Introduction

In Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc., 374 Or 212 (2025), the Supreme Court of Oregon resolved a recurring and consequential limitations question under the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA). The Court held that ORS 12.125—which imposes a one-year statute of limitations on “an action arising under a rental agreement or ORS chapter 90”—does not incorporate a discovery rule. The one-year period runs from the alleged breach of a rental agreement or from the occurrence of an ORLTA violation, not from the time the tenant discovers or reasonably should have discovered the violation.

The case arises from a putative class action brought by current and former residents of Salem RV Park against the park’s owners and managers. Plaintiffs alleged unlawful utility billing practices in violation of ORS 90.315 (2011), including charging more than the actual cost of electricity and imposing “meter reading” fees. The trial court certified a class spanning ten years, reasoning that a discovery rule tolled the one-year limitation. The Court of Appeals reversed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings limited by the one-year statute.

This commentary explains the decision’s reasoning, situates it within existing precedent, clarifies complex concepts (including accrual and the “purview” of ORS 12.010), and analyzes its implications for landlord-tenant litigation and Oregon limitations law more broadly.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court (Garrett, J.) held that ORS 12.125 contains no discovery rule. The text “an action arising under a rental agreement or ORS chapter 90 shall be commenced within one year”:

• Uses “arising under” as a subject-matter limitation identifying which claims are covered (rental agreements and ORLTA), not as a temporal trigger for accrual.
• Does not state, and therefore does not embody, any discovery-based accrual standard. When the legislature intends a discovery trigger, it says so expressly in the statutory text (as it has done elsewhere in ORS chapter 12).
• Is not brought within the “purview” of ORS 12.010 simply because ORS 12.125 is codified in ORS chapter 12. ORS 12.125 originated as part of the ORLTA (SB 159 (1973)) and was placed into chapter 12 by the Office of Legislative Counsel as an organizational step, not by the legislature; that codification choice carries no interpretive weight.
• Should be read against the longstanding rule that contract actions accrue at breach; thus, the one-year period for rental-agreement claims runs from breach. For statutory ORLTA claims covered by the same statute, the analogous trigger is the occurrence of the statutory violation itself.

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the circuit court’s judgment that had been premised on a discovery rule and a 10-year class window, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the one-year limitations period. The Court expressly did not decide issues of fraudulent concealment tolling (not alleged) or other assignments of error raised in defendants’ separate, denied petition for review.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Rice v. Rabb, 354 Or 721 (2014): Rice applied a discovery rule to claims for conversion/replevin under ORS 12.080(4), reasoning that statutes “under the purview of ORS 12.010” (which uses “accrued”) incorporate discovery by virtue of Berry v. Branner. Hathaway clarifies that not every statute codified in ORS chapter 12 is under ORS 12.010’s purview; codification alone is not determinative.
• Berry v. Branner, 245 Or 307 (1966): Berry construed “accrued” in ORS 12.010—applied to the tort limitations in ORS 12.110(1)—to include a discovery rule, overruling the earlier malpractice-trigger rule from Vaughn v. Langmack. Hathaway recognizes Berry’s principle where ORS 12.010 truly applies, but holds ORS 12.125 is not in that category.
• Vaughn v. Langmack, 236 Or 542 (1964): The pre-Berry position that limitations ran from occurrence in malpractice claims; cited as historical backdrop for Berry’s pivot to discovery for statutes that accrue under ORS 12.010.
• Gladhart v. Oregon Vineyard Supply Co., 332 Or 226 (2001): Emphasized that courts do not assume a discovery rule; the legislature “knows how to express” one. Hathaway uses this to reinforce that ORS 12.125’s silence on discovery is significant.
• Waldner v. Stephens, 345 Or 526 (2008): Interpreted “arising under” as subject-matter linkage (“authorized by, or brought in accordance with”), not a timing rule. Hathaway adopts this understanding to reject plaintiffs’ textual “arising = discovery” argument.
• Huff v. Great Western Seed Co., 322 Or 457 (1996), and Moore v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 317 Or 235 (1993): Instances where the Court declined to import discovery when the governing limitations scheme used language other than “accrue.” Hathaway cites the line of cases to illustrate when Berry/Rice do not apply.
• Vollertsen v. Lamb, 302 Or 489 (1987): Established that ORS 12.125 was enacted as part of the ORLTA and should be read “as if it still were part of” ORS chapter 90, despite its codification in chapter 12 by Legislative Counsel. Hathaway relies on Vollertsen to decouple ORS 12.125 from ORS 12.010.
• Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Oregon Pacific Industries, 262 Or 578 (1972): The classic rule that contract claims accrue at breach. Hathaway uses this to anchor ORS 12.125’s timing for rental agreement claims and to analogize statutory ORLTA claims to run from violation.
• Romero v. Amburn, 323 Or App 410 (2022): Not controlling here, but referenced by the Court as a discussion of tension between Rice’s discovery approach and the breach-accrual rule for contracts; Hathaway declines to resolve that broader tension because the case turns on ORS 12.125’s origin and context.

Legal Reasoning

Applying the State v. Gaines (346 Or 160) methodology, the Court examined text, context, and legislative history to determine whether a discovery rule is embodied in ORS 12.125.

• Text: ORS 12.125 says: “An action arising under a rental agreement or ORS chapter 90 shall be commenced within one year.” The phrase “arising under” identifies the source of the claim (rental agreements; ORLTA), not a timing trigger. The statute contains no words linking timeliness to discovery. In other Oregon limitations statutes, when the legislature intends discovery to control accrual, it says so expressly (e.g., ORS 12.110(4), 12.132, 12.274, 12.280, 12.137). The omission here is telling.
• Context: Plaintiffs argued that because ORS 12.125 is in chapter 12, ORS 12.010’s “accrual” clause applies by default, importing Berry’s discovery rule. The Court rejected that categorical approach. ORS 12.125 originated as §39 of SB 159 (1973) within the ORLTA; its later placement in chapter 12 was an organizational decision by Legislative Counsel under ORS 173.160, not a legislative enactment. Under Vollertsen, ORS 12.125 must be read as if still part of chapter 90. Therefore, it is not necessarily “under the purview of ORS 12.010,” and Berry’s discovery rule does not carry over by location alone.
• Legislative History: The one-year limitation was added to SB 159 “at the suggestion of Senator John Burns” to impose a “short (1 year)” statute “to prevent landlords and tenants from dragging out ancient history” in landlord-tenant disputes. Nothing in that history suggests a discovery-based accrual. The policy objective favors prompt resolution, not an indefinite tolling until discovery.
• Analogy to Contracts: ORS 12.125 expressly covers “an action arising under a rental agreement.” In 1973 (and now), Oregon law provided that contract claims accrue at breach (Seattle-First). The legislature adopted a shorter one-year period for the landlord-tenant context but gave no indication that it intended to depart from the breach-accrual rule for rental agreements—or to create a different, discovery-based trigger for companion statutory claims within the same one-year statute. The most sensible inference is a uniform trigger: breach for rental agreements and occurrence of violation for statutory ORLTA claims.

The Court also addressed two additional arguments:

• “Arising” Language Across Statutes: Plaintiffs noted that other discovery-rule statutes use the word “arising” (e.g., ORS 12.110(4)-(5), 12.132). The Court concluded the opposite inference is warranted: those statutes include express discovery text in addition to “arising,” confirming that “arising” does not itself signal discovery-based accrual.
• Rice’s “Purview of ORS 12.010”: Hathaway clarifies that Rice did not announce a blanket rule that all limitations provisions in chapter 12 derive accrual from ORS 12.010. Where, as here, the legislature enacted the period as part of a different statutory scheme (ORLTA) and Legislative Counsel later codified it in chapter 12 for organizational convenience, ORS 12.010’s accrual clause does not govern.

Impact

Hathaway decisively narrows the temporal scope of landlord-tenant litigation under ORS 12.125 and clarifies Oregon limitations law in several respects:

• ORLTA and rental agreement claims are subject to a hard one-year lookback from breach/violation, not from discovery. Tenants must file within a year of the alleged offending act (e.g., an improper charge), absent some other legally recognized tolling doctrine not addressed here.
• Class actions will be constrained: Certifications premised on decade-long periods anchored by discovery are no longer tenable. On remand in Hathaway, the trial court must recalibrate the class period and damages to a one-year window preceding filing (April 2012 to April 2013), subject to any case-specific determinations (e.g., how to treat separate billings).
• Codification location is not destiny: The decision reinforces that the placement of a statute in the ORS—especially when accomplished administratively by Legislative Counsel—does not, by itself, incorporate ORS 12.010’s “accrual” clause or any other rule. Courts must examine enactment history and statutory context to determine whether Berry/Rice apply.
• Contract accrual remains breach-based and, by analogy, statutory violations under ORS 12.125 also trigger the clock upon occurrence. This alignment promotes a coherent, uniform limitations regime within the landlord-tenant sphere.
• Strategic pleading and diligence will matter more: Parties should assess the timing of each alleged violation. Plaintiffs may explore alternative claims with different limitations frameworks where available, but ORS 12.125 will control ORLTA and rental agreement claims unless another statute expressly provides otherwise.
• Open questions remain: The Court expressly did not address fraudulent concealment tolling (no such allegation), “continuing violation” theories, or how recurring billings should be treated (as discrete breaches/violations or part of a single course of conduct). Those issues may arise on remand or in future cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Statute of limitations: A deadline for filing a lawsuit. Missing it usually bars the claim, regardless of its merits.
• Discovery rule: A principle that delays (tolls) the start of the limitations period until the plaintiff actually discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the facts giving rise to the claim. It must be embodied in the statute or clearly implied by the governing framework.
• Accrual: The moment a claim is legally capable of being filed. In Oregon, tort claims governed by ORS 12.010 often accrue on discovery (Berry), while contract claims accrue at breach. Hathaway holds that ORS 12.125 claims accrue at breach/violation, not discovery.
• “Under the purview of ORS 12.010”: A phrase from Rice meaning the statute of limitations in question derives its accrual rule from ORS 12.010’s “after the cause of action shall have accrued” language. Hathaway clarifies that merely being codified in chapter 12 does not place a statute under ORS 12.010’s purview when the legislature enacted it as part of a different scheme and Legislative Counsel later placed it in chapter 12 for organizational reasons.
• “Arising under”: In this context, a subject-matter descriptor. It means the claim originates in, is authorized by, or is brought in accordance with a rental agreement or the ORLTA. It does not define when the claim accrues or when the limitations clock starts.
• Legislative Counsel codification: The Office of Legislative Counsel may renumber or reorganize statutes in the ORS (ORS 173.160) without changing their meaning. Placement choices aid organization but are not evidence of legislative intent.
• Statute of repose vs. statute of limitations: A statute of repose sets an absolute deadline measured from the defendant’s act or omission, regardless of discovery, while a statute of limitations is typically measured from accrual. Plaintiffs invoked a 10-year repose concept in seeking a long class period, but Hathaway did not adjudicate whether any repose applies to ORLTA claims.
• Tolling: Legal doctrines that pause or extend the limitations period (e.g., fraudulent concealment). Hathaway does not foreclose tolling where established doctrines apply; it simply holds that ORS 12.125 itself does not include a discovery-based tolling rule.

Conclusion

Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc. establishes a clear rule with broad practical significance in Oregon landlord-tenant law: ORS 12.125 contains no discovery rule; the one-year limitations period for claims “arising under a rental agreement or ORS chapter 90” runs from breach or violation, not from discovery. The decision rests on a rigorous application of textual and contextual analysis under Gaines, an insistence that discovery rules must be expressed or clearly implied, and a careful separation of legislative enactment from codification choices by Legislative Counsel.

The ruling narrows the window for ORLTA-based class actions and individual suits, aligns the timing for rental-agreement and statutory claims, and clarifies that ORS 12.010’s accrual clause does not automatically govern every limitations period placed in chapter 12. While the Court leaves open other potential tolling doctrines and case-specific questions about recurring or continuing violations, Hathaway’s core holding provides a bright-line accrual rule likely to streamline landlord-tenant litigation and reduce uncertainty over timeliness defenses.

Key takeaway: Tenants and their counsel must act promptly. For landlords and park operators, the decision underscores the importance of ensuring compliance on a rolling basis, as each alleged breach or ORLTA violation starts its own one-year clock.

Case Details

• Case: Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc.
• Citation: 374 Or 212 (2025)
• Court: Supreme Court of Oregon
• Date: September 25, 2025
• Opinion by: Garrett, J.
• Disposition: Court of Appeals affirmed; circuit court reversed; remanded
• Core holding: ORS 12.125 has no discovery rule; one-year period runs from breach or ORLTA violation