"Only Constituents May Recall": Washington Supreme Court Establishes Constitutional Standing Rule for Local Recalls and Affirms Fee Sanctions for Bad-Faith Petitions

Introduction

In In re Recall of Suggs (Wash. Mar. 27, 2025), the Washington Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Stephens, resolved a previously unsettled question about who may initiate a recall petition against local elected officials. John Worthington, a Sequim resident and thus not a voter in the City of Port Angeles, filed petitions to recall the Port Angeles mayor and three city council members—Latrisha Suggs (Position 1), Mayor Kate Dexter (Position 4), Navarra Carr (Position 6), and Lindsey Schromen-Wawrin (Position 3). The petitions focused on Port Angeles’ membership in the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), alleging that membership rendered the officials unqualified for office under various theories.

The threshold issue was standing: whether a person who is not a “legal voter” in the relevant political subdivision (here, the City of Port Angeles) may file a recall petition against its officers. The superior court dismissed for lack of standing and awarded attorney fees to the officials, finding the petitions intentionally frivolous and filed in bad faith. The Supreme Court affirmed both the dismissal and the fee award (including fees on appeal).

The Court’s decision clarifies the scope of Washington Constitution article I, section 33 and RCW 29A.56.110, holding that only legal voters within an officer’s constituency—that is, within the political subdivision from which the officer was elected—may initiate a recall of that officer. It also confirms that attorney fees may be awarded where recall petitions are intentionally frivolous and brought for harassment.

Summary of the Opinion

Standing rule established: When a recall petition targets officials of a political subdivision (e.g., city, county, district), only legal voters in that political subdivision have standing to initiate the recall (Wash. Const. art. I, § 33; RCW 29A.56.110).
Textual interpretation: The word “or” in the constitutional and statutory text does not permit any legal voter of the state to recall any official; rather, it distinguishes between statewide officers (recallable by legal voters of the state) and local officers (recallable by legal voters of that political subdivision), “as the case may be.”
Alignment with prior jurisprudence: The Court finds persuasive the Court of Appeals’ unpublished reasoning in Knedlik v. Snohomish County and reads its own prior decisions (Boldt and White) as consistent with the constituency-based view of recall standing.
Rejection of appellant’s arguments: The Court rejects claims that the officials “opted out” of their political subdivision via nonprofit collaborations, that counsel agreed to a merits hearing, and that the officials waived standing by seeking attorney fees and entry of judgment.
Attorney fees affirmed and awarded on appeal: Because Worthington knew or should have known he lacked standing and pursued the petitions for harassment, fees are warranted under RAP 18.1 and 18.9 and recall fee precedents (Piper; Pearsall‑Stipek).

Analysis

Constitutional and Statutory Text

Article I, section 33 states that every elective public officer “is subject to recall and discharge by the legal voters of the state, or of the political subdivision of the state, from which [they were] elected.” The parallel statutory provision, RCW 29A.56.110, provides the procedures “[w]henever any legal voter of the state or of any political subdivision thereof … desires to demand the recall and discharge of any elective public officer of the state or of such political subdivision, as the case may be.”

The Court adopts a structural, plain-meaning reading that avoids surplusage. If “any legal voter of the state” could recall any officer, the phrases “or of any political subdivision thereof” and “or of such political subdivision, as the case may be” would be superfluous, because local voters are also state voters. The better reading is that the “or” separates two distinct pairings:

State officers are recallable by legal voters of the state; and
Local officers are recallable by legal voters of the officer’s political subdivision.

This interpretation ties recall power to the official’s constituency and advances the constitutional purpose of democratic accountability to those governed by the official’s actions.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Knedlik v. Snohomish County (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2015) (unpublished).
A King County voter attempted to recall a Snohomish County executive. The Court of Appeals held he lacked standing because he was not a legal voter in Snohomish County, construing the same constitutional and statutory language to mean “only voters from an official’s constituency may recall the official.” While unpublished (and therefore nonbinding), it is citable as persuasive authority and is expressly adopted in substance by the Supreme Court here.
Teaford v. Howard, 104 Wn.2d 580, 583, 707 P.2d 1327 (1985).
Cited in Knedlik and noted here for the principle that an officer’s constituency initiates recall proceedings. The term “constituency” anchors the interpretation that standing is limited to those entitled to vote for the officer.
In re Recall of Boldt, 187 Wn.2d 542, 556 n.6, 386 P.3d 1104 (2017).
Although the Court did not resolve standing, it flagged that standing turns on whether “political subdivision” refers to the officer’s “constituency,” signaling that not every state voter may recall a local official regardless of voting eligibility.
In re Recall of White, 196 Wn.2d 492, 495, 474 P.3d 1032 (2020).
In the course of addressing sufficiency, the Court stated that “any legal voter in the political subdivision that elected a person” may file a recall petition, affirming the constituency-based conception of recall authority.
Grange Ins. Ass’n v. State, 110 Wn.2d 752, 757 P.2d 933 (1988).
Worthington argued waiver of standing because the officials sought affirmative relief (fees, sanctions, judgment). Citing Grange, the Court rejected this, explaining that “affirmative relief” means relief that could be sought in an independent action; here, the requests were derivative of defending against the petitions and did not waive standing. The Court expressly declined to hold that lack of standing is waivable in the same manner as lack of jurisdiction.
In re Recall of Piper, 184 Wn.2d 780, 787, 364 P.3d 113 (2015); In re Recall of Pearsall‑Stipek, 141 Wn.2d 756, 783, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000); Pearsall‑Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 266, 961 P.2d 343 (1998).
These cases set and refine the standard for fee-shifting in recall matters—fees may be awarded when recall petitions are intentionally frivolous and brought in bad faith for the purpose of harassment. The Court applied this standard to affirm fees below and award fees on appeal.
Rogerson Hiller Corp. v. Port of Port Angeles, 96 Wn. App. 918, 982 P.2d 131 (1999).
Cited by Worthington to argue that fees require a prior sufficiency determination. The Court rejected that reading: Rogerson was not a recall case, and nothing in it requires a sufficiency ruling before awarding fees. Here, fees were appropriate because the appeal from dismissal for lack of standing was frivolous.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds along three mutually reinforcing lines:

Text and Structure. The constitutional and statutory phrases are read as paired: state officers/state voters; local officers/local voters. The “as the case may be” clause confirms the pairing. Accepting a “statewide voter may recall anyone” reading would nullify the political-subdivision language, violating the canon against surplusage.
Purpose: Democratic Accountability to Constituents. The recall power serves to ensure local accountability in representative government. Limiting initiation to the officer’s constituency aligns with that purpose and avoids opening local officials to recall by nonconstituents with no electoral stake in the office.
Consistency with Precedent. Although the Court had not previously issued a holding on this precise standing question, prior cases repeatedly describe recall as a constituency-driven mechanism. The Court of Appeals’ Knedlik opinion, while unpublished, is persuasive and consistent with the constitutional structure and earlier Supreme Court descriptions in Boldt and White.

Applying this rule, Worthington (a Sequim resident) lacked standing to recall Port Angeles officials. The Court also disposed of ancillary arguments:

No “expanded” political subdivision. Nonprofit activity across county lines and ICLEI membership do not alter the legal boundaries of the City of Port Angeles or create a new, two‑county political subdivision. No authority supports that theory.
No contractual waiver to reach the merits. Counsel’s e-mails pursued a continuance and a briefing schedule; no agreement to forego standing or to hold a merits hearing was formed.
No waiver via affirmative relief. Requests for sanctions, attorney fees, and entry of judgment were defensive and derivative of the recall action and did not constitute “affirmative relief” that would waive a threshold defense even if such waiver were possible.

Attorney Fees and Bad Faith

The Court affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees and also awarded fees on appeal. Under RAP 18.1, a party may recover fees when authorized by law; RAP 18.9 allows sanctions for frivolous appeals. In the recall context, fees are appropriate for petitions that are both frivolous and brought in bad faith (harassment).

The record supported bad faith: Worthington knew he was not a Port Angeles voter; he publicly acknowledged the need for a Port Angeles petitioner; opposing counsel alerted him to the standing defect; and he had previously filed several recall petitions against the same officials that were denied. The superior court also noted the ICLEI‑membership theory targeted a discretionary policy choice, reinforcing frivolousness. The Supreme Court agreed and rejected the suggestion that fees require a prior sufficiency ruling.

Finally, the Court emphasizes that this standing requirement is constitutional in nature—rooted in article I, section 33—and “cannot be altered by the courts.” In practical terms, neither judicial doctrine nor ordinary legislation can expand recall initiation beyond the officer’s constituency absent a constitutional amendment.

Impact

The decision has immediate and longer-term consequences for Washington recall practice:

Clear gatekeeping rule. A recall petition against a local official must be initiated by a legal voter in the official’s constituency. Petitions filed by nonconstituents are subject to dismissal at the threshold without reaching legal or factual sufficiency.
Reduced forum-shopping and harassment risk. The ruling thwarts statewide or out‑of‑district campaigns from initiating recalls to pressure or punish local officials without local electoral accountability, preserving the recall’s local-democracy function.
Practical compliance for organizers. Advocacy groups must ensure that the filer (and, of course, the subsequent signatories) are legal voters of the targeted jurisdiction. For by-district seats, the constituency likely narrows to the district itself, consistent with the Court’s “officer’s constituency” language (see Boldt n.6).
Early motion practice and cost shifting. Respondents should promptly challenge standing where appropriate. Where the filing is knowingly improper, fee exposure—both in the trial court and on appeal—creates a meaningful deterrent against intentionally frivolous, harassing recalls.
Institutional clarification. By elevating the rule to constitutional status, the Court stabilizes recall practice against fluctuations in prudential standing doctrines or statutory tweaks. Any change would require constitutional amendment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing (who is allowed to sue or file): A threshold requirement. In recall cases, standing is constitutionally limited: only legal voters of the officer’s constituency (the political subdivision that elected the officer) may initiate recall of that officer.
Legal voter: Generally, a registered voter eligible to vote in the jurisdiction at issue. For a city official, this means a registered voter residing in that city (or, for district-based seats, in that district).
Political subdivision: A governmental unit within the state—e.g., county, city, town, school district, port district. The “officer’s constituency” is the set of voters entitled to vote for that particular office within the subdivision.
Recall (Washington): Washington uses a for‑cause recall system. Although the Court did not reach sufficiency here, recall petitions ordinarily must allege legally and factually sufficient grounds (misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office). Standing comes first.
Bad faith and frivolousness (fees): Fees may be awarded when a recall is intentionally frivolous and brought for harassment. Knowledge of a clear defect (e.g., lack of standing) and pursuit despite warnings can support a bad-faith finding.
Affirmative relief (waiver argument): Relief the opposing party could seek independently of the action. Requests like fees or sanctions arising from defending the action are not “affirmative relief” and do not waive threshold defenses.

Conclusion

In re Recall of Suggs establishes a definitive constitutional rule for Washington recalls: only the officer’s own constituents—the legal voters of the political subdivision from which the officer was elected—may initiate a recall of that officer. The Court’s textual and purposive analysis harmonizes the Constitution and RCW 29A.56.110, aligns with prior descriptions of recall as a constituency-based mechanism, and expressly adopts the reasoning of the Court of Appeals’ unpublished Knedlik decision.

The ruling also reinforces that recall petitions filed in knowing disregard of this standing requirement may draw fee sanctions, including on appeal, when they are intentionally frivolous and pursued for harassment. As a result, this opinion clarifies the front-end gatekeeping of recall proceedings, protects local democratic accountability from out-of-district interference, and provides clear guidance to litigants and courts for early resolution of defective filings.