Oros and Chambers Remain Controlling—But the Court Signals Reassessment of Premeditation and Police “Effect-on-Listener” Testimony in People v. Turner

Case: People of Michigan v. Keith Devon Turner, No. 167563 (Mich. Oct. 3, 2025)

Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Disposition: Application for leave to appeal denied; motions to remand and correct the record denied; motion to amend application granted.

Introduction

In an order denying leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court declined to review a homicide case arising from a late-night altercation outside a Flint nightclub. Although the Court issued no merits decision, two separate writings make Turner a consequential signal case in two fraught areas of Michigan criminal law:

Premeditation and the “second look” doctrine under People v Oros, 502 Mich 229 (2018) (Welch, J., concurring), and
The Confrontation Clause implications of police testimony relaying anonymous “tips” ostensibly to explain investigative steps—so-called “effect-on-the-listener” use (Hood, J., dissenting, joined by Bolden, J.).

The defendant, Keith Devon Turner, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and related firearm and assault offenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision, though one judge concluded the proof of premeditation and deliberation was insufficient. At the Supreme Court, Justice Welch concurred in denying leave while explicitly inviting reexamination of Michigan’s thin line between first- and second-degree murder; Justice Hood would have granted leave to consider whether a police officer’s testimony about multiple anonymous identifications of Turner as the “actual” shooter violated the Confrontation Clause and whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object.

While Turner sets no new binding rule, it meaningfully signals possible doctrinal recalibrations: (1) a stricter approach to what counts as “premeditation” under Oros’s “brief moment of thought,” and (2) reinvigorated limits on admitting testimonial hearsay from informants under the guise of background “effect-on-listener” testimony. The case thus matters both for homicide charging/sufficiency and for evidence law at the intersection of hearsay and confrontation.

Summary of the Order and Separate Writings

The Court:

Granted the motion to amend the application for leave to appeal.
Denied the application for leave to appeal the July 18, 2024 Court of Appeals judgment, finding no question warranting review.
Denied motions to remand and to correct the record.

Welch, J. (concurring, joined by Cavanagh, C.J.). The concurrence underscores concern that the difference between first- and second-degree murder—in Michigan, the difference between mandatory life without parole and a term-of-years sentence—is often “paper-thin.” Citing Oros, Justice Welch notes that a “brief moment of thought” or “matter of seconds” suffices for premeditation, a standard that can render the borderline between the two offenses arbitrary, especially in chaotic circumstances like those captured here on ambiguous video and conflicting eyewitness accounts. Nevertheless, because the defendant did not ask for Oros to be reconsidered, the concurrence agrees that denial of leave is appropriate under current law.

Hood, J. (dissenting, joined by Bolden, J.). The dissent would grant leave to decide whether the officer-in-charge’s testimony that multiple anonymous tipsters identified Turner as the shooter violated the Confrontation Clause and whether defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting. In a case with conflicting eyewitness accounts, the dissent reasons that such testimonial hearsay cannot be laundered as “effect on the listener” when, in substance, it is used as proof of identity—the central trial issue. The dissent questions the breadth of People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1 (2007), urges a narrower reading consistent with People v Eady, 409 Mich 356 (1980), and concludes that any error was not harmless on this record.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

1) Premeditation and the “Second Look” Doctrine: People v Oros and Related Authority

People v Oros, 502 Mich 229 (2018). Oros holds that premeditation and deliberation can be inferred from circumstances showing a “second look”—the opportunity to take a brief pause and reflect—even if the time is minimal, described as a “brief moment of thought” or a “matter of seconds.” This standard allows the jury to infer premeditation from circumstantial evidence such as the sequence of events, weapon use, and actions before and after the homicide.
MCL 750.316(1)(a) and MCL 750.317. Michigan law distinguishes first-degree murder (mandatory life without parole) from second-degree murder (life or a term of years) based on the presence of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. Justice Welch highlights the sentencing gulf and cites Michigan Department of Corrections data showing a 22.1-year average minimum for second-degree murder in 2023.
People v Morris, ___ Mich ___; 14 NW3d 411 (Dec. 26, 2024). Justice Welch previously suggested the need to revisit Michigan’s premeditation framework and the practical consequences of Oros’s minimal temporal requirement. Turner’s concurrence builds on that theme.

2) Confrontation Clause and “Effect-on-Listener” Testimony

Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004). Bars admission of testimonial hearsay against a defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. “Testimonial” statements include those made under circumstances objectively indicating they will be used later at trial.
Davis v Washington, 547 US 813 (2006). Clarifies the “primary purpose” test for distinguishing testimonial from nontestimonial statements, depending on whether statements were made to address an ongoing emergency or to establish facts for later prosecution.
People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515 (2011). Michigan Supreme Court reiterates that the Confrontation Clause applies to statements used as substantive evidence. Also synthesizes confrontation inquiries into whether a person is a witness against the accused and whether the accused had a chance to confront the witness.
People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1 (2007). Permits limited testimony about informant tips to explain police actions (e.g., why officers focused on a suspect or conducted surveillance) on the understanding that the statements are not offered for their truth. Turner’s dissent argues Chambers is being applied too broadly, risking circumvention of confrontation protections.
People v Eady, 409 Mich 356 (1980). The Michigan Supreme Court disapproved using a dispatch’s contents as substantive proof of contested facts; offers an early caution that “background” evidence must not double as substantive evidence on core issues.
People v Jackson, 113 Mich App 620 (1982). Found no confrontation problem where a 911 dispatcher’s statement explained the officers’ presence, and the jury clearly would not treat the content as substantive proof of a robbery—distinguished by Hood, J., from cases like Turner where identity is the central contested issue and the content of the “tip” is inherently substantive.
People v Spangler, 285 Mich App 136 (2009); People v Buie, 285 Mich App 401 (2009); People v McPherson, 263 Mich App 124 (2004). Michigan decisions elaborating on testimonial hearsay, confrontation scope, and non-hearsay uses.
Standards of Review and Prejudice: People v Carines, 460 Mich 750 (1999) (plain-error review for unpreserved claims), People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135 (2003) (ineffective assistance standard), and People v Washington, 514 Mich 583 (2024) (harmless error applies to confrontation violations).

Legal Reasoning Reflected in the Separate Writings

A. The Concurrence: Why Denial Was Appropriate Under Current Law

Justice Welch’s concurring statement identifies a structural concern: Michigan’s legal test allows juries to find premeditation based on exceptionally brief opportunities to reflect. Oros’s “brief moment of thought” standard makes the first/second-degree line exceedingly thin even in fast-moving, tumultuous situations—such as a chaotic brawl in a parking lot with unclear video and inconsistent eyewitness testimony. Because the defendant did not ask the Court to revisit or overrule Oros, the concurrence accepts that existing law sets a “low bar” for premeditation. Within that legal framework, there was no compelling reason to grant leave. The concurrence thus preserves institutional regularity while signaling openness to a doctrinal recalibration in a future case that squarely presents the question.

B. The Dissent: Anonymous “Tips” as Testimonial Hearsay and the Limits of “Effect-on-Listener”

Justice Hood’s dissent frames a recurring evidence problem: when officers testify that unnamed informants identified the defendant, the testimony often does double duty. Ostensibly offered to explain why police focused on a suspect, it simultaneously supplies substantive proof—identity. Under Crawford and its progeny, statements to police informants that would reasonably be used at trial are testimonial. If relayed for their truth (or in a manner the jury is likely to treat as truth), they trigger confrontation rights. The dissent reasons that:

Multiple anonymous identifications of Turner as the “actual” shooter were inherently testimonial and were used substantively to prove identity, not merely to explain investigative steps.
Chambers should be read narrowly. It allowed limited background testimony explaining police actions where the informant’s statement was not used to prove a contested fact. Turner is different: identity was the central issue and the content of the tips went directly to that issue.
Admitting the testimony was plain error affecting substantial rights in a thin case with conflicting eyewitness accounts; and defense counsel’s failure to object was likely deficient and prejudicial, supporting an ineffective assistance claim.

The dissent also highlights that the Court of Appeals over-relied on Chambers, risking an “exception” that would swallow the Crawford rule by permitting the State to present testimonial accusations through officers, insulated by a nominal “effect-on-listener” rationale.

Potential Impact and Forward-Looking Considerations

1) Premeditation Doctrine May Be Revisited

Turner fortifies a growing signal—already present in Morris—that the Court is open to recalibrating the “second look” doctrine. A future grant could:

Require more robust evidence of planning or reflection beyond mere temporal opportunity.
Refocus deliberation on the quality of reflection (e.g., purposefulness, calmness, or sequence of actions) rather than the sheer possibility of a split-second pause.
Reduce arbitrary sentencing outcomes by more sharply differentiating premeditated killings from impulsive or chaotic ones.

For charging decisions, appellate sufficiency challenges, and jury instruction practice, Turner signals that prosecutors may face higher scrutiny when arguing premeditation based solely on momentary pauses in fluid, violent encounters.

2) Renewed Scrutiny of “Effect-on-Listener” Police Testimony

The dissent’s analysis invites renewed attention to how “background” testimony is elicited and used:

When identity or another core element is genuinely disputed, testimony that “anonymous tipsters named the defendant” walks straight into Crawford territory. Such statements are predictably treated by juries as substantive proof, regardless of limiting invocations.
Chambers should not be treated as a blanket safe harbor. Courts may require sanitization (e.g., “based on information received, we focused on Mr. Turner”) without relaying accusatory content or numbers of accusers, coupled with limiting instructions and, where appropriate, exclusion under MRE 403 due to unfair prejudice.
Defense counsel should object early and seek motions in limine to preclude testimonial hearsay presented as “effect on the listener,” particularly where the informants are anonymous and unavailable for cross-examination.

In short, Turner puts Michigan practitioners on notice that the Court may curtail expansive use of background hearsay that doubles as critical substantive evidence.

3) Harmless Error and Ineffective Assistance in Confrontation Cases

The dissent’s reliance on Washington (harmless error applies to confrontation violations) and Riley (ineffective assistance) indicates that where the State’s case is not overwhelming and the disputed testimony goes to identity, reversal may be warranted. Practitioners should build a record on prejudice by showing the centrality of the hearsay to the verdict, especially amid inconsistent eyewitness evidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Premeditation and Deliberation: For first-degree murder in Michigan, the prosecution must show the defendant decided to kill (premeditation) and reflected on that decision (deliberation) before acting. Under current law (Oros), even a very brief pause—seconds—can suffice if it shows the defendant had time to take a “second look.”
“Second Look” Doctrine: A shorthand for the idea that premeditation can be inferred from circumstances suggesting a chance to reflect, even momentarily, before killing. Turner’s concurrence questions whether this standard is too permissive.
Confrontation Clause: The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to confront witnesses against them. If someone’s out-of-court accusation is “testimonial” (made under circumstances suggesting it will be used at trial), it generally cannot be used unless the declarant testifies or was previously subject to cross-examination.
“Effect-on-the-Listener” Use: Some out-of-court statements are admitted not to prove their truth but to explain why someone (like a police officer) acted as they did. This is not hearsay. But if the content is inherently accusatory and the jury is likely to take it as truth (e.g., “multiple anonymous people identified the defendant”), the Confrontation Clause may still be implicated.
Plain Error Review: If counsel did not object at trial, an appellate court asks whether there was a clear error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights and the outcome, and whether relief is warranted.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A defendant must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense—i.e., there is a reasonable probability of a different result absent counsel’s error.
Harmless Error in Confrontation Cases: Even if a violation occurred, a conviction stands if the error did not affect the verdict. The more central the hearsay to a disputed element (like identity), the less likely the error is harmless.

Practical Guidance for Future Cases

Charging and Trial Strategy (Premeditation): Prosecutors should marshal evidence of planning and reflection beyond a mere opportunity to pause. Defense counsel should emphasize chaotic, rapidly evolving circumstances to undermine inferences of deliberation.
Evidence Management (Confrontation):
- Prosecutors: If background is necessary, avoid relaying accusatory content. Use neutral phrasing and seek limiting instructions.
- Defense: Move in limine to bar testimonial tip content, particularly anonymous identifications. Object contemporaneously and request curative instructions if necessary.
- Trial Courts: Enforce a narrow “effect-on-listener” lane; if the statement’s probative force depends on its truth—and especially if it goes to a key element—exclude or strictly limit it.
Preservation: Given Carines, contemporaneous objections are critical to avoid plain-error hurdles. Ineffective assistance claims may be necessary but are harder to win on direct appeal without a developed record.

Conclusion

People v. Turner establishes no new binding precedent; the Supreme Court denied leave, leaving the Court of Appeals’ unpublished affirmance in place. Yet the separate writings make Turner an important waypoint. Justice Welch’s concurrence underscores growing doubt about the breadth of the “second look” doctrine under Oros, pointing to the profound sentencing consequences that hinge on a “paper-thin” distinction between degrees of murder. Justice Hood’s dissent highlights another pressing concern: the misuse of testimonial hearsay under the “effect-on-listener” rubric, particularly when anonymous tips identify a defendant on a central issue like identity in a case built on conflicting eyewitness accounts.

The upshot is twofold. First, Oros remains controlling—for now—but the Court is signaling openness to revisiting premeditation’s contours. Second, while Chambers continues to permit some background testimony, its broad application is under scrutiny; statements that practically function as substantive proof of guilt, especially testimonial accusations, risk running afoul of the Confrontation Clause. Turner therefore counsels caution for prosecutors, vigilance for defense counsel, and careful gatekeeping for trial courts. Should a suitable case present square challenges to Oros or to expansive “effect-on-listener” practices, the Court appears poised to recalibrate Michigan law in both domains.