Oral Pronouncement Controls Unless “Unambiguous Conflict”: Referencing PSI/Standard Conditions Suffices for Supervised-Release Conditions (11th Cir.)

Case: United States v. Derrick Slade (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (Not for Publication)
Posture: Appeal from jury convictions and life sentence (plus supervised release) arising from “Onsight” gang activity.

1. Introduction

Derrick Danard Slade appealed convictions and a total sentence of life imprisonment with five years of supervised release after a jury found him guilty on ten counts tied to violent racketeering and robberies. The counts included: a RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy and substantive robberies (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), firearms conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 924(o)), multiple § 924(c) firearms counts (including discharges), and a death-causing firearms offense (18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1)).

On appeal, Slade raised four principal issues: (1) whether the district court wrongly admitted certain law-enforcement identification testimony and a summary exhibit; (2) whether contextual testimony about an unrelated investigation improperly prejudiced him; (3) whether limiting cross-examination about a cooperator’s plea obligations violated confrontation rights; and (4) whether the court improperly pronounced (or failed to pronounce) discretionary supervised-release conditions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that: (i) challenged identification testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 was within the district court’s discretion and, in any event, largely harmless given other identification evidence; (ii) the firearms-report summary was properly admitted (and unobjected-to) under Rule 1006; (iii) the officer’s brief explanation about being in the area for an unrelated GPS-tracker installation was permissible context and harmless; (iv) even if the court erred by limiting a question probing a cooperating witness’s plea obligations, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to extensive other bias impeachment and overwhelming evidence; and (v) under plain-error review, the supervised-release pronouncement sufficiently incorporated referenced conditions and did not “unambiguously conflict” with the written judgment.

3. Analysis

A. Standards of Review Driving the Outcome

The panel emphasized appellate deference in evidentiary matters and the practical power of harmless-error and plain-error doctrines:

• Abuse of discretion for preserved evidentiary rulings (with affirmance possible even if the district court’s reasoning was imperfect).
• Plain error for unpreserved objections, requiring an error that is plain and affects substantial rights, plus a discretionary fourth prong.
• Harmless error for evidentiary mistakes and Confrontation Clause errors if the verdict is supported by unaffected evidence.
• Supervised release pronouncement: de novo in true oral/written conflict cases, but plain error where the defendant had the opportunity to object yet did not.

B. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Court’s Reasoning)

• United States v. Novaton and United States v. Myers
  Used to anchor the deferential “clear abuse of discretion” framework for evidentiary rulings, particularly lay opinion admission.
• United States v. Samaniego and United States v. Maurya
  Supported the principle that appellate courts affirm correct outcomes even if the district court’s rationale is imperfect, and that lack of explanation for exclusion is not itself reversible error.
• United States v. Graham; United States v. Beach; United States v. Rodriguez (398 F.3d 1291)
  These cases supplied the preservation requirements and the four-part plain-error framework; Beach reinforced the need for a specific objection to preserve appellate claims.
• United States v. Barton and United States v. Fortenberry
  Provided the harmless-error yardstick: no reversal when the alleged error had no substantial influence and the remaining evidence supports the verdict.
• United States v. Pierce and United States v. Ware
  These were central to the Rule 701 issue. They supply the multi-factor test for when lay identification testimony is “helpful” to the jury—especially the witness’s familiarity with the defendant’s appearance beyond what the jury can glean at trial.
• United States v. Khan and United States v. Jayyousi
  Khan cautions against “overview testimony” untethered to personal knowledge; Jayyousi clarifies that lay witnesses may testify about contents of documents reviewed even if they did not create them.
• Curtis v. Perkins (In re Int'l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC)
  Confirmed Rule 1006’s function and legitimacy: summaries can prove the content of voluminous materials not conveniently examined in court.
• United States v. Abel
  Provided the relevance principle for bias/credibility—bias evidence tends to make testimony less probable, making it generally admissible and significant.
• Delaware v. Van Arsdall; United States v. Maxwell; United States v. Lankford
  These framed the confrontation analysis. Van Arsdall supplies harmless-error review for confrontation violations; Maxwell provides factors; Lankford underscores that cross-examination on motive to testify is a core Sixth Amendment function and narrows trial-court discretion when limiting it.
• United States v. Chavez; United States v. Bates; United States v. Rodriguez (75 F.4th 1231); United States v. Hayden
  These governed the supervised-release pronouncement question. Chavez/Bates establish that oral pronouncement controls when there is an “unambiguous conflict.” Rodriguez (2023) requires pronouncement of discretionary conditions (or incorporation by reference). Hayden explains that referencing “mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court” and later listing standard conditions in the judgment can be sufficient, especially under plain-error review.

C. Legal Reasoning

1) Lay identification evidence (Rule 701): why the testimony was “helpful”

Applying United States v. Pierce and United States v. Ware, the court focused on whether the witnesses had familiarity with Slade (and a codefendant) beyond what jurors could obtain by simply viewing the video. The panel credited:

• Officer Goodnow’s prolonged, direct interactions during arrest-related events, including face-to-face observation.
• Agent Box’s years-long investigative immersion and comparative review of extensive materials (reports, social media, video).

But the court’s affirmance did not depend solely on admissibility: it repeatedly invoked harmlessness because codefendants independently identified Slade (and the jacket) in the relevant video, making any incremental impact of the challenged testimony minimal.

2) Firearms-report “summary” (Rule 1006): no plain error

Because Slade did not object, the panel applied plain-error review and found none. The summary exhibit was treated as a classic Rule 1006 summary of voluminous ballistics evidence already introduced, supported by the Rule’s text and Curtis v. Perkins (In re Int'l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC).

3) Contextual testimony about unrelated police activity: relevance and harmlessness

Slade argued that the officer’s mention of being nearby to install a GPS tracker “in an unrelated case” injected improper other-case information. The panel treated the testimony as contextual—explaining why the officer was present in an unmarked car and thus able to observe events. Even if marginally questionable, the panel found it harmless because the officer explicitly disconnected the unrelated case from Slade, minimizing prejudice.

4) Cross-examination restriction: likely error, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

The court acknowledged the force of Slade’s confrontation argument: asking whether a plea agreement required the cooperator to testify against Slade goes directly to motive and credibility, an area protected by United States v. Lankford. Nevertheless, the panel applied Delaware v. Van Arsdall and the United States v. Maxwell factors to hold any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because:

• Defense counsel extensively impeached the witness on cooperation benefits and sentencing reductions.
• The jury heard broadly about codefendants’ plea agreements and reasons for testifying.
• The government’s case was characterized as “overwhelming,” including multiple cooperating witnesses, video evidence, and arrest testimony.

5) Supervised release pronouncement: no “unambiguous conflict” under plain-error review

The most “rule-like” portion of the opinion concerns how oral pronouncements interact with written judgments. Citing United States v. Chavez, United States v. Bates, United States v. Rodriguez (75 F.4th 1231), and United States v. Hayden, the panel held:

• Because Slade did not object at sentencing after the court referenced the PSI and listed special conditions, review was for plain error.
• The oral pronouncement sufficiently notified Slade of standard conditions and identified three discretionary special conditions by reference to the PSI.
• The phrasing difference between the oral condition (pay unpaid special assessments during supervised release) and the written condition (notify probation of material economic changes affecting ability to pay restitution/fines/assessments) did not create an “unambiguous conflict.”
• Even assuming an issue, Slade failed to show an effect on substantial rights, given notice via the PSI and the speculative posture (life sentence plus consecutive time; the condition matters only upon eventual release with unpaid assessment remaining).

D. Impact

• Supervised-release conditions: The decision reinforces (in application) that defendants should object at sentencing if they believe a discretionary condition was not properly pronounced or incorporated. Without an objection, plain-error review makes relief difficult, especially where the court referenced the PSI and there is no “unambiguous conflict.”
• Bias impeachment limits: The court’s willingness to assume (or strongly suggest) error yet affirm on harmlessness underscores that confrontation claims often turn on the total cross-examination permitted and the strength of the remaining evidence.
• Identification testimony: The opinion illustrates the continuing acceptance of law-enforcement lay identification when the witness has investigative or personal familiarity beyond the jury’s, while also signaling that redundant identification evidence can render disputes harmless.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Lay opinion testimony (Rule 701): Non-expert opinion is allowed if it is based on what the witness perceived and helps the jury. In identification cases, it is “helpful” when the witness knows the defendant’s appearance better than jurors would from the courtroom and exhibits alone.
• Rule 1006 summaries: If evidence is too bulky to show item-by-item (e.g., many reports/photos/records), a party can use a summary chart/exhibit—so long as it fairly reflects the underlying admitted/available materials.
• Plain error: If you did not object at trial, you must show a clear, obvious error that likely changed the outcome; even then, the appellate court may decline to fix it unless it seriously undermines the proceeding’s fairness.
• Harmless error (including confrontation errors): Even if a ruling was wrong, the conviction stands if the appellate court is convinced the verdict would be the same given the rest of the evidence.
• Oral vs. written sentence: The sentence announced in court controls if there is an “unambiguous conflict” with the written judgment; courts can also “incorporate” conditions by referring to a known list (like the PSI or standard conditions).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Derrick Slade affirms sweeping racketeering, robbery, and firearms convictions while showcasing appellate doctrines that frequently decide criminal appeals: deference to trial evidentiary rulings, aggressive harmless-error analysis (even for confrontation concerns), and stringent plain-error review when objections are not preserved. Most notably, the decision applies the Eleventh Circuit’s supervised-release pronouncement framework to hold that referencing the PSI and announcing standard conditions—without an “unambiguous conflict” between oral and written terms—will generally defeat post hoc challenges, particularly where the defendant did not object at sentencing.