Introduction

In Kenneth A. Horowitz v. Allied Marine, Inc. (11th Cir. 2025), the Eleventh Circuit clarified the standards for awarding damages under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act when a consumer-owned good arrives defective. Kenneth Horowitz, assignee of Underwater Exploration Company Inc., purchased a 38-foot RIVA yacht from Ferretti Group of America, LLC for $1,254,000. Despite the purchase, the vessel arrived with multiple defects—malfunctioning gauges, open engine hatches, faulty wiring, non-charging alternators, and safety concerns—that rendered the yacht effectively worthless to Horowitz. Allied Marine, the warrantor, disputed the jury’s $546,055.28 award for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and sought remittitur or a new trial. The district court denied those motions, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Key issues:

• Whether the jury’s diminished-value award was supported by competent evidence;
• Whether a plaintiff’s subjective testimony about the value of a defective good can establish damages;
• The proper standard for reviewing remittitur or new-trial motions under federal and Florida law.

• Plaintiff-Appellee: Kenneth A. Horowitz (assignee of Underwater Exploration Company Inc.)
• Defendant-Appellant: Allied Marine, Inc. (a.k.a. Ferretti Group USA, Inc.)

Summary of the Judgment

After a five-day jury trial in the Southern District of Florida, the jury found Allied Marine liable for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. § 2301) and awarded $548,755.28 in diminished-value damages, later reduced by $2,700 for failure to mitigate, for a net award of $546,055.28. Allied Marine moved for remittitur (to reduce the award to roughly $38,455) or a new trial, arguing the evidence could support no more than repair costs of about $40,000. The district court denied relief, and on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit—applying an abuse-of-discretion standard—affirmed, holding:

• The jury had competent evidence (owner testimony, expert opinion, invoices, photographs) to find the yacht’s value was zero upon delivery;
• The plaintiff’s subjective testimony, corroborated by other witnesses and stipulations, sufficed to prove diminution in value;
• Under Florida law (Fla. Stat. § 672.714(2) and § 768.74), the award was neither excessive nor against the great weight of the evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Moore v. Appliance Direct, Inc., 708 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2013): Defines abuse-of-discretion standard for remittitur and new-trial motions.
• Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940): New trial allowed only when verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.
• Ard v. Southwestern Forest Industries, 849 F.2d 517 (11th Cir. 1988): Reinforces the “great weight” standard.
• Collins v. Marriott International, Inc., 749 F.3d 951 (11th Cir. 2014): Federal courts decide sufficiency of damages under state law for state-law claims.
• Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 188 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 1999): Magnuson-Moss incorporates Florida law for damages.
• Florida Statutes § 672.714(2): Measure of breach-of-warranty damages—difference between the value as delivered and value as warranted.
• Florida Statutes § 768.74: Factors for assessing whether a damages award is excessive or inadequate.
• Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1977): Damages should be disturbed only if inordinately large.
• Lowe v. Pate Stevedoring Co., 558 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1977): Jury credibility and weight-of-the-evidence determinations are binding.
• Kia Motors America, Inc. v. Doughty, 242 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018): Rebuffs the notion that expert valuation is always required—owner testimony may suffice if it proves the value.
• Neff v. Kehoe, 708 F.2d 639 (11th Cir. 1983): Property owners are competent to testify to value.
• Allied Chemical Corp. v. Eubanks Industries, Inc., 155 So. 2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963): Supports leaving jury verdicts intact where evidence supports them.
• Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1986): Jury entitled to reject a witness’s damages estimate.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in several steps:

1. Standard of Review: Denial of remittitur or a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
2. Governing Law: Federal Rule 59(a) (new trial for verdicts against the weight of evidence or excessive damages) and Florida law for damages under the Magnuson-Moss Act.
3. Measure of Damages: Under Fla. Stat. § 672.714(2), the difference between value “as warranted” ($1,254,000) and value “as delivered.”
4. Evidence of Value: Horowitz’s uncontradicted testimony that post-delivery the yacht had zero value to him; corroboration by expert witnesses and a marine mechanic; stipulation on purchase price as warranted value.
5. Rejection of Allied Marine’s Theory: The defendant’s own director estimated $40,000 in repair costs, but the jury weighed that against extensive defect testimony and credible evidence of major refitting needs.
6. Applicability of Kia Motors: That case only held plaintiff had no evidence of defect-time value; here, Horowitz offered ample evidence, so expert testimony was not mandatory.
7. Florida Excessiveness Factors: The award was not indicative of passion, nor speculative, and bore a reasonable relation to proof of loss.

Impact

This decision reinforces several important principles:

• Consumers may rely on their own testimony, supported by lay or expert corroboration, to establish diminished-value damages when a warranted good arrives defective.
• Juries have broad discretion to assess credibility and weigh conflicting damage estimates, even when the warrantor offers a lower repair-cost figure.
• The decision narrows attempts by warrantors to limit damages awards to repair costs alone, emphasizing the difference-in-value measure.
• Future litigants under Magnuson-Moss and state warranty laws will cite Horowitz v. Allied Marine to resist remittitur arguments based on expert-only valuations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: A federal law that allows consumers to sue warrantors for breach of written or implied warranties on consumer products.
• Implied Warranty of Merchantability: A warranty that goods are fit for ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
• Diminution-of-Value Damages: The difference between the value of the goods as promised (warranted) and their actual value at time of delivery.
• Remittitur: A post-trial motion asking the court to reduce an excessive jury verdict instead of ordering a new trial.
• New Trial Motion: A request that the court grant a retrial because the original verdict was against the weight of the evidence or improperly excessive.
• Abuse of Discretion: A highly deferential appellate standard—reversal only if the lower court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable.

Conclusion

Horowitz v. Allied Marine establishes that in warranty-breach cases under Magnuson-Moss, a plaintiff’s own valuation of a defective product—when supported by credible testimony and evidence—can justify a jury’s award of diminished-value damages. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms the deferential standard applied to jury verdicts and post-trial motions, and it underscores that courts should disturb damage awards only when they truly exceed the bounds of reasonable judgment. This ruling will guide future disputes over warranty remedies, reaffirming the consumer’s right to full compensation where defects render a purchased product effectively worthless.