Ownership Alone Is Not Command: Third Circuit Clarifies “Person in Charge” Standard Under 18 U.S.C. § 2237(a)(1)

1. Introduction

United States v. Jorge Romero-Amaro (3d Cir. 2025) addresses a recurring problem in maritime interdiction prosecutions: who, exactly, must heed a federal order to “heave to,” and what evidence is needed to prove that the defendant was the responsible party?

The U.S. Coast Guard and Customs & Border Protection intercepted a small pleasure craft near the U.S. Virgin Islands. Five individuals—including boat owner Jorge Romero-Amaro—were on board. When agents signalled the vessel to “heave to” (slow/stop to permit boarding), it allegedly failed to comply. A jury convicted Romero-Amaro under 18 U.S.C. § 2237(a)(1) (failure to heave to).

At trial, the defense twice moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arguing that the Government had not shown Romero-Amaro was the “master, operator, or person in charge.” The District Court reserved decision, the jury convicted, and Romero-Amaro received 12 months’ imprisonment. On appeal the Third Circuit vacated the conviction, holding that mere ownership and presence aboard the vessel are insufficient, standing alone, to establish the statutory “in-charge” element.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Holding: The evidence introduced during the Government’s case-in-chief did not allow a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Romero-Amaro was the “master, operator, or person in charge” of the vessel. Ownership plus presence is not enough.
Disposition: Conviction vacated; case remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.
Standard of Review: Plenary review of the Rule 29 ruling, confined—pursuant to Rule 29(b)—to the evidence presented before the District Court reserved decision.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001) – Establish the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2010) – Reinforce that when a court reserves a Rule 29 motion, appellate review is confined to the evidence existing at reservation time.
United States v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2005) – Recited for the canon against surplusage: courts should not interpret statutes so that distinct terms become redundant.

Collectively, these decisions dictate the analytical path: determine what evidence was in the record at the close of the Government’s case; then ask whether, viewing that evidence favorably to the prosecution, a juror could convict.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Statutory Text and Structure
Section 2237(a)(1) criminalizes knowingly failing to obey a federal order to “heave to” by “the master, operator, or person in charge.” Congress deliberately separated those roles from mere “owner,” as shown by other maritime statutes (e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 10101). Applying the canon against surplusage, the panel refused to read “owner” into “operator.”
Evidence Presented
During the Government’s case-in-chief it showed only: (i) Romero-Amaro owned the boat; (ii) five people were aboard; (iii) the driver was a “tall slender man,” identity unknown. No witness testified that Romero-Amaro was at the helm or issued commands. Thus the “in-charge” element lacked proof.
Rule 29 Confinement
Because the District Court reserved the Rule 29 motion, Rule 29(b) compels reviewing courts to ignore later defense evidence, even if it might—or might not—help the Government. Both parties urged the panel to look at the whole trial, but the panel invoked its duty to apply correct law despite waiver.
Forfeiture Argument Rejected
The Government sought plain-error review, claiming defense counsel “forfeited” the sufficiency claim by mis-stating the procedural posture at sentencing. The panel rejected that argument: the motion was properly renewed; sentencing schedule implicitly denied it; sufficiency was preserved.

3.3 Potential Impact

Higher Evidentiary Bar in Maritime-Interdiction Cases – Prosecutors must now present concrete evidence identifying who controlled a vessel (e.g., helm observation, admissions, navigation logs). Ownership and presence, once perhaps enough to survive a jury, no longer suffice in the Third Circuit.
Guidance on Rule 29 Procedure – District judges are reminded that reserving decision narrows the appellate record. Practical effect: judges may be less inclined to “take under advisement” where the case appears weak, or they may grant the motion to avoid reversible error.
Statutory Interpretation Beyond § 2237 – The decision reinforces that terms like “master,” “operator,” and “owner” are distinct across maritime statutes. Civil and regulatory regimes (e.g., vessel safety, environmental liability) may cite this opinion to argue for precise role-based liability.
Defense Strategy – Owners travelling on their own boats now have a stronger defense if the Government cannot show actual command. Expect more Rule 29 motions framed around role-differentiation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Heave to”: Nautical term meaning slow, stop, or adjust course/speed so boarding can occur safely.
Rule 29 Motion: A request for a judgment of acquittal on grounds that the evidence is legally insufficient. Must be made at specific trial junctures.
Reservation of Decision: The judge postpones ruling on the Rule 29 motion. Under Rule 29(b), any later ruling must be based only on the evidence that existed when the motion was first made.
Plenary Review: Appellate court reviews the legal question anew, without deference to the district judge’s conclusion.
Canon Against Surplusage: Interpret statutes so every word and phrase has effect; avoid readings that make certain words redundant.
Plain-Error vs. Preserved Error: If an issue is properly preserved (raised timely and specifically), the appellate court uses normal review; if forfeited, the higher “plain-error” standard applies.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Romero-Amaro crystallizes an important limitation on § 2237(a)(1): the Government must prove that the defendant was actually in command of—or at least responsible for—the vessel at the moment of defiance. Ownership and mere presence do not equate to command. Equally significant is the procedural lesson: when a Rule 29 motion is reserved, both trial and appellate courts are confined to the evidentiary snapshot existing at that moment.

The decision therefore creates a dual precedent: substantively, it tightens the “person in charge” requirement; procedurally, it enforces Rule 29’s temporal boundaries. Future maritime prosecutions in the Third Circuit (and likely beyond) must adapt by gathering and presenting clearer evidence of operational control, lest convictions founder on the shoals of sufficiency.