Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation: § 69(A)(4)(b) Imposes a Continuing Six-Month Diligence Requirement After a Timely Hearing Request

Case: OBI HOLDING COMPANY v. SCHULTZ-BUTZBACH AND THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Citation: 2025 OK 55 (Okla. Sept. 9, 2025)
Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a contested knee-injury claim brought by Shaneese T. Schultz-Butzbach (“Employee”) against OBI Holding Company (“Employer”) under Oklahoma’s Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act. After the Employee filed a CC-Form 3 and requested a hearing, an IME-style evaluation occurred by order of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The case then went inactive inside the workers’ compensation system for months.

The core dispute was statutory: whether 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) permits dismissal when an employee—despite having timely requested a hearing—does not receive or seek benefits (including medical care) for a continuous six-month period later in the claim’s life. The ALJ denied the Employer’s dismissal motion, the Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court vacated the Commission’s order and granted the Employer’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. It held that 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) contains two distinct timing mechanisms: subsection (a) governs the initial six-month period after filing (promptly requesting a hearing), while subsection (b) imposes an ongoing diligence requirement—receipt or pursuit of benefits—measured by any six-month period during the claim’s pendency.

The Court also rejected constitutional challenges, concluding § 69(A)(4) is “constitutionally firm”: it is not an impermissible special law under Okla. Const. art. 5, § 46, and it does not violate the access-to-courts/right-to-remedy or due process guarantees under Okla. Const. art. 2, §§ 6 and 7.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Statutory interpretation framework

• Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Paredes (2023 OK 42): Used for two functions. First, it supplies the de novo standard for statutory interpretation and appellate review posture. Second, it provided contextual support for the proposition that once a claim is filed it “must be pursued in a diligent manner” and may be dismissed if not actively pursued after six months—language the Court used to reinforce the legislative purpose behind § 69.
• Benedetti v. Cimarex Energy Co. (2018 OK 21): Cited for defining de novo review as “plenary, independent, and non-deferential.”
• Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co. (2018 OK 23) and Keating v. Edmondson (2001 OK 110): These cases supplied the “cardinal rule” methodology—ascertain legislative intent from statutory language, read provisions together, and avoid importing interpretive canons unless ambiguity exists.
• Am. Airlines, Inc. v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n (2014 OK 95): Cited for the ambiguity test—whether language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.

How the Court treated intermediate appellate precedent

• White v. 918 Construction (2023 OK CIV APP 2): This was the “seminal case” relied upon by the ALJ and Commission. The Supreme Court did not adopt White’s broader implication as applied here and sharply limited White’s relevance to its factual posture—i.e., the “immediate six month time period following the filing” of the claim. The Court held White did not answer the distinct question presented: whether subsection (b) continues to apply after subsection (a) has been satisfied.
• Arulkumar v. Arulkumar (2022 OK 90): Cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court is not bound by Court of Civil Appeals decisions—explaining why it could depart from the Commission’s reliance on White.

Special-law doctrine and “symmetry” of procedure

• Hill v. Am. Med. Response (2018 OK 57): Cited for the heavy presumption of constitutionality and burden on challengers.
• Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc. (2006 OK 98): Provided the definition of a “special law” as separating part of a class of similarly affected persons for different treatment.
• Montgomery v. Potter (2014 OK 118): Quoted for the “symmetry” principle under Okla. Const. art. 5, § 46—procedures must apply equally across an entire class of similarly situated persons or things.
• Graham v. D & K QOilfield Services, Inc. (2017 OK 72): Used as an example where a statute was deemed special because it altered benefits for hernias but not other injuries within the class of injured employees—illustrating what “targeting less than an entire class” looks like.

Right-to-remedy / forfeiture analysis in workers’ compensation

• Gibby v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2017 OK 78): Central comparator case. There, the Court struck a statute that forfeited all benefits after missed appointments, holding it upset the “Grand Bargain” and violated Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6. Here, the Court distinguished § 69(A)(4) as a diligence/administration rule rather than a forfeiture penalty that extinguishes benefits based on misconduct.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Textual structure: two timing clauses with different functions

The Court’s analysis is primarily textual and structural. It emphasized the different temporal phrasing in § 69(A)(4):

• Subsection (a): a hearing request must be made “within six (6) months of the date the claim is filed.” This is a filing-anchored deadline.
• Subsection (b): the employee must “receive or seek benefits… for a period of six (6) months.” This is not tied to the filing date and is phrased as a rolling, duration-based condition.

From that contrast, the Court concluded subsection (b) “remains operative” after the initial six-month window in subsection (a) has passed, and it applies to “any period of six months” during the life of the claim. In the Court’s view, reading subsection (a) as a permanent safe harbor would effectively nullify subsection (b) and defeat the statutory purpose—keeping claims from becoming stale or dormant.

(B) Purpose: active pursuit and prevention of stale claims

The Court read § 69 as an integrated diligence regime: timely filing is necessary but not sufficient. The statute also demands active pursuit after filing, and subsection (b) provides an enforcement mechanism—dismissal with prejudice upon employer motion when the claim is not being prosecuted through benefit-seeking behavior.

(C) Application to the facts

The Employee indisputably satisfied subsection (a) by requesting a hearing. But she did not receive or seek medical benefits within the workers’ compensation system for nine months following her last documented visit with Dr. Hargrove. That inactivity exceeded the statutory six-month period in subsection (b), triggering the Employer’s right to move for dismissal.

(D) Constitutional holdings

• No special law (Okla. Const. art. 5, § 46): The Court reasoned that § 69(A)(4) does not carve out a subset of injured employees for different treatment; it applies to all injured employees who file claims. The Employee’s “asymmetry” argument comparing employees to employers failed because special-law analysis asks whether a statute treats some members of a single class differently—not whether two different classes have identical litigation burdens.
• No unconstitutional forfeiture / art. 2, § 6 violation: Unlike the forfeiture struck in Gibby v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., § 69(A)(4) was characterized as a procedural diligence requirement with ample opportunity to comply. It does not impose a punishment for misconduct; it conditions the continuation of the claim on basic prosecutorial activity (seeking/receiving benefits).
• No due process violation (Okla. Const. art. 2, § 7): Applying rational-basis review (via Hill v. Am. Med. Response), the Court found a legitimate state interest—efficient resolution of claims—and held the six-month benefit-seeking requirement is rationally related to and advances that interest.

3.3 Impact

(A) A clear, employer-enforceable “rolling inactivity” dismissal standard

The decision supplies a bright-line administration rule: even after a claimant timely requests a hearing, the claim remains vulnerable to dismissal with prejudice if the claimant goes six months without receiving or seeking benefits (including medical treatment). This materially strengthens employers’ ability to clear dormant dockets and compels claimants to maintain an affirmative litigation/medical-treatment cadence.

(B) Narrowing the practical reach of White v. 918 Construction

The Court did not overrule White outright, but it confined White’s usefulness to the early, post-filing window and rejected the Commission’s broader reliance on White to treat subsection (a) as effectively dispositive for all time. Going forward, litigants can expect Commission-level decisions to treat subsection (b) as a continuing condition—even where subsection (a) was satisfied.

(C) Procedural and strategic consequences for claimants and counsel

• Claimants must document “seeking” benefits in a way that is cognizable “under this title” (i.e., within the workers’ compensation process), not merely through private medical care unconnected to Commission filings.
• Counsel should treat six months of inactivity as a critical deadline and create compliance mechanisms (status requests, treatment authorization pursuits, motions to compel, hearing resets, or other benefit-seeking steps).
• Employers and carriers are incentivized to track inactivity periods and file timely § 69(A)(4)(b) motions to secure dismissal with prejudice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Dismissed with prejudice”: The claim is ended permanently; the employee generally cannot refile the same claim.
• “Receive or seek benefits”: “Receive” means benefits are actually being provided (e.g., medical treatment authorized/paid in the system). “Seek” means the employee is actively pursuing benefits through steps recognizable in the workers’ compensation framework (requests, motions, discovery tied to benefit entitlement, treatment authorization disputes, etc.).
• Two different six-month clocks: Subsection (a) is a one-time, filing-based deadline (request a hearing within six months of filing). Subsection (b) is a continuing, rolling inactivity bar (do not go six months without pursuing/receiving benefits at any point).
• “Special law” (Okla. Const. art. 5, § 46): A law is “special” if it singles out a subset of a larger similarly situated group for different treatment in an area the Constitution forbids special laws. The Court held § 69(A)(4) treats all injured employees the same once they file.
• The “Grand Bargain”: Workers’ compensation is a trade-off: employees get a no-fault remedy; employers get limits on exposure. A statute can be unconstitutional if it upsets that balance by stripping the substitute remedy without adequate justification (as in Gibby v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.), but the Court found § 69(A)(4) does not do that.

5. Conclusion

OBI HOLDING COMPANY v. SCHULTZ-BUTZBACH AND THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION establishes that 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4)(b) functions as a continuing diligence requirement: after a claim is filed—even after a timely hearing request—an employee must avoid any six-month period in which they neither receive nor seek benefits, or the employer may obtain dismissal with prejudice.

The decision reorients Oklahoma practice toward active prosecution throughout the case’s lifespan, limits overreliance on White v. 918 Construction outside its initial post-filing context, and fortifies § 69(A)(4) against special-law, right-to-remedy, and due-process challenges.