Ohio Supreme Court Caps Clerk Technology Fee at $1 Total Per Service for “Complete Record” Charges, Not Per Page

Case: State ex rel. Gault v. Medina County Court of Common Pleas Clerk, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-4699 (Supreme Court of Ohio, Oct. 15, 2025)

Author: Justice Fischer (joined by Chief Justice Kennedy and Justices DeWine, Brunner, Deters, Hawkins, and Shanahan)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. Gault v. Medina County Court of Common Pleas Clerk, which resolves a recurring question about clerk-of-courts fee authority under Ohio’s fee schedule. At issue was whether a clerk may impose an additional “computerization/technology” fee of one dollar per page when “making complete record” under R.C. 2303.20(H), or only a single one-dollar charge for that service in total under former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1).

The parties were appellee Nathan Gault, who was assessed a $2-per-page charge to prepare the complete record after his divorce case concluded, and appellants, including the Medina County Clerk of Courts, the Medina County Treasurer, and Medina County (through its Board of Commissioners). Gault filed a class action alleging overcharges of the clerk’s computerization fee. After a split between districts—most notably the Ninth District (Medina) and the Fifth District (in State v. Hare)—the Supreme Court accepted the case on both discretionary review and certified conflict to unify the law.

The Court held that the plain text of former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) authorizes the clerk to collect only one additional dollar in total for the “service” of making a complete record under R.C. 2303.20(H), not an additional dollar per page. This ruling affirms the Ninth District’s judgment and disapproves the Fifth District’s contrary approach.

Summary of the Opinion

R.C. 2303.20(H) mandates a $1-per-page fee for “making complete record, including indexing.” Gault did not challenge this baseline per-page fee.
Former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) permits an “additional fee” for certain enumerated services—including subsection (H)—“not to exceed one dollar each.”
The Court interpreted “each” to mean each service, not each page. Making a complete record is one “service,” regardless of length; therefore, the clerk may impose only one additional $1 total under former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) for that service.
By using different words in the two provisions (“for each page” in R.C. 2303.20(H) versus “one dollar each for the services” in R.C. 2303.201(B)(1)), the General Assembly expressed different fee structures. If a per-page technology surcharge had been intended in R.C. 2303.201(B)(1), the legislature knew how to say so and did not.
The Ninth District’s interpretation was affirmed; the Fifth District’s contrary view in State v. Hare was rejected. Appellants’ two propositions of law were denied.

Analysis

Statutory Framework

Two provisions govern the dispute:

R.C. 2303.20(H): “the clerk shall charge … [o]ne dollar for each page, for making complete record, including indexing.” This is the baseline per-page fee for creating the complete, indexed record of a case.
Former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) (2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166 version): Upon a determination that additional funds are needed to make technological advances or computerize the clerk’s office, the court (now, as of 2024 amendments, the clerk) may authorize an “additional fee … not to exceed one dollar each for the services described in divisions (B), (C), (D), (F), (H), and (L) of section 2303.20.”

The Medina County Clerk imposed $2 per page: $1 per page under R.C. 2303.20(H) and an additional $1 per page under former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1). The Supreme Court held that the latter is capped at $1 total for the service of “making complete record,” not $1 per page.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Wayt v. DHSC, L.L.C., 2018-Ohio-4822 and Ceccarelli v. Levin, 2010-Ohio-5681: Establish the de novo standard for reviewing pure questions of statutory interpretation. The Court applied de novo review here.
Obetz v. McClain, 2021-Ohio-1706: Confirms the textual canon that the General Assembly’s use of different words signals different meanings. This canon proved pivotal: “for each page” (2303.20(H)) versus “one dollar each for the services” (former 2303.201(B)(1)).
Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) and Kiefer v. State, 106 Ohio St. 285 (1922): Support the same canon and the general proposition that courts respect textual differences chosen by the legislature.
State v. Noling, 2018-Ohio-795 and Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007): Recognize that while textual canons “readily yield” to context, context here did not undermine the ordinary meaning; it reinforced it.
State v. Hare, 2019-Ohio-3047 (5th Dist.): The Fifth District’s opinion endorsed a per-page application of the additional technology fee. The Supreme Court’s decision creates statewide uniformity by expressly rejecting Hare’s approach.

By leaning on well-established textual canons and a straightforward de novo review, the Court anchored its analysis in the statutory text itself, limiting recourse to extratextual aids. The legislative chronology mattered only to confirm that the General Assembly knew how to impose per-page charges when it wanted to.

Legal Reasoning

Plain Meaning Controls: The Court viewed the interpretive question as a pure matter of statutory construction. Where the legislature’s words are unambiguous, “we apply the statute as written.” The phrase “one dollar each for the services” was deemed clear: “each” modifies “services,” and “service” refers to the entire act described by the cross-referenced subsection, not each component part of that act.
Different Words, Different Meanings: R.C. 2303.20(H) expressly says “one dollar for each page,” revealing the General Assembly’s ability to impose per-page pricing when desired. Former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) uses distinct words—“one dollar each for the services”—and therefore carries a distinct scheme: an additional fee per service, not per page.
Structural Reading of “Service”: The enumerated services in R.C. 2303.20 (including subsections (B), (C), (D), (F), (H), and (L)) are units of clerk work (e.g., issuing writs, docketing, making complete record). The Court concluded that “making complete record” is a singular “service” event per case, regardless of how many pages result.
Legislative Chronology as Contextual Confirmation: The “complete record” per-page fee has been in place since 1992, and the cross-reference to subsection (H) was added to former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) in 2012. If the General Assembly intended a second per-page surcharge for technology under (B)(1), it would have said so, particularly when simultaneously cross-referencing a subsection that already uses per-page language.
Certified Conflict Resolved: Answering the Ninth District’s certified question, the Court held the additional technology fee is $1 total per service (for making a complete record), not $1 per page, thereby rejecting the Fifth District’s contrary reading in Hare and establishing uniform statewide practice.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

1) Immediate Operational Consequences for Clerks and Counties

Fee schedules must be updated to reflect that while R.C. 2303.20(H) still authorizes $1 per page for making the complete record, any technology/computerization surcharge under former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) is capped at $1 total per service (i.e., per record), not per page.
Potential refund exposure for jurisdictions that previously collected per-page technology fees for “complete record” services. The Gault case is a class action, and similar suits may emerge statewide in light of the Court’s definitive interpretation.
Budgeting and revenue planning may require recalibration. The technology fund (authorized by R.C. 2303.201) could see reduced inflows where past practice included per-page surcharges. Counties may need to explore alternative funding for clerk technology initiatives.

2) Broader Doctrinal Guidance for Other R.C. 2303.20 Services

The reasoning is not confined to subsection (H). For all enumerated services listed in former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1), the additional technology fee is assessed per service event, not per unit of output (e.g., not per page or per copy unless the statute explicitly says so).
Where an underlying service fee in R.C. 2303.20 is itself measured “per page” or “per document,” the technology surcharge remains capped at one dollar per service event, unless the legislature expressly provides a different metric.

3) Access-to-Justice and User-Cost Effects

By eliminating unapproved per-page technology surcharges, filing and post-judgment costs for litigants may fall, particularly in large-record cases. This aligns with fairness and transparency in court costs and may reduce barriers to accessing the judicial system.

4) Legislative Response and the 2024 Amendments

The Court notes that former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) was renumbered to R.C. 2303.201(B)(1)(a) effective Oct. 24, 2024 (Sub. S.B. 94), and the decision-maker for the “additional funds needed” determination has shifted to the clerk. The opinion’s core interpretive holding is unaffected: the “one dollar each for the services” language remains the controlling limit unless the General Assembly amends it.
If the legislature wishes to authorize per-page technology fees for particular services, it can do so expressly—as it did in R.C. 2303.20(H) for the baseline fee structure.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Making complete record” (R.C. 2303.20(H)): The clerk compiles and indexes the final record of a case. Ohio law sets a $1-per-page fee for this work.
“Service” in former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1): Refers to the whole task described in the cross-referenced subsection (e.g., making the complete record), not the individual steps or pages involved in performing that task.
Technology/computerization fee: An extra clerk’s fee deposited into a fund to support modernizing the clerk’s office. The statute caps this at $1 per service for certain services unless otherwise stated.
De novo review: The appellate court independently interprets the statute without deferring to the trial court’s conclusions.
Certified conflict: When appellate districts reach conflicting interpretations of law, a court of appeals can certify the conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio for resolution, producing a uniform statewide rule.
Textual canon (“different words, different meanings”): Courts presume distinct statutory terms carry distinct meanings. Here, “for each page” and “one dollar each for the services” are not interchangeable.

Practical Guidance for Compliance

Audit clerk fee schedules and automated billing systems to ensure that:
- R.C. 2303.20(H) fees remain $1 per page for making complete record;
- Any additional technology fee under R.C. 2303.201(B)(1)(a) is limited to $1 total per complete-record service, not per page.
Review historical assessments for potential overcharges; consult counsel regarding refund obligations, class-action exposure, and claim-processing procedures.
Train staff and update public-facing fee schedules and forms to reflect the ruling.
Consider alternative funding plans for clerk technology needs if prior budgets assumed per-page technology surcharges.

Case Timeline (Abbreviated)

Trial court: Initially dismissed on res judicata; Ninth District reversed (2022-Ohio-3955).
On remand: Trial court upheld $2-per-page practice; Ninth District reversed (2024-Ohio-1530), holding the tech fee is $1 total per service, not per page.
Supreme Court: Accepted discretionary appeal and certified conflict; affirmed the Ninth District, disapproved Hare, and held the additional fee is $1 total for the “making complete record” service.

Note: The slip opinion appears to contain a minor date inconsistency in the procedural history regarding the filing date of the complaint and the trial court’s initial decision. The discrepancy does not affect the legal analysis or holding.

Conclusion

Gault establishes a clear statewide rule: for the “making complete record” service under R.C. 2303.20(H), the clerk may charge the statutorily mandated $1-per-page fee, but may add at most one additional dollar in total under former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) (now R.C. 2303.201(B)(1)(a)) for technology/computerization—not one dollar per page. The Court’s textual analysis reinforces predictable, uniform application of clerk fees and reduces the risk of runaway surcharges untethered to statutory language.

Key takeaways:

“Service” means the full task described by the cross-referenced subsection; it is not subdivided into pages or steps for purposes of the technology surcharge.
Different statutory phrasing reflects deliberate differences in fee metrics. Courts may not import per-page language into provisions that lack it.
The decision resolves a district split and is likely to prompt fee-schedule revisions, potential refunds, and renewed legislative attention to clerk-office funding mechanisms.

In the broader legal context, the opinion underscores the primacy of text and structure in statutory interpretation and offers a replicable framework for reading fee statutes that cross-reference enumerated “services.”

Notes

In 2024, Sub. S.B. 94 renumbered former R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) to R.C. 2303.201(B)(1)(a) and shifted the “additional funds needed” determination from the court to the clerk. The Gault Court’s interpretation of the “one dollar each for the services” cap remains directly informative unless and until the General Assembly amends the fee limit language.