Once the Structure Is Gone, So Is the Case: Mississippi Supreme Court Holds § 11-51-75 Appeals Are Moot After Demolition and That Standing Must Persist Through Appeal; Judicial Admissions in Briefs Can Establish Mootness

Decision: Supreme Court of Mississippi (en banc)

Case: Linda Lee v. The City of Pascagoula, Mississippi, No. 2022-CT-01190-SCT

Date: February 20, 2025

Author: Justice Maxwell

Introduction

This commentary examines the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision vacating the Court of Appeals and dismissing Linda Lee’s statutory appeal from a municipal demolition order. The case arises from the City of Pascagoula’s December 7, 2021 order declaring the Crown Inn Motel a public menace and directing immediate demolition of dilapidated structures. Linda Lee appealed the order under Mississippi Code § 11-51-75, asserting lack of substantial evidence and inadequate notice. While that appeal was pending, the building was demolished by a subsequent owner, and Lee separately sued the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages.

The Supreme Court’s opinion does not reach the merits of the due process notice question addressed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, it clarifies—and in practical terms tightens—threshold justiciability constraints in administrative appeals from municipal actions: the appeal is moot because the motel has already been razed, and Lee lacks standing because she had conveyed the property the day of the City’s decision and no longer had any interest when she filed the § 11-51-75 appeal. The Court further explains that appellate courts may treat party statements in briefs as binding judicial admissions and may take judicial notice of recorded deeds and apply judicial estoppel to resolve standing disputes.

Summary of the Opinion

Mootness: The sole question in a § 11-51-75 appeal is whether to affirm or reverse the municipal decision. Because Lee admitted the motel “was razed,” there was no longer a live controversy over an order to demolish a non-existent structure. Courts may not issue advisory opinions (MONAGHAN v. BLUE BELL).
Standing: Standing must exist when the litigation commences and continue throughout. Lee quitclaimed the property to her son on December 7, 2021—before she filed her appeal on December 16, 2021—so she had no legally protected interest and lacked standing. The Court relied on judicial notice of the deed, her admissions, and judicial estoppel.
Appellate Practice: Admissions in briefs can bind a party on appeal (City National Bank; Elliott). The Court criticized the Court of Appeals for addressing merits despite Lee’s admission that the motel was razed and for remanding for a “remedy” where the statutory appeal could only affirm or reverse the municipal order.
Disposition: The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ reversal-and-remand and dismissed the appeal for lack of a justiciable controversy and lack of standing.

Background and Procedural History

The Crown Inn Motel, approximately fifty years old, had deteriorated and was being used as long-term housing. Authorities documented extensive nuisance activity—more than a thousand police service calls over four years. In fall 2021, Lee received a nuisance abatement letter under Miss. Code § 41-29-309, a condemnation notice effective November 1, 2021, and notice of a December 7, 2021 hearing alleging the property constituted a menace to public health, safety, and welfare. Lee did not appear; her son and a contractor did. The City Council concluded the motel was beyond repair and ordered demolition.

Lee timely appealed to circuit court under § 11-51-75, which affirmed. She then appealed to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, she filed a separate § 1983 damages suit in state court; the City removed to federal court. In federal court, Lee admitted that she had quitclaimed the property to her son on December 7, 2021, and that neither she nor her son owned the property thereafter. The federal court held Lee had standing only to pursue damages for pre-December 7 conduct and granted summary judgment to the City on federal due process claims, finding the City had provided constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to be heard (Lee v. City of Pascagoula, 2023 WL 8654932).

In the § 11-51-75 appeal, the City argued mootness and lack of standing, attaching recorded deeds and proof the structure had been razed. In her reply, Lee admitted “the property was razed” but argued the appeal remained relevant to issues in her separate damages action. The Court of Appeals rejected the City’s justiciability arguments on record-based grounds, found substantial evidence of a nuisance, but concluded the City’s pre-hearing notice was constitutionally inadequate because it did not flag demolition as a potential outcome, and reversed and remanded for the circuit court to determine an appropriate remedy.

The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari to address mootness and standing and dismissed the appeal.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

MONAGHAN v. BLUE BELL, Inc., 393 So.2d 466 (Miss. 1980): Reaffirmed that cases may become moot during appellate review and that Mississippi courts do not issue advisory opinions. The Court relied on Monaghan to reject Lee’s request for a merits ruling to aid separate litigation and to emphasize the absence of a live controversy after demolition.
Elliott v. Amerigas Propane, L.P., 249 So.3d 389, 396 n.4 (Miss. 2018), adopting City Nat’l Bank v. United States, 907 F.2d 536, 544 (5th Cir. 1990): Establishes that courts may treat statements in briefs as binding judicial admissions of fact. The Court invoked this to bind Lee to her reply-brief admission that the motel “was razed.”
Barrett v. City of Gulfport, 196 So.3d 905, 910 (Miss. 2016); HALL v. CITY OF RIDGELAND, 37 So.3d 25 (Miss. 2010); Frisby v. City of Gulfport (In re City of Biloxi), 113 So.3d 565 (Miss. 2013): Cited for the de novo standard applicable to jurisdictional issues like standing and mootness in municipal appeals.
CITY OF PICAYUNE v. SOUTHERN REGIONAL CORP., 916 So.2d 510, 526 (Miss. 2005): Articulates Mississippi’s general standing rule—plaintiff must show a present, existent, actionable title or interest at the time of filing and throughout litigation. This controlled Lee’s lack of standing after conveying the property before filing her appeal.
Hotboxxx, LLC v. City of Gulfport, 154 So.3d 21, 27 (Miss. 2015): Reinforces that standing is jurisdictional, underscoring the Court’s obligation to dismiss for lack of standing.
NewSouth Neurospine, LLC v. Hamilton, 283 So.3d 1092, 1098 (Miss. 2019) (citing MRE 201(b)(2)): Confirms courts may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute, including those from reliable sources like public records. The Court used this to notice the recorded quitclaim deed reflecting Lee’s transfer of the property.
Saunders v. NCAA, 352 So.3d 618, 624 (Miss. 2022) (citing Clark v. Neese, 131 So.3d 556 (Miss. 2013)): Sets out elements of judicial estoppel—(1) inconsistent legal position, (2) acceptance by a court, and (3) no inadvertence. The Court applied judicial estoppel to prevent Lee from contradicting her federal-court concession regarding the property transfer date.

Legal Reasoning

1) Mootness: No live controversy after demolition

The Supreme Court emphasizes that a § 11-51-75 appeal is tightly confined: the reviewing court decides whether to affirm or reverse the municipal decision. That binary remedial framework presupposes an extant order with practical effect. Here, the motel was already razed. Even if the court were to reverse the demolition order, that relief would have no operative effect—there is no structure left to save. Issuing a merits ruling to influence Lee’s separate damages action would be advisory and therefore beyond the judicial power (Monaghan). This distinguishes the direct administrative appeal from a separate damages suit: the latter seeks monetary relief and is not mooted by demolition, but it is a different case with different remedies and record.

Crucially, the Court held that Lee’s admission in her reply brief—“the property was razed”—is a binding judicial admission sufficient to resolve mootness. The Court also noted that the City’s evidentiary attachments corroborated demolition, but the admission alone sufficed, obviating concerns about straying outside the appellate record.

2) Standing: The interest must exist at filing and persist through appeal

Standing in Mississippi requires a plaintiff to have a present, existent, legally protectable interest at the time of filing and to maintain that interest through subsequent stages (City of Picayune; In re City of Biloxi). Lee filed her § 11-51-75 appeal on December 16, 2021, after quitclaiming the property to her son on December 7, 2021. Because she no longer owned or held any interest in the property when she commenced the appeal—and subsequently—she lacked standing to challenge the City’s demolition order.

The Court reached this conclusion through three complementary doctrines:

Judicial admissions: Lee conceded in related litigation and in briefing that she transferred the property on December 7, 2021.
Judicial notice: The Court took notice of the recorded quitclaim deed (MRE 201(b)(2); NewSouth Neurospine).
Judicial estoppel: After the federal court accepted Lee’s position that the transfer occurred on December 7, 2021, she could not take an inconsistent position in this appeal (Saunders).

Because standing is jurisdictional, the defect required dismissal regardless of any merits issues. The Court also reminded that standing must persist “through all subsequent stages of litigation,” dovetailing with the separate finding of mootness once the structure was razed.

3) Scope of § 11-51-75 and the error in remanding for “remedy”

The Supreme Court underscored that a § 11-51-75 appeal presents a limited question: affirm or reverse the municipal decision (see § 11-51-75(d)). It rejected the Court of Appeals’ approach of reversing on a due process notice theory and remanding for the circuit court to determine a “remedy,” particularly when Lee’s damages claims were being pursued in a separate action. The statutory appeal is not the vehicle to award or design remedies beyond affirmance or reversal of the administrative decision, and certainly not when the case is moot.

4) Record, appellate attachments, and admissions in briefs

The Court addressed the Court of Appeals’ hesitation to go outside the record to consider deeds and affidavits attached to the appellate docket. While record integrity matters, two separate doctrines made it unnecessary to rely on extra-record evidence: (1) a party’s express admission in briefing can be treated as a binding judicial admission; and (2) the court can take judicial notice of recorded public documents like deeds. The opinion harmonizes fidelity to the record with the need to police jurisdictional prerequisites efficiently.

Practical Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

For property owners and appellants

Preserve your interest: Transferring the property before filing a § 11-51-75 appeal will likely defeat standing. If a transfer is contemplated, structure the litigation strategy accordingly (e.g., the transferee should prosecute the appeal).
Avoid mootness: If demolition is imminent, seek a stay, supersedeas, or injunctive relief to preserve the status quo during appellate review. Without such relief, physical demolition will almost certainly moot the appeal.
Mind your admissions: Statements in appellate briefs are not mere advocacy; they can be binding judicial admissions that determine jurisdictional outcomes.
Separate remedies appropriately: Use the § 11-51-75 appeal for review of the municipal order and pursue damages (e.g., § 1983, state tort) in separate actions. Do not expect the administrative appeal to resolve or dictate remedies in collateral cases.

For municipalities and enforcement officials

Jurisdictional defenses: Raise mootness and standing early and support with public-record evidence (e.g., deeds, demolition permits, photographs) and request judicial notice.
Notices still matter: Although the Supreme Court did not reach the due process notice issue, the Court of Appeals’ discussion signals ongoing scrutiny of notices that fail to disclose demolition as a possible outcome. Draft notices to expressly identify demolition as a potential remedy and provide a fair opportunity to be heard.
Coordinate timing: If demolition proceeds while an appeal is pending, be prepared to show that no stay barred action and that mootness has supervened.

For appellate practitioners

Brief with care: Admissions in briefs can be treated as binding facts. Verify all factual statements with the client and the record.
Use judicial notice strategically: Public records like recorded deeds fall within MRE 201(b)(2). Consider motions for judicial notice to establish uncontested jurisdictional facts.
Beware of inconsistent positions: Judicial estoppel can bar a litigant from shifting positions across parallel proceedings, especially when a court has accepted the prior position.

Doctrinal clarifications

Mootness in administrative appeals is rigorously enforced where the only relief would be ineffectual. Once the bulldozer has moved, review gives way.
Standing must exist at filing and persist throughout. Transfer of the res can extinguish the legal interest that confers standing.
Section 11-51-75 appellate review is limited—affirm or reverse. It is not a platform for advisory pronouncements or for crafting damages remedies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: Courts decide live disputes, not hypotheticals. If the court’s decision can no longer affect the parties’ rights in a practical way (e.g., the building has already been demolished), the case is moot and must be dismissed.
Standing: To sue, you must have a personal, legally protected interest at stake when you file—and you must keep that interest throughout the case. Selling or quitclaiming the property often eliminates that interest.
Judicial admission: A clear, deliberate factual statement by a party in a brief can bind that party. Courts can rely on such admissions without additional proof.
Judicial notice: Courts may accept indisputable facts from reliable sources (like recorded deeds) without formal proof. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2) allows this.
Judicial estoppel: If you persuade one court based on a certain factual or legal position, you generally cannot take an inconsistent position in another court later, especially if the first court relied on your earlier position.
Miss. Code § 11-51-75 appeals: A statutory mechanism to challenge decisions of municipal governing authorities. The reviewing court’s role is to affirm or reverse the decision; the proceeding is not designed to award damages or other remedies.

Conclusion

The Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion delivers a crisp message: an administrative appeal from a municipal demolition order cannot outlast the demolition, and a litigant who has divested her interest in the property cannot maintain such an appeal. By treating admissions in briefs as binding, invoking judicial notice of recorded deeds, and applying judicial estoppel, the Court provides a pragmatic toolkit for resolving threshold jurisdictional issues without protracted evidentiary disputes. The decision also serves as a cautionary note to the intermediate appellate court not to address merits or devise remedial remands where only an affirm-or-reverse choice is authorized and the controversy has gone moot.

In the broader legal context, the ruling reinforces Mississippi’s strong bar on advisory opinions, clarifies the limits of § 11-51-75 appellate review, and aligns state appellate practice with federal jurisprudence on judicial admissions and estoppel. For practitioners, the takeaways are practical and immediate: preserve the status quo if you want merits review; preserve your client’s legal interest if you want standing; and preserve credibility by keeping your positions consistent across forums.