Ohio Supreme Court Clarifies: A Pending Adoption Petition Does Not Divest Juvenile Courts of Their Continuing Jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.353 and 2151.417

Introduction

In State ex rel. T.B. v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-4484, the Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously denied writs of prohibition and mandamus sought by proposed adoptive parents who attempted to halt a juvenile court’s consideration of a biological mother’s visitation motion while an adoption petition was pending in the probate court. The case sits at the intersection of two Ohio trial court divisions: juvenile courts exercising continuing jurisdiction in abuse/neglect/dependency matters and probate courts exercising exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions.

The relators—T.B. and A.B., the proposed adoptive parents and co-legal custodians of minor child Z.B.—argued that the probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction over adoption matters divested the juvenile court of authority to hear the biological mother’s (K.T.’s) motion for visitation. They sought to prohibit the juvenile magistrate from proceeding and to compel the juvenile judge to vacate an order that had lifted a stay and reinstated the visitation motion. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the juvenile court’s continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.353 and 2151.417 persists notwithstanding the filing of an adoption petition, unless and until displaced by a final decree of adoption or a competing probate order such as a preadoption placement order that creates a direct conflict.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that:

A juvenile court’s continuing jurisdiction to review and adjust dispositional orders under R.C. 2151.353 and 2151.417—including addressing visitation—remains intact despite the pendency of a related adoption petition in probate court.
State ex rel. Davis v. Kennedy, 2023-Ohio-1593, is distinguishable because, there, the probate court had already issued a preadoption placement order; here, no such order existed, and the proposed adoptive parents were already legal custodians under a juvenile court order, triggering the exception in R.C. 5103.16(E).
In re Adoption of Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319 (1991), is inapposite because there was no juvenile-court order imposing postadoption visitation conditions; juvenile courts’ continuing jurisdiction ends upon a final adoption decree, R.C. 2151.353(F)(1).
Because relators did not show that the juvenile magistrate’s future consideration of the visitation motion was unauthorized by law, nor that the juvenile judge had a clear legal duty to vacate the order lifting the stay and reinstating the motion, the prerequisites for prohibition and mandamus were not met. The writs were denied.
Separately, the Court granted respondents’ motion to file evidence under seal, citing statutory privacy protections for adoption and juvenile records and the impracticality of effective redaction (Sup.R. 45(E), R.C. 3107.17(B), and Sup.R. 44).

Factual and Procedural Background

Z.B., born in 2016, was adjudicated abused, neglected, and dependent following positive toxicology findings at birth. The juvenile court made Z.B. a ward and entered dispositional orders culminating in legal custody to a maternal relative and later co-legal custody to the relators (the proposed adoptive parents). In 2019, the relators filed an adoption petition in probate court. While that petition was pending, the biological mother K.T. moved in juvenile court for visitation. The juvenile magistrate ordered and then expanded supervised visitation in 2022–2023.

In 2023, a probate magistrate recommended denying the adoption, but on appeal, the Tenth District reversed and remanded for consideration of all R.C. 3107.161(B) best-interest factors. The juvenile court stayed its proceedings pending the probate remand but later lifted the stay on March 3, 2025, reinstated K.T.’s visitation motion, and set it before a magistrate. The relators then sought extraordinary relief in the Supreme Court to stop the juvenile proceedings and unwind the March 3 order.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

State ex rel. Davis v. Kennedy, 2023-Ohio-1593:
Davis granted a writ of prohibition to stop a juvenile court from issuing temporary parenting-time orders after a probate court had already entered a preadoption placement order awarding the proposed adoptive parents “care, custody, and control.” The key to Davis is the existence of a probate preadoption placement order under R.C. 5103.16(D), which required a best-interest determination and created an immediate risk of conflicting orders. In T.B., by contrast, no such probate placement order existed because the proposed adoptive parents were already legal custodians under a juvenile court order—placing the case within the statutory exception in R.C. 5103.16(E). The absence of a preadoption placement avoided the conflict that controlled Davis.
In re Adoption of Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319 (1991):
Ridenour held that a juvenile court cannot impose postadoption visitation conditions (there, grandparent visitation “to be maintained subsequent to such adoption”) because doing so infringes on the probate court’s exclusive adoption jurisdiction and discretion. In T.B., the juvenile court had not attempted to encumber any future adoption with postadoption visitation; it was only considering a preadoption visitation motion. Additionally, R.C. 2151.353(F)(1) independently terminates juvenile continuing jurisdiction upon a final adoption decree, ensuring no postadoption overreach.
State ex rel. Allen Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v. Mercer Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., 2016-Ohio-7382:
Recognizes that probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction over preadoption placement under R.C. 5103.16(D) and that such jurisdiction, once exercised, supersedes juvenile courts’ continuing jurisdiction when there is a conflict. T.B. harmonizes with Allen County by emphasizing that supersession hinges on actual exercise of probate placement authority; a mere adoption filing is insufficient.
Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 2019-Ohio-2845:
Cited for the principle that a court with general subject-matter jurisdiction may still patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over a particular case only if a statute explicitly removes it. T.B. applies that principle to reject a categorical divestiture theory based solely on the filing of an adoption petition.
Visitation-in-Dependency Cases: In re C.J., 2011-Ohio-3366 (4th Dist.); In re C.H., 2011-Ohio-1386 (10th Dist.); In re J.S., 2012-Ohio-4461 (11th Dist.); In re S.S., 2022-Ohio-520 (8th Dist.):
These appellate decisions recognize that, although R.C. Chapter 2151 contains no express visitation-motion provision post-loss of legal custody, juvenile courts may address visitation within their continuing jurisdiction to review and modify dispositional orders under R.C. 2151.353 and 2151.417, guided by the child’s best interests and any residual parental rights.
State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 2024-Ohio-135:
Reiterates that visitation and custody are distinct legal concepts. T.B. uses this distinction to reject the “ward of another court” argument under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), because the juvenile court was not determining custody, only considering visitation within its continuing jurisdiction.
Standards for Extraordinary Writs:
The Court applied settled standards for prohibition and mandamus (e.g., State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner) and the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden (State ex rel. Kilby; Cross v. Ledford). Relators failed to demonstrate that the magistrate’s prospective exercise of judicial power was unauthorized or that the judge had a clear legal duty to vacate the order.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

Identify the juvenile court’s continuing jurisdiction and its scope. Juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in abuse/neglect/dependency matters (R.C. 2151.23(A)(1)) and retain continuing jurisdiction over children subject to dispositional orders under R.C. 2151.353 until age 18 or issuance of a final adoption decree (R.C. 2151.353(F)(1)). R.C. 2151.417(A) authorizes continuing review of placements and orders the court deems necessary in the child’s best interests. Multiple appellate decisions confirm that visitation can be handled within this continuing jurisdiction.
Determine whether any statute or exercised probate authority explicitly divests that jurisdiction. Probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings (In re Adoption of Pushcar) and preadoption placement orders (R.C. 5103.16(D)). When a probate court has issued a preadoption placement order, that exercise of jurisdiction can supersede the juvenile court’s continuing jurisdiction if a conflict would arise (Allen County; Davis). But here, the proposed adoptive parents were already legal custodians under a juvenile court order. By statute, preadoption placement provisions “do not apply” to an adoption by a legal custodian (R.C. 5103.16(E)(1)-(2)). Consequently, the probate court had not entered any preadoption placement order, and no explicit statutory removal or exercised conflicting probate authority existed to strip the juvenile court of power to hear a visitation motion.
Reject arguments premised on speculative or inapposite conflicts. The Court emphasized that any conflict between juvenile-court visitation orders and probate-court adoption proceedings was “merely speculative at this juncture.” Davis was distinguishable because no preadoption placement order existed; Ridenour was distinguishable because there was no attempt to bind postadoption visitation, and, in any event, juvenile jurisdiction ceases upon a final decree (R.C. 2151.353(F)(1)). The “ward of another court” limitation in R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) did not apply because the juvenile court was operating under its continuing jurisdiction, and the pending motion addressed visitation, not custody (Jones v. Paschke).

Impact and Future Implications

This decision clarifies and cabins the effect of an adoption filing on ongoing juvenile proceedings:

No automatic stay or divestiture. Filing an adoption petition in probate court does not, by itself, divest juvenile courts of their continuing jurisdiction to manage dispositional aspects—such as visitation—of abuse/neglect/dependency cases.
Davis is limited to actual conflicts caused by probate placement orders. Parties invoking Davis must show that the probate court has exercised its preadoption placement authority under R.C. 5103.16(D), creating a concrete conflict; the mere pendency of an adoption is insufficient.
Visitation remains a live issue in juvenile court until a final decree of adoption. Biological parents’ residual rights, including potential visitation, may be addressed in juvenile court subject to best-interest analysis unless and until a final adoption decree is entered.
Strategic considerations for practitioners.
- Proposed adoptive parents cannot use an adoption filing as a tactical device to freeze juvenile proceedings; they must either obtain a probate preadoption placement order (where available) or proceed toward a final decree.
- Biological parents seeking contact can continue to litigate visitation in juvenile court notwithstanding a pending adoption, absent an entered probate placement order or final decree.
- Courts should remain vigilant to avoid inconsistent orders; if the probate court later exercises placement authority or grants a final decree, juvenile continuing jurisdiction yields as mandated by statute.
Confidentiality reaffirmed. The sealing portion underscores the strict privacy regime surrounding juvenile and adoption records and signals the Court’s willingness to seal filings when redaction would be impractical or would undermine minors’ privacy interests.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Continuing jurisdiction (R.C. 2151.353 and 2151.417): After a juvenile court enters a dispositional order for an abused/neglected/dependent child, it retains authority to revisit and adjust that order (including visitation and placement reviews) until the child turns 18 or a final adoption decree is entered.
Exclusive adoption jurisdiction (probate court): Probate courts have exclusive power over adoption proceedings and, when they issue preadoption placement orders under R.C. 5103.16(D), their determinations can supersede juvenile courts’ continuing jurisdiction where a conflict would arise.
Preadoption placement and the legal-custodian exception: R.C. 5103.16(D) governs placements for adoption. But under R.C. 5103.16(E), these placement procedures do not apply when the proposed adoptive parent is already the child’s legal custodian by court order. In such cases, there is typically no probate preadoption placement order to conflict with juvenile proceedings.
Visitation vs. custody: Custody concerns who has legal authority over the child’s care; visitation concerns the schedule and terms of contact. They are distinct. The juvenile court’s consideration of visitation does not amount to a custody determination.
Extraordinary writs (prohibition and mandamus): Prohibition prevents a court from exercising unauthorized judicial power; mandamus compels a public official to perform a clear legal duty. Both demand clear and convincing proof. If the challenged action is not clearly unauthorized or there is no clear legal duty to act, the writs fail.
Sealing juvenile/adoption records: Ohio law presumes public access to court records but recognizes strong privacy protections for juvenile and adoption matters (Sup.R. 44–45; R.C. 3107.17). The Court may seal filings when privacy interests outweigh access and redaction is impractical.

Key Statutory Anchors

R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) and (A)(2): Juvenile court original jurisdiction in abuse/neglect/dependency; custody determinations “not a ward of another court.”
R.C. 2151.353(A)(3), (F)(1): Dispositional orders (including legal custody) and continuing jurisdiction until age 18 or final adoption decree.
R.C. 2151.417(A): Ongoing authority to review placements and require actions in the child’s best interests.
R.C. 5103.16(D), (E): Probate preadoption placement and the legal-custodian exception.
R.C. 3107.161(B): Best-interest factors in contested adoption proceedings.
R.C. 3107.17(B); Sup.R. 44–45: Confidentiality of adoption and juvenile records; standards for restricting public access.

Conclusion

State ex rel. T.B. v. Brown establishes a clear and practical rule: the mere filing of an adoption petition does not extinguish a juvenile court’s continuing jurisdiction to manage dispositional issues—like visitation—under R.C. 2151.353 and 2151.417. Only concrete, conflicting exercises of probate authority (such as a preadoption placement order under R.C. 5103.16(D)) or the entry of a final adoption decree terminates or supersedes that jurisdiction.

By distinguishing Davis and Ridenour, the Court preserves a functional allocation of authority between juvenile and probate courts and prevents adoption filings from becoming a tactical lever to halt necessary, best-interest-driven juvenile proceedings. The decision also reinforces the demanding standards for extraordinary writs and reaffirms robust confidentiality protections in child-related litigation.

Practitioners should calibrate their strategies accordingly: absent a probate preadoption placement order or a final decree, juvenile courts remain empowered to adjudicate visitation and related matters in the child’s best interests while adoption proceedings run their course in probate court.