Ohio Supreme Court Clarifies Limits of Prohibition: No Writ Against Prosecutors; Alleged Fraud in Trial-Level Filings Must Be Addressed by Appeal, Not Extraordinary Relief

Introduction

In State ex rel. Watkins v. McNamara, 2025-Ohio-979 (Ohio Mar. 25, 2025), the Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously affirmed the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ sua sponte dismissal of a pro se petition for a writ of prohibition brought by inmate Charles L. Watkins. The petition sought to prohibit a common pleas judge and an assistant prosecuting attorney from allegedly presenting or relying on “fraudulent” documents in connection with Watkins’s decades-old criminal case and to obtain relief from an order denying his motion for a “final, appealable order.”

The case presents two recurring issues in Ohio extraordinary-writ practice: (1) whether prohibition can lie against a prosecutor (it cannot), and (2) whether allegations of fraud or procedural irregularity in a trial court’s handling of a motion convert an exercise of jurisdiction into a jurisdictional defect cognizable in prohibition (they do not, especially where appeal is available). The Court also denied a motion for judicial notice that attempted to inject disputed factual assertions into the appellate record.

Parties:

Appellant/Relator: Charles L. Watkins (pro se inmate at North Central Correctional Complex)
Appellees/Respondents: Judge Joseph V. McNamara (Lucas County Court of Common Pleas) and Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Lauren Carpenter

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a per curiam opinion joined by all seven justices, held:

A writ of prohibition cannot be issued against an assistant prosecuting attorney because she does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power.
The common pleas judge had subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on Watkins’s motion for a final, appealable order in his felony case; any alleged reliance on inaccurate or fraudulent documents, or case-management choices (such as denying a motion before the reply deadline), at most constitute errors in the exercise of jurisdiction, remediable by appeal, not prohibition.
Watkins had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by appealing the denial of his motion; this adequacy forecloses the extraordinary remedy of prohibition.
The motion for judicial notice was denied, because the facts sought to be noticed (that a filing was fraudulent, altered, and knowingly false) were disputed and outside the record, and therefore not proper subjects of judicial notice on direct appeal under Evid.R. 201.

Result: The Court affirmed the Sixth District’s dismissal of the prohibition petition and denied the motion for judicial notice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

State ex rel. Gray v. Leis, 62 Ohio St.2d 102 (1980): This foundational precedent establishes that prohibition lies to restrain the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power. Prosecutors do not exercise such power. The Court relied on Gray to summarily reject the prohibition claim against Assistant Prosecutor Carpenter. This reinforces a categorical rule: prosecutors are not proper respondents in prohibition.
State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 2022-Ohio-2427: The Court quoted and applied the three-part test for prohibition: (1) respondents are about to exercise or have exercised judicial power; (2) the exercise is unauthorized by law; and (3) denial of the writ would result in injury for which no adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. The Court also reiterated the exception that the third element need not be shown if there is a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction. Here, because the common pleas court had jurisdiction and appeal was available, prohibition was unavailable.
State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 2019-Ohio-1329: Cited to clarify that a writ of prohibition may issue when a court of general jurisdiction acts beyond its authority because a specific statute has patently and unambiguously divested it of jurisdiction. Watkins pointed to no such divesting statute; thus, Novak did not help him.
R.C. 2931.03; State ex rel. Thompson v. Gonzalez, 2024-Ohio-897: R.C. 2931.03 confers original jurisdiction over felonies on courts of common pleas. Thompson reiterates that principle. Watkins’s case, a transferred felony prosecution, remained within the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas’ subject-matter jurisdiction, which comfortably encompassed the authority to rule on his motion for a final, appealable order.
R.C. 2901.12(K): This change-of-venue provision confirms the permissibility of transfer to any court with jurisdiction over the subject matter under specified conditions. It undercuts any implication that venue or transfer stripped the Lucas County court of jurisdiction.
Morgan v. Eads, 2004-Ohio-6110: Emphasizes the “bedrock principle” that appellate review is confined to the record below. This framed the Court’s refusal to take judicial notice of disputed facts about the supposed “fraudulent” document that were outside the record.
State ex rel. Arnold v. Gallagher, 2018-Ohio-2628; Evid.R. 201(B): Limits judicial notice to facts “not subject to reasonable dispute.” The Court found Watkins’s assertions (fraud, alteration, knowledge of wrongdoing) to be contestable and thus not judicially noticeable.
State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex, 2020-Ohio-411; State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 2006-Ohio-6573; State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, 2023-Ohio-3832: These cases collectively authorize sua sponte dismissal of an extraordinary-writ petition that is frivolous or obviously meritless and supply the standard of review for such dismissals. Applying these, the Court affirmed the Sixth District’s sua sponte dismissal without notice.
Schlegel v. Sweeney, 2022-Ohio-3841: Cited for the proposition that an appeal is an adequate remedy to challenge the denial of a motion for a final, appealable order. This directly addressed Watkins’s effort to recast his challenge to the trial court’s ruling and supporting materials as a prohibition claim.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning moves in three coordinated steps.

Judicial notice denied on a direct appeal. The Court first addressed Watkins’s motion for judicial notice. Because this matter reached the Supreme Court as a direct appeal from the Sixth District’s dismissal, the record is fixed. Under Morgan v. Eads, the Court cannot augment the record with new factual assertions. And under Evid.R. 201(B), only indisputable facts may be judicially noticed. Claims that an exhibit is “fraudulent,” “altered,” or knowingly false are quintessentially disputed. The Court therefore denied the motion.
No prohibition against a prosecutor. Prohibition is designed to restrain the unlawful exercise of judicial (or quasi-judicial) power. Prosecutors are advocates, not adjudicators. Gray v. Leis makes this a nonstarter. Even if Watkins styled Carpenter as a “co-conspirator,” the dispositive point is that she does not wield judicial power. The prohibition claim against her was properly dismissed.
Trial judge had jurisdiction; appeal is the adequate remedy. The Court next rejected the prohibition claim against Judge McNamara. As a common pleas judge in a felony case properly before him (even after venue transfer), Judge McNamara had subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on Watkins’s motion for a final, appealable order. R.C. 2931.03 and Thompson v. Gonzalez control that question. Watkins argued that the judge exceeded his authority by “conspiring” to use fraudulent material and by denying his motion before the reply deadline. But those contentions, even if taken as true for purposes of the dismissal standard, describe alleged errors in the exercise of jurisdiction—not a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction.

The distinction is critical: prohibition does not correct errors within jurisdiction; it prevents acts taken without jurisdiction. Jones v. Paschke. Because the common pleas court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion, the only remaining question for prohibition is whether Watkins lacked an adequate remedy at law. He did not. An ordinary appeal from the denial of his motion was available, Schlegel v. Sweeney, and that appeal could have presented his claims about the trial court’s reliance on allegedly improper evidence or about the timing of the ruling. The existence of that appellate remedy defeats the extraordinary writ.

Note: The slip opinion contains a minor textual lapse referring to “the requested writ of mandamus” when restating the prohibition standard. Context and citations make clear the Court meant “prohibition.” Slip opinions are subject to correction, and the Court’s notice invites reports of such typographical errors.

Impact and Practical Implications

This decision does not announce a new doctrine so much as it cements and clarifies several recurring points in Ohio extraordinary-writ practice.

Reaffirmed boundaries of prohibition. Litigants cannot repackage alleged litigation misconduct (e.g., use of an inaccurate or disputed exhibit) or case-management choices (e.g., denying a motion before a reply is filed) into jurisdictional challenges. Absent a statute that clearly divests jurisdiction, trial-level errors are for appeal.
Prosecutors are not proper prohibition targets. The Court’s reliance on Gray v. Leis underscores a bright-line rule. Future petitions naming prosecutors in prohibition actions will be short-lived.
Appeal is the path for “final, appealable order” disputes. The Court confirms that disagreements about whether the trial court correctly resolved a motion to issue a final, appealable order must be pursued by appeal. This is particularly salient in older criminal cases in which defendants seek to clarify or correct judgment entries: the remedy remains in the ordinary appellate process.
Judicial notice is not a backdoor to expand the record. On direct appeal, parties cannot use judicial notice to inject contested factual narratives—such as allegations of fraud—into the record. The Court’s application of Evid.R. 201(B) will discourage attempts to litigate factual disputes via “judicial notice” motions at the appellate level.
Efficient disposal of meritless writ petitions. By endorsing sua sponte dismissal standards, the opinion reinforces appellate courts’ ability to promptly dismiss obviously meritless writ cases without formal briefing or oral argument, preserving judicial resources.

For practitioners, the message is clear: when the complaint is about what the trial court did with jurisdiction, appellate review is the remedy. Reserve prohibition for truly jurisdictional overreach—especially where a statute patently and unambiguously strips jurisdiction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of Prohibition: An extraordinary court order used to stop a lower court or judicial officer from acting outside their jurisdiction. It is not a substitute for appeal and generally does not correct errors made within jurisdiction.
Judicial vs. Quasi-Judicial Power: Judicial power is exercised by judges when they decide cases; quasi-judicial power involves agencies or bodies acting in an adjudicatory capacity. Prosecutors advocate; they do not adjudicate.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: The court’s legal authority to hear a type of case. For felonies, Ohio courts of common pleas have subject-matter jurisdiction statewide (R.C. 2931.03), and venue changes do not negate that jurisdiction.
Adequate Remedy at Law: If an ordinary legal avenue (like an appeal) can address the claimed harm, extraordinary writs such as prohibition are unavailable.
Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction: A clear, unmistakable absence of authority—often because a statute explicitly withdraws jurisdiction. Only then may prohibition issue without analyzing whether appeal is adequate.
Final, Appealable Order: An order that conclusively resolves a claim or case (or falls within specific categories defined by statute and rule) and can be appealed. Disputes over whether an order is final are resolved in the appellate process.
Judicial Notice (Evid.R. 201): A court’s acceptance of a fact as true without formal proof, limited to facts not subject to reasonable dispute (e.g., calendar dates, matters of common knowledge). Disputed assertions like “this document is fraudulent” are not proper subjects.
Sua Sponte Dismissal: A court’s dismissal of a case on its own initiative. In extraordinary-writ cases, courts may dismiss petitions that are frivolous or where the claimant obviously cannot prevail, even without prior notice.
Per Curiam: An opinion issued by the court as an institution rather than authored by a particular justice, often signaling a straightforward application of settled law. This opinion was unanimous.

Conclusion

State ex rel. Watkins v. McNamara is a clear reaffirmation of the narrow function of prohibition in Ohio. The Supreme Court held that:

Prohibition does not run against a prosecutor, who exercises no judicial or quasi-judicial power.
Common pleas courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony matters and the associated motion practice, including motions seeking a final, appealable order.
Allegations that a judge relied on a flawed or fraudulent exhibit, or ruled before a reply deadline, describe potential errors within jurisdiction; the remedy is appeal, not prohibition.
Efforts to expand the appellate record via judicial notice with disputed facts will be rejected.

The opinion’s import is practical and immediate: it channels disputes about trial-level evidentiary and procedural issues into the ordinary appellate pipeline; it forecloses prohibition claims against prosecutors; and it empowers appellate courts to dispose of meritless writ petitions efficiently. For litigants and counsel, the central takeaway is doctrinal discipline: reserve prohibition for true jurisdictional usurpations, and pursue alleged trial errors—including those involving disputed documents—through appeal.