Ohio Supreme Court Confirms No-Credit Rule for Interim Remedial Suspensions and Tightens Substance-Use Mitigation: Disciplinary Counsel v. Norton (2025-Ohio-5091)

Introduction and Case Overview

In Disciplinary Counsel v. Norton, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5091, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed attorney discipline arising from an Ohio lawyer’s possession of illegal drugs and criminal tools and the discovery of illegal child-abuse material on his cellphone. The case presents three central issues:

Whether the presence of illegal child-abuse material on the respondent’s phone—though the related criminal charge was dismissed—could be considered in the disciplinary analysis.
Whether the respondent, who was subject to an interim remedial suspension, is entitled to credit for that time toward his final suspension.
How substance-use disorder mitigation is established under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7), including the importance of candor with treatment providers.

Respondent Eric Edward Norton, admitted in 1999 and previously disciplined in 2007, attempted to enter the Cuyahoga County Justice Center with methamphetamine, resulting in a five-count indictment. He ultimately pled guilty to drug possession and possessing criminal tools, and he entered an intervention-in-lieu-of-conviction program under R.C. 2951.041. During the investigation, a forensic review of his cellphone revealed two files of illegal child-abuse material. The Board of Professional Conduct recommended a two-year suspension with one year stayed, conditions tied to OLAP and treatment compliance, and no credit for interim remedial suspension time. Norton objected on factual, sanction, and credit grounds.

The court’s per curiam majority (DeWine, Osowik, Deters, and Shanahan, JJ.) adopted the Board’s findings and recommendation. Chief Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by Justices Fischer and Hawkins, urging an indefinite suspension because the case involved child sexual exploitation material—a category the court has historically treated as warranting indefinite suspension.

Summary of the Opinion

The court found violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (illegal act reflecting adversely on honesty or trustworthiness) and 8.4(h) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice). It emphasized that the conduct was sufficiently egregious to support an 8.4(h) violation.
Sanction: Two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed. Conditions include:
- Full compliance with respondent’s OLAP contract (April 13, 2023) and any extension.
- Random drug and alcohol testing through OLAP.
- Compliance with all court orders arising from his criminal case.
Reinstatement prerequisites beyond Gov.Bar R. V(24): a certification from the treating addiction counselor that respondent can return to competent, ethical, and professional practice; upon reinstatement, one year of monitored probation with a relator-approved practice monitor.
No credit for time served under the interim remedial suspension. The court reaffirmed that Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2) does not authorize such credit and rejected equal-protection and due-process challenges.
The court rejected Norton’s factual objection regarding the cellphone findings. It held the Board properly found, based on stipulated forensic evidence (ICAC report), that two files of illegal child-abuse material were present and that the presence of those files is relevant context for the disciplinary analysis.
Mitigation based on substance-use disorder under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) was denied because respondent failed to provide a reliable prognosis letter—he did not disclose a recent relapse to his counselor before she issued her opinion.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court’s analysis draws on a cohesive set of disciplinary precedents to calibrate sanction and to resolve credit and evidentiary issues.

Bricker (2013-Ohio-3998): Cited for the proposition that egregious conduct supports an 8.4(h) violation. The court invoked Bricker to confirm that Norton’s conduct crossed that threshold.
Norris (1996-Ohio-418) and Scacchetti (2007-Ohio-2713): Both involved drug possession and attorneys with substance-use disorders. In Norris, the court imposed a two-year suspension with one year stayed; in Scacchetti, two years with 18 months stayed. The majority treats these as the closest comparators, concluding that Norton’s repeated relapses and compliance problems justify an actual suspension component.
Kelley (2021-Ohio-770), May (2005-Ohio-5320), and Casalinuovo (66 Ohio St.3d 367 (1993)): Norton cited these to argue for a fully stayed sanction. The court distinguished them:
- May: The attorney established sustained sobriety, completed treatment in lieu of conviction, and satisfied all prongs of R. V(13)(C)(7), resulting in a fully stayed two-year suspension. Norton’s relapses and failure to establish a credible prognosis set his case apart.
- Casalinuovo: No relapses were noted; the attorney completed treatment in lieu; no prior discipline. In contrast, Norton relapsed multiple times and had prior discipline.
- Kelley: By the hearing, Kelley had nearly a year of abstinence and was compliant with OLAP; Norton was not compliant and had a relapse a month before his hearing.
Hartley (2024-Ohio-5232) (the opinion also references “Harvey” at one point): The court relies on this recent pronouncement that credit for time served is available only for specific interim suspensions enumerated in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2), which do not include interim remedial suspensions. The court treats Hartley as foreclosing discretion to award credit in Norton’s case.
Austin (2019-Ohio-3325), Marrelli (2015-Ohio-4614), and Brown (2000-Ohio-82): Previously, the court sometimes awarded credit for non-enumerated interim suspensions. The majority characterizes those as pre-Hartley practice and distinguishes the attorneys as not similarly situated to Norton for equal-protection purposes.
Tamburrino (2016-Ohio-8014), In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Carr, and Character: Cited to define the procedural due-process contours in disciplinary proceedings, emphasizing that hearings, subpoena rights, and a fair opportunity to be heard satisfy due process—standards met here.
Noling (2016-Ohio-8252): Equal protection framework; the court finds Norton failed to show he is similarly situated to attorneys who previously received credit for different interim suspension types or under pre-Hartley practice.

Legal Reasoning

1) Misconduct Findings under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) and (h)

The record contained clear and convincing evidence that Norton brought 5.12 grams of methamphetamine into the Justice Center, placed it in a restroom, and had alcohol on his breath while attempting to visit a prospective incarcerated client. DNA evidence linked him to the baggie. This illegal conduct supports an 8.4(b) violation as an act reflecting adversely on honesty or trustworthiness. Given the seriousness and context—involving the courthouse and an intended client visit—the court also found the misconduct sufficiently egregious to violate the fitness catch-all in 8.4(h) (citing Bricker).

2) Considering Child-Abuse Material Found on the Phone

Norton argued the Board “mischaracterized” evidence by stating the forensic analysis revealed “illegal child-abuse material,” noting the related criminal charge was dismissed and that the images were allegedly auto-downloaded by a third-party app. The court rejected this objection because Norton had stipulated to the authenticity and admissibility of the ICAC report, which identified two files the commander categorized as illegal child-abuse material. Although not the basis of a conviction, the court held the presence of this material was properly considered in the disciplinary record and relevant to the risk-of-harm assessment and to the 8.4(b) and 8.4(h) analyses. This confirms that dismissed charges do not bar considering stipulated underlying conduct in attorney discipline.

3) Mitigation Under Gov.Bar R. V(13)

The court accepted several mitigating factors—no dishonest or selfish motive, cooperation, other penalties, and interim rehabilitation efforts (inpatient/outpatient treatment)—but declined to apply the special substance-use mitigation under R. V(13)(C)(7). That rule requires four elements, including a credible professional prognosis that the respondent can return to practice ethically. Norton’s counselor letter described stimulant use disorder in early partial remission and supported his eventual return, but Norton admitted he had not disclosed a recent relapse to the counselor before she authored her opinion. The court therefore found the (C)(7) “prognosis” prong unsatisfied, denying special mitigation.

4) Sanction Selection

The court positioned Norton between Norris and Scacchetti. As in those cases, the misconduct centered on drug possession and a diagnosed substance-use disorder, which can support a partially stayed term suspension geared toward rehabilitation. But unlike those attorneys, Norton had:

A prior disciplinary record.
Multiple relapses during the pendency of the matter, including one a month before hearing.
Noncompliance and friction with OLAP monitoring and documentation requirements.
Lack of a reliable prognosis demonstrating present readiness to return to ethical practice.

The court therefore imposed a two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed, tethered to concrete treatment and monitoring obligations. It rejected Norton’s request for a fully stayed suspension and declined to remand to supplement the record with evidence of completion of intervention in lieu, explaining that completion—even if established—would not suffice to show present competence to return to practice.

5) No Credit for Interim Remedial Suspension

Relying on its recent pronouncement in Hartley (2024-Ohio-5232), the court held that Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2) enumerates which interim suspensions can receive credit for time served—and interim remedial suspensions are not among them. The court treated Hartley as foreclosing discretionary credit and rejected Norton’s equal-protection and due-process arguments:

Equal protection: Norton did not demonstrate he is similarly situated to attorneys previously granted credit under different interim suspensions or under pre-Hartley practice. The court distinguished Austin and Marrelli (interim default suspensions) and Brown (context different and pre-Hartley).
Due process: The court outlined the process provided—hearing, continuances, right to present evidence, extended filing deadlines—and concluded Norton received all process due in disciplinary proceedings.

The Dissent’s Position: Indefinite Suspension for Cases Involving Child Sexual Exploitation Material

Chief Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Fischer and Hawkins) argued that Norton’s case is not a garden-variety drug case because it also involves child sexual exploitation material on the attorney’s phone. Citing a line of cases—Martyniuk (2017-Ohio-4329), Greenberg (2013-Ohio-1723), Butler (2011-Ohio-236), Connors (2020-Ohio-3339), and Ballato (2014-Ohio-5063)—the dissent emphasized the court’s historic practice of imposing indefinite suspensions in cases involving possession of child pornography, often with no credit for time served under interim felony suspensions. While many of those cases included criminal convictions, the dissent also invoked Goodman (2024-Ohio-852) to stress that discipline may consider the underlying conduct, not just charges, thereby supporting an indefinite suspension here. The dissent would also deny credit for interim remedial suspension, both categorically (under Hartley) and on the facts (given relapses and treatment noncompliance).

Impact and Implications

1) Hardening of the No-Credit Rule for Interim Remedial Suspensions

Norton cements Hartley’s rule: attorneys under interim remedial suspensions should not expect any credit for time served. Efforts to repackage credit claims as equal-protection or due-process arguments will likely fail absent a persuasive showing that the attorney is both similarly situated to earlier comparators and denied basic procedural fairness. The court’s detailed explanation of dissimilarities and due-process compliance offers a roadmap for future panels and respondents.

2) Substance-Use Disorder Mitigation Requires Full Transparency

The decision sends a clear message: to secure mitigation under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7), respondents must meet all four prongs, including furnishing a reliable, candid prognosis from a qualified professional. Failing to disclose a relapse to one’s counselor undermines the credibility of the prognosis and will likely defeat (C)(7) mitigation even if a diagnosis and treatment efforts are established. Robust compliance with OLAP and consistent documentation (meeting logs, therapy confirmations, treatment discharge summaries) will be scrutinized.

3) Considering Child-Abuse Material Without a Conviction

The majority reaffirms that stipulated forensic findings of illegal child-abuse material can be considered in the disciplinary record—even when a related criminal count was dismissed—and may inform both risk-of-harm assessments and the overall sanction calculus. The dissent signals a competing view that cases with such material generally warrant indefinite suspension. Practitioners should expect close scrutiny and potentially divergent outcomes depending on the breadth and nature of the evidence, presence or absence of convictions, and the degree to which the record links the material to knowing possession or use.

4) Sanction Calibration for SUD Cases with Relapses

For attorneys with substance-use disorders, Norton clarifies that multiple relapses, near-term positive tests before hearing, and OLAP noncompliance push sanctions toward actual suspensions, even where significant treatment has occurred. The opinion also illustrates tailored conditions: OLAP compliance, random testing, counselor certification at reinstatement, and monitored probation—all designed to bridge recovery with public protection.

5) Completion of Intervention in Lieu of Conviction is Not Dispositive

The court’s refusal to remand to add evidence of successful completion underscores that such completion, while positive, is not by itself determinative of fitness to practice. The focus remains on demonstrated, reliable readiness to practice—supported by transparent treatment records and sustained sobriety—not merely program completion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) and (h): 8.4(b) forbids illegal acts that reflect adversely on a lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness; 8.4(h) is a catch-all prohibiting conduct that reflects adversely on fitness to practice.
Interim remedial suspension: A temporary suspension imposed when there is substantial, credible evidence of a violation and a substantial threat of serious harm to the public during the pendency of proceedings. Under Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2) and Hartley, time served under such an interim suspension does not count toward a final sanction.
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) substance-use mitigation: Requires four elements: (1) a qualifying diagnosis by a professional; (2) causation between the disorder and misconduct; (3) successful completion of an approved treatment program; and (4) a credible prognosis that the attorney can return to competent, ethical practice under specified conditions. Missing any prong—especially a reliable, candid prognosis—defeats this special mitigation.
OLAP: The Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program provides monitoring, testing, and support for lawyers with substance-use and mental-health conditions. Compliance with OLAP (including documentation) is often a condition of stayed sanctions and reinstatement.
Intervention in lieu of conviction (R.C. 2951.041): A criminal-justice program allowing qualifying offenders to receive treatment instead of proceeding to conviction. Completion can lead to dismissal of charges, but in attorney discipline it is not conclusive proof of readiness to practice.
Illegal child-abuse material: Often referred to as child sexual exploitation material or child pornography. Even without a conviction, stipulated forensic evidence can be considered in discipline to assess risk and fitness.
Monitored probation and practice monitor: Conditions imposed upon reinstatement requiring oversight of the attorney’s practice to ensure compliance with ethical and professional standards.
Due process in attorney discipline: Distinct from criminal procedure; requires notice, a fair hearing, subpoena/deposition rights, and a meaningful opportunity to respond. The court found those standards met here.

Conclusion

Disciplinary Counsel v. Norton clarifies and consolidates several important points in Ohio attorney discipline. First, the court definitively applies Hartley to deny credit for time served under interim remedial suspensions, rejecting constitutional challenges and distinguishing pre-Hartley practices. Second, the decision underscores that substance-use disorder mitigation under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) is all-or-nothing and depends critically on a candid, credible prognosis from a qualified professional—candor with treatment providers is indispensable. Third, stipulated forensic evidence of illegal child-abuse material may be considered in discipline even when a related criminal charge is dismissed, informing both risk assessments and sanction selection.

On sanction, the court situates Norton between Norris and Scacchetti, imposing a two-year suspension with one year stayed and robust conditions aimed at public protection and recovery. The dissent amplifies a competing perspective: where child sexual exploitation material is involved, indefinite suspension has been the norm, and should be here. That divide signals that future outcomes may turn on the presence or absence of convictions, the volume and nature of the material, and the strength of the evidentiary record establishing knowing possession or use.

The broader lesson for practitioners is threefold: rigorously comply with OLAP and court orders; be fully transparent with treatment professionals; and recognize that completion of criminal diversion programs, while important, is not a proxy for a demonstrated, reliable capacity to return to competent and ethical practice. Norton thus refines the contours of discipline in substance-use and sensitive-content cases while reinforcing public protection as the lodestar of sanction design.