Opportunity Is Not Inducement: New Hampshire Clarifies Entrapment and Attempt Mens Rea in Online Decoy Stings

State of New Hampshire v. Casely Schandorf (N.H. May 29, 2025)

Introduction

In this Rule 20(3) order, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed convictions for attempted endangering the welfare of a child and attempted felonious sexual assault arising from an online decoy operation. The case centers on whether the State produced sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s purposeful intent to commit the charged “attempt” offenses, whether the record established entrapment as a matter of law, and whether alleged Brady violations warranted setting aside the verdict. The decision clarifies two particularly important points in the context of internet sting prosecutions:

• Under New Hampshire law, providing an opportunity for a crime—even via an online decoy—does not amount to entrapment absent “something more,” such as excessive pressure or exploitation of non-criminal motives.
• Purposeful intent for attempt can be inferred where a defendant continues to pursue sexual services after explicit disclosure that the putative partner is underage, and completes a substantial step (e.g., traveling to the arranged meeting).

The defendant, while traveling for work, responded to a “SkiptheGames” ad created by a Nashua Police Department (NPD) detective. After the decoy twice disclosed she was 15, the defendant nonetheless confirmed he still wanted “full service and BJ,” negotiated price and logistics, and drove to the arranged location, where he was arrested. A search found a generic form of Viagra in his bag. He later claimed he intended only to verify the decoy’s age. The jury convicted; the trial court denied his motions to dismiss and to set aside the verdict; and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

• Sufficiency of the evidence (intent): Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the purpose to commit attempted endangering the welfare of a child (RSA 639:3) and attempted felonious sexual assault (RSA 632-A:3) under the attempt statute (RSA 629:1). The defendant’s post hoc claim that he went only to verify age was not a “reasonable” alternative conclusion given the messaging and conduct after the age disclosure.
• Entrapment: The State did not induce the defendant within the meaning of RSA 626:5. The police presented an opportunity but did not exert excessive pressure, threaten, exploit non-criminal motives, or persist in dogged insistence. The decoy offered a “clear exit,” yet the defendant continued. Because inducement was lacking, the Court did not reach predisposition.
• Brady: The defendant failed to show that the NPD grant, budget, and arrest records were favorable or exculpatory, or that they were knowingly withheld. No Brady violation was established under State v. Verrill and Brady v. Maryland.
• Disposition: Convictions affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• State v. Zuzelo, 176 N.H. 499 (2024): De novo review for sufficiency challenges; court considers the entire record in the light most favorable to the State.
• State v. Pierce, 176 N.H. 487 (2024): When an element is proved solely by circumstantial evidence, the evidence must exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt—focusing on “reasonable” conclusions based on the evidence, not every possible innocent hypothesis.
• State v. Boggs, 171 N.H. 115 (2018): Articulates the “reasonable alternative conclusion” inquiry—would a rational juror still find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
• State v. Folley, 172 N.H. 760 (2020) & State v. Carr, 167 N.H. 264 (2015): The jury is free to accept or reject witness testimony and make credibility determinations; appellate review assumes all credibility determinations supporting the verdict.
• RSA 629:1 (Attempt): Requires purpose that a crime be committed and a substantial step under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be.
• RSA 632-A:3 (Felonious Sexual Assault): Prohibits sexual acts with minors in the specified age range and age-difference conditions relevant here.
• RSA 639:3 (Endangering the Welfare of a Child): Criminalizes, among other conduct, soliciting a child for specified sexual acts.
• RSA 626:5 (Entrapment): Two-part test in New Hampshire: (1) government inducement; and (2) lack of predisposition; opportunity alone is not inducement.
• State v. Larose, 157 N.H. 28 (2008): New Hampshire’s hybrid entrapment test; inducement requires “opportunity plus something else,” such as excessive pressure or exploitation of an alternative motive.
• State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238 (1970): Entrapment as a matter of law is rare and requires undisputed facts compelling a finding that police lured an otherwise unwilling defendant.
• United States v. Rutgerson, 822 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2016) & United States v. Plowman, 700 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2012): Entrapment-as-a-matter-of-law reviewed de novo, viewing facts in State’s favor.
• United States v. Hinkel, 837 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2016): The decoy’s offering a “clear exit” militates against inducement; defendant’s persistence supports culpability.
• United States v. Lofstead, 574 F. Supp. 3d 831 (D. Nev. 2021): Distinguished: there, law enforcement arguably encouraged continued engagement amid legal-age confusion specific to commercial sex laws; not so here, where the decoy said “I’m 15” and did not press the encounter.
• State v. Verrill, 175 N.H. 428 (2022) & Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963): Brady framework; under the New Hampshire Constitution, once a defendant shows favorable exculpatory evidence was knowingly withheld, the burden shifts to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that nondisclosure did not affect the verdict.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency of the Evidence: Purposeful Intent and Substantial Step

The attempt statute, RSA 629:1, I, requires that the defendant act “with a purpose that a crime be committed” and take a substantial step “under the circumstances as he believes them to be.” The Court emphasized that, after the decoy’s explicit disclosure “I’m 15,” the defendant:

• Asked “How old are you?”; was told again “I’m 15” and acknowledged illegality;
• Nonetheless confirmed he still wanted “full service and BJ” for $75 and potentially more;
• Arranged logistics (time, transport to his hotel, attire) and traveled to the pre-arranged location;
• Had a generic Viagra pill in his bag (the jury could draw inferences about intent from this).

The defendant’s alternative explanation—that he merely intended to verify age—rested on his own testimony. Under New Hampshire’s sufficiency standard, the appellate court presumes the jury rejected that testimony if doing so supports the verdict. The Court held that, considering the whole record in the State’s favor, the “verification” explanation was not a reasonable alternative conclusion in light of the explicit age disclosures, the sexual-service confirmations, and the execution of a substantial step (driving to meet as arranged). Thus, a rational juror could find purposeful intent to commit the charged attempt offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

2) Entrapment: Opportunity versus Inducement

Entrapment in New Hampshire has two elements under RSA 626:5 and Larose: (1) government inducement; and (2) lack of predisposition. The Court focused on inducement and found it absent.

• No excessive pressure or exploitation: There were no threats, pleas of desperation, repeated importuning, or exploitation of sympathy or non-criminal motives. Messaging lasted roughly two days with fewer than 100 texts.
• Clear exit offered: After the defendant raised the illegality, the decoy said “alright im sorry” and “if u change your mind im here”—an invitation to disengage, not pressure to proceed. The decoy also said she “only like[d] sure things” and “thanks anyways tho,” and did not add enticements beyond what the defendant requested. This aligns with Hinkel’s “clear exit” concept.
• Adult-site context isn’t inducement: While the ad appeared on an adults-only website and listed an obviously fictitious age (99), the decisive point is the defendant’s conduct after the explicit 15-year-old disclosure. Post-disclosure pursuit defeats inducement.
• Distinguishing Lofstead: Unlike in Lofstead, there was no legal-age confusion specific to commercial sex; the decoy said “I’m 15,” which the defendant recognized as making any sex illegal under RSA 632-A:3. The decoy did not repeatedly encourage, did not add “sweeteners” like additional sexual options, and even deferred to the defendant to reinitiate for day-two planning.

Because inducement was not shown, the Court did not reach predisposition. The record also contained the detective’s report noting no evidence of other minor-exploitation incidents on the defendant’s devices—but absent inducement, predisposition is immaterial to entrapment’s failure as a matter of law.

3) Brady: No Showing of Favorable, Exculpatory, Knowingly Withheld Evidence

The defendant argued the State failed to disclose multijurisdictional operation materials (grant, budget, arrest records). The Court held that:

• The defendant did not establish these items were favorable or exculpatory;
• Nor did he show they were knowingly withheld;
• Therefore, he failed to meet his initial burden under Verrill and Brady, and the burden never shifted to the State to prove lack of prejudice.

Programmatic or administrative records about an operation’s funding or arrest totals, without a concrete nexus to guilt, impeachment, or punishment in the case, generally will not qualify as Brady material.

Impact

This decision carries practical and doctrinal implications for online child-exploitation sting cases in New Hampshire:

• Entrapment boundaries reaffirmed: Law enforcement can use decoy personas, even on adult-oriented websites, without inducing crime, provided they avoid excessive pressure, repeated importuning, or exploitation of non-criminal motives—and offer a “clear exit” once illegality is flagged.
• Mens rea in decoy cases: Post-disclosure confirmation of sexual services and follow-through on logistics can suffice to prove purposeful intent for attempt. Claims of “age verification only” will be measured against contemporaneous texts and conduct; unsupported self-serving testimony will not defeat a verdict on appeal.
• Substantial step clarified in practice: Traveling to a prearranged meeting after confirming interest in proscribed sexual activity supports the “substantial step” requirement for attempt.
• Defense strategy recalibrated: To advance entrapment, defendants will need evidence of inducement beyond mere opportunity—e.g., repeated pressure, threats, or appeals to desperation. To challenge sufficiency, defendants must present a truly reasonable alternative narrative supported by record facts, not solely by their own testimony.
• Brady requests sharpened: Requests for operational documents should articulate how the material is favorable and material to guilt, punishment, or impeachment in the specific case. Absent that, courts are unlikely to find Brady violations.
• Operational guidance for agencies: The Court’s reliance on the “clear exit,” minimal messaging, and lack of pressure offers a compliance template for decoy operations designed to withstand entrapment challenges.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Attempt (RSA 629:1): Trying to commit a crime with the purpose that it occur, plus taking a meaningful step toward it (a “substantial step”), considering how the actor believed the facts to be at the time.
• Purposeful intent: The defendant’s objective was to bring about the criminal result (here, sexual activity with a minor). It can be inferred from words and actions.
• Substantial step: Conduct that strongly shows the crime will occur if not interrupted—e.g., confirming sexual services after underage disclosure and traveling to meet.
• Entrapment (RSA 626:5): A defense where police induced the offense using methods likely to ensnare someone not otherwise disposed to commit it. Merely giving an opportunity is not inducement.
• Inducement versus opportunity: Inducement = opportunity plus something else (pressure, threats, exploitation of need). Opportunity alone, even via decoy, is not enough.
• Predisposition: If inducement exists, the State may rebut entrapment by showing the defendant was already ready and willing to commit the crime. If there is no inducement, courts do not reach predisposition.
• Brady material: Evidence favorable to the accused (exculpatory or impeaching) that is material to guilt or punishment. In New Hampshire, if the defendant shows the State knowingly withheld such favorable evidence, the State must prove nondisclosure did not affect the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Circumstantial evidence standard: When proof of an element is circumstantial, the State’s evidence must exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt—focusing on “reasonable,” not speculative possibilities.

Conclusion

State v. Schandorf reinforces that, in online decoy prosecutions, a defendant’s persistence after explicit underage disclosure can establish purposeful intent and a substantial step for attempt crimes. The decision sharply delineates entrapment’s inducement prong: opportunity, without more, is not enough. It also underscores that generalized operational records are not Brady material absent a concrete link to favorable, material evidence on guilt, punishment, or impeachment. For investigators, the opinion offers a blueprint—provide a clear exit, avoid pressure, and let suspects steer the engagement. For defenders, it signals that sufficiency and entrapment arguments must be anchored in the evidentiary record, not solely in post hoc explanations. In the broader context, the ruling provides clear guidance for New Hampshire’s courts and practitioners on evaluating intent, substantial steps, and entrapment in the increasingly common arena of internet sting operations.

Note: This commentary is for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.