Padilla Limited to Deportation; Sixth Amendment Duty Confined to Direct Plea Consequences—No Duty to Warn of False Claims Act Exposure

Case: Nita Patel v. United States; Kirtish N. Patel v. United States

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Precedential)

Date: October 17, 2025

Panel: Judges Hardiman (author), Krause, and Freeman

Docket Nos.: 23-2418 (Nita Patel); 23-2795 (Kirtish N. Patel)

Introduction

This precedential decision squarely answers a question the Third Circuit had not previously resolved in a binding way: whether the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel, before a guilty plea, to advise a client about collateral civil consequences—here, exposure to liability under the False Claims Act (FCA) and the collateral estoppel effects of plea admissions in a later qui tam case. The Court holds it does not. In doing so, the Court expressly joins sister circuits in adopting the “direct consequences only” rule for plea advisals, and it limits the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky to deportation.

The case arises from a long-running healthcare fraud scheme by Nita and Kirtish Patel, who pled guilty to healthcare fraud and later faced an FCA judgment predicated in part on collateral estoppel from their plea. In collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, they argued their lawyers rendered ineffective assistance by failing to warn that their pleas would effectively determine civil FCA liability. The Third Circuit rejects that claim and, alternatively, holds that even if such a new Sixth Amendment rule existed, it would not apply retroactively on collateral review under Teague v. Lane and Edwards v. Vannoy.

Notably, the Court also addresses mootness: although Nita Patel completed her supervised release, her petition is not moot because the FCA judgment—grounded on the plea’s estoppel effect—constitutes a continuing collateral consequence redressable if the conviction were vacated (via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5)).

Summary of the Opinion

Article III mootness: Nita’s appeal is not moot despite completing supervised release because the FCA judgment stands as a continuing collateral consequence that could be reopened if her conviction were vacated. Rule 60(b)(5) provides a path to relief, satisfying redressability.
Merits—Sixth Amendment scope: The Court holds that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to advise clients only about the direct consequences of a guilty plea, not collateral ones. Padilla’s carve-out for deportation is limited to deportation and does not extend to civil FCA liability or collateral estoppel effects in qui tam actions.
Padilla limited: The Court reads Padilla as specific to deportation and “ill-suited” to broader collateral-consequence categorization; it does not broadly expand counsel’s constitutional advisory duties to all severe collateral consequences.
Alternative holding—Non-retroactivity: Even if a new Sixth Amendment duty to advise about FCA consequences existed, it would be a “new rule” not dictated by precedent; under Teague and Edwards, such a rule would not apply retroactively on collateral review. Relief is therefore barred.
No evidentiary hearing required: Because the Strickland claim fails as a matter of law, no evidentiary hearing was necessary.
Judgment affirmed: The Court affirms the denial of § 2255 relief for both Nita and Kirtish Patel.

Background

Nita and Kirtish Patel ran two companies—Biosound Medical Services Inc. and Heart Solution P.C.—that offered mobile diagnostic testing. To bill Medicare for neurological testing, a subspecialist physician had to supervise and interpret tests. In 2006, Kirtish falsely represented to Medicare that a neurologist would supervise the testing, securing approval. By 2008, Kirtish (unlicensed) authored diagnostic reports and Nita affixed a forged physician signature. The scheme generated at least $4.386 million in reimbursements (about $1.669 million from Medicare).

A former employee filed a sealed qui tam action in 2014. The Patels were arrested and pled guilty to healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347. The plea agreements explicitly stated they were “reached without regard to any civil or administrative matters” and did not preclude civil actions by the Government or third parties. The court imposed prison sentences, restitution, and forfeiture.

After the pleas, the Government intervened in the qui tam case and obtained summary judgment on FCA claims, relying on collateral estoppel from the plea admissions. The district court trebled damages and added civil penalties, for a total FCA judgment of $7,756,864.85. The Third Circuit affirmed Nita’s FCA liability in 2019. Enforcement of the FCA judgment was stayed pending these habeas proceedings.

In § 2255 motions, the Patels argued their counsel failed to advise them that pleading guilty would estop challenges and expose them to FCA liability. The district court denied relief, holding that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient and, in any event, the plea colloquies confirmed the pleas were knowing and voluntary despite the civil exposure. The district court also denied motions to alter or amend. A certificate of appealability was granted on a single issue: whether counsel was ineffective for failing to advise about collateral estoppel effects in the qui tam action.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010): Padilla held that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to advise a noncitizen client if a plea carries a risk of deportation. Many courts had previously treated deportation as a collateral consequence outside the Sixth Amendment. Padilla refrained from embracing or rejecting the direct/collateral framework in the abstract, but found that deportation is “a particularly severe penalty” intimately related to criminal proceedings and often nearly automatic, such that advice about deportation falls within Strickland’s ambit. Here, Padilla is pivotal because the Patels sought to extend it to FCA civil liability. The Third Circuit declines, reading Padilla as limited to deportation.

Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013): Chaidez held that Padilla announced a “new rule” for Teague purposes and thus does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The Third Circuit uses Chaidez to bolster its alternative holding: any further extension of Sixth Amendment duties to collateral civil liability would likewise be a new rule, non-retroactive under Teague and Edwards.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985): The familiar two-pronged ineffective assistance standard applies: deficient performance under prevailing professional norms and prejudice. Hill tailors prejudice to pleas—reasonable probability the defendant would have insisted on trial but for counsel’s errors. The Court resolves the Patels’ claims at step one, holding there is no constitutional duty to advise about FCA civil liability.

Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017); Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970): These cases establish the right to counsel at critical stages, including plea entry, and the requirement that defendants be informed of the advantages/disadvantages of a plea and rights forfeited by pleading. The Third Circuit situates its holding within this framework but confines the advice obligation to direct consequences.

Third Circuit’s pre-2010 treatment of collateral consequences: The opinion canvasses historical distinctions:

Kincade v. United States, 559 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1977), and United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991), treat direct consequences as those affecting the sentence’s length or nature.
Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147 (3d Cir. 1996) (parole eligibility); United States v. Rengifo, 832 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2016) (future sentencing); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963) (voting rights), among others, treat various disabilities as collateral.

The Court notes that neither it nor the Supreme Court had previously issued a categorical, precedential holding tying the Sixth Amendment duty to advise strictly to direct consequences. This opinion fills that gap.

United States v. Reeves, 695 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2012): Cited approvingly for the proposition that Padilla is limited to deportation; the Third Circuit aligns with this reading.

Farhane v. United States, 121 F.4th 353 (2d Cir. 2024) (en banc): The Patels relied on Farhane, which extends Padilla to advice about denaturalization when it exposes the client to deportation. The Third Circuit distinguishes Farhane as another immigration-context decision tied to deportation and thus not supportive of extending Padilla to purely civil, non-immigration consequences like FCA liability.

Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948): Quoted to underscore the uniquely severe nature of deportation (“banishment or exile”), reinforcing why Padilla is exceptional and not a template for non-immigration consequences.

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255 (2021): Teague’s non-retroactivity framework—new constitutional rules generally do not apply on collateral review. Edwards abrogates the “watershed” exception, clarifying that only new substantive rules apply retroactively. These authorities supply the alternative ground for affirmance: even if the Patels’ reading of Padilla were accepted, it would be a new, non-retroactive rule.

Chaidez’s application to Padilla retroactivity: The Court analogizes that, just as Padilla was a new rule, any further extension to civil liability would likewise be novel and therefore unavailable on collateral review.

Abreu v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI, 971 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 2020); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998): These frame Article III mootness in habeas after custody ends. The Court uses them to analyze collateral consequences and redressability.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5): Invoked to show that if the criminal conviction were vacated, a civil judgment premised on that conviction’s preclusive effect may be reopened, satisfying the Article III redressability requirement.

United States v. Rivera, 74 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2023): Cited for the proposition that the appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, allowing consideration of the Government’s non-retroactivity argument even though raised late.

United States v. Arrington, 13 F.4th 331 (3d Cir. 2021): Supports denying an evidentiary hearing where the petitioner fails to state a colorable Strickland claim.

Plunk v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc): Used by analogy—further extending Strickland to new advisory obligations (there, parole eligibility) would create a new rule not applicable on collateral review.

Legal Reasoning

Mootness and Redressability: The Court first addresses jurisdiction. Though Nita completed supervised release, the FCA judgment entered against her—based in part on collateral estoppel from her plea—persists as a concrete collateral consequence. A favorable ruling could enable relief from the civil judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) because it was “based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated.” That prospect of redress defeats mootness.
Sixth Amendment Duty Limited to Direct Consequences: Turning to the merits, the Court surveys pre-Padilla case law distinguishing “direct” and “collateral” consequences, and emphasizes that Padilla expressly declined to resolve the broader dichotomy but recognized an immigration-specific duty due to deportation’s severity and tight linkage to conviction. The Court “joins” other circuits in holding that counsel’s constitutional duty at plea is confined to direct consequences—those that determine the sentence’s length or nature—not collateral consequences dependent on other actors or separate proceedings. FCA exposure, including treble damages and civil penalties and the collateral estoppel effect of plea admissions in subsequent civil litigation, is a collateral consequence beyond the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s minimum requirements.
Padilla’s Limitation: The Court rejects the Patels’ attempt to abstract a general two-factor Padilla test grounded in “intertwining” and “severity.” Padilla’s holding is explicit: counsel must advise about deportation risk. The Seventh Circuit’s Reeves is quoted as recognizing Padilla’s limited scope, and the Second Circuit’s Farhane is distinguished as extending Padilla only within the immigration arc (denaturalization leading to deportation). Civil FCA liability is categorically different from deportation—less tightly linked to the criminal process, not automatic, and not an integral part of the criminal penalty.
Alternative Holding—Non-Retroactivity: Even assuming arguendo the Sixth Amendment encompassed a duty to advise about FCA consequences, such a holding would be a “new rule” not dictated by existing precedent at the time the Patels’ convictions became final. Under Teague and Edwards, new procedural rules do not apply retroactively on collateral review. Following Chaidez’s reasoning (Padilla itself was a new rule), any analogous expansion here would be non-retroactive; thus, habeas relief would still be unavailable.
No Hearing Necessary: Because the claim fails as a matter of law—counsel had no constitutional duty to provide the advice the Patels claim was missing—the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing.

Impact and Implications

1) Binding adoption of the direct/collateral framework in the Third Circuit: For the first time in a precedential decision, the Third Circuit expressly holds that the Sixth Amendment requires advice only about the direct penal consequences of a plea. That aligns the Circuit with the prevailing federal approach and forecloses federal ineffective assistance claims premised solely on a failure to warn about collateral civil, regulatory, or administrative outcomes (e.g., FCA liability, professional licensing actions, civil tax assessments, employment consequences), absent some other constitutional defect.

2) Padilla remains a narrow exception: Efforts to extend Padilla beyond the immigration context will face stiff headwinds in the Third Circuit. The Court signals that deportation’s unique severity and integration with the criminal process justify Padilla’s exception; comparable treatment is unlikely for most collateral consequences. Farhane’s denaturalization holding remains tied to deportation risk and does not support extensions to non-immigration consequences.

3) Plea practice and “global resolutions”: Practitioners should not read this decision as discouraging robust counseling about collateral risks; rather, it clarifies the constitutional floor. As a matter of prudent practice and client care, defense counsel negotiating pleas in matters with potential parallel civil exposure—especially healthcare fraud—should explore coordinated resolutions with civil divisions and explicitly address estoppel risks, even though the Constitution does not require it. The Patels’ plea agreements’ express reservation of civil remedies underscores the need to confront collateral consequences contractually rather than relying on constitutional claims later.

4) FCA litigation: The decision reinforces that guilty plea admissions can and will be used to establish liability in subsequent FCA cases via collateral estoppel. Defendants contemplating pleas in healthcare fraud matters should assume estoppel risks unless terms are negotiated otherwise, recognizing that failure to advise about these risks will not ordinarily support Sixth Amendment relief.

5) Habeas strategy and retroactivity: The alternative Teague/Edwards holding is a cautionary note: even successful doctrinal innovations on direct review may not benefit defendants whose convictions are final. Petitioners advancing new Sixth Amendment theories on collateral review will confront Chaidez’s framework and Edwards’s strict retroactivity limits.

6) Justiciability in completed-custody cases: The Court’s mootness analysis highlights that civil judgments predicated on criminal convictions can preserve a live case or controversy post-custody where Rule 60(b)(5) relief is plausibly available. This may affect strategic choices in timing and sequencing of collateral attacks and related civil proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Direct vs. Collateral Consequences: Direct consequences are those the sentencing court imposes as part of the criminal judgment (e.g., imprisonment, fines, restitution). Collateral consequences are indirect results controlled by other actors or processes (e.g., immigration removal, professional discipline, civil suits). After Patel, counsel’s Sixth Amendment duty in the Third Circuit covers only direct consequences, with Padilla’s immigration-specific exception.
Padilla Exception: Although deportation often occurs outside the criminal courtroom, the Supreme Court deemed it uniquely severe and tightly linked to conviction, requiring counsel to advise noncitizen clients about deportation risk. Patel limits Padilla to deportation (and decisions in its direct orbit).
False Claims Act (FCA): A civil statute imposing liability for false or fraudulent claims to the federal government. Remedies include treble damages and per-claim penalties. FCA suits may be brought by whistleblowers (relators) under seal (qui tam), with the Government having the right to intervene.
Qui Tam and Collateral Estoppel: In FCA cases, admissions in a criminal plea can collaterally estop defendants from relitigating facts, enabling summary judgment on liability.
Strickland/Hill Framework: Ineffective assistance requires showing deficient performance and prejudice. In the plea context, prejudice requires a reasonable probability the defendant would have gone to trial but for counsel’s errors.
Teague/Edwards Non-Retroactivity: New procedural rules of constitutional criminal law generally do not apply to cases already final on direct review; only new substantive rules do. Chaidez applied this to hold Padilla is not retroactive on collateral review.
Rule 60(b)(5): Allows a civil court to relieve a party from a civil judgment if it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated—key to the mootness analysis here.
Certificate of Appealability (COA): A § 2255 petitioner must obtain a COA to appeal, which can be limited to specific issues. Here, the COA was limited to the claim that counsel failed to advise about collateral estoppel consequences in the FCA case.

Conclusion

In a precedential opinion of wide practical import, the Third Circuit clarifies that defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment duty at the plea stage extends only to direct consequences of the plea. Padilla v. Kentucky remains a narrow, immigration-specific exception requiring advice about deportation and does not authorize a broad constitutional duty to advise about civil or administrative collateral consequences such as False Claims Act exposure or the collateral estoppel effects of plea admissions in subsequent litigation.

The Court’s alternative Teague/Edwards holding confirms that any further enlargement of Sixth Amendment advisory obligations would be a new procedural rule unavailable on collateral review. The decision thus both delineates the constitutional floor of counsel’s advisory obligations and provides critical guidance for practitioners: while best practices counsel robust discussion of collateral risks and pursuit of global resolutions where feasible, failures in this domain ordinarily will not support federal ineffective assistance claims in the Third Circuit.

Finally, the Court’s mootness analysis underscores a practical pathway for post-conviction litigants: when civil judgments rest on criminal convictions, successful collateral attacks on the conviction may open a route to reopening those civil judgments under Rule 60(b)(5). Nonetheless, on the merits, Patel makes clear that the Sixth Amendment does not constitutionally obligate defense counsel to anticipate and warn about such civil consequences.