Introduction

United States v. Wilson is a Second Circuit summary order addressing the imposition and review of supervised release conditions following a guilty plea to assaulting federal court security officers under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b). The panel (Judges Sullivan and Nathan, and District Judge Reyes sitting by designation) affirms two special conditions, finds waiver as to a third, and vacates the “standard” conditions of supervised release because the district court failed to provide notice at sentencing as required by the Second Circuit’s recent en banc decision in United States v. Maiorana.

The appeal presents three interlocking issues:

• Whether the district court adequately justified the three special conditions (financial disclosure, no-contact with victims, and mental-health treatment).
• Whether any challenges were waived or forfeited and the applicable standard of review (waiver vs. plain error).
• Whether “standard” conditions under U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c) must be orally pronounced or expressly incorporated at sentencing.

Although the order is non-precedential, it is citable under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1 and is particularly instructive because it operationalizes the Second Circuit’s recent en banc pronouncement in Maiorana and clarifies how waiver and plain-error doctrines interact with supervised release conditions.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands:

• Mental-health treatment condition: Challenge waived because defense counsel affirmatively proposed it at sentencing. The court therefore does not review it even for plain error.
• Financial-disclosure condition: Affirmed under plain-error review. Even though the district court did not articulate reasons on the record, the rationale is “self-evident” given the restitution order and the Guidelines’ recommendation for financial disclosure where restitution is imposed.
• No-contact-with-victims condition: Affirmed under plain-error review. The record makes the justification self-evident given the assault on three CSOs and the need to protect victims.
• Standard conditions of supervised release (U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)): Vacated and remanded because the district court did not orally pronounce or expressly incorporate them at sentencing. Under Maiorana, non-mandatory conditions require notice during the sentencing proceeding. If the district court intends to reimpose them on remand, it must convene a hearing and advise the defendant by reciting the conditions or expressly adopting written conditions made available in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a court notice. The defendant may waive such a hearing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Standards of review:
  • United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2019): Abuse-of-discretion review generally applies to supervised release conditions.
  • United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69 (2d Cir. 2025): When a defendant has notice a condition will be imposed and fails to object, review is confined to plain error. Wilson’s failure to object to two special conditions triggered plain-error review.
  • United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Dussard, 967 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2007): The four prongs of plain-error review and the admonition that reversal for plain error is exceptional.
  • United States v. Washington, 904 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2018): De novo review where a defendant lacked prior notice of the conditions. This paved the way for vacating the standard conditions here.
• Waiver vs. forfeiture:
  • United States v. Spruill, 808 F.3d 585 (2d Cir. 2015): Invited-error doctrine—when a defendant actively solicits or agrees to a course of action, challenges may be waived.
  • United States v. Kon Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116 (2d Cir. 1995): True waiver extinguishes a claim and forecloses even plain error review.
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 775 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 2014): A defendant who affirmatively requests a condition is barred from challenging it on appeal.
  • United States v. Thompson, 143 F.4th 169 (2d Cir. 2025): Agreement with a special condition constitutes waiver.
• Substantive limits on special conditions:
  • United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008): District courts have wide latitude in imposing supervised release conditions.
  • United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2019): Conditions must be reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors, involve no greater deprivation than necessary, and be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.
  • United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Courts must make an individualized assessment and state reasons; however, appellate courts may uphold a condition if the reasoning is self-evident in the record.
  • United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2024): Guidelines-recommended conditions are “necessary to the administration of supervised release” and “presumed suitable in all cases.”
• Pronouncement/notice requirement:
  • United States v. Maiorana, No. 22-1115, 2025 WL 2471027 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2025) (en banc): Sentencing courts intending to impose non-mandatory conditions, including “standard” conditions under § 5D1.3(c), must notify the defendant at sentencing by reading them aloud or expressly adopting them by reference to written conditions made available in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a court notice. Failure warrants vacatur and remand for proper pronouncement. Wilson is an application of this fresh en banc rule.
• Guidelines provisions:
  • U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c): “Standard” conditions recommended by the Guidelines.
  • U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(3): Recommends financial-information disclosure where restitution is imposed, supporting Wilson’s financial-disclosure condition.
• Statutory anchors:
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d): Mandatory conditions; framework for supervised release conditions.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B)–(D): Nature and circumstances of the offense; deterrence, protection of the public, and treatment needs—factors that justify the no-contact and mental-health conditions.

Legal Reasoning Applied to Wilson

The court parses each category of conditions with attention to preservation, standard of review, and the evidentiary record.

• Mental-health condition: Waiver

  Defense counsel explicitly suggested that mental-health treatment at the VA could be a supervised release condition. Under Rodriguez and Thompson, that affirmative proposal constitutes waiver, which “extinguishes” the claim (Kon Yu-Leung) and bars even plain-error review. The court thus does not reach the merits or the degree of on-record explanation.

• Financial-disclosure condition: Affirmed under plain-error review

  Wilson did not object, so the panel reviewed for plain error. Although the district court did not articulate its reasoning, Betts permits affirmance where the rationale is “self-evident in the record.” The presence of a restitution order ($1,499) makes financial disclosure an obvious tool to monitor ability to pay. The Guidelines explicitly recommend financial-information access when restitution is imposed (§ 5D1.3(d)(3)), and Sims characterizes Guidelines-recommended conditions as “presumed suitable.” Against that backdrop, Wilson could not satisfy the demanding plain-error standard.

• No-contact-with-victims condition: Affirmed under plain-error review

  Again, no objection triggers plain-error review. The PSR described a violent assault on a CSO and resistance that injured two others. Protecting victims from future harm is a core § 3553(a)(2)(C) objective, and the record also referenced Wilson’s history of violent conduct and threats toward public officials. Those facts make the justification for a no-contact condition self-evident. Accordingly, there was no plain error in imposing it without a more elaborate, on-the-record explanation.

• Standard conditions: Vacated and remanded under Maiorana

  The district court neither read the standard conditions aloud nor expressly adopted them by reference to a written source at the sentencing hearing. Under Maiorana, non-mandatory conditions require notice at sentencing. Because Wilson lacked prior notice, Washington dictated de novo review, leading to vacatur of the standard conditions and a remand. If the district court wishes to reimpose them, it must convene a hearing, recite them or expressly adopt written conditions available in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a court notice. The panel notes Wilson may waive the resentencing hearing.

Impact and Practical Implications

Wilson is notable less for creating new law and more for enforcing the Second Circuit’s en banc rule in Maiorana and highlighting recurring pitfalls in supervised release practice.

• Procedural rigor at sentencing: the Maiorana imperative

  District courts in the Second Circuit must now ensure that any non-mandatory supervised release condition—including the Guidelines’ “standard” conditions—is either orally pronounced or expressly incorporated by reference to a written source that was made available to the defendant. Written judgments alone will not suffice. This will likely lead to:

  • More frequent on-the-record recitations or explicit incorporations by reference.
  • Greater reliance on PSR addenda, local standing orders, or written notices that set out standard conditions in advance.
  • Fewer post-sentencing surprises and increased transparency for defendants and counsel.
• Waiver traps for defense counsel

  Wilson underscores that proposing or agreeing to a special condition waives appellate review. Defense counsel should:

  • Avoid affirmatively requesting conditions unless strategically necessary.
  • State clarifications or alternatives without “agreeing” to the condition’s imposition, or expressly reserve objections.
  • Object contemporaneously where appropriate to preserve abuse-of-discretion review.
• “Self-evident” rationale can save conditions on appeal

  Even without a detailed on-the-record explanation, conditions will be affirmed if the record readily shows a permissible basis, especially under plain-error review. Nonetheless, to avoid remands or reversals, district courts should:

  • Make brief but individualized findings linking each special condition to § 3553(a) factors.
  • Note any Guidelines provisions (e.g., § 5D1.3(d)(3) for financial disclosure when restitution is ordered).
• Expect reimposition of vacated “standard” conditions after proper notice

  Given Sims’s statement that Guidelines-recommended conditions are “presumed suitable,” standard conditions vacated for lack of notice will often be reimposed after the court cures the procedural defect. The message is that process matters: defendants are entitled to clear, in-court notice even when conditions are routine and likely appropriate.

• Administrative adjustments for probation and prosecutors

  Probation offices and U.S. Attorney’s Offices should ensure that PSRs, sentencing submissions, and draft judgments list proposed conditions and cite the relevant Guideline or policy basis, facilitating express adoption at sentencing. This record-building supports both transparency and appellate resilience.

• Non-precedential but instructive

  Although a summary order has no precedential effect, it is citable and signals how panels are applying Maiorana, reinforcing the practical steps sentencing courts must take and the consequences for failing to do so.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised Release: A post-incarceration period during which a defendant must comply with conditions overseen by the U.S. Probation Office. Violations can lead to additional sanctions.
• Mandatory vs. Standard vs. Special Conditions:
  • Mandatory: Required by statute (e.g., not committing another crime), automatically imposed.
  • Standard: Recommended by the Guidelines for all cases (e.g., reporting to probation, lawful employment). They are non-mandatory and now must be pronounced or expressly incorporated under Maiorana.
  • Special: Tailored to the defendant or offense (e.g., treatment, no-contact, financial restrictions). Must be reasonably related to § 3553(a) and not more restrictive than necessary.
• Waiver vs. Forfeiture:
  • Waiver: Intentional relinquishment of a known right; if a defendant proposes or agrees to a condition, he generally cannot challenge it later (no plain-error review).
  • Forfeiture: Failure to timely object; permits plain-error review but places a heavy burden on the appellant.
• Plain Error Review: Appellant must show a clear or obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. It is a high bar and “used sparingly.”
• Individualized Assessment: Courts should explain why a special condition is appropriate for the particular defendant and offense. On appeal, a missing explanation can be cured if the justification is self-evident from the record.
• Oral Pronouncement/Express Incorporation Requirement: Under Maiorana, a court must at the sentencing hearing either read non-mandatory conditions or expressly adopt written conditions that were made available to the defendant (e.g., in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a court notice). Otherwise, those conditions must be vacated.
• Financial-Disclosure Condition and Restitution: When restitution is imposed, financial disclosure is commonly used to monitor ability to pay. The Guidelines recommend it, which supports its appropriateness.
• No-Contact-with-Victims Condition: Designed to protect victims from further harm or harassment; particularly justified where the offense involved violence or threats.

Conclusion

United States v. Wilson exemplifies the Second Circuit’s post-Maiorana insistence on procedural clarity when imposing non-mandatory supervised release conditions. The panel vacates unpronounced standard conditions, reaffirming that even routine conditions require in-court notice or express incorporation. At the same time, it underscores two powerful constraints on appellate relief: waiver when defendants request or agree to a condition, and the demanding plain-error standard where objections are not preserved.

Key takeaways include:

• Non-mandatory supervised release conditions must be orally pronounced or expressly incorporated by reference to written materials made available to the defendant at sentencing.
• Affirmatively requesting a special condition waives any subsequent appellate challenge.
• Even absent an explicit on-the-record rationale, a special condition may be sustained if its justification is self-evident from the record, especially under plain-error review.
• Guidelines-recommended conditions are “presumed suitable,” but courts must still provide Maiorana-compliant notice.

While a non-precedential order, Wilson signals that the Second Circuit will strictly enforce Maiorana’s pronouncement requirement and will continue to apply well-settled waiver and plain-error doctrines to supervised release conditions. Sentencing courts, counsel, and probation officers should adjust practices accordingly to ensure both procedural compliance and robust, individualized justifications.