility restrictions can bar future lawful entry, sometimes permanently after certain convictions. Padilla addresses the duty to warn about deportation, not the separate web of admissibility consequences.
§ 2255 and “in custody” status: A person on supervised release is “in custody” for purposes of § 2255. This matters because it shows there was an available, earlier avenue for relief that the petitioner failed to pursue.

Conclusion

Aceituno solidifies two important propositions in the First Circuit. First, the Sixth Amendment duty recognized in Padilla is limited to advising about the risk of deportation. Counsel who warn clients that removal will follow a plea meet the constitutional floor, even if they do not catalog downstream immigration disabilities like permanent reentry bars. Second, the diligence requirement for coram nobis is real and exacting: petitioners must promptly challenge criminal convictions when they learn of the pertinent facts; simultaneous pursuit of immigration remedies does not excuse a prolonged delay.

The decision also reinforces the primacy of finality in post-conviction practice, the importance of accurate factfinding, and the discretion courts wield to deny extraordinary relief even when threshold showings are arguably met. For defense counsel and trial courts, the opinion provides clarity and a manageable boundary around Padilla. For coram nobis litigants, it is a cautionary tale: delay and overbroad theories of constitutional duty will not suffice to reopen long-final convictions.