Open‑Ended Answer Extensions as “Good Cause” Precluding Failure‑to‑Prosecute Dismissals: A Commentary on Arrowsmith v. Odle, 2025 S.D. 70

I. Introduction

In Arrowsmith v. Odle, 2025 S.D. 70, the Supreme Court of South Dakota confronted a recurring and practically important problem in civil litigation: when may a trial court dismiss a case for “failure to prosecute” where the parties themselves have agreed to an open‑ended extension of time to answer, and the plaintiff has relied on that agreement while pursuing medical stabilization and potential settlement?

The Court reversed a dismissal with prejudice entered under both SDCL 15‑11‑11 and SDCL 15‑6‑41(b) (Rule 41(b)), holding that the trial court abused its discretion in light of a formal, open‑ended extension agreement that both sides had acknowledged and even reaffirmed shortly before the motion to dismiss was filed. The opinion solidifies and develops several important principles:

An open‑ended agreement extending the time to answer is “good cause” for inactivity under SDCL 15‑11‑11.
Such an agreement, when reasonably relied upon by plaintiff’s counsel, defeats a finding of “egregious” delay required for dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b).
Fairness requires that if a plaintiff’s forbearance from seeking default is induced by an open‑ended extension, the defendant is reciprocally precluded from using the resulting delay as a basis to seek dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Arguments grounded substantively in “good cause” and lack of egregious conduct are preserved for appeal even if counsel did not utter those precise legal buzzwords below.

This commentary examines the decision in depth, places it in the context of South Dakota’s failure‑to‑prosecute jurisprudence, and explores the implications for litigators and courts.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The underlying accident and lawsuit

Plaintiff Ryan Scott Arrowsmith, a resident of British Columbia, Canada, attended the Sturgis Motorcycle Rally on August 11, 2017. While riding his motorcycle in Sturgis, he collided with a vehicle driven by Defendant Devin Matthew Odle, who allegedly pulled out of a parking lot directly into Arrowsmith’s path ([¶1]–[¶2]). Arrowsmith sustained serious injuries.

On July 23, 2020, nearly three years after the accident, Arrowsmith filed suit alleging negligence and negligence per se. Odle was personally served on July 28, 2020 ([¶2]).

B. The open‑ended extension to answer

Shortly after filing, on August 20, 2020, Odle’s insurer, AAA Insurance, contacted Arrowsmith’s counsel. Arrowsmith’s lawyer explained that:

Arrowsmith’s recovery was ongoing,
further surgery was expected, and
the value of the claim could not yet be reliably assessed.

To accommodate this uncertainty and presumably to facilitate informed settlement discussions, plaintiff’s counsel granted AAA an open‑ended extension of time to obtain counsel and file an answer, confirmed in an August 20, 2020 email ([¶3]). The stated purpose was to allow time to reach “maximum recovery information” before resuming active litigation.

C. Clerk’s notices of intent to dismiss and plaintiff’s objections

The Meade County clerk of courts issued three separate notices of intent to dismiss the action for inactivity:

September 22, 2021 notice – triggered by more than one year without file activity.
Arrowsmith objected the next day, explaining:
- He had granted AAA “an open extension of time” to answer because of ongoing treatment.
- Valuation was difficult due to evolving medical needs and Canadian residency/medical providers ([¶4]–[¶5]).
November 23, 2022 notice – again due to apparent inactivity.
Arrowsmith objected, reiterating the ongoing extension and adding that:
- He had been in touch with AAA with updates about ongoing care.
- He had assured AAA the open extension remained in effect.
- He had earlier believed Arrowsmith reached maximum recovery, but Arrowsmith later suffered setbacks.
- He was still awaiting information from Canadian providers and subrogation lienholders, after which he would discuss settlement with AAA ([¶6]).
June 21, 2024 notice – the third such notice.
Arrowsmith again objected, essentially repeating prior explanations but now adding that Arrowsmith had recently been evaluated for disability, employability, and impairment rating, and that settlement could potentially be finalized once that information was received ([¶7]).

Aside from these notices and plaintiff’s objections, the record showed no formal activity over four years ([¶7]).

D. Defense counsel enters appearance and reaffirms the extension

Odle obtained counsel in August 2024. On August 1, 2024, defense counsel emailed plaintiff’s counsel and:

Notified him that she now represented Odle.
Discussed the status of the case.
Reaffirmed the open‑ended extension to answer initially granted to AAA ([¶8]).

Both attorneys later confirmed at the hearing that during this August 1 contact, they discussed and reaffirmed the extension. Defense counsel acknowledged there were no new writings, but her understanding was that plaintiff’s counsel was “still … trying to obtain records and evaluate the case” ([¶8]). She formally filed a notice of appearance on August 7, 2024.

E. Motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and circuit court ruling

On November 20, 2024—over two months after counsel’s appearance—Odle moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute under SDCL 15‑11‑11 and Rule 41(b) ([¶9]). The motion argued that:

Plaintiff’s counsel had shown an “egregious, unexplained and unreasonable” failure to proceed with promptitude.
No evidence supported counsel’s excuses: no correspondence with providers, no time entries, no emails, no discovery, no depositions.

In response, Arrowsmith argued:

He had relied on the open‑ended extension “for the benefit of both parties.”
Odle should not avoid liability by disregarding an agreement that had been to his advantage (avoidance of default).
Delays were attributable to aggravated injuries, cross‑border medical issues, and differing Canadian insurance/subrogation landscapes ([¶10]).

On January 9, 2025, after a hearing, the circuit court orally granted the motion under both SDCL 15‑11‑11 and Rule 41(b), and on January 16, 2025 entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice ([¶11]). Arrowsmith appealed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court, per retired Justice Kern, reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing the case under both SDCL 15‑11‑11 and Rule 41(b).

A. Key holdings

Preservation of issues: Arrowsmith did not forfeit his “good cause” and “lack of egregiousness” arguments by failing to invoke those terms verbatim below. His reliance on the open‑ended extension as justification for delay squarely joined the issues under SDCL 15‑11‑11 and Rule 41(b) ([¶17]–[¶18]).
SDCL 15‑11‑11 – Good cause for inactivity:
- The open‑ended extension agreement between the parties satisfied the “good cause” requirement of SDCL 15‑11‑11.
- Delays arising from reliance on that mutual agreement were not due to “negligence or inattention to pleading deadlines.”
- Accordingly, dismissal under SDCL 15‑11‑11 was a “choice outside the range of permissible choices” and thus an abuse of discretion ([¶19]–[¶23]).
Rule 41(b) – No “egregious” delay:
- Rule 41(b) dismissals require more than the mere passage of time; there must be “unreasonable and unexplained” delay rising to “egregious” conduct.
- Here, the delay was explained by the open‑ended extension and medical/cross‑border issues; the record did not show willful neglect, disobedience of court orders, or bad faith.
- Given the extension, the reaffirmation in August 2024, the absence of demonstrated prejudice, and the lack of lesser sanctions considered, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) was also an abuse of discretion ([¶24]–[¶33]).
Reciprocal forbearance principle: By granting an open‑ended extension, Arrowsmith effectively gave up his right to move for default. In fairness, Odle correspondingly relinquished the right to seek a failure‑to‑prosecute dismissal based solely on delay produced by that same extension ([¶23]).

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and their influence on the decision

1. Dakota Cheese, Inc. v. Taylor, 525 N.W.2d 713 (S.D. 1995)

Dakota Cheese is the foundational South Dakota case setting general principles for failure‑to‑prosecute dismissals. It supplied the Court in Arrowsmith with several guiding rules ([¶13]):

Dismissal for failure to prosecute is an extreme remedy.
It should be used only in cases of “unreasonable and unexplained” delay.
The mere passage of time is not the proper test.
The plaintiff bears the burden to move the case forward; the defendant need only meet the plaintiff “step by step.”
Courts must assess whether the plaintiff lacked “due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.”

The Supreme Court in Arrowsmith applies these principles by emphasizing that the plaintiff’s delay was not “unexplained” in the sense required for dismissal; rather, it stemmed from a formal extension agreement entered for mutual convenience and reaffirmed by both sides.

2. Olson v. Huron Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 2025 S.D. 34, 24 N.W.3d 405

Olson, decided the same year, is central in clarifying the distinction between SDCL 15‑11‑11 and Rule 41(b):

SDCL 15‑11‑11 is a “clerical tool” to clear dockets after a quota of inactivity.
Dismissals under SDCL 15‑11‑11 are without prejudice.
Rule 41(b) is a sanctioning tool for delay or disobedience.
Rule 41(b) dismissals generally operate with prejudice unless otherwise specified ([¶14]–[¶15]).

Olson also emphasized an “institutional preference for resolving cases on their merits” and discouraged overreliance on temporal delay alone ([¶15], [¶25], [¶30]). It introduced a practical, non‑talismanic set of factors (first suggested by Justice Konenkamp’s dissent in Eischen, discussed below) for assessing whether Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate ([¶26]).

In Arrowsmith, the Court explicitly cites and builds on Olson:

To reinforce the need for two distinct analyses for SDCL 15‑11‑11 and Rule 41(b) ([¶14]).
To reaffirm the system’s preference for merits‑based resolutions ([¶15], [¶25]).
To apply the Eischen/Olson factors (notice, lesser sanctions, bad faith, prejudice, merits) in concluding dismissal was unwarranted ([¶26], [¶33]).

3. Rotenberger v. Burghduff, 2007 S.D. 7, 727 N.W.2d 291

Rotenberger characterized SDCL 15‑11‑11 as a docket‑clearing mechanism and highlighted that dismissals under it are without prejudice ([¶14]–[¶15]). In Arrowsmith, this separation reinforces the error in using SDCL 15‑11‑11 as a vehicle for effectively with‑prejudice dismissals, especially where good cause exists.

4. Annett v. American Honda Motor Co., 1996 S.D. 58, 548 N.W.2d 798

Annett is the leading case on what constitutes “good cause” under SDCL 15‑11‑11. It held:

“Good cause” requires contact with the opposing party and some form of excusable conduct beyond mere negligence or inattention ([¶19]).
Courts must evaluate delay in light of the case’s circumstances, not time alone ([¶19]).
In Annett, the serious nature of injuries and difficulty finding an expert did not constitute good cause, mainly because there was no communication with the opposing party during the period of inactivity ([¶21]).

Arrowsmith uses Annett as a foil:

There was contact with the opposing side here—via AAA and later Odle’s counsel.
There was a formal agreement to defer answering, distinguishing it from Annett’s unilateral delays.

Thus, what was absent in Annett—mutual communication and agreement—is present and dispositive in Arrowsmith.

5. Lamar Advertising of South Dakota, Inc. v. Heavy Constructors, Inc., 2010 S.D. 77, 790 N.W.2d 45

In Lamar Advertising, the plaintiff argued that informal settlement negotiations justified delay and constituted good cause under SDCL 15‑11‑11. The Court rejected that argument, stressing:

“There was no formal agreement between the parties, written or otherwise, to extend the deadline” ([¶21]).

By contrast, in Arrowsmith:

There was a formal agreement—confirmed in writing (email)—providing an open‑ended extension.
This agreement squarely fits within the statute’s language that “the record” for good cause includes:
“written evidence of agreements between the parties or counsel which justifiably result in delays in prosecution.” (SDCL 15‑11‑11, emphasis added; cited at [¶16]).

Lamar therefore supports the opposite conclusion when the missing element there—a formal agreement—exists here.

6. London v. Adams, 1998 S.D. 41, 578 N.W.2d 145

London did not directly decide the effect of answer extensions, but in footnote 3 it favorably noted other jurisdictions that treat extension agreements as precluding failure‑to‑prosecute dismissals. It cited out‑of‑state authority recognizing that:

“[A]n agreement extending the time within which to answer is a reflection of the parties’ intent to defer action in the case and that dismissal for failure to prosecute is, therefore, precluded.” ([¶20], quoting London n.3).

Those courts concluded that mutual extension agreements imply a mutual intent “to excuse [each] other from diligence both in answering and taking default” ([¶20]).

Arrowsmith essentially elevates this footnote observation to controlling doctrinal status in South Dakota:

It expressly quotes and endorses the reasoning in London’s footnote.
It then directly applies that reasoning to find good cause and to bar a 41(b) dismissal.

In effect, the Court converts what had been an informative dictum into a clear rule: where parties mutually agree to extend the time to answer, that agreement precludes failure‑to‑prosecute dismissal based on the very delay the parties have chosen to accept.

7. Jenco, Inc. v. United Fire Group, 2003 S.D. 79, 666 N.W.2d 763

Jenco is a leading example of when Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate. The Court there affirmed dismissal where:

The plaintiff failed to obtain new counsel for 30 months despite an express court order to do so.
There were no settlement negotiations, discovery, exchange of pleadings, or agreements explaining the delay ([¶27]).
The plaintiff “even attempted to do anything whatsoever” was lacking ([¶27]).

Arrowsmith distinguishes Jenco on multiple grounds:

No outstanding court order was ignored.
There was a mutual agreement to defer pleading deadlines.
There was at least some communication about case status, culminating in reaffirmation of the extension in August 2024 ([¶29], [¶31]).

Thus, the “total inaction” context of Jenco is absent here; what might look like inactivity on the docket is, in context, a mutually accepted stand‑still.

8. Eischen v. Wayne Township, 2008 S.D. 2, 744 N.W.2d 788

In Eischen, the Court upheld a Rule 41(b) dismissal where:

Over nearly four years, the plaintiffs initiated only two acts.
Plaintiffs’ counsel repeatedly postponed hearings and failed to timely deliver agreed responses ([¶28]).

Justice Konenkamp’s dissent proposed a factor‑based approach for Rule 41(b) decisions. That approach, later adopted in Olson and applied in Arrowsmith, considers:

Notice that further delay will result in dismissal.
Consideration of lesser sanctions.
Whether conduct was willful or in bad faith.
Actual or likely prejudice to the defendant.
Merits of the plaintiff’s claim ([¶26]).

Arrowsmith deploys these factors to show why dismissal was inappropriate: there was no showing of bad faith or prejudice; lesser sanctions were not explored; and the delay was not egregious given the extension agreement ([¶29]–[¶33]).

B. The Court’s legal reasoning

1. Standard of review and abuse of discretion

The Court reiterates the three‑tier review framework from Olson ([¶12]):

Findings of fact – reviewed for clear error.
Conclusions of law – reviewed de novo.
Ultimate decision to dismiss – reviewed for abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion is defined, quoting Frye‑Byington v. Rapid City Med. Ctr., LLP, as:

“a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.” ([¶12]).

The Court ultimately holds that, given the extension agreement and the lack of prejudice or bad faith, dismissal under either provision exceeded the permissible range of options.

2. SDCL 15‑11‑11: Good cause based on a mutual extension agreement

SDCL 15‑11‑11 allows dismissal for want of prosecution where there has been no record activity for one year “unless good cause is shown to the contrary.” The statute expressly defines “record” to include, among other things:

Settlement negotiations,
Formal or informal discovery,
Exchange of pleadings, and critically,
Written evidence of agreements between the parties or counsel “which justifiably result in delays in prosecution.” ([¶16], emphasis added).

The Court focuses its analysis on the second prong—good cause—rather than debating whether there was record activity ([¶17]). It reasons:

“Good cause” requires both:
- Contact with the opposing party, and
- Excusable conduct not rooted in negligence or inattention ([¶19]).
Here, those elements are met because:
- Arrowsmith’s counsel had repeated communication with AAA and later with Odle’s counsel.
- There was a formal, open‑ended extension agreement, documented by email, that both sides later reaffirmed ([¶3], [¶8], [¶22]).
- Any inactivity was a reasonable reliance on that agreement, not neglect of deadlines ([¶22]).

The Court then adopts the view (previously floated in London) that answer extensions reflect an intent to defer action and excuse each side from strict diligence in pleading and default:

“In agreeing to an open-ended extension, Arrowsmith essentially agreed to forgo pursuit of a default judgment. It follows that Odle correspondingly agreed to forgo pursuit of a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.” ([¶23]).

From this, the Court draws a fairness principle: allowing Odle to profit from the extension by avoiding default while later attacking the same extension‑induced delay as failure to prosecute would strip Arrowsmith of the mutual benefit of the bargain. The open‑ended extension therefore constitutes sufficient good cause and precludes dismissal under SDCL 15‑11‑11 ([¶22]–[¶23]).

3. Rule 41(b): No egregious delay, and factor analysis weighs against dismissal

Rule 41(b) authorizes dismissal with prejudice for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or to comply with rules or court orders. Crucially:

Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is presumptively with prejudice unless stated otherwise ([¶24]).
Such dismissal requires egregious conduct, i.e., an “unreasonable and unexplained delay” ([¶24]–[¶25]).

The Court notes:

“Unreasonable and unexplained delay” means failure to do something a party reasonably would be expected to do to vindicate his rights ([¶25], quoting Dakota Cheese).
There is a “strong aversion to the sanction of dismissal” and courts should explore lesser sanctions first ([¶25]).

Applying Jenco, Eischen, and especially Olson, the Court concludes:

Unlike Jenco, there was no disobedience of a court order to obtain counsel and no 30‑month total inaction ([¶27], [¶29]).
Unlike Eischen, there was no pattern of postponements, missed commitments, or unresponsiveness ([¶28]–[¶29]).
As in Olson, the trial court placed excessive weight on temporal delay and insufficient weight on contextual, good‑faith efforts to move toward a resolution ([¶30]).

The open‑ended extension lies at the heart of the “explanation” for delay:

The parties agreed to defer formal pleadings.
They reaffirmed that agreement during the August 1, 2024 discussion.
Defense counsel gave no indication that she intended to terminate that agreement until the motion to dismiss was filed two months later ([¶31]–[¶32]).

On this record, the Court holds that Arrowsmith’s conduct was not egregious but “explainable”— indeed, induced by the defendant and his insurer. The Eischen/Olson factors further cut against dismissal:

Notice: Plaintiff did receive clerk’s notices, but those were met with objections, and the court itself had previously declined to dismiss.
Lesser sanctions: No evidence that the circuit court considered any remedy short of dismissal ([¶33]).
Bad faith: Odle did not allege bad faith, and the record does not support such a finding ([¶33]).
Prejudice: Odle offered no evidence of actual prejudice, such as lost witnesses, spoiled evidence, or impaired defenses ([¶33], echoing Olson).
Merits: While not fully assessed, the claim stems from a serious motorcycle collision; nothing suggests it is frivolous.

Given this constellation of factors, the Court holds that Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.

C. Impact and significance

1. Clarifying the legal effect of open‑ended extensions

The most significant doctrinal development is the clear recognition that:

A formal, open‑ended extension of time to answer constitutes good cause for delay under SDCL 15‑11‑11.
Such an agreement, when reasonably relied upon, substantially undercuts any claim of egregious delay under Rule 41(b).

This decision gives concrete force to the suggestion in London v. Adams that mutual extensions indicate a joint intent to defer action, precluding failure‑to‑prosecute dismissals based on the same delay the parties themselves have created.

Practically, this:

Encourages parties to document extensions clearly (as here, with emails).
Signals that courts should view such agreements as affirmative evidence of good cause, not as a risk factor for later sanctions.
Protects plaintiffs from being “sandbagged” by defendants who tacitly accept delay and later weaponize it.

2. Reinforcing the preference for adjudication on the merits

Arrowsmith, building on Olson and Dakota Cheese, reinforces an important policy: the judiciary’s “institutional preference for resolving cases on their merits” ([¶15], [¶25], [¶30]). The case warns:

Trial courts should not equate long periods of limited docket activity with egregious neglect when a reasonable explanation exists.
Clerk’s notices, standing alone, are not a mandate to dismiss; they are prompts to examine whether good cause exists.
Lesser sanctions and case‑management tools (status conferences, scheduling orders, conditional orders) should be considered before resorting to dismissal with prejudice.

3. Guidance for litigants and insurers in long‑tail personal injury cases

The facts here—a foreign plaintiff, serious injuries, ongoing treatment, and complex subrogation from foreign medical providers—are common in significant personal injury litigation. The opinion:

Recognizes that valuation of damages can reasonably require extended time, particularly where:
- Maximum medical improvement is uncertain, and
- Multiple medical and subrogation actors (especially across borders) must be coordinated.
Endorses the practice of using open‑ended extensions to avoid unnecessary litigation expense while injuries stabilize and settlement is explored—so long as such agreements are clearly documented.

Insurers and defense counsel should recognize that if they seek and benefit from such extensions, they may be estopped—practically if not formally—from claiming that the very delay they invited is evidence of failure to prosecute.

4. Separation of SDCL 15‑11‑11 and Rule 41(b) analysis

A subtle but important impact is the insistence—reiterated from Olson—that SDCL 15‑11‑11 and Rule 41(b) require separate analyses ([¶14]):

SDCL 15‑11‑11: threshold of one‑year inactivity + no good cause → discretionary, without‑prejudice dismissal.
Rule 41(b): focus on egregious conduct, prejudice, and sanctions; presumptively with prejudice.

Trial courts must avoid collapsing these standards into a single, time‑based inquiry. A court may, for example:

Find that a clerk’s notice is appropriate under SDCL 15‑11‑11, yet
Conclude that dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) is not justified because the delay is adequately explained and non‑egregious.

5. Preservation of issues without magic words

The Court’s discussion of preservation ([¶17]–[¶18]) offers practical assurance: parties preserve legal theories by the substance of their arguments, not by recitation of statutory labels. Arrowsmith:

Did not explicitly say “good cause” or “egregiousness” in his briefing or oral argument below.
But he did argue that the open‑ended extension justified his delay and that it would be unfair to penalize him for relying on that agreement.

The Supreme Court held that this was sufficient to preserve the good‑cause and non‑egregiousness issues. This encourages practitioners to focus on substantive justification rather than over‑formal invocations of legal buzzwords.

V. Simplifying Complex Concepts and Legal Terminology

1. Failure to prosecute

“Failure to prosecute” means that the plaintiff has not been actively moving the case forward in a reasonable way—filing necessary papers, conducting discovery, or otherwise taking steps towards resolution. It does not simply mean the case has been pending for a long time.

2. Dismissal with prejudice vs. without prejudice

With prejudice: The case is over on the merits; the plaintiff cannot bring the same claim again.
Without prejudice: The plaintiff can file a new action asserting the same claim (assuming no statute‑of‑limitations bar).

SDCL 15‑11‑11 dismissals are without prejudice; Rule 41(b) dismissals are generally with prejudice unless the court states otherwise ([¶14]–[¶15], [¶24]).

3. “Good cause” under SDCL 15‑11‑11

“Good cause” is not a rigid formula, but in this context it means:

The plaintiff has stayed in contact with the defendant or defendant’s insurer, and
There is a reasonable, non‑negligent explanation for why the case has not been actively prosecuted during the period of apparent inactivity.

The statute explicitly says good cause can include “written evidence of agreements … which justifiably result in delays in prosecution” ([¶16]).

4. “Egregious” conduct and “unreasonable and unexplained delay” (Rule 41(b))

“Egregious” conduct is more than simple oversight or slow progress. It involves:

Serious neglect of the case (e.g., doing virtually nothing for a long time),
Ignoring court orders, or
Acting in bad faith or with deliberate disregard for procedural obligations.

“Unreasonable and unexplained delay” means:

The plaintiff did not do something that a reasonable litigant would be expected to do to move the case along, and
There is no valid explanation for that failure ([¶25]).

5. Default judgment and reciprocal forbearance

If a defendant does not file a timely answer to a complaint, the plaintiff can seek a default judgment, winning the case because the defendant failed to respond.

In Arrowsmith, by giving Odle an open‑ended extension to answer, Arrowsmith agreed to not pursue default. The Court reasons that fairness requires a reciprocal understanding: Odle should not be allowed to take advantage of the extension to avoid default and later use the delay it produced to seek dismissal for failure to prosecute ([¶23]).

6. Subrogation lienholders

“Subrogation lienholders” are insurers or other entities that have paid some of the plaintiff’s expenses (like medical bills) and have a legal right to be reimbursed from any recovery the plaintiff obtains from the defendant.

Here, some subrogation lienholders were in Canada, complicating the process of gathering information and negotiating the case value ([¶5]–[¶6]).

VI. Conclusion: The Broader Significance of Arrowsmith v. Odle

Arrowsmith v. Odle is more than a fact‑bound reversal of a dismissal; it is a clarifying statement on the interplay between private procedural agreements and judicial docket control.

Key takeaways include:

Open‑ended answer extensions matter: When formal and mutual, they constitute “good cause” under SDCL 15‑11‑11 and strongly weigh against Rule 41(b) dismissal.
Fairness and reciprocity: A plaintiff who foregoes default in reliance on such an extension cannot fairly be punished for the resulting delay; the defendant, having gained time and avoided default, cannot turn that time into a sword to dismiss the case.
Context over calendar: Courts must look beyond the mere passage of time and examine whether delay is reasonably explained, especially in complex injury cases with ongoing treatment and difficult valuation questions.
Separate frameworks: SDCL 15‑11‑11 (clerical, without prejudice) and Rule 41(b) (sanctioning, with prejudice) serve different functions and require distinct analyses.
Preference for merits adjudication: Reinforcing Olson and Dakota Cheese, the decision cautions that dismissal with prejudice remains an extreme measure reserved for truly egregious, unjustified neglect or disobedience.

For practitioners, Arrowsmith underscores the importance of:

Documenting extensions and their purposes in writing.
Responding substantively to clerk’s dismissal notices, with clear explanations and evidence of good cause.
Recognizing that extension agreements not only delay the defendant’s pleading obligations but also affect the equitable calculus around failure‑to‑prosecute motions.

For courts, the opinion serves as a reminder to:

Scrutinize the reasons for delay, including any mutual understandings that may justify it.
Assess lesser sanctions before imposing the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice.
Ensure that procedural tools like SDCL 15‑11‑11 and Rule 41(b) are used to manage dockets and ensure fairness, not to defeat potentially meritorious claims where both parties have agreed to proceed slowly.

In sum, Arrowsmith v. Odle firmly establishes that cooperative case‑management arrangements—especially open‑ended answer extensions—are not traps for the unwary but are to be given real legal effect as “good cause” protecting litigants from the harsh consequences of dismissal for failure to prosecute.

Open‑Ended Answer Extensions as “Good Cause” Against Failure‑to‑Prosecute Dismissals: Commentary on Arrowsmith v. Odle, 2025 S.D. 70