Ordinary Negligence Against Health Care Providers Survives Only for Conduct Independent of the Medical Relationship: Commentary on Renown Regional Medical Center v. Dist. Ct. (Freeman)

Ordinary Negligence Against Health Care Providers Survives Only for Conduct Independent of the Medical Relationship

Commentary on Renown Regional Medical Center v. District Court (Freeman), 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 64 (Dec. 11, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Renown Regional Medical Center v. District Court (Freeman) (No. 89838, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 64) is a major clarification – and tightening – of the boundary between “professional negligence” and “ordinary negligence” in suits against health care providers under NRS Chapter 41A.

At stake was whether a hospital’s allegedly negligent discharge planning, failure to document and escalate a spouse’s warnings, and inadequate policies and training regarding safe discharge could be pursued as a separate ordinary negligence claim, or whether those theories are necessarily part of a professional negligence action subject to Chapter 41A’s special requirements (expert affidavit, damage cap, limitations period, etc.).

The court holds that:

  • When a health care provider’s allegedly negligent conduct occurs within the course of the provider–patient professional relationship, any claim based on that conduct sounds in professional negligence.
  • An ordinary negligence claim against a health care provider can survive as a stand-alone claim only if it is based on conduct that is independent of the medical relationship.
  • Decisions regarding whether, when, and how to discharge a patient – and the policies, training, documentation, and communications that implement those decisions – are inherently linked to medical diagnosis, treatment, or judgment and therefore fall under professional negligence.

Applied here, the court concludes that the plaintiff’s claim for negligent credentialing, hiring, training, supervision, and retention against Renown Regional Medical Center is not an “ordinary negligence” claim but must be treated as part of her professional negligence claim. The Supreme Court grants a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to subsume (fold) that count into the professional negligence claim.

II. Overview of the Case

A. Parties and Factual Background

The case arises from the treatment and discharge of Scott Freeman, a medically complex patient with:

  • End-stage renal disease on dialysis,
  • Hypertension,
  • Insulin-dependent diabetes, and
  • Vascular disease resulting in an amputation.

On October 26, 2022, Scott’s minor daughter found him unconscious on the bathroom floor, covered in fecal matter. She called 911 with Scott’s wife, Melissa Freeman, on a three-way call (Melissa was out of town).

Emergency medical services (EMS) documented:

  • An altered level of consciousness,
  • Later, after a shower, hypertensive and hyperglycemic status with difficulty staying awake,
  • “Rhythmic twitching/flexing of extremities with decreasing level of mentation.”

Because of his altered mental status, Scott was unable to sign a consent form for treatment and transport. EMS transported him to petitioner Renown Regional Medical Center, which assumed care at 11:50 p.m.

Key events at Renown, according to the complaint (accepted as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage), include:

  • At 12:45 a.m., a physician entered a discharge order – less than an hour after Renown assumed care.
  • At 12:58 a.m., Melissa called nursing staff, expressing:
    • Concern about Scott’s rising glucose levels (which she was monitoring remotely on her phone), and
    • That no adult was at home to receive or care for Scott.
  • The nurse did not document these concerns or convey them to Scott’s physician.
  • At 1:29 a.m., Scott was wheeled to the lobby and allowed to take an Uber home alone.

When Melissa returned home less than eight hours later, she found Scott unresponsive and gurgling on the bathroom floor. He was transported to another hospital, where he was diagnosed with a large acute subdural hematoma and diabetic ketoacidosis, underwent surgery, sustained brain damage, and ultimately died after prolonged hospitalization.

B. Procedural History

Before Scott’s death, Melissa sued:

  • Renown Regional Medical Center,
  • Renown nurse Emilie C. Hyland (together, “petitioners”),
  • Northern Nevada Emergency Physicians,
  • Physician David Benaron, M.D., and
  • Nurse Tyler Cline, RN.

In her first amended complaint, Melissa alleged:

  • Professional negligence (medical malpractice) in caring for and discharging Scott;
  • Negligent credentialing, hiring, training, supervision, and retention against Renown, alleging that:
    • Renown knew or should have known its medical staff was unfit to care properly for Scott;
    • Renown failed to hire, train, supervise, and retain competent employees; and
    • Renown should have had adequate policies, procedures, and training in place regarding patient advocacy and safe discharge of emergency room patients.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the negligent credentialing/hiring/training/supervision/retention (NCHTSR) claim, arguing:

  1. It is “inextricably linked” to the professional negligence claim and therefore must be treated as professional negligence under NRS Chapter 41A, and
  2. Alternatively, it should be dismissed for failure to comply with NRS 41A.071’s expert affidavit requirement.

The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the NCHTSR claim did not raise issues of medical judgment beyond common knowledge and therefore sounded in ordinary negligence.

After this ruling, the Nevada Supreme Court issued Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas LLC, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 45, 550 P.3d 825 (2024), significantly refining the professional negligence vs. ordinary negligence distinction. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration in light of Limprasert.

The district court:

  • Concluded Limprasert did not overrule prior cases (like DeBoer and Szymborski) recognizing ordinary negligence claims against health care providers for non-medical acts, and
  • Held that the essence of Melissa’s NCHTSR claim was that Renown failed to perform an “administrative” rather than “medical” function (discharge policies and staffing decisions), so ordinary negligence still applied.

Melissa later filed a second amended complaint (after Scott’s death), adding:

  • A wrongful death claim; and
  • A new expert affidavit.

The challenged NCHTSR claim, however, remained substantively identical.

Petitioners filed an original petition for a writ of mandamus in the Nevada Supreme Court, challenging:

  • The denial of their motion to dismiss the NCHTSR claim; and
  • The denial of their motion for reconsideration based on Limprasert.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Writing for a unanimous three-justice panel (Herndon, C.J., Bell, and Stiglich, J., with Justice Stiglich authoring the opinion), the Nevada Supreme Court:

  1. Accepts mandamus review under the first Int’l Game Technology exception because:
    • There is no factual dispute material to the issue; and
    • Limprasert supplies clear authority that the district court misapplied.
  2. Rejects mootness based on the filing of the second amended complaint, because:
    • The NCHTSR claim was reasserted and is substantively identical; and
    • The legal question (whether it sounds in professional negligence) remains live and capable of meaningful relief.
  3. Clarifies and restates the governing test under Limprasert and NRS 41A.015:
    “The sole inquiry is whether the claim involves a provider of health care rendering services in a way that causes injury.”
    and
    “For an ordinary negligence claim against a health care provider to survive as a stand-alone claim, it must be based on conduct that is independent of the medical relationship.”
  4. Holds that Melissa’s NCHTSR claim sounds in professional negligence because:
    • The gravamen (core) of the claim is petitioners’ decision to discharge a medically complex patient in the middle of the night,
    • That decision and the related failures (to document/communicate Melissa’s concerns, to have appropriate discharge policies) occurred within, and were dependent on, the professional relationship with Scott,
    • Such discharge decisions inherently involve medical diagnosis, treatment, or judgment, and
    • Related policies and staff training on discharge are “inherently linked to the provision of medical treatment” in the same way infection-control cleanliness was in Montanez.
  5. Distinguishes DeBoer and Szymborski as cases involving conduct that genuinely occurred outside the professional relationship:
    • DeBoer: a social worker assisting with financial power-of-attorney arrangements.
    • Szymborski: a father suing for property damage caused by his son after discharge, where the father himself was not a patient.
  6. Concludes the district court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss (or to subsume) the NCHTSR claim, by misapplying Limprasert and related precedent.
  7. Issues a writ of mandamus directing the district court:
    • To vacate the portion of its order denying dismissal of Melissa’s stand-alone NCHTSR claim; and
    • To grant petitioners’ request to subsume that claim under the professional negligence claim (rather than dismissing it outright, since the existing expert affidavits satisfy NRS 41A.071).

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

1. NRS 41A.015 and the Definition of Professional Negligence

NRS 41A.015 defines “professional negligence” as:

“the failure of a provider of health care, in rendering services, to use the reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and experienced providers of health care.”

NRS 41A.017 defines “provider of health care.” The parties agreed that Renown and its nurse are “providers of health care” within that statute.

This definition has long triggered a host of special rules:

  • The requirement of an expert affidavit at filing (NRS 41A.071),
  • Special statutes of limitation (NRS 41A.097),
  • Damages caps (e.g., NRS 41A.035 for noneconomic damages), and
  • Substantive limitations and defenses unique to medical malpractice.

Thus, whether a claim is treated as “professional negligence” rather than ordinary negligence has profound consequences.

2. Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas LLC

Limprasert is the backdrop for Freeman and is repeatedly invoked and applied. There, the court:

  • Read NRS 41A.015 to mean that a claim “arising from services rendered within the course of the relationship between a patient and a health care provider” sounds in professional negligence;
  • Announced that the “sole inquiry” for classification is:
    whether the claim involves a provider of health care rendering services in a way that causes injury.
  • Explicitly rejected earlier suggestions that the classification turned on:
    • The complexity of the proof; or
    • Whether expert testimony/affidavits were necessary for the jury to understand the allegations.

In other words, after Limprasert, a claim is not ordinary negligence simply because lay jurors might understand it without expert help. The question is where, and in what capacity, the alleged negligence occurred: inside or outside the professional provider–patient relationship.

3. Estate of Curtis v. South Las Vegas Medical Investors, LLC

In Estate of Curtis, 136 Nev. 350, 466 P.3d 1263 (2020), the court held that when the underlying allegations are “inextricably linked to professional negligence,” a plaintiff cannot escape Chapter 41A by labeling the theory “negligent hiring, training, and supervision.”

Though Estate of Curtis was later overruled on other grounds by Limprasert, this principle remains good law and is directly reaffirmed in Freeman.

Freeman draws heavily on this “inextricably linked” concept: if the allegedly negligent corporate policies, training, or supervision are directed to the provision of medical care during the professional relationship, they fall within professional negligence.

4. Montanez v. Sparks Family Hospital, Inc.

In Montanez, 137 Nev. 742, 499 P.3d 1189 (2021), a patient developed a bacterial eye infection that led to blindness soon after surgery. She brought, among other things, a premises liability claim, arguing that the hospital’s failure to keep its facilities clean was a non-medical, ordinary negligence issue.

The court rejected this, holding:

  • A claim that a hospital’s lack of cleanliness caused a patient’s postoperative infection sounds in professional negligence; and
  • “The level of cleanliness that a medical provider must maintain is inherently linked to the provision of medical treatment.”

Freeman uses Montanez to analogize discharge policies and practices to infection-control cleanliness: both are operational or “administrative” on the surface, but they are functionally inseparable from the standard of care in treating patients.

5. Szymborski and DeBoer: True Ordinary Negligence Outside the Medical Relationship

The district court in Freeman relied on two earlier cases – Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatment Center, 133 Nev. 638, 403 P.3d 1280 (2017), and DeBoer v. Senior Bridges of Sparks Family Hospital, Inc., 128 Nev. 406, 282 P.3d 727 (2012) – to argue that certain “administrative” acts by health care providers can be pursued as ordinary negligence.

In DeBoer, a social worker at an acute care facility helped a dementia patient execute a financial power-of-attorney. The third party with that power misappropriated the patient’s assets. The court held that:

  • Helping a patient set up financial arrangements was not a medical function; and
  • The social worker’s conduct fell outside the facility’s provision of health care services, so the claim was ordinary negligence.

In Szymborski, a father sued a treatment center after it discharged his son, transported him to the father’s home without notice, and the son caused significant property damage. The father himself was not a patient, and he asserted claims in his own capacity for damage to his property. The court held that:

  • The father’s claims did not arise from a medical provider–patient relationship between himself and the facility; and
  • His action was ordinary negligence, not professional negligence.

Freeman embraces these cases but narrows their scope: they exemplify situations where the allegedly negligent act either:

  • Is unrelated to medical diagnosis, treatment, or judgment (e.g., purely financial arrangements), or
  • Occurs in a context where the plaintiff is not the patient and has no provider–patient relationship with the health care entity.

By contrast, where a patient (or the patient’s estate) sues a provider for actions that are part of the provider’s medical management of that very patient, Limprasert and now Freeman require those claims to be treated as professional negligence.

6. Writ Standards and Mootness: International Game Technology, Walker, Armstrong, and Orbitz

Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewable only on appeal after final judgment. However, under Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial District Court, 124 Nev. 193, 179 P.3d 556 (2008), the Supreme Court will entertain a writ petition in two narrow circumstances:

  1. Where there is no factual dispute and the district court is obligated to dismiss under clear statutory or rule-based authority; or
  2. Where an important legal issue needs clarification and judicial economy strongly favors intervention.

Here, the first exception applies: Limprasert provides clear authority, the facts are undisputed for purposes of classification, and the district court misapplied controlling law.

The court also reaffirms that mandamus review lies only where the district court has “manifestly abused” its discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously (Walker v. Second Judicial District Court, 136 Nev. 678, 476 P.3d 1194 (2020), quoting Armstrong).

On mootness, the court cites Orbitz Worldwide, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 139 Nev. 367, 535 P.3d 1173 (2023), and holds that the later filing of a second amended complaint with the same challenged claim does not moot a writ petition. The amendment does not render the legal issue abstract or prevent effective relief.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Freeman

1. Central Question: Where Did the Alleged Negligence Occur?

The court starts and ends with the Limprasert test: whether the claim “pertains to an action that occurred within the course of a professional relationship.”

Applying that test, it reasons:

  • The decision to discharge Scott was made only because he was a patient at Renown and was being treated by its providers.
  • Determining whether to admit him for observation, assessing his risks in light of his significant comorbidities, and deciding whether and how to discharge him safely are core functions of medical judgment, diagnosis, and treatment.
  • The nurse’s failure to document Melissa’s concerns and to relay them to the physician is directly tied to the discharge decision and thus to the professional relationship.
  • Renown’s alleged failure to implement adequate discharge policies, training, and supervision is likewise “inherently linked” to the provision of medical care, just like infection-control policies in Montanez.

Thus, every aspect of the NCHTSR claim is rooted in how Renown and its staff rendered medical services to Scott as a patient. There is no conduct alleged that is independent of that relationship.

2. Rejecting the “Administrative vs. Medical” Distinction

The district court tried to preserve an ordinary negligence path by labeling the challenged actions as “administrative” (policies, hiring, documentation) rather than “medical.” The Supreme Court firmly rejects this:

  • Many hospital functions – including policies, staffing, credentialing, documentation, and communication protocols – are “administrative” in form, but they can be substantively medical when they govern how care is provided.
  • Under Limprasert and Montanez, the classification turns not on labels like “administrative” but on whether the alleged conduct is “inextricably linked” to the provision of medical treatment to the patient.
  • Discharge planning and execution are quintessential medical management decisions, and the policies and training surrounding them are part of how the hospital renders medical services.

As a result, even if one could describe the discharge policies as “administrative,” they still fall squarely within professional negligence because they govern care delivered within the professional relationship.

3. Why DeBoer and Szymborski Do Not Control

The Supreme Court carefully distinguishes the two cases the district court relied on:

  • In DeBoer, the social worker’s assistance with a power-of-attorney was financial/legal assistance – “cannot be regarded as a medical function.” It did not involve diagnosis, treatment, or medical judgment about the patient’s condition.
  • In Szymborski, the plaintiff was not the patient. The father was suing in his own right for property damage on a theory that the facility negligently arranged for his son’s discharge location. His claim did not depend on whether the facility properly diagnosed or treated his son as a patient.

By contrast, in Freeman:

  • Melissa sues on behalf of Scott (individually and as personal representative of his estate).
  • The alleged damages are Scott’s injuries and death – quintessential medical consequences.
  • The disputed conduct is the hospital’s medical decision-making and discharge planning for Scott.

Therefore, DeBoer and Szymborski are viewed as corner cases where the conduct or the plaintiff lies outside the provider–patient medical relationship – precisely the category where ordinary negligence remains viable.

4. Treatment of Negligent Credentialing, Hiring, Training, Supervision, and Retention

A key practical question is whether claims like “negligent credentialing” or “negligent training” survive at all after Freeman. The Court’s answer is nuanced:

  • Plaintiffs can still allege that a hospital negligently hired or trained staff, or failed to implement adequate policies.
  • But where those theories relate to the provision of medical services to the plaintiff as a patient, they must be treated as professional negligence theories.
  • Such theories cannot be used as a separate “ordinary negligence” count to avoid Chapter 41A’s expert affidavit requirement or damages cap, as cautioned in Estate of Curtis.

In Freeman, the Court acknowledges that Melissa’s expert affidavits satisfy NRS 41A.071 and address the underlying professional negligence. Petitioners did not challenge the sufficiency of those affidavits. Therefore, while the separate NCHTSR claim cannot stand as an ordinary negligence cause of action, its substantive allegations may still be pursued within the professional negligence claim.

The remedy, accordingly, is not outright dismissal, but subsumption: the district court must:

  • Vacate its denial of the motion to dismiss the standalone NCHTSR count; and
  • Treat those allegations as part of the professional negligence claim governed by Chapter 41A.

C. The New Boundary Rule: Ordinary vs. Professional Negligence After Freeman

The most important doctrinal statement in Freeman is:

“For an ordinary negligence claim against a health care provider to survive as a stand-alone claim, it must be based on conduct that is independent of the medical relationship.”

Taken together with Limprasert, Estate of Curtis, and Montanez, the landscape is now:

1. Conduct That Is Inextricably Linked to the Medical Relationship

These claims must be treated as professional negligence (subject to NRS Chapter 41A), even if they are labeled otherwise:

  • Decisions to admit, discharge, or transfer a patient;
  • Monitoring and responding to vital signs or lab abnormalities;
  • Communication among providers and nurses about a patient’s condition;
  • Documentation of symptoms, concerns, and physician orders;
  • Infection-control and cleanliness affecting the patient’s risk of medical complications (Montanez);
  • Policies and training governing how staff discharge, monitor, or treat patients;
  • Hospital-level decisions about staffing, credentialing, and supervision insofar as they govern how care is delivered to the plaintiff-patient.

In each of these, the conduct applies only because the person is a patient receiving medical care; the harm alleged is medical in nature; and the content of the duty turns on professional medical standards.

2. Conduct Independent of the Medical Relationship

Ordinary negligence survives where:

  • The conduct does not involve diagnosis, treatment, or medical judgment about the plaintiff’s health; and
  • The duty alleged is not dependent on the person’s status as a patient.

Examples (from cases or logical extrapolation) include:

  • Financial or legal assistance unrelated to treatment, as in DeBoer, where a social worker facilitated a power-of-attorney not as part of medical treatment but as a separate financial arrangement.
  • Injuries to non-patient third parties, as in Szymborski, where a non-patient father sued for property damage caused by his son after discharge.
  • Potentially, general premises hazards not tied to treatment – e.g., a visitor slipping on a wet floor in the hospital cafeteria, or a delivery driver injured in a loading dock accident. Those duties arise from general premises liability, not medical care.

In such cases, the relationship is ordinary landowner–invitee, provider–third party, or advisor–client, not provider–patient.

D. Practical Impact

1. For Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel

  • No more “workarounds”: Plaintiffs cannot avoid Chapter 41A requirements by re-pleading aspects of care as “ordinary negligence,” “premises liability,” or “negligent hiring/training,” if the conduct occurred as part of the medical relationship.
  • Pleading strategy: Corporate negligence, negligent credentialing, and negligent policies can and should still be alleged, but they must:
    • Be clearly tied to the standard of care within the professional negligence claim; and
    • Be supported by expert affidavits under NRS 41A.071.
  • Expert affidavits: Affidavits must be broad enough to cover:
    • Individual provider negligence (e.g., nurse, physician), and
    • Institutional negligence (e.g., hospital policies, training, staffing) as professional negligence theories.
  • Damages caps and timing: Claims tied to medical services will be subject to medical malpractice damages caps and limitation periods. Plaintiffs should not assume they can obtain uncapped or differently-timed recovery by recasting the same facts as ordinary negligence.

2. For Health Care Providers and Defense Counsel

  • Early motions to dismiss or to reclassify will remain a crucial tool. Defense counsel should:
    • Scrutinize any “ordinary negligence” or “premises liability” counts in suits brought by patients; and
    • Move to dismiss or subsume them into the professional negligence claim under Freeman and Limprasert.
  • Unified defense strategy: Because policies, training, and supervision are now unequivocally part of professional negligence when they affect care, defendants can:
    • Address all such theories under the medical standard of care; and
    • Utilize Chapter 41A’s protections uniformly across individual and corporate allegations.
  • Discharge practices under heightened scrutiny: This decision highlights discharge planning, communication with families, and safe transport policies as central to the professional standard of care. Expect more expert-driven scrutiny and discovery in this area.

3. For Trial Courts

  • Classification is a legal question: Courts must look beyond labels to the gravamen of the allegations – not whether an expert is needed.
  • Subsumption rather than reflexive dismissal: Where the plaintiff has complied with NRS 41A.071 and the facts describe professional negligence, courts should:
    • Reject parallel ordinary negligence counts covering the same conduct; but
    • Permit the underlying factual theories to proceed as part of the professional negligence claim.

4. For Third-Party and Non-Patient Claims

Freeman reaffirms that:

  • Non-patient third parties (like the father in Szymborski) can still bring ordinary negligence claims for harms they personally suffer; and
  • Claims that arise from purely non-medical functions (like financial planning in DeBoer) remain ordinary negligence, even if perpetrated by a health care entity employee.

The critical inquiry is always whether the allegedly negligent act:

  • Was done in the course of rendering medical services to the plaintiff as a patient; or
  • Was an independent, non-medical act giving rise to a non-medical duty to a non-patient.

E. Key Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Professional Negligence vs. Ordinary Negligence

  • Professional negligence (in the Nevada Chapter 41A sense) means:
    • A health care provider,
    • While rendering medical services to a patient,
    • Fails to use the care, skill, or knowledge ordinarily used by similar providers under similar circumstances.
  • Ordinary negligence means:
    • Failure to use reasonable care under the circumstances,
    • In any non-specialized context – such as driving, maintaining premises, conducting business – where no special professional patient-care duty is at issue.

In Nevada, when a health care provider is being sued, the question is not just what they did, but whether they were doing it as part of providing medical care to a patient. If yes, Chapter 41A applies.

2. “Inextricably Linked” and “Subsumed”

  • When the court says conduct or a theory is “inextricably linked” to professional negligence, it means:
    • The alleged wrong can’t be meaningfully separated from the patient’s medical care; and
    • It necessarily depends on medical judgment, diagnosis, or treatment.
  • When a claim is “subsumed” under professional negligence, the separate label (e.g., “negligent hiring”) is not recognized as an independent claim; instead:
    • The same facts are treated as one unified professional negligence claim; and
    • The plaintiff may still prove those facts, but only under Chapter 41A’s framework.

3. Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary order from a higher court directing a lower court to perform a particular legal duty or to correct a clear abuse of discretion. It is:

  • Not a substitute for an ordinary appeal;
  • Used sparingly, when immediate correction is needed and an appeal after final judgment would be inadequate; and
  • In Freeman, used to correct misapplication of clear legal authority (Limprasert) regarding the classification of claims.

V. Conclusion

Renown Regional Medical Center v. District Court (Freeman) cements a bright-line rule in Nevada medical malpractice jurisprudence:

If the alleged negligence occurs within, and as part of, the professional provider–patient relationship, it is professional negligence, even when framed as negligent policies, hiring, training, supervision, or “administrative” decisions like discharge planning.

Only when a health care provider’s conduct is genuinely independent of the medical relationship – such as financial arrangements unrelated to treatment or injuries to non-patients in non-medical contexts – can an ordinary negligence claim survive as a stand-alone cause of action.

Practically, this decision:

  • Eliminates most opportunities to plead around NRS Chapter 41A through creative labeling;
  • Forces plaintiffs to bring all patient-care-related theories, including corporate negligence and discharge policies, under the professional negligence rubric with expert support;
  • Provides health care providers and trial courts a clearer, more predictable classification rule; and
  • Signals that discharge decisions and related policies are central elements of the medical standard of care in Nevada.

In conjunction with Limprasert, Estate of Curtis, and Montanez, Freeman completes a doctrinal shift: rather than asking whether a jury needs an expert, Nevada courts must ask where and in what capacity the alleged wrongful conduct occurred. Where the answer is “within the course of a professional medical relationship,” the action is, and must be, treated as professional negligence under NRS Chapter 41A.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

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