One Day Late Is Jurisdictionally Fatal: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Statutory Rule 4(a)(5) Deadline and Dismisses Objectors’ Appeals for Nonpayment of Rule 7 Bond in the East Palestine Class Action

One Day Late Is Jurisdictionally Fatal: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Statutory Rule 4(a)(5) Deadline and Dismisses Objectors’ Appeals for Nonpayment of Rule 7 Bond in the East Palestine Class Action

Introduction

In a precedential decision recommended for publication, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has delivered a strong message on two recurring procedural flashpoints in complex class litigation: (1) the unforgiving, jurisdictional nature of appellate time limits when a party seeks to extend the deadline to appeal; and (2) the consequences for class-action objectors who refuse to post a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 7 appeal bond.

The case arises from the February 2023 Norfolk Southern derailment near East Palestine, Ohio, and a $600 million class settlement approved by the district court in September 2024 after extensive discovery, motion practice, and mediation. Several objectors appealed. The district court ordered the objectors to post an $850,000 appeal bond to cover settlement administration costs caused by the delay and taxable costs. The objectors neither posted the bond nor offered a lesser amount, and—crucially—filed a motion in the district court to extend the time to appeal the bond order one day after the statutory grace period expired.

Writing for a panel that included Judges Thapar, Readler, and Hermandorfer, Judge Thapar held that because the motion to extend was one day late, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant it. The court also dismissed the objectors’ appeals from the settlement itself because the objectors ignored the bond order without seeking a stay or making a good-faith proffer.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Extension motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A) are jurisdictional. A motion to extend the time to appeal a bond order must be filed no later than 30 days after the initial 30-day appeal period expires. Here, the objectors filed their extension motion on March 21, 2025—one day after the March 20 deadline—depriving the district court of jurisdiction to grant relief.
  • The “law-of-the-case” doctrine could not rescue the late motion. A prior motions-panel observation that objectors “could still obtain review” by filing a direct appeal did not bind the district court and could not expand jurisdiction or override statutory deadlines.
  • The objectors’ settlement appeals were dismissed for failure to post the Rule 7 appeal bond. Applying Sixth Circuit precedent (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation), the court weighed prejudice, justification, and merits, concluding that:
    • Prejudice was substantial because about 55,000 claimants awaited distribution, while fewer than 0.01% of the class objected.
    • Objectors had no valid justification for nonpayment; they neither sought a stay nor proffered any portion of the bond with supporting financial affidavits.
    • Objectors were unlikely to succeed on their challenges to notice and settlement reasonableness.
  • The court reaffirmed that notice need not include items like class representatives’ incentive awards or attorney-fee allocations and that a 31-day opt-out period, coupled with extensive multi-channel notice, satisfied Rule 23 and due process.
  • Incentive awards of $15,000 and a fee award of $162 million (approximately 27% of the fund) were within the district court’s discretion given the complexity and scope of the litigation.

Background and Procedural History

  • February 2023: Norfolk Southern derailment near East Palestine, Ohio, triggers toxic releases, leading to federal class litigation.
  • September 2024: District court approves a $600 million class settlement after extensive discovery (over one million documents, 70 depositions) and mediation.
  • January 16, 2025: District court orders class-objector appellants to post an $850,000 Rule 7 appeal bond by January 30 (comprised of $825,000 in administration costs due to delayed distribution and $25,000 in taxable costs).
  • January 2025: Objectors file in the Sixth Circuit a “Motion to Eliminate or Reduce Appeal Bond,” insisting it not be treated as a stay request; the motions panel declines relief and notes a direct appeal route is available.
  • March 21, 2025: Objectors move in the district court to extend time to appeal the bond order—one day after the 30-day statutory grace period expired (March 20).
  • District court denies the extension as untimely; objectors appeal. Meanwhile, plaintiffs move to dismiss the settlement appeals for failure to post the bond.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s analysis rests on a well-developed Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit framework distinguishing jurisdictional deadlines from nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules:

  • Bowles v. Russell (551 U.S. 205): Appellate time limits prescribed by statute are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Bowles forecloses equitable exceptions beyond those Congress has provided.
  • Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki (562 U.S. 428): Reinforces the principle that courts may not expand statutory jurisdictional time limits through equitable doctrines.
  • Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago (583 U.S. 17): Clarifies that deadlines grounded only in rules (not statutes) are generally claim-processing rules. But where a rule “implements” a statutory deadline, the deadline is jurisdictional.
  • In re Tennial (978 F.3d 1022) and Ultimate Appliance CC v. Kirby Co. (601 F.3d 414): Sixth Circuit precedent applying Hamer and Bowles to hold that Rule 4(a)(5)(A)’s timing requirements, because they implement § 2107(c), are jurisdictional in this circuit.
  • Powers v. Citizens Union National Bank & Trust Co. (329 F.2d 507) and In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation (391 F.3d 812): Sixth Circuit authority confirming that failure to post a Rule 7 appeal bond is grounds for dismissal and setting out the dismissal factors (prejudice, justification, and underlying merits).
  • Fidel v. Farley (534 F.3d 508) and UAW v. General Motors (497 F.3d 615): Standards for reviewing class notice and settlement approval (clear-error review for factual findings on notice adequacy, de novo for legal adequacy; abuse-of-discretion for overall settlement reasonableness).
  • Swanigan v. FCA US LLC (938 F.3d 779): Forfeiture principles—objections not presented to the district court are generally not entertained later.
  • In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Securities Litigation (726 F.2d 1075) and Does 1–2 v. Déjà Vu Services, Inc. (925 F.3d 886): The “likelihood of success” factor in the settlement reasonableness calculus and the emphasis on practical benefits to the class.
  • In re Dry Max Pampers Litigation (724 F.3d 713): Guidance on incentive awards and settlement scrutiny; here, the panel finds $15,000 awards reasonable under the circumstances.
  • Wright v. Spaulding (939 F.3d 695) and Keahy v. Marquis (978 F.3d 474): Limits of the law-of-the-case doctrine; dicta or comments not necessary to a decision, or decisions issued without jurisdiction, cannot control later proceedings.

Together, these authorities drive two core holdings: the jurisdictional bar on late extension motions and the appropriateness of dismissing appeals where objectors ignore a Rule 7 bond without seeking a stay, a reduction, or making a good-faith proffer.

Legal Reasoning

1) The extension motion was jurisdictionally barred when filed one day late

Section 2107(a) sets a 30-day deadline to appeal civil orders; § 2107(c) authorizes district courts to extend that time upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, but only if the extension motion is filed no later than 30 days after the original 30-day deadline. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) and (a)(5)(A) implement these statutory mandates. Because these time limits implement a statute, they are jurisdictional, not merely claim-processing rules (Hamer; In re Tennial; Ultimate Appliance CC).

Applying FRAP 26’s time-computation provisions for weekends and holidays, the 30-day appeal period from the January 16 bond order expired on February 18, 2025. The 30-day grace period to move for an extension ran through March 20, 2025. The objectors filed on March 21—one day late. As the panel succinctly put it, “It doesn’t matter whether the motion to extend was one day, one hour, or one minute late.” Under Bowles and § 2107, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension, and no equitable principle could revive the request.

2) “Law of the case” could not create jurisdiction

Objectors argued that a prior motions-panel order stating they “could still obtain review” of the bond order via direct appeal compelled acceptance of their late filing. The court rejected that argument on two independent grounds:

  • The motions-panel statement did not determine the outcome and thus was not law of the case (Wright; Keahy).
  • Even if it were, law-of-the-case cannot expand jurisdiction or trump statutory deadlines (Bowles; Ultimate Appliance CC).

3) Dismissal of settlement appeals for failure to post the Rule 7 bond

The court then enforced the January 2025 bond order. Quoting longstanding Sixth Circuit precedent, “[f]ailure to execute … a bond unless exempted by law is grounds for dismissal of an appeal” (Powers). Under In re Cardizem, whether to dismiss for nonpayment turns on:

  • Prejudice: The delay in distribution to approximately 55,000 claimants—where fewer than 0.01% of an estimated 500,000 eligible class members objected—created substantial prejudice. The settlement payments address “loss of use and enjoyment, emotional distress, inconvenience, relocation, [and] medical monitoring” for residents and “net business loss” for businesses. Continued delay imperiled health and community stability.
  • Justification: The objectors neither sought a stay nor proffered a lesser bond with supporting affidavits. Their arguments—that ongoing challenges excused nonpayment and that they could not afford the bond—failed. Challenging a bond does not authorize ignoring it; inability to pay must be supported by detailed evidence and at least a good-faith proffer. The record showed neither. The court also noted that the objectors were not proceeding in forma pauperis and that contingency arrangements suggested limited out-of-pocket appellate obligations, undermining claims of total inability to post any amount.
  • Merits (used as a factor in the dismissal analysis): The court found objectors were unlikely to prevail on their notice and settlement objections. The record showed extensive multi-channel notice and a reasonable 31-day opt-out window. Many contentions were forfeited by not being raised below (Swanigan). The settlement’s reasonableness was supported by exhaustive litigation, low opt-out rates (0.18% of households and 0.31% of businesses), and substantial benefits. Incentive awards of $15,000 and fees of $162 million (about 27% of the fund) fell within accepted ranges (Dry Max Pampers; Déjà Vu).

With all three Cardizem factors breaking against the objectors, the panel dismissed their appeals from the class settlement.

Impact and Implications

A. Appellate timing: zero tolerance for late extension motions

This decision reiterates in unmistakable terms that the 30+30-day framework in § 2107 and Rule 4(a)(5)(A) is jurisdictional. A motion to extend filed even moments late cannot be entertained. Counsel must calendar both the initial 30-day deadline and the subsequent 30-day extension window, applying FRAP 26 for weekends and holidays. The opinion’s bright-line reminder—“one day, one hour, or one minute late” is fatal—will likely be cited frequently in the Sixth Circuit when litigants miss the extension window.

B. Rule 7 bonds: practical blueprint for enforcing payment in class cases

The panel sets out a practical enforcement roadmap for Rule 7 appeal bonds in class actions:

  • Objectors who contest bond validity should promptly move for a stay in the district court, seek reduction with detailed financial affidavits, or at least proffer uncontested portions. Doing none of the above invites dismissal.
  • District courts can tailor bonds to foreseeable administrative costs caused by delayed distributions, provided the amounts are grounded in evidence in the record.
  • On a motion to dismiss for nonpayment, the Sixth Circuit will evaluate prejudice, justification, and a preview of the underlying merits. Where nonpayment is coupled with weak merits and heavy class prejudice (especially in large settlements), dismissal is likely.

C. Class notice and settlement content

The court reinforces that Rule 23 and due process require notice that is reasonably calculated to reach and inform class members; it need not include every granular detail such as precise incentive awards or fee allocations. A shorter-than-average opt-out period may still be reasonable if the overall dissemination strategy is robust (mail, online postings, newspapers, social media, local television).

On fees and incentive awards, the decision signals continued Sixth Circuit acceptance of percentage-of-the-fund fee awards in the 20–30% range for complex litigation and modest incentive payments to class representatives where justified by effort, risk, and results.

D. Practical guidance for practitioners

  • When a bond order issues, immediately decide whether to:
    • File a notice of appeal of the bond order within 30 days;
    • Move for a stay, reduction, or elimination in the district court with evidentiary support;
    • Proffer uncontested amounts to demonstrate good faith while challenges are pending.
  • If an extension to appeal is needed, file the Rule 4(a)(5) motion before the 30-day grace period lapses; do not rely on equitable extensions or informal statements suggesting flexibility.
  • Preserve objections to notice content and settlement terms in the district court; forfeited arguments face steep odds on appeal.
  • For alleged inability to pay, provide detailed, sworn financial statements and a concrete proffer. Mere assertions will not suffice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Jurisdictional deadline: A time limit set by statute that cannot be extended by a court’s equitable powers. Missing it deprives the court of authority to act.
  • Rule 4(a)(5)(A) motion: A request to the district court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal, permitted only if filed within 30 days after the original appeal deadline and supported by excusable neglect or good cause.
  • Rule 7 appeal bond: An amount the district court can require an appellant to post to cover “costs on appeal,” which in class cases may include administrative costs caused by delayed distributions.
  • Stay of bond order: A court order temporarily suspending the bond requirement; without a stay or payment (or a good-faith proffer), an appeal may be dismissed.
  • Law-of-the-case: A prudential doctrine that generally binds courts to follow their own prior decisions in the same case. It does not create jurisdiction and does not apply to statements unnecessary to the prior decision.
  • Settlement reasonableness: Assessed under Rule 23(e)(2) and circuit factors, with emphasis on litigation risks and benefits to the class, the views of class members, and the absence of collusion.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in In re East Palestine Train Derailment cements two critical propositions for class-action practice in this circuit:

  • Jurisdictional rigor governs appellate timing. A Rule 4(a)(5) motion to extend filed one day late is as fatal as one filed one month late; neither the law-of-the-case doctrine nor equitable notions can expand jurisdiction beyond the bounds Congress set in § 2107.
  • Rule 7 bonds are not aspirational. Objectors who refuse to pay and fail to seek a stay, reduction, or to make a good-faith proffer risk dismissal, particularly where delay threatens thousands of claimants and the underlying appeals appear weak.

Beyond its immediate effect—clearing the way for distribution of a substantial settlement to tens of thousands of affected residents and businesses—the decision provides a clear, precedential roadmap for handling appeal-bond enforcement and extension motions in complex class actions. Counsel would be well advised to treat its deadlines and directives as hard stops, not soft targets.

Citations Highlighted in the Opinion

  • 28 U.S.C. § 2107; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), 4(a)(5), 7, 23, 26
  • Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)
  • Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17 (2017)
  • Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011)
  • In re Tennial, 978 F.3d 1022 (6th Cir. 2020)
  • Ultimate Appliance CC v. Kirby Co., 601 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2010)
  • Powers v. Citizens Union Nat. Bank & Tr. Co., 329 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964)
  • In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2004)
  • Fidel v. Farley, 534 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008)
  • UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2007)
  • Swanigan v. FCA US LLC, 938 F.3d 779 (6th Cir. 2019)
  • In re Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1984)
  • Does 1–2 v. Déjà Vu Servs., Inc., 925 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2019)
  • In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2013)
  • Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019)
  • Keahy v. Marquis, 978 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2020)
  • In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 178 F. Supp. 3d 635 (N.D. Ohio 2016)

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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