Introduction

In this appeal from the Western District of Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit affirms the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a residential search warrant. The core controversy is whether a warrant affidavit reciting a trained officer’s detection of the odor of marijuana emanating from inside a residence is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the United States v. Leon good‑faith exception should not apply. The panel (Judges Gilman, Davis, and Mathis; opinion by Judge Mathis) concludes that it is not: the smell of marijuana, coupled with the officer’s stated experience identifying that odor, provides at least a “modicum of evidence” creating a minimally sufficient nexus to the residence. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that probable cause was debatable, suppression is unwarranted under Leon.

The case arises out of a non-drug investigation: officers visited Adam Noble’s home to follow up on a tip that a missing child was present. During a conversation at the residence, an officer reported smelling marijuana coming from inside. A detective later applied for a warrant, relying on the odor and the officer’s training and experience to identify marijuana. The ensuing search uncovered drugs, paraphernalia, cash, ammunition, and firearms; Noble, a felon, was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and moved to suppress, arguing the affidavit was “bare bones.” The district court denied suppression; Noble entered a conditional guilty plea preserving the suppression issue for appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirms.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standard of review: Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; factual findings for clear error; the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling (citing United States v. Simmons, 129 F.4th 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 2019)).
• Fourth Amendment framework: Warrant affidavits must show a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought (citing United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 2005)). Even if a warrant later proves unsupported by probable cause, the Leon good‑faith exception prevents exclusion unless the affidavit is “bare bones,” i.e., so lacking in indicia of probable cause that reliance on it is objectively unreasonable (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Laughton; United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2017)).
• Key holding: The affidavit here was not “bare bones.” The smell of marijuana coming from inside the home, combined with the officer’s attested familiarity with that odor through experience, constitutes more than a “modicum of evidence” linking the residence to contraband, thereby satisfying the “minimally sufficient nexus” needed to invoke the good‑faith exception (relying on United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 469 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc)).
• Hearsay from a fellow officer is permissible: A magistrate may rely on hearsay in an affidavit, and information from another officer is presumptively reliable (citing United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 819 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lapsins, 570 F.3d 758, 764 (6th Cir. 2009)).
• Probable cause and odor: The panel cites Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit authority recognizing that the detection of distinctive odors by a qualified officer can establish probable cause (Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948)), and that marijuana odor alone can establish probable cause in the vehicle context, and potentially in homes (United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Stevenson, 43 F.4th 641, 648 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638, 659 (6th Cir. 2002)). It further notes unpublished Sixth Circuit decisions finding odor alone sufficient for residential searches. The court ultimately resolves this case on good‑faith grounds without needing to declare a categorical rule on probable cause for homes.
• Rejection of defense arguments: The affidavit need not enumerate “multiple events” or additional corroboration if what it does contain suffices (United States v. Thomas, 605 F.3d 300, 309 (6th Cir. 2010)). The practice of securing odor-based warrants is not “deliberate, grossly negligent, and recurrent” misconduct in light of existing caselaw permitting reliance on marijuana odor.
• Disposition: Affirmed. Suppression denied under the Leon good‑faith exception.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011)
  These anchor the good‑faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Leon permits the use of evidence obtained via a warrant later deemed invalid if officers relied on it in objectively reasonable good faith. The panel invokes Leon to hold that even if probable cause were lacking, evidence need not be suppressed unless the affidavit falls into a recognized exception (here, the “bare bones” category).
• United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2017)
  These cases articulate Sixth Circuit standards distinguishing insufficient affidavits from “bare bones” affidavits. The latter are so devoid of factual support that no reasonable officer could rely on them. The court uses these as the measuring stick for whether the affidavit here was too deficient to permit good-faith reliance.
• United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc)
  Sanders refines the bare-bones inquiry, emphasizing that any “modicum of evidence” creating a minimally sufficient nexus between the place and the evidence triggers good faith. The Noble panel relies heavily on this en banc formulation to conclude that the odor-plus-experience facts surpass the threshold.
• Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)
  Johnson recognizes that distinctive odors detected by a qualified officer can establish probable cause for a warrant. The panel deploys Johnson to validate odor as a meaningful indicator of illegality when presented to a magistrate.
• United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Stevenson, 43 F.4th 641 (6th Cir. 2022)
  These hold that the smell of marijuana alone can supply probable cause to search a vehicle. While vehicle and home contexts differ (e.g., the automobile exception), the court uses these cases to reinforce odor’s probative value.
• United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2002)
  Elkins notes that the same may be true for homes. The Noble panel cites Elkins to bridge vehicle odor jurisprudence to the residential context, signaling that odor within a home can supply or contribute to probable cause.
• United States v. Brooks, 987 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2010)
  In 2021, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that its caselaw recognizes odor alone can create probable cause of illegal activity. In 2010, the court found probable cause based on odor plus additional corroboration (seeds, cash). The panel uses these to counter the defendant’s argument that odor must always be corroborated and to support the reasonableness of reliance here.
• Unpublished: United States v. Rounsaville (No. 19-5659, 6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2020), United States v. Porter, 774 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2019)
  Both recognize odor alone sufficing for residential probable cause. While nonprecedential, their existence supports the objective reasonableness of relying on an odor-based affidavit.
• United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
  Applies Leon where the affidavit linked marijuana plants near a property with the residence via a connecting road. The Noble panel cites Carpenter to reinforce that some factual link—however modest—between a residence and suspected contraband supports good faith.
• United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lapsins, 570 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2009)
  These establish that hearsay is permissible in warrant affidavits and that information relayed by other law enforcement officers carries inherent reliability for probable cause assessments. This undercuts the defense challenge to the affiant relying on another officer’s olfactory observations.
• United States v. Thomas, 605 F.3d 300 (6th Cir. 2010)
  Affidavits are judged on what they include, not on what critics believe is missing. This supports the panel’s refusal to fault the affidavit for lacking extra corroboration.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning is methodical and layered:

1. Framework: probable cause and the nexus requirement. A warrant affidavit must demonstrate a “fair probability” that the place to be searched will contain the things sought. This is implemented through a “nexus” showing between the residence and the suspected contraband. While the court does not squarely decide whether the affidavit establishes probable cause, it emphasizes that odor is a well-recognized factor capable of establishing or materially contributing to probable cause, especially when the affiant or the source officer is qualified to recognize the odor (Johnson; Elkins; Brooks).
2. Good‑faith exception and “bare bones” limit. The decisive step in the analysis is the good‑faith inquiry: Was the affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer would rely on it? Through Sanders, the Sixth Circuit has recently clarified that good faith applies when the affidavit offers even a “modicum of evidence” creating a minimally sufficient nexus between crime and place. The odor of marijuana from within the home, attested by an experienced officer, surpasses that minimal threshold.
3. Odor as nexus. The affidavit recited that Officer Parris “smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from inside” Noble’s residence and explained his training and experience in recognizing marijuana. That is the quintessential kind of “specific, articulable fact” that ties the suspected contraband to the location. Unlike generic hunches or boilerplate, odor localizes the suspected contraband: it specifically connects marijuana to the interior of the residence.
4. Hearsay sufficiency. The affidavit was based on Parris’s observation relayed to Whitaker. Under settled Sixth Circuit law, magistrates may rely on hearsay, and information from another officer is presumptively reliable. This defeats the argument that the affidavit was “unsubstantiated hearsay” and thus bare bones.
5. Rejection of “odor-plus” requirement. Noble argued odor alone cannot establish probable cause to search a home, citing cases where odor appeared alongside other corroborative facts. The panel acknowledges unpublished decisions endorsing odor alone and, crucially, uses those decisions and broader odor jurisprudence to show that reliance on odor alone is at least objectively reasonable. Thus, even if probable cause were arguable, good faith still applies.
6. Deterrence calculus. Noble’s claim that the officer’s practice is “deliberate, grossly negligent, and recurrent” fails because the practice comports with existing caselaw suggesting odor alone may be sufficient. Suppression would not appreciably deter misconduct where officers act within the boundaries of settled doctrine.

Impact and Significance

Although designated “Not Recommended for Publication,” the decision is instructive on two fronts:

• Practical rule for odor-based residential warrants: In the Sixth Circuit, a warrant affidavit that (1) reports the odor of marijuana emanating from inside a home and (2) establishes the observing officer’s qualification to recognize that odor, is not “bare bones.” That combination supplies the “minimally sufficient nexus” to invoke the Leon good‑faith exception. Consequently, suppression will be difficult to obtain where such facts are credibly presented, even if a court harbors doubts about probable cause in close cases.
• Guidance for law enforcement: Officers should ensure affidavits explicitly state the source and location of the odor (e.g., “from inside the residence”) and the officer’s training/experience. Affiants may rely on another officer’s observations, but should identify that officer and summarize their qualification to recognize marijuana odor.
• Defense strategy recalibration: To defeat good faith, defendants will need to show more than a lack of additional corroboration. They may focus on undermining the officer’s claimed ability to identify the odor, challenging whether the odor truly came from within the residence, or demonstrating misstatements or omissions (e.g., Franks-type issues, though not at issue here), or arguing other Leon exceptions (magistrate abandonment; facial deficiency).
• State-law context and evolving cannabis laws: This case arose in Tennessee, where marijuana possession remains illegal under state law. The panel does not address how state legalization in parts of the Sixth Circuit (e.g., Michigan and Ohio) might interact with odor-based probable cause in state prosecutions. But as to federal prosecutions and Tennessee-based warrants, odor remains a potent indicator of illegality. Noble underscores that, at minimum, odor supports good‑faith reliance.
• Doctrinal continuity post‑Sanders: Noble concretizes the en banc Sanders standard by operationalizing “modicum of evidence” in the odor context, lowering the ceiling for what counts as “bare bones.” The decision will likely be cited (even informally) to resist suppression where affidavits recite observable, experience‑based sensory facts tying suspected contraband to the home.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable cause vs. good‑faith exception: Probable cause asks whether, before the search, the affidavit showed a fair probability that evidence would be found at the place to be searched. The good‑faith exception asks a different question: even if probable cause was lacking, did officers reasonably rely on the warrant? Suppression is reserved for cases where reliance on the warrant was objectively unreasonable (e.g., a “bare bones” affidavit).
• Bare‑bones affidavit: An affidavit that “nakedly asserts” conclusions with no facts—e.g., “I believe drugs are inside” without any supporting observation. By contrast, specific sensory observations (like smelling marijuana from within the home) plus an explanation of the officer’s relevant experience are facts, not conclusions.
• Nexus requirement: There must be a link between the place and the evidence sought. Odor emanating from inside the home is a direct link to that particular location. Vague or non‑localized indications (e.g., “somewhere in the neighborhood”) do not create the nexus.
• Hearsay in affidavits: Magistrates may rely on hearsay; an affiant can present information learned from another officer. Information from fellow officers is deemed reliable for probable cause purposes absent reasons to doubt it.
• Standard of review: On appeal, courts defer to the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the lower court’s decision on suppression.

Key Takeaways

• The Sixth Circuit holds that an affidavit reciting marijuana odor from within a home, coupled with the officer’s experience in recognizing that odor, is not “bare bones.”
• Given Sanders’s “modicum of evidence” standard, such affidavits create a minimally sufficient nexus between the residence and contraband, triggering Leon good‑faith and defeating suppression.
• Affiants may rely on fellow officers’ sensory observations; no special reliability showing is required beyond identifying the source and the officer’s qualification.
• The court does not need to decide whether odor alone always equals probable cause for residential searches; it suffices that reliance on the warrant here was objectively reasonable.
• Practitioners should expect odor‑based residential warrants to withstand suppression challenges on good‑faith grounds absent stronger defects (e.g., false statements, magistrate abandonment, facial deficiency).

Conclusion

United States v. Noble reaffirms the enduring evidentiary significance of marijuana odor in Fourth Amendment analysis and, more importantly, demonstrates how the Sixth Circuit’s recent en banc articulation of the good‑faith standard in Sanders meaningfully lowers the threshold for overcoming suppression based on alleged affidavit deficiencies. By emphasizing that a trained officer’s detection of marijuana odor from within a residence supplies more than a “modicum of evidence” linking contraband to the location, the court places odor‑based residential warrants squarely within the protective ambit of Leon.

Although unpublished, the opinion offers clear guidance: when an affidavit ties a distinctive, contraband‑specific odor to a home and explains the officer’s ability to recognize that odor, it is not “bare bones,” and suppression is unwarranted. For law enforcement, this underscores the importance of detailing training and the precise source of the odor. For defense counsel, it signals that successful challenges must focus on undermining the factual foundation (e.g., disputing the odor’s presence, its source, or the officer’s qualifications) or invoking other Leon exceptions. In the broader landscape—especially amid evolving state marijuana laws—Noble illustrates that, at least in Tennessee and for federal prosecutions in the Sixth Circuit, odor remains powerful evidence and a firm foothold for good‑faith reliance.