Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007): The Supreme Court held that certain statutory deadlines for filing notices of appeal are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” The Sixth Circuit relied on Bowles to emphasize that when Congress sets an appeal-related time limit in a statute, courts cannot use equitable powers to excuse noncompliance. Here, § 2107(c)’s 30‑day grace period for extension motions is such a statutory limit.
• Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011): Reinforces that courts may not create non-statutory exceptions to jurisdictional timelines. The panel invoked Henderson to underscore that equitable considerations cannot expand statutorily defined appellate jurisdiction.
• Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17 (2017): Clarified that time limits grounded solely in court-made rules are generally claim-processing rules, not jurisdictional. The Sixth Circuit contrasted Hamer with this case: Rule 4(a)(5)(A)’s timing requirement is jurisdictional because it implements a statutory limit in § 2107(c).
• In re Tennial, 978 F.3d 1022 (6th Cir. 2020): Articulated the Sixth Circuit’s post-Hamer framework—if a timing rule implements a statutory deadline, it is jurisdictional. The court applied Tennial to hold that Rule 4(a)(5)(A)’s “no later than 30 days” extension window is jurisdictional.
• Ultimate Appliance CC v. Kirby Co., 601 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2010): Recognized the jurisdictional nature of § 2107-based deadlines. The panel cited this case to reiterate that courts cannot enlarge the statutorily prescribed extension window.
• Powers v. Citizens Union National Bank & Trust Co., 329 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964): Established that failure to execute a bond is grounds for dismissal of an appeal. The court used Powers to reinforce that noncompliance with a bond order can have dispositive appellate consequences.
• In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 391 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2004): Set out factors guiding whether to dismiss for failure to post a Rule 7 bond: (1) prejudice from delay, (2) justification for nonpayment, and (3) merits of the appeal. The panel applied these factors and found each favored dismissal.
• Fidel v. Farley, 534 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008): Addressed standards for class notice and settlement approval. The court drew on Fidel for both the standard of review and the substantive notice requirements under Rule 23 and due process.
• UAW v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2007): Provided factors for assessing the reasonableness of class settlements, emphasizing the likelihood of success as the most important consideration.
• Does 1–2 v. Déjà Vu Services, Inc., 925 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2019): Confirmed the regularity of fee awards in the 20%–30% range of a common fund and the propriety of approving reasonable settlements balancing benefits against litigation risks.
• In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2013): Cautioned against disproportionate incentive awards; here, the Sixth Circuit found $15,000 awards within the district court’s discretion given the case’s scope and risk.
• Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019) and Keahy v. Marquis, 978 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2020): Clarified limits of the law-of-the-case doctrine and its inapplicability to dicta or statements that did not determine the outcome. The prior motions panel remark that objectors “could still obtain review” was not binding and, in any event, could not expand jurisdiction.
• In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 178 F. Supp. 3d 635 (N.D. Ohio 2016): Cited to illustrate the type of financial showings that can support a request to reduce or structure a bond; lack of such showings undermined the objectors’ “inability to pay” argument.
• Swanigan v. FCA US LLC, 938 F.3d 779 (6th Cir. 2019) and In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Securities Litigation, 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1984): Address forfeiture of belated objections and the centrality of likelihood of success when assessing settlement reasonableness.

Legal Reasoning

1) Jurisdictional Time Limits Under § 2107 and Rule 4(a)(5)

The court began with first principles: when Congress sets the deadlines for appeal in a statute, those limits are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Section 2107(a) imposes a 30‑day deadline to appeal civil judgments and orders (with exceptions not applicable here). Section 2107(c) allows district courts to “extend the time for appeal” on a showing of excusable neglect or good cause—provided the would‑be appellant moves “not later than 30 days after” the original appeal deadline expires.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) and 4(a)(5)(A) implement these statutory rules. Because Rule 4(a)(5)(A)’s extension window mirrors § 2107(c), it carries the same jurisdictional character. The court stressed that equitable doctrines cannot override jurisdictional statutes: a motion filed one day after the 30‑day extension window closes is as fatal as one filed a month late. The district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant the objectors’ extension motion; the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal of that ruling for lack of jurisdiction.

2) “Law of the Case” Cannot Create Jurisdiction

The objectors argued that a prior Sixth Circuit motions panel statement—that they “could still obtain review of the bond order by filing a direct appeal”—compelled the district court to allow a late filing. The panel rejected this on two grounds:

• The prior remark was not part of a binding merits decision; it did not “determine the outcome” and thus was not law of the case.
• Even if it were, no court can expand jurisdiction by fiat. Statutory time limits constrain both district and appellate courts, and no prior statement (much less dicta) can overcome § 2107’s mandate.

3) Dismissal for Failure to Post a Rule 7 Bond

Turning to the settlement appeals, the court enforced the Rule 7 bond order. It explained that “failure to execute … a bond” is grounds for dismissal and applied In re Cardizem’s three-factor test:

• Prejudice: The continued pendency of objectors’ appeals without a bond delayed distribution to roughly 55,000 claimants—residents and businesses relying on funds for “loss of use and enjoyment, emotional distress, inconvenience, relocation, [and] medical monitoring,” and business “net loss.” With fewer than 0.01% of the half‑million eligible class members objecting, the panel found the prejudice to be “overwhelming.”
• Justification: Neither ongoing efforts to challenge the bond nor bare assertions of inability to pay justified wholesale noncompliance. The court emphasized what objectors should have done: move for a stay, submit detailed, sworn financial information to support a reduction, or at least make a good‑faith proffer of an uncontested portion. The record lacked such steps.
• Merits: The objectors were unlikely to succeed on their remaining challenges to notice and settlement reasonableness. The notice methods (mail, web, newspapers, social media, local TV) and content met Rule 23 and due process requirements; a 31‑day opt‑out was adequate. As to reasonableness, the $600 million settlement struck a sensible balance given the risks, costs, and duration of further litigation; low opt‑out and objection rates supported approval; and both $15,000 incentive awards and a 20–30% range fee award were within the district court’s discretion.

With all three factors favoring enforcement, the court dismissed the settlement appeals for failure to post the bond.

Impact and Practical Consequences

A. Appellate Deadlines: Zero Tolerance for Tardiness

The opinion cements within the Sixth Circuit that the Rule 4(a)(5)(A) extension window is jurisdictional because it implements § 2107(c). The practical message is stark: if you intend to appeal but miss the original notice-of-appeal deadline, your only safety valve is to file an extension motion within the statutory 30‑day grace period—and you must do so on time. File it even a minute late, and neither the district court nor the court of appeals has power to help you.

B. Challenging Rule 7 Bonds: Process Matters

For objectors, the decision underscores the narrow path for challenging appeal bonds:

• Promptly file a stay motion in the district court (and, if necessary, in the court of appeals) if you cannot immediately comply with the bond order.
• Support any request to reduce or eliminate the bond with detailed, sworn financial disclosures.
• At minimum, tender a good‑faith partial bond to demonstrate seriousness and mitigate prejudice.
• A direct appeal of the bond order must be noticed within Rule 4(a)(1)’s 30 days, or an extension must be sought within the statutory 30‑day grace period.

Failure to take these steps invites dismissal, especially where delay materially harms a large class awaiting distributions.

C. Class Action Administration and “Professional Objectors”

The court’s approach will likely deter strategic delay by objectors. By affirming substantial bond amounts tied to demonstrable administrative costs of delay and enforcing dismissal for nonpayment, the decision empowers district courts to protect class members from prolonged holdups in distribution.

D. Settlement Approval Guidance

On the merits, the opinion offers useful touchpoints for future cases:

• Notice: Multi-channel campaigns (mail, website, print, social media, local TV) that fairly describe settlement terms satisfy Rule 23 and due process; notices need not disclose class representative award amounts or precise fee allocations to be adequate.
• Opt-out: A 31‑day opt-out period can be reasonable in context.
• Fees and Incentives: Common-fund fee awards in the 20–30% range and $15,000 service awards can be upheld where the record shows complexity, risk, and substantial work performed.
• Reasonableness: Courts weigh the likelihood of success heavily; where additional litigation risks delaying relief without clear upside, a robust settlement will generally stand.