Ollison v. Gossett: Seventh Circuit tightens limits on constructive amendments at summary judgment and demands fact‑specific pleadings for systemic deliberate indifference against wardens

Introduction

In Eric Ollison v. Gregory Gossett, No. 23-1125 (7th Cir. May 7, 2025), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Central District of Illinois’s judgment in a civil rights case arising from a catastrophic failure to manage a prisoner’s chronic kidney disease at the Illinois River Correctional Center (IRCC). Former inmate Eric Ollison sued wardens Walter Nicholson and Gregory Gossett under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed Nicholson and later granted summary judgment for Gossett, and excluded plaintiff’s two experts. Judge Ripple wrote for the court affirming. Judge Kirsch concurred, emphasizing the complaint’s factual insufficiency and the impermissibility of shifting factual theories at summary judgment. Judge Hamilton dissented, calling for trial on systemic deficiencies and warning against “gotcha” pleading traps.

The opinion is noteworthy for two interrelated rulings with forward-looking implications: (1) the Seventh Circuit’s application of Schmees v. HC1.COM, Inc. to confirm district courts’ discretion—rarely to be exercised—to refuse a constructive amendment of a complaint via new factual allegations first offered in summary judgment briefing; and (2) the demand, in systemic deliberate indifference claims against prison supervisors, for concrete, fact‑specific pleading that identifies the alleged systemic breakdowns and the supervisor’s knowledge and response—general “warden in charge” allegations will not suffice.

Summary of the Opinion

Two deliberate indifference pathways. The court reaffirms Seventh Circuit doctrine recognizing (i) isolated-instance claims tied to a specific inmate’s care and (ii) systemic-deficiency claims alleging constitutionally inadequate care for the inmate population. Both require proof of the official’s subjective awareness and disregard of a substantial risk.
Dismissal of Warden Nicholson affirmed for failure to state a claim. Although the district court incorrectly found the claim time-barred, accrual rules (Devbrow v. Kalu) meant the claim was timely. The Seventh Circuit nonetheless affirmed dismissal because the complaint did not allege specific systemic deficiencies known to Nicholson; it relied on conclusory assertions and Nicholson’s general responsibility as warden.
Summary judgment for Warden Gossett affirmed.
- Isolated grievance theory. Gossett’s January 3, 2014 determination that Ollison’s December 26 “emergency” grievance was not emergent (without consulting medical staff) did not show actual knowledge of a substantial risk; the grievance itself suggested he was still going to recreation, undermining the apparent urgency.
- Systemic-deficiency theory. The court refused to credit new factual allegations first offered in opposition to summary judgment to bolster a systemic theory absent an amendment; under Schmees, district courts have discretion to reject such constructive amendments, and it was reasonable to do so here given plaintiff’s ample time and prior warning. Even assuming consideration of the new facts, the record did not permit a finding that Gossett had the requisite knowledge and deliberately indifferent response, particularly given Wexford’s control over physician staffing and the difficult choice between tolerating a deficient medical director and having no physician at all.
Exclusion of experts affirmed. Applying Rule 702 and Daubert/Kumho, the court upheld the exclusion of nephrologist Dr. Samra (opinions extended beyond her medical expertise to the duties of a non-medical warden and grievance policy) and corrections expert Ralf Salke (opinions amounted to common-sense observations, credibility judgments, or legal conclusions on supervisory liability).
Concurrence and dissent. Judge Kirsch concurred, stressing the claim/theory distinction and fair notice of the factual basis. Judge Hamilton dissented, finding ample evidence from Wexford emails and testimony that either or both wardens knew of longstanding systemic failures and responded unreasonably; he would reverse on Nicholson and Gossett and remand for trial, criticizing procedural rulings that rewarded contradictions over substance.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). These foundational cases anchor the Eighth Amendment framework: deliberate indifference requires an objectively serious medical need and subjective knowledge plus disregard of a substantial risk. Farmer’s subjective test and allowance for inference from obvious risks guided the panel’s analysis of both isolated and systemic theories.
Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015); Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2014). These cases define the contours of “isolated-instance” deliberate indifference, including when grievance information can impute actual knowledge to supervisors. The panel distinguished Perez/Pyles because Ollison’s grievance did not sufficiently alert Gossett to an excessive risk.
Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1989); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1996); Steidl v. Gramley, 151 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1998). These authorities recognize systemic-deficiency claims and insist on more than general supervisory responsibility. Wellman’s “systemic and gross deficiencies” test framed the substantive bar for such claims; Steidl and Benson (761 F.2d 335) supplied the pleading bar: conclusory allegations that a warden is “in charge” won’t do. The court applied these to hold Nicholson’s complaint insufficient and to assess Gossett’s knowledge and authority constraints.
Twombly, Iqbal, Erickson v. Pardus. The panel invoked plausibility pleading and the need for factual content to give fair notice, rejecting threadbare recitals of supervisory indifference for Nicholson.
Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2013). On accrual, the panel corrected (but did not reverse on) the district court’s limitations ruling: deliberate indifference claims accrue when the prisoner knows of his physical injury and its cause. Ollison’s claim accrued upon hospitalization/diagnosis (Jan. 16, 2014).
Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2014); Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, 867 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2017); BRC Rubber & Plastics v. Continental Carbon, 900 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2018); Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 1996); Schmees v. HC1.COM, Inc., 77 F.4th 483 (7th Cir. 2023). The court synthesized its line on “constructive amendment” at summary judgment. Schmees clarified that district courts have discretion—though “rarely” should exercise it—to treat new factual allegations in summary judgment briefing as a de facto Rule 15 motion; here, the district court reasonably refused because plaintiff had years and an earlier warning to amend yet did not. The concurrence situates this within the claim/theory divide: legal theories may shift; factual bases may not.
Daubert, Kumho Tire, Rule 702; Gopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard, 877 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2017); Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010); Good Shepherd Manor v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2003). The panel affirmed gatekeeping that excluded expert opinions that lacked fit (opinions on a non-medical warden’s duties), extended beyond the experts’ qualifications, or constituted legal conclusions. The court emphasized helpfulness and domain expertise alignment.

Legal Reasoning

Two tracks of deliberate indifference; same subjective element. The court restated that isolated-instance and systemic-deficiency claims are doctrinally distinct but both require subjective awareness and disregard. This ensured the analysis consistently demanded proof that each warden knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to Ollison.
Nicholson: pleading deficiency despite timeliness. Although accrual occurred at diagnosis (Devbrow), the complaint’s allegations against Nicholson were conclusory: it asserted, without factual specifics, that he “was aware of, facilitated, and/or turned a blind eye to deficient practices.” Under Steidl/Benson and Twombly/Iqbal, alleging general supervisory responsibility is insufficient; a plausible systemic claim must identify the alleged systemic defects and facts supporting the warden’s knowledge and culpable inaction.
Gossett: the grievance decision and lack of actual knowledge. On the isolated-instance theory, the court asked whether the December 26 grievance gave Gossett sufficient notice of an excessive risk. The grievance, which tied symptoms to a medication change and noted continued recreation activity, did not make the substantial risk obvious; without more, Gossett’s non-emergency designation did not show actual knowledge and disregard.
Gossett: systemic theory—procedural bar and merits.
- Procedural posture. Plaintiff, alerted by the earlier Nicholson dismissal, had years to amend to add specific facts (e.g., Wexford’s documented concerns about Dr. Greby, vacancies in the Health Care Unit Administrator post, knowledge communicated to the warden). He did not. Under Schmees, the district court could refuse to entertain new factual allegations at summary judgment that materially altered the case’s factual theory; it did so within its discretion.
- Substantive insufficiency (even if considered). On the summary judgment record, the court found the evidence inadequate to show that Gossett (a) knew of systemic, gross deficiencies and (b) responded with deliberate indifference. Wexford controlled physician hiring and allocation; Gossett’s practical options were constrained, arguably to a choice between a problematic medical director and having no physician at all. The record did not allow a reasonable jury to find that tolerating Dr. Greby pending a replacement or failing to secure a temporary administrator, on these facts, crossed the line to deliberate indifference rather than difficult administration amid contractor staffing limits.
Expert exclusions: fit and scope. The trial court applied Rule 702/Daubert correctly and acted within its discretion in excluding:
- Dr. Samra. Qualified to opine on nephrology, but not on a non-medical warden’s duties, grievance triage requirements, or prison staffing solutions; her opinions lacked foundation in prison grievance policy and prison administration and risked confusing the jury.
- Mr. Salke. Corrections opinions reduced to common-sense or legal conclusions (e.g., supervisory liability), which are not proper expert subjects; the jury did not require expert assistance to assess the warden’s knowledge from the record evidence.

Impact

The decision has practical and doctrinal consequences across prisoner civil rights litigation, supervisory liability, and federal civil procedure:

Fact‑specific pleading for systemic claims. Plaintiffs pursuing systemic deliberate indifference against wardens must plead concrete deficiencies (e.g., chronic vacancies, documented protocol failures, communication breakdowns) and facts supporting the warden’s knowledge and culpable inaction. Generic “in charge” allegations will be dismissed. Early investigation and careful Rule 8 pleading are essential.
Constructive amendment at summary judgment—use sparingly, amend early. Schmees, as applied here, counsels that parties who discover new facts should move promptly under Rule 15 to amend. District courts retain discretion to reject attempts to “smuggle” new factual bases into a case at summary judgment, especially after prior warnings. Expect more aggressive defense challenges to late-shifting factual theories, and plan amendments proactively.
Supervisory liability remains narrow. The opinion reinforces that § 1983 does not recognize respondeat superior. To hold wardens liable, plaintiffs must tie knowledge and inaction to specific risks; where private contractors control staffing, plaintiffs must show what reasonable steps the warden could take and failed to take—mere dissatisfaction with pace or vigor of contractor action is not enough.
Grievance review by non-medical officials. The court’s disposition signals that non-medical wardens may reject “emergency” designations without consulting clinicians if the grievance content does not make a substantial risk apparent. Plaintiffs should consider corroborating emergent conditions through repeated grievances, sick-call records, or third-party alerts that squarely present obvious risks.
Expert boundaries. Daubert gatekeeping will exclude medical experts who opine on policy/administrative obligations of non-medical officials, and corrections experts who offer legal conclusions. Practitioners should ensure experts stay within domain expertise and tie methods/opinions to the issues the jury must decide.
Accrual clarity but not dispositive. The court reaffirmed Devbrow’s accrual rule—claims accrue at diagnosis or when the plaintiff knows injury and cause—yet still affirmed on pleading/summary judgment grounds. Timeliness will not save conclusory pleadings.
Circuit dialogue captured in concurrence and dissent. The concurrence underscores the fair-notice function of pleadings and distinguishes claims from theories; the dissent warns against turning Schmees into a trap that forces “perhaps-unnecessary” amendments and urges trial where prolonged, documented systemic failures exist. Litigants should expect district courts to exercise discretion case-by-case, with careful attention to notice, timing, and record development.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Deliberate indifference. A constitutional standard requiring proof that an official knew of and ignored a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate’s health or safety. It is more than negligence and less than purpose to harm; it is akin to criminal recklessness.
Two types of Eighth Amendment medical claims.
- Isolated-instance claim: Focuses on the plaintiff’s own medical care or lack thereof. Example: ignoring repeated requests for care after a specific injury.
- Systemic-deficiency claim: Alleges prison-wide shortcomings (staffing, protocols, equipment) that effectively deny adequate care to inmates generally.
Supervisory liability under § 1983. Supervisors are liable only for their own conduct—knowing, facilitating, approving, or turning a blind eye—not solely for subordinates’ misconduct. There is no automatic liability due to rank.
Constructive amendment at summary judgment. When a party introduces new factual allegations at summary judgment that change the case’s factual theory, a court may treat that as an (untimely) amendment and refuse it. Parties should use Rule 15 to amend earlier, rather than relying on summary judgment briefs to expand the case.
Daubert gatekeeping. Judges must ensure expert testimony is both reliable and helpful. An expert must be qualified in the specific area of the opinion, apply reliable methods, and offer opinions that assist the jury; legal conclusions and cross-domain speculation are inadmissible.
Accrual for limitations purposes. A claim “accrues” when the plaintiff knows he has been injured and knows (or has reason to know) the cause. In medical deliberate indifference, this often occurs upon diagnosis or when the failure to treat becomes manifest, not at the first lapse in care.

Conclusion

Ollison v. Gossett reiterates foundational Eighth Amendment doctrine while sharpening procedural expectations in prisoner litigation. Substantively, systemic deliberate indifference claims remain viable, but plaintiffs must plead and prove specifics: identifiable system breakdowns, the supervisor’s actual knowledge, and an unreasonable response within the official’s power to take. Procedurally, the court’s application of Schmees confirms that new factual theories cannot be grafted onto a case through summary judgment briefing after years of litigation and clear warnings—Rule 15 remains the proper vehicle, and courts will “rarely” allow constructive amendments.

The decision also provides a roadmap for expert practice: keep opinions within domain expertise, avoid legal conclusions, and anchor testimony to issues the jury must decide. Finally, while the panel corrected the district court’s limitations analysis (per Devbrow), it underscores that timeliness will not cure conclusory pleadings. Taken together, the opinion signals disciplined adherence to pleading standards, careful gatekeeping of expert evidence, and pragmatic recognition of the institutional constraints on wardens in contractor-run medical systems—while leaving open, as the dissent stresses, that strong record evidence of prolonged systemic failures and supervisory knowledge can and should go to a jury when properly pleaded and preserved.