Overwhelming Circumstantial Evidence and Harmless Error in Drug Prosecutions: Commentary on United States v. Victor Cremades

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s published decision in United States v. Victor Yoel Perez Cremades, No. 24-10284 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2025), is a robust reaffirmation of two recurring themes in federal criminal law:

That circumstantial evidence can, standing alone, overwhelmingly support drug convictions for possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy; and
That even arguably erroneous evidentiary rulings—here, the admission of a purported “drug ledger”—will not warrant reversal where the remaining, properly admitted evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error does not substantially influence the verdict.

The case arises out of a large-scale methamphetamine and fentanyl distribution operation centered on a small Tampa residence, a FedEx package shipped from Nogales, Arizona, and a set of Western Union money transfers tied to locations associated with transnational drug trafficking, including the Sinaloa Cartel. A jury convicted Victor Cremades of:

Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine and 400 grams of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A) (Count I); and
Possession with intent to distribute those same quantities and types of drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (Count II).

On appeal, Cremades raised two principal issues:

The sufficiency of the (largely circumstantial) evidence to sustain both the possession and conspiracy convictions; and
The district court’s admission of a spiral notebook page—described by agents as a “drug ledger”—which he argued was irrelevant and unsupported by a proper foundation.

The Eleventh Circuit (Judge Ed Carnes, joined by Judges Rosenbaum and Lagoa) affirmed on all fronts. The opinion is important less because it breaks new ground, and more because it synthesizes and applies longstanding doctrines on:

Constructive possession of narcotics found in a residence;
Inferring intent to distribute from drug quantity and packaging;
Proving conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 with circumstantial evidence; and
The harmless-error standard for nonconstitutional evidentiary rulings in criminal trials.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The FedEx Package from Nogales

In September 2021, law enforcement intercepted a FedEx package addressed to “Oliver Holme” at 4813 North MacDill Avenue in Tampa, Florida. The package contained:

Almost four pounds of methamphetamine; and
More than 1,200 fentanyl-laced pills, with an approximate value of $40,000.

Key contextual facts:

No “Oliver Holme” resided in Florida.
Although the label bore a Miami return address, the package actually shipped from Nogales, Arizona—a border city known to law enforcement as a frequent drug-smuggling gateway.
The destination address (4813 N. MacDill) was linked to utility accounts in the name of Victor Yoel Perez Cremades.

Agents removed the narcotics, repackaged the box with non-drug items, and arranged a controlled delivery to the MacDill address by an undercover officer. Cremades’ 14-year-old daughter accepted the package at the door.

B. The Search of the MacDill Residence

Shortly after the controlled delivery, local police and the FBI executed a search warrant at the residence. Cremades was not present. However, agents found:

Mail addressed to Cremades;
His Social Security card and passport;
The delivered FedEx box placed on a bed in one bedroom of this small, approximately 800-square-foot rented house.

In that same bedroom:

The nightstand contained thirteen $100 bills.
The closet held men’s clothing, identification belonging to Cremades, and a purple duffel bag.

Inside the purple duffel bag agents found:

Six vacuum-sealed plastic bags containing a total of 3,068 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine;
A pair of jeans with $3,500 in cash in the pocket (for a total of $4,800 in that room); and
A Ziplock bag with more than 7,000 blue pills containing 831 grams of fentanyl, visually similar to the 1,200 pills in the intercepted FedEx package.

Also in the closet:

A Western Union receipt bearing Cremades’ name showing that on August 5, 2021, he had transferred $1,500 to “Jose Romero Espinosa” in Nogales, Arizona.

C. Evidence Found in the Kitchen Area

In the kitchen (sometimes called the dining area in the record), agents discovered:

On the table: another Western Union receipt in Cremades’ name, also dated August 5, 2021, documenting the same $1,500 transfer to Espinosa in Nogales, accompanied by a handwritten note with “Jose Romero Espinosa,” “1500,” and “Nogales.”
Under the table: a black trash bag containing 145.1 grams of 98% pure methamphetamine.
Elsewhere in the kitchen: three additional Western Union receipts from early August 2021:
- None listed Cremades by name as sender, but all were sent by a person in Tampa, Florida.
- One recipient was again “Jose Romero Espinoza” (slightly variant spelling) in Nogales.
- The other two recipients were in Culiacan, Sinaloa—identified by FBI Agent Jamie Walker as an operational base of the Sinaloa Cartel, “one of the most prolific drug organizations in the world.”

Agents testified that only Cremades and his daughter were known residents of the home and that Cremades had been seen outside the house on the morning of the search. Law enforcement also testified, in line with prior Eleventh Circuit precedent, that traffickers do not typically send packages containing tens of thousands of dollars’ worth of narcotics to unsuspecting or uninvolved individuals.

D. The “Drug Ledger”

During the search, FBI Special Agent Melissa Montoya oversaw the intake of seized items. Among them was a spiral notebook opened to a page listing names with numbers next to each. The government introduced a photograph of this page.

Defense counsel objected, arguing:

The government would likely characterize the notebook as a “ledger” without proof;
No foundation had been laid as to its significance; and
It was irrelevant because its purpose and authorship were unknown.

The district court overruled the objection. Montoya testified that:

She catalogued the notebook as a “ledger.”
It was located near the black trash bag under the kitchen table containing methamphetamine.
In her experience, a “ledger” is a book or paper with names, nicknames, phone numbers, money, or orders, “commonly used in the distribution of narcotics.”
Based on her FBI experience, she believed this notebook page was a drug distribution ledger, though she did not know whose handwriting it contained.

Another FBI agent corroborated that in drug trafficking, documents showing names with dollar amounts can be “drug ledgers” used to track money owed or paid.

The agents also testified that, when they entered the house:

Only Cremades’ 14-year-old daughter and a man named Eugene Fields were present.
Fields consented to a phone search; nothing tied him to the package or the drugs.
No mail was addressed to anyone other than Cremades.

E. Trial, Conviction, and Sentencing

At the close of the government’s case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, arguing insufficiency of the evidence (implicitly as to both counts). The court took the motion under advisement.

The defense offered only one exhibit—a photograph of the living room—and presented no witnesses. The jury convicted on both counts. The district court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced Cremades to 180 months (15 years) on each count, to run concurrently.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of the judgment of acquittal de novo, applying the usual sufficiency standard: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences in that favor, a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court emphasized:

No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in sufficiency review.
The jury is free to choose among reasonable interpretations of the evidence.
The evidence need not exclude every innocent explanation or “foreclose” all contrary hypotheses.

Applying those principles:

Count II (Possession with intent to distribute): The court held that the large quantities of high-purity methamphetamine and fentanyl found in Cremades’ home, coupled with:
- His control over the premises (utilities, IDs, residence);
- His proximity (seen at the house that morning);
- The intercepted FedEx package addressed to his residence; and
- Substantial cash and Western Union transfers to Nogales, Arizona,
amply supported findings of knowledge, constructive possession, and intent to distribute.
Count I (Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute): The same evidence—particularly the drug quantities, financial transfers to Nogales and Sinaloa-linked destinations, and the controlled delivery to his residence—permitted the jury to infer an agreement to distribute drugs, that Cremades knew of it, and that he voluntarily joined it.

B. Admission of the Alleged “Drug Ledger”

The court reviewed the evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, a standard that affords “considerable leeway” and results in reversal only where there is manifest error. But even if there was error, reversal would be warranted only if the error was not harmless—i.e., if it affected the defendant’s substantial rights or had a substantial influence on the verdict.

Assuming without deciding that admission of the notebook page as a drug ledger was an abuse of discretion, the court held any error was harmless because:

The evidence of guilt was overwhelming and entirely independent of the ledger.
The court’s sufficiency analysis did not need to rely on the ledger at all.
It was “inconceivable” that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the ledger been excluded.

In distinguishing the case from United States v. Stephens, where the erroneous exclusion of exculpatory evidence warranted reversal, the panel emphasized that:

Stephens involved a seriously flawed government case where the excluded evidence went to the heart of the defense theory.
Here, by contrast, the ledger was at most marginal, cumulative inculpatory evidence within a trial record already saturated with incriminating facts.

The judgment was therefore affirmed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Treatment of Circumstantial Evidence and Sufficiency

1. Standard of Review and General Principles

The court’s sufficiency analysis is built on a line of Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the equivalence of circumstantial and direct evidence:

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) – Although a civil Title VII case, the Supreme Court’s statement is quoted here: there is no requirement for direct evidence even where proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required; circumstantial evidence can be fully sufficient.
United States v. Kennedy, 146 F.4th 1054, 1064 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936, 945 (11th Cir. 2009)) – “We make no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence” when evaluating sufficiency.
United States v. Bird, 79 F.4th 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023) – The court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in support of it.
United States v. Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155, 1168 (11th Cir. 2020) – A guilty verdict cannot be overturned if “any reasonable construction of the evidence” supports the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2014) – The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; the jury may choose from among reasonable interpretations.

Applying these principles, the panel explicitly rejects the defense’s attempt to leverage the largely circumstantial nature of the evidence. The opinion thus reinforces, in a published, criminal-law context, that:

Circumstantial evidence is not “second-class” proof.
Appellate review is highly deferential to the jury’s role in drawing inferences.

2. Constructive Possession and Control Over Premises

For Count II, the government had to establish “possession” of the drugs, either actual or constructive. The court draws on United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1998), to define constructive possession:

Constructive possession exists where the defendant has “dominion or control over the premises” where the contraband is found.

The key constructive-possession precedents and applications are:

United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391–92 (11th Cir. 1989) – Circumstantial evidence can prove knowledge, possession, and intent to distribute.
United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) – The court upheld a § 841 conviction where drugs were found in a residence the defendant purportedly did not own, but:
- He was found in the driveway with a key to the house;
- He was seen entering and exiting the house;
- Drugs were in common areas;
- A letter addressed to him was in the house; and
- His daughter stated that he “frequented” the house.
These facts sufficed to show dominion and control, and hence constructive possession.

The panel observes that the evidence against Cremades is “as much or even more” compelling than in Cochran:

Utilities were in his name.
His mail, passport, and Social Security card were present.
He was seen at the house the morning of the search.
Only he and his daughter were known residents.
Massive quantities of drugs were stored in a bedroom closet containing his clothing and IDs and in a kitchen area of his small residence.
The intercepted package, containing $40,000 worth of drugs, was sent to that address.

By aligning these facts with Cochran and Leonard, the court makes clear that, in the Eleventh Circuit, a defendant’s control over a residence strongly supports constructive possession of contraband found anywhere within that space—especially when no competing occupant is credibly identified.

3. Inferring Intent to Distribute from Quantity and Packaging

Having found knowledge and possession, the panel addresses “intent to distribute,” which may be established circumstantially, particularly by drug quantity and manner of packaging. It relies on:

United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2005) – Intent to distribute may be inferred from the amount of the drug involved.
United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1071 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2008) – Individual packaging in plastic bags supports an inference of intent to distribute.
United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998) – Nine kilograms of cocaine is “far more than” personal-use quantity and supports intent to distribute.
United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497, 499 (11th Cir. 1992) – Two kilograms of cocaine is far more than personal use and evidences an intent to distribute.
United States v. Tamargo, 672 F.2d 887, 890 (11th Cir. 1982) – Possession of 2,000 methaqualone tablets reasonably supports inference of intent to distribute, not mere personal consumption.

Here, the quantities are even more striking:

Approximately 3,068 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine (in six vacuum-sealed bags);
831 grams of fentanyl in over 7,000 pills, visually identical to the intercepted pills; and
An additional 145.1 grams of 98% pure methamphetamine in a separate black trash bag.

The court’s rhetorical flourish—invoking “the brevity of life” and the danger of consuming large quantities of nearly pure methamphetamine and thousands of fentanyl pills—underscores a core point: it is simply implausible these quantities were meant for personal use. From that premise, the panel reasons that the only realistic alternative is distribution:

[T]here is no chance that Cremades intended to personally consume all of the more than 3,000 grams of high purity methamphetamine or all of those more than 7,000 pills of fentanyl. And if he didn't intend to personally consume the large quantity of drugs, the only other possibility is that he intended to distribute them...

Coupled with:

Vacuum-sealed packaging (indicative of trafficking);
Substantial cash ($4,800); and
Money transfers to Nogales, Arizona (origin of the FedEx package),

the inference of intent to distribute is, in the court’s view, unavoidable to any reasonable jury.

B. Conspiracy Under 21 U.S.C. § 846

1. Elements and Applicable Standard

To sustain a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must show:

An agreement to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance;
The defendant’s knowledge of the agreement; and
The defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the agreement.

The panel relies on:

United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) – Setting out the conspiracy elements.
United States v. Russo, 717 F.2d 545, 549 (11th Cir. 1983) – Conspiracies may be proven by circumstantial evidence.

2. Evidence of an Agreement and Knowledge

While no co-conspirator was named in the indictment or at trial, this is not a bar to a § 846 conviction; an agreement can be inferred from conduct and circumstances. The panel highlights:

The large volumes of narcotics stored in the home;
The intercepted FedEx package containing $40,000 in drugs sent from Nogales to an alias at Cremades’ address;
The Western Union transfers to “Jose Romero Espinosa/Espinoza” in Nogales;
Additional Western Union transfers to recipients in Culiacan, Sinaloa—linked by testimony to the Sinaloa Cartel; and
The “prudent smuggler” inference, discussed below.

The “prudent smuggler” concept comes from:

United States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1997) – A reasonable jury may infer that a rational drug smuggler will not entrust large quantities of drugs to an unwitting or innocent courier.

By invoking Quilca-Carpio, the court suggests that:

It is highly unlikely that traffickers would dispatch a $40,000 package of drugs to a home where the recipient was unaware of or uninvolved in the enterprise.
The fact that the destination utilities and occupancy were tied to Cremades allows a strong inference that he was part of the arrangement.

3. Knowing and Voluntary Participation

The same facts supporting possession with intent—control of the house, knowledge inferred from the package, presence of large quantities of drugs and cash, and pre-delivery money transfers—also support an inference that Cremades knowingly and voluntarily joined an agreement with others:

At least one actor in Nogales (Espinosa/Espinoza), evidenced by the $1,500 transfer and the origin of the FedEx package;
Possibly others in Sinaloa-linked locations, based on the two additional Western Union transfers to Culiacan.

The panel emphasizes that conspiracies are typically proven not by direct evidence of explicit agreements, but by circumstantial evidence of coordinated activities. Here, the temporal proximity between the August 5 transfers and the September 2021 FedEx shipment, plus the pattern of money flowing to trafficking hotspots, strongly indicated a drug trafficking arrangement in which Cremades knowingly participated.

C. The Alleged Drug Ledger and Harmless Error

1. The Evidentiary Ruling

At trial, the district court admitted a photograph of a notebook page listing names with accompanying numbers, over defense objections that the document’s purpose was unproven and that calling it a “ledger” invited speculation.

On appeal, Cremades argued:

The notebook was irrelevant without proof of its nature, authorship, or connection to him;
No proper foundation established that it was a “drug ledger;” and
Allowing agents to label it a drug ledger invited the jury to infer additional, unsupported criminal involvement, prejudicing him unfairly.

2. Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion and Manifest Error

The panel applies the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard:

United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2013) – Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2018) – This standard gives trial courts “considerable leeway”; reversal is warranted only for “manifest error”—essentially, a clear error of judgment or application of the wrong legal standard.

But rather than definitively deciding whether there was an abuse of discretion, the court sidesteps that question by invoking harmless error doctrine for nonconstitutional errors.

3. Harmless Error Framework

The harmless error analysis rests on:

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) – Nonconstitutional errors that do not affect substantial rights “must be disregarded.”
United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1197 (11th Cir. 2012) – Nonconstitutional evidentiary error is harmless if it does not affect substantial rights.
United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1992) – An evidentiary error does not warrant reversal if it had no substantial influence on the outcome and if sufficient untainted evidence supports the verdict.
United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) – Although addressing constitutional error, the court reiterates that the Constitution guarantees a fair trial, not an error-free one, and warns against overturning verdicts for trivial errors that did not influence the outcome. It emphasizes:
- Focusing on “underlying fairness” promotes public respect for the judicial system;
- Avoiding a “regime of gotcha review” prevents strategic exploitation of minor mistakes; and
- Judicial resources must be conserved.
United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002) – The government bears the burden of proving an error is harmless.
United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Hough, 803 F.3d 1181, 1193 (11th Cir. 2015) – “Overwhelming evidence of guilt” can render an evidentiary error harmless; if it is “inconceivable” the jury would have reached a different verdict absent the error, reversal is unwarranted.

Against this backdrop, the court assumes arguendo (for the sake of argument) that the notebook’s admission may have been erroneous, but:

Concludes that the ledger had no substantial influence on the outcome;
Relies on the extensive, independent evidence summarized in its sufficiency discussion; and
Notes explicitly that its sufficiency analysis did not depend on the ledger at all.

4. Distinguishing United States v. Stephens

Cremades pointed to United States v. Stephens, 365 F.3d 967 (11th Cir. 2004), where the court had reversed a conviction due to erroneous exclusion of exculpatory evidence, arguing that evidentiary mistakes can indeed prejudice verdicts.

In Stephens:

The government’s case was “disturbingly” flawed—officers claimed to have thoroughly searched and monitored a confidential informant but in fact had not.
The central government theory was that drugs found on the informant must have come from Stephens due to this supposedly thorough monitoring.
The excluded testimony would have shown that the informant had independent access to methamphetamine and had possessed and sold it while working with law enforcement.

The Stephens panel concluded that the excluded testimony was “potentially exculpatory” and “quite probative,” going to the heart of the defense, and that its absence “more likely than not” affected the verdict.

In contrast, Cremades involves:

No significant weaknesses in the government’s case;
An allegedly erroneous admission of marginal, inculpatory evidence (the ledger), rather than the exclusion of significant, exculpatory material; and
A trial record already replete with incriminating, untainted evidence.

The court thus treats Stephens as an example of when an evidentiary error does affect substantial rights—because the error deprived the defendant of key exculpatory evidence and undermined the fairness of the trial. In Cremades, by contrast, the ledger was at most a minor addition to a powerful prosecution case, making any error harmless beyond serious debate.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Roles

The opinion is notable for its heavy reliance on precedent, each serving a specific doctrinal function:

Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2008) – Packaging in plastic bags as evidence of distribution.
Bird, 79 F.4th 1344 (11th Cir. 2023) – Articulation of the sufficiency standard (“light most favorable to verdict”).
Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2020) – “Any reasonable construction” standard for affirming verdicts.
Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2014) – No requirement to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) – Legitimatizing circumstantial evidence as sufficient.
Kennedy, 146 F.4th 1054 (11th Cir. 2025) & Tate, 586 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2009) – No distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.
Poole, 878 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1989) – Elements of § 841(a) offense; acceptance of circumstantial proof.
Leonard, 138 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1998) – Constructive possession via control over premises; inferring intent from quantity.
Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) – Intent to distribute inferred from amount.
Cochran, 683 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) – Constructive possession and residence link; analogized directly to Cremades.
Gates, 967 F.2d 497 (11th Cir. 1992) & Tamargo, 672 F.2d 887 (11th Cir. 1982) – Drug quantity as evidence of distribution.
Charles, 313 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) & Russo, 717 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1983) – Elements and proof of drug conspiracy.
Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719 (11th Cir. 1997) – “Prudent smuggler” inference regarding valuable drug shipments.
Troya, 733 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2013) & Barton, 909 F.3d 1323 (2018) – Abuse-of-discretion review for evidentiary rulings.
House, 684 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2012), Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717 (11th Cir. 1992), Roy, 855 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2017), Pon, 963 F.3d 1207 (2020), Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002), Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350 (1999), and Hough, 803 F.3d 1181 (2015) – Harmless error and fair trial principles.
Stephens, 365 F.3d 967 (11th Cir. 2004) – Example of when an evidentiary error is not harmless due to exclusion of probative exculpatory evidence.

Taken together, these authorities provide a nearly textbook map of Eleventh Circuit doctrine on:

Sufficiency review in narcotics cases;
Possession and conspiracy doctrines;
Use of circumstantial evidence; and
Harmless-error analysis for trial-level evidentiary decisions.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts in the opinion may be opaque to non-lawyers. The following brief explanations may help clarify them:

Circumstantial evidence – Evidence that suggests a fact by implication, rather than directly. For example, finding drugs in a person’s bedroom closet (circumstantial) suggests possession, even if no one saw the person physically holding the drugs (direct).
Direct evidence – Evidence that, if believed, proves a fact without inference. An example is a witness testifying, “I saw the defendant handing a bag of drugs to another person.”
Constructive possession – A legal doctrine where a person is treated as possessing something even if it is not physically on them, so long as they have the power and intention to exercise control over it. Having drugs in a house you control, in your closet and among your personal items, can constitute constructive possession.
Possession with intent to distribute – A crime under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) where the government must prove:
1. The defendant knew about the controlled substance;
2. He possessed it (actually or constructively); and
3. He intended to distribute it to someone else (often inferred from drug quantity, packaging, and cash).
Drug conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846) – An agreement between two or more people to commit a drug crime (such as possession with intent to distribute), plus proof that the defendant knew of the agreement and voluntarily joined it. There is no requirement that co-conspirators be charged or even identified by name.
“Prudent smuggler” inference – A common-sense doctrine: drug traffickers will not entrust large quantities of valuable drugs to people who are unaware of the scheme. So if a large quantity of drugs is shipped to someone’s address, a jury may infer that the recipient is part of the operation.
Abuse of discretion – An appellate standard of review that defers heavily to the trial judge’s decisions (here, on evidence). The appellate court will reverse only if the trial judge’s ruling was clearly unreasonable or based on the wrong legal rule.
Harmless error – Even if a trial court makes a legal mistake (for example, admitting an item of evidence it should have excluded), an appellate court will not reverse the conviction if the error did not affect the outcome—i.e., if the remaining, properly admitted evidence is so strong that the verdict would have been the same.
Substantial rights – In this context, rights whose violation affects the fairness, integrity, or outcome of the trial. If a mistake did not affect substantial rights, it is harmless.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Reinforcement of Circumstantial Evidence in Drug Cases

United States v. Cremades consolidates several existing principles into a clear practical message: in drug prosecutions, especially those involving residences and distribution quantities, circumstantial evidence can easily cross the “overwhelming” threshold.

For prosecutors, the opinion underscores the value of:

Tying a residence to the defendant through utilities, mail, IDs, and observations of occupancy;
Documenting the similarity of drugs found in multiple locations (e.g., pills in a seized package and pills in a defendant’s home);
Introducing evidence of money transfers to known trafficking hubs; and
Relying on established “common sense” inferences like the prudent smuggler rationale.

For defense counsel, the case is a reminder that:

Challenging sufficiency based on the circumstantial nature of the evidence is unlikely to succeed where the circumstantial web is dense and cohesive.
Presenting no defense evidence at trial can leave the jury with only one narrative and reduce appellate room to argue that the government’s inferences were unreasonable.

B. Constructive Possession and Residence-Based Drug Trials

By analogizing directly to Cochran and stressing that the evidence here is even stronger, the opinion bolsters a relatively permissive approach to constructive possession where drugs are found in:

Small residences;
Closets with the defendant’s clothing and IDs; and
Shared spaces in homes where the defendant is the only known adult resident.

Defendants who attempt to distance themselves from drugs discovered in their living spaces—especially where no plausible alternative possessor is identified—will face an uphill battle in the Eleventh Circuit.

C. Conspiracy Inferences from Financial Patterns

The opinion also highlights that evidence of:

Wire transfers to border cities like Nogales;
Repeated transactions to cartel-associated regions like Culiacan, Sinaloa; and
Temporal proximity between those transfers and large drug shipments;

can support inferences of a drug-distribution conspiracy even without direct testimony from co-conspirators or explicit communications.

This approach reflects the reality that conspiracy agreements are often concealed and must be reconstructed from financial and logistical trails. It also warns that financial footprints linking a defendant to known trafficking hubs can be powerful circumstantial proof of criminal agreements.

D. Harmless Error and the Limits of Appellate Relief

On the evidentiary side, Cremades reinforces:

The high bar defendants face to obtain reversal based on the erroneous admission of inculpatory evidence.
The centrality of the “substantial influence” inquiry—would the verdict reasonably have been different without the challenged evidence?
The distinction between:
- Errors that exclude important exculpatory evidence (as in Stephens), which can readily affect substantial rights; and
- Errors that merely add marginal inculpatory evidence to an already overwhelming prosecution case, which are typically harmless.

Practically, this means that even where defense counsel can persuasively argue at trial that a document like a “drug ledger” lacks proper foundation or reliability, the likelihood of appellate relief is slim if:

Significant other evidence independently establishes guilt; and
The ledger is not central to the prosecution’s theory.

The opinion, in short, reaffirms that appellate courts will not use evidentiary technicalities to overturn convictions where the trial as a whole was fundamentally fair and the evidence of guilt independently compelling.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Victor Yoel Perez Cremades is a paradigmatic Eleventh Circuit drug case that:

Reaffirms the full equivalence of circumstantial and direct evidence in assessing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
Clarifies how constructive possession is established via control over a residence and its contents;
Illustrates how massive drug quantities, high purity, and associated financial activity permit a virtually inescapable inference of intent to distribute and participation in a conspiracy;
Reinforces a restrained, harmless error approach to nonconstitutional evidentiary mistakes, especially when the contested evidence is peripheral and guilt is otherwise overwhelming; and
Distinguishes between evidentiary errors that truly undermine the fairness of a trial (as in Stephens) and those that do not.

While the decision does not articulate an entirely new legal test, it crystallizes and applies existing precedent in a way that provides a clear roadmap for future narcotics prosecutions and appeals in the Eleventh Circuit. It signals that:

Defendants whose homes contain large, distribution-level quantities of drugs, linked to them by documents, IDs, utilities, and money transfers, will find sufficiency challenges exceptionally difficult; and
Appellate courts will be reluctant to overturn such convictions based on peripheral evidentiary disputes when the overall trial record is strongly and independently incriminating.

Consequently, Cremades stands as a significant, if incremental, precedent that tightens the doctrinal and practical framework for evaluating circumstantial drug evidence and harmless error in federal criminal appeals.