Precedents Cited and Their Role

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Heller recognized an individual right to possess firearms for self‑defense but underscored that the right is “not unlimited” and noted that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” remain presumptively lawful. The opinion also cites Heller’s historical acknowledgment that 19th‑century prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were widely deemed lawful—supporting the panel’s concern with Suggs’s repeated concealed‑carry violations involving loaded guns.

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Bruen framed the modern Second Amendment analysis: if the Second Amendment’s text covers an individual’s conduct, the government must justify regulation by showing it accords with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence reiterated that felon‑in‑possession bans are “presumptively lawful,” echoing Heller. The panel locates § 922(g)(1) within that tradition while applying an individualized “dangerousness” lens from Williams.

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Rahimi upheld § 922(g)(8) (domestic‑violence restraining orders) against a facial challenge and articulated a key historical principle: when an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence, the government may disarm him. The panel uses Rahimi’s historical insight to confirm that targeted disarmament of dangerous individuals aligns with the Second Amendment’s tradition.

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024). Williams supplies the Sixth Circuit’s controlling as‑applied framework for § 922(g)(1): (1) felons are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment; (2) governments may disarm classes they reasonably deem dangerous if individuals have an opportunity to show they are not; (3) courts must make fact‑specific dangerousness determinations that consider the defendant’s entire criminal record; and (4) prior convictions can be grouped into three categories indicating varying probative value of dangerousness: crimes against the person (most probative), crimes posing high risk to others/community (e.g., drug trafficking, burglary), and non‑violent offenses like fraud (least probative). The Suggs panel operationalizes this test.

Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014). Abramski emphasized federal safeguards designed to prevent firearms from falling into the “wrong hands.” The panel invokes this rationale to stress the risks inherent in Suggs’s admitted gun lending and illegal sales into a violent gang context.

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). The Court observed that “drugs and guns are a dangerous combination.” The panel echoes this when recounting Suggs’s probation violation involving a loaded gun and methamphetamine.

United States v. Lightning, 835 F. App’x 38 (6th Cir. 2020) (Nalbandian, J., dissenting). While noting it as a dissent, the panel quotes the common‑sense proposition that gunshots and attempted police evasion pose inherent risks—supporting the conclusion that Suggs’s firearms conduct increased danger to the community.

Sentencing precedents and standards:

• United States v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2024) (de novo review of constitutional challenges).
• United States v. Robinson, 892 F.3d 209 (6th Cir. 2018) (abuse‑of‑discretion review for substantive reasonableness).
• United States v. Hale, 127 F.4th 638 (6th Cir. 2025) (abuse of discretion occurs if court relies on clearly erroneous facts, misapplies law, or uses wrong standard).
• United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018) (substantive unreasonableness occurs when a sentence is longer than necessary due to improper weighting of § 3553(a) factors).
• United States v. Smith‑Kilpatrick, 942 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2019) (below‑Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable).
• United States v. Greco, 734 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2013) (defendant bears a “heavy burden” to rebut presumption of reasonableness).
• United States v. Adkins, 729 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2013) (a sentence is not unreasonable merely because the defendant would have weighed the § 3553(a) factors differently).

Recent Sixth Circuit citations: The panel cites two 2025 decisions for the proposition that “multiple convictions for unlawfully possessing firearms” demonstrate a dangerous “propensity” to have weapons when one should not. See United States v. White, 2025 WL 2060869, at *3 (6th Cir. July 23, 2025) (quoting United States v. Poe, 2025 WL 1342340, at *3 (6th Cir. May 8, 2025)).

Legal Reasoning

1) As‑Applied Second Amendment Challenge

Standard and framework. The court reviews constitutional challenges de novo. It adopts Williams’s approach: felons are within “the people,” but historical tradition allows the disarmament of those who are dangerous, provided individuals can show they are not. Courts must conduct a fact‑specific inquiry into dangerousness, evaluating the defendant’s entire criminal record and the details of the current offense. Williams’s three‑category schema helps gauge how probative prior convictions are of dangerousness.

Suggs’s argument and the court’s response. Suggs argued he fell within Williams’s third category (offenses least probative of dangerousness, such as fraud‑type crimes). The panel rejects that characterization and undertakes a holistic review of both the present offense and his record, concluding that Suggs’s conduct demonstrates significant dangerousness:

• Present offense conduct shows active, real‑world dangerousness. Messages revealed that Suggs—identified as a member of the “36” gang—loaned a firearm to a member of the “00” gang for protection during an ongoing gang war involving the 36, 00, and “Chase the Bag” (CTB) gangs. Officers discovered a firearm in his home safe and found in his iPhone detailed records of marijuana and firearms sales; Suggs admitted he buys and sells “guns and stuff” regularly and had sold at least three guns before. His residence was shot at three times; in one incident a young girl was shot. The court underscores that gang affiliation correlates with elevated violence rates and that illegal gun transfers risk evasion of federal safeguards intended to keep guns from the “wrong hands.”
• Criminal history confirms the risk. Suggs’s past includes multiple firearms violations:
  • After responding to reports of gunfire, police stopped Suggs (the sole occupant) driving a car with a loaded firearm on the driver’s floorboard—an unlawful concealed carry. The court highlights the inherent risk posed by gunshots and attempted evasion, and notes the long‑recognized lawfulness of prohibitions on concealed carry.
  • Within months, and mere days after pleading guilty to the first offense, Suggs was arrested again for carrying a concealed weapon and for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. This time, three loaded guns were in the vehicle—amplifying the dangerousness of repeated unlawful possession.
  • During a probation check tied to an associate’s felony case, officers found Suggs in a car with a loaded gun and methamphetamine, and in Michigan despite being on Indiana probation—again confirming risky associations with drugs and weapons. His probation evaluation noted he “places himself around negative people who possess weapons and drugs late at night.”

Historical and doctrinal fit. Synthesizing Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi, the panel reasons that disarming individuals who present a concrete danger comports with historical tradition. The Williams framework translates that tradition into an individualized dangerousness assessment. On these facts—gang involvement, illegal gun transfers and sales, repeated loaded concealed‑carry offenses, and drugs‑and‑guns conduct—the government satisfied its burden to show Suggs is dangerous. The as‑applied challenge therefore fails.

2) Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence

Procedural posture and range. The initial PSR calculated a 57–71 month advisory range based on three firearms. At sentencing, the parties agreed only two firearms were involved (the gun in the safe and the loaned gun), lowering the range to 46–57 months. The district court imposed a 45‑month sentence—one month below the range—plus three years of supervised release.

Abuse‑of‑discretion review and presumption. The court reviews for abuse of discretion and applies a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to a below‑Guidelines sentence. The record shows the district court thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors and exercised individualized judgment.

Mitigation addressed. The district court credited substantial mitigating facts: Suggs’s challenging upbringing without a father in a violent environment; acceptance of responsibility; demonstrated insight and goal‑setting; absence of substance abuse; high‑school graduation; no theft or domestic violence history; and youth (21 at the time), with the court noting the science of adolescent brain development and risk‑taking.

Aggravation and balancing. Against mitigation, the court weighed the gravity of Suggs’s conduct: repeated firearms violations in quick succession, a retrofitted rifle, loaning a firearm to a known gang member, and active involvement in gang activity amid ongoing shootings—all of which threatened public safety. The court also consulted national sentencing data from the Judicial Sentencing Information Network (JSIN). For defendants with the same base offense level, total offense level, and criminal history category, the average sentence was 45 months—the exact sentence imposed.

No undue reliance on JSIN. The appellate panel rejects Suggs’s contention that the district court “overly based” the sentence on JSIN data. The record reflects a comprehensive § 3553(a) analysis in which the JSIN figure served as a disparity‑avoidance data point, not a substitute for individualized consideration.

Bottom line. The balanced and individualized reasoning supports the below‑Guidelines sentence, which remains within the heartland of reasonableness. Suggs did not meet the “heavy burden” to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.

Impact and Significance

A. Second Amendment As‑Applied Challenges Post‑Williams

• Concrete markers of “dangerousness.” This decision illustrates the kinds of facts that will satisfy Williams’s dangerousness test: active gang involvement during an ongoing violent feud; lending guns to gang members for protection; evidence of illegal gun sales; repeated unlawful possession of loaded, concealed firearms; and weapons‑plus‑drugs conduct. Even if some prior convictions might fall in Williams’s “third category,” present‑offense facts and the overall record can independently establish dangerousness.
• Holistic, record‑driven inquiry. The court’s emphasis on the “entire criminal record” and current offense conduct signals that defendants cannot rely solely on the formal labels of past convictions. Courts will scrutinize the totality of circumstances—including admissions (e.g., buying/selling “guns and stuff”), digital evidence (phone messages), and community‑safety context (ongoing retaliatory shootings)—to determine danger.
• Use of empirical and historical sources. The panel’s citation to criminological literature on gangs and violence, coupled with historical references (Heller’s concealed‑carry discussion; Rahimi’s dangerousness principle), shows that courts may draw on both empirical risk indicators and historical analogues in this analysis.
• Practical takeaway for litigants. Defendants mounting as‑applied challenges should build a robust record of rehabilitation and risk mitigation—stable employment, time since offense, renunciation of gang ties, completion of treatment or supervision conditions, and credible community ties. The government, conversely, will marshal digital communications, admissions, and law‑enforcement observations to establish danger.

B. Sentencing Practice

• JSIN as a permissible tool. The Sixth Circuit confirms that district courts may consult JSIN to inform § 3553(a)(6)’s directive to avoid unwarranted disparities, so long as the court does not elevate aggregate data over individualized assessment. Here, JSIN corroborated the tailored analysis rather than dictating the sentence.
• Below‑Guidelines presumption carries real weight. Where the record documents careful consideration of mitigation and aggravation, a one‑month variance below the range will often withstand substantive reasonableness review, particularly in firearms cases with public‑safety concerns.

C. Persuasive—but Not Binding—Authority

Because the opinion is “not recommended for publication,” it is nonprecedential within the Sixth Circuit. Even so, it is likely to be cited as persuasive authority in district courts and by litigants seeking guidance on how Williams’s dangerousness test is applied to gang‑related gun conduct and repeat firearms violations.